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THE PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES. ORANGISM IN WORD AND IMAGE
1650-1675.
The sudden death of the Prince of Orange William II in 1650 was followed by twenty- 
two years of government without a stadholder in the majority of the Dutch provinces. 
The hopes of the Orangists centred on his posthumous son William III and the 
expectation that one day he would succeed to the offices of his forefathers.
To this end, the supporters of the House of Orange defined and defended the role 
of the stadholderate within the constitutional framew ork of the Dutch Republic. This 
thesis examines the nature of the stadholderate in Orangist polemic and imagery and the 
crucial role which the ‘single head' was alleged to play within the Union of Utrecht. 
Rebutting the writings of John de Witt and his supporters, the Orangists were to argue 
that without a stadholder and captain general the Dutch Republic was doomed to fall 
victim to internal discord or external aggression.
Orangist sentiment centred on the person of the young prince and the gratitude 
owed to his forefathers. Inherent in this thinking was the assumption that only William 
III could become stadholder in his turn. Essential to this strategy was the rebuttal of 
attacks on the persons and policies of the previous stadholders, particularly William I 
and Maurice. At critical times, the supporters of the Prince were able to exploit a strand 
of popular Orangism which came to fruition in the crisis year of 1672.
This thesis examines the various strands of the Orangist argument. The sources 
used include political pamphlets, particularly those listed in the Knuttel collection, 
poetry, drama and visual imagery including portraits, prints and medals. The aim of the 
thesis is to bring together sources from the various media to create a coherent picture of 
the Orangist case from 1650 to William Ill’s failure to become Duke of Gelderland in 
1675.Contents
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INTRODUCTION
The late Sir Denis Thatcher was an ideal political spouse. Bidden to attend numerous 
state and diplomatic junkets in the company of his wife, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, Sir Denis was a silent but supportive figure; always present, never there. Yet 
among those of the same political stamp, he could be a lively member of the company. 
At one such convivial gathering, over post prandial ‘bevies’, the assembled guests 
bemoaned the state of the nation and offered their personal nostrums. Sir Denis was in 
no doubt.
‘What this country needs', he opined, ‘is a return to basic Tory principles’.
He paused.
‘But don't ask me what the hell they are!1
The Tory party has existed in one form or another for over three hundred years 
and if longevity is a sign of success, then successful it surely is. Yet clearly some of 
those who devote their lives to its service find it difficult to articulate those principles 
for which it purports to stand. In the Netherlands, the House of Orange-Nassau similarly 
spans the centuries. From its present royal representatives, its political pedigree 
stretches back to the beginnings of the Dutch Revolt. Like the Tory Party, support may 
be tribal, as much emotional as cerebral; attachment to a particular family playing as 
important a role as any set of political principles.2
Political movements of long standing as these can be peculiarly elusive. A 
twentieth century European far left of centre movement could deploy such concepts as
1   I am indebted to David Willetts M.P tor this information
‘ See for example. Coos Huijsen. D e Oranjem ythe: een posim odem e fenom een (Zaltbommel: Europa 
Bibliotheek. 2001)the dialectic, the class struggle, the particular relations between labour and capital and 
expect to be understood by its members and its protagonists within and beyond national 
boundaries. At the source of its ideology lie basic texts which set out a framework in 
which history and contemporary politics can be interpreted. In most forms of democracy 
elements of this interpretation are open to revision but the fundamental structure 
remains unchanging. Likewise a man seeking to define the Republican ideal in 
seventeenth century Europe could draw' upon classical texts and their Renaissance 
interpreters. One observer might argue that the Swiss confederation best matched the 
Republican ideal while another wrote of the virtues of the Venetian Republic but the 
discussion would be set within a shared framework. There are other political 
movements which are more ‘opportunist’. Here what is shared is as much a matter of 
experience as of ideology. Loyalties can centre on individuals as much as ideals.
These political movements can helpfully be described in terms of the ‘language’ 
they use.  Every political movement has its own  ‘language’ in the Pocockian sense in 
which it presents information selectively in the context of the conduct and character of 
contemporary political life. This ‘language’ encourages the definition of political 
problems and values in certain ways and not others. The recipient is provided with a 
stock of judgments and images, rational and affective which in the words of Jacques 
Ellul establish  ‘une maniere de penser, d'interpreter l’experience, de se comporter’. The 
communication of symbols and stereotypes, both verbal and visual, creates not only a 
culture of identification but one of aspiration in which the communicator seeks to evoke 
the hoped for outcome. Providing these symbols and stereotypes remain reasonably 
stable, they can reproduce themselves whenever events jolt them into play. For the 
individual, as the case of Sir Denis Thatcher indicates, they may obviate the need for 
reflection and intellectual apprehension.3
' J.G.A Pocock.  Virtue.  Commerce and H istory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  1985). p.8: 
Jacques Ellul. Propayandes (Paris.  1962). pp.  181-1853
The aim of this thesis is to examine the ‘language' of the supporters of the House 
of Orange in the years  1650-1675. This period presented particular challenges. For 
twenty-two years from the death of William II in November 1650 there was to be no 
stadholder in the majority of the Dutch provinces. The House of Orange was now in 
‘opposition’ and faced with an adversary who was increasingly willing to deploy the 
language of the classical republic to define the goal of the Dutch state. The task of 
Orangist writers was not simply to contest this, rather it was to create and define a 
framework within which its objective, the restoration of the Orange stadholderate 
appeared natural and inevitable.
An investigation of Orangist political rhetoric calls for a close study of  political 
pamphlets of the period which are catalogued in the Knuttel Collection.4 Here Orangist 
writers sought to attack the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government of the 
Republic while defending the institution of the stadholderate and the policies and 
actions of former Princes of Orange.  I will also draw on sources from the world of 
poetry, drama and visual imagery whether in paintings, prints or medals. Here are 
furnished symbol and metaphor both verbal and visual which do not merely 
complement the words of political rhetoric but provide a storehouse of potent imagery 
which is not vulnerable to the rhetorical arguments of the opposition but can only be 
opposed indirectly by the creation of counter symbols and images. The deployment of 
such rhetoric and imagery was not only to combat the political principles espoused by 
John de Witt and his supporters but also to suggest that the fortunes of the Republic and 
the Houses of Orange were inextricably linked.  They were as one fictional character in 
a pamphlet of 1650 alleged like ‘tweelingen’ the one unable to conceive of life without 
the other.5
4  Catalogus  van de pamfletten-verzam eling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek, ed. by W.P.C. 
Knuttel. 9 vols (Utrecht: HES.  1978)
’ Knuttel no 6868. np.The period covered by this thesis begins with the sudden and unexpected death 
from smallpox on November 6  1650 of the young stadholder William II. Eight days 
later on November 14 his son William III was bom. In the same month the States of 
Holland decided to leave the stadholderate in Holland indefinitely vacant. At the Great 
Assembly in  1651  a majority of the provinces of the Republic followed Holland’s 
example. The Pensionary of Holland, John de Witt, was to articulate the aspiration that 
the United Provinces would form a ‘true’ republic in which there would be no single 
head and no authority based on birth alone. Meanwhile, it was the hope and intention of 
the supporters of the House of Orange that the young prince William IU would succeed 
to the offices of his forefathers.  This situation lasted from  1650-1672, a period of 
intermittent political ferment culminating in the feverish intensity of the summer of 
1672, the restoration of the position of captain general and stadholder in the person of 
William III and the murders of the brothers de Witt. The thesis concludes in  1675 with 
William Ilfs rejection of the title Duke of Gelderland, an event which sees the 
highwatermark of William's authority following the restoration of the stadholderate in 
1672.
It must be emphasised that this struggle between the forces sympathetic to the 
stadholder and elements of the Province of Holland was not new. The death of the 
stadholder marked but a stage, albeit a highly significant one, in a contest between two 
opposing forces.6 The Peace of Munster in  1648 marked not only the ending of 
hostilities with Spain but the victory of a particular group within the States of Holland. 
Since the renewal of war against Spain in  1621, they had urged negotiations for peace 
and with the capture of Breda and the securing of the Republic’s frontiers in  1637 the 
demands for a cessation of war grew louder. Ranged against them were many of the 
supporters of the public church, for whom war against the catholic foe had forged and
6 J. Lesley Price. Culture and Society in  the Dutch Republic in  the Seventeenth  Century (London: 
Batsford.  1974). p. 25.5
sustained the nation and the Prince of Orange as stadholder of the majority of the 
provinces and captain general of the army of the Republic. Holland’s victory was of 
short duration. In  1650 following a furious contest over the decommissioning of troops, 
the stadholder imprisoned six members of the States of Holland and attempted to seize 
the city of Amsterdam. His star seemed once more in the ascendant. William II’s death 
in November 1650, however, should have marked the total triumph of the party of 
Holland. Yet the birth of his son William eight days after his death on  14 November 
provided a focus for Orangist propaganda in the hope that one day he would come into 
his own.
Who were the Orangists who were responsible for publicising the cause of the 
young William III?  Centred on the court at the Hague, they were not a united group. 
Even had the infant William III succeeded to the offices of his forefathers, there would 
have been a power struggle among the factions at court. Now with the death of William 
II and the abolition of the stadholderate in the majority of the provinces there was a 
vacuum at the head of the network of Orangist patronage.7  This was compounded by the 
w'arring factions at the court in the Hague. One group gathered around the Princess 
Royal Mary Stuart and her superintendent the Heer van Heenviiet. Opposed to her was 
the dominating figure of the prince's grandmother Amalia von Solms who was 
supported by her son-in-law the Elector of Brandenburg and Constantijn Huygens who 
had been secretary to Frederick Henry and William  II. The guardianship of the young 
prince was hotly contested between the two women and Huygens was moved to write a 
poem to the Princess Royal urging an end to this ‘incivile guerre'.  It was finally 
determined that the Princess Royal, Amalia von Solms and the Elector of Brandenburg 
were to share the guardianship of William III but hostilities did not cease. The French
'  Olaf Morke.  ‘De Hof cultuur van het huis Oranje-Nassau in de zeventiende eeuw\ in Cultuur en 
m aalschappij in Nederland 1500-/800, ed. Peter te Boekhorst. Peter Burke and Willem Frijhofl (Meppel: 
Boom.  1992 ). pp. 39-77 (49)
^   A la Princesse de la Grande Bretagne'. D e Gedichten  van  Constantijn  Huygens, ed. Jacob Worp. 9 vols 
(Groningen.  1892-1899).  iv. 25 1-252 (25 1  )ambassador wrote in  1654 that following the Exclusion crisis the Republic was divided 
and if Mary Stuart and Amalia von Solms had combined forces they would have carried 
the country behind them and forced the States of Holland to back down. He concluded 
however, ia  reconciliation de ces deux dames est une chose impossible’.9 Only the 
death of Mary Stuart in  1661 resolved this problem.
The court clearly played a role in commissioning political pamphlets on behalf of 
the Orangist cause. Following the publication of John de Witt’s Deductie in 1654 a 
correspondent of Secretary Thurloe recorded,
it is said that there are a great many heads at work already, to refute the deduction of 
Holland; and that the guardians (of the prince) will especially cause to be refuted all that 
makes against the Prince.1 0
Writing from Leiden in  1663 Pieter de la Court listed recent publications and added that 
a pamphlet from the court at the Hague was expected any day now.  1 1  The court was the 
source of patronage for artists. The painter Theodor van Thulden was commissioned by 
Amalia von Solms to produce a series highlighting the role of the young prince and 
herself in the Orangist cause.1 2  That commission was unfortunately not completed. The 
artist Raguineau. whose portrait of William III was much copied, was appointed a tutor 
in painting to the young prince.n
In the first half of 1650 it appears that the Frisian stadholder William Frederick 
had a role to play. He wanted to be appointed as lieutenant captain general during the
9 Archives on correspondence inedite de la Maison de Oranje-Nassau  25  volumes in 5 series, ed Groen 
van Prinsierer (Leiden and Utrecht.  1835-1915). v( 1650-1688). pp.  140-141
1 0  A  Collection o f the State Papers o f John  Thurloe. ed. Thomas Birch. 7 vols (London: Printed for the 
executor of F. Gyles.  1742). II. p. 521
1 1   'Brieven uit de Correspondentie van Pieter de la Court en zijn verwanten (1661-1666), Bijdragen en 
M ededelingen  van  het Historisch GenootschaplUtrecht). 69 (1955 ). pp. 82-165 (107)
Theodoor van  Thulden:  een Zuidnederlandse barokschilder. ed. Alain Roy (Noordbrabants Museum. 
Musee des Beaux Arts Strasbourg: Zwolle), p. 77.
A Staring.  ‘Portretten van den  Koning-Stadholder'. Nederlandsch  Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek,  3 
( 1950/195 h. pp.  151-196 (165)minority of William III. Hence it was in his interests that the role of the stadholder and 
the interests of the House of Orange were defended. In  1652 William Frederick had 
been in correspondence with the Delft preacher  Johannes Goethals, an ardent Orangist 
who had been present at the deathbed of Frederick Henry. Printers in Holland were 
afraid to publish political pamphlets by preachers in favour of the Prince of Orange and 
Goethals asked William Frederick if he could arrange for Orangist tracts to be published 
in, and distributed from, Friesland.  14  Amalia von Solms was always suspicious of the 
motives of her son-in law William Frederick. Her fears appeared justified.  John de Witt 
persuaded the Frisian stadholder to give up his opposition to the act of Exclusion of the 
Prince of Orange by tempting  him in  1655 with the suggestion that he would be 
appointed field marshall of the army of the Republic.15 Having won over William 
Frederick, de Witt reneged on his promise. From then on William Frederick’s role 
becomes more peripheral.
Although writers frequently apply the terms Orangist Party and States Party to 
describe the protagonists, the reader must not ascribe to them many of the 
characteristics of a modern party. As present day historians have emphasised, factions 
based at civic and provincial level concerned primarily with local issues formed the 
mainstay of much of politics in the Republic and for many ideology was of peripheral 
importance.16  It may be argued that the history of party and faction in the Dutch 
Republic has been illuminated by this Namier like analysis but as readers will find, the 
polemic of the period was marked by significant differences in political emphasis 
between the two groups which were expressed with verve and passion. This is not the 
place to investigate the link between political polemic and political realities except to 
say that the rhetoric of competing groups is in itself a valid subject for the historian. It
1 4  Jonathan Israel. The Dutch Republic,  its Rise,  Greatness and Fall (Oxford: Clarendon Press.  1995). pp. 
717-718.
Luc Kooijmans. Liefde in  Opdracht (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker. 2000). p. 233.
1 6  D. J. Roorda. Partij en  Factie (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.  1961). pp.  1-3: Simon Groenveld.
Evidente factien  in den staet (Hilversum:  Yerloren.  1990). pp.  10-1 I.8
may be, as one dissenting historian has argued, that party and faction were not mutually 
exclusive and certainly at times of crisis such as  1672 party feeling became more acute 
and the regents groups more polarised.1 7
There seems to have been, in the view of this outsider at least, a curious 
reluctance on the part of historians to engage with the principles and convictions of the 
Orangists. Concepts such as ‘true freedom' and the works of the brothers de la Court 
have merited the attention of historian such as Eco Haitsma Mulier and Ernst H  ,
| o
Kossmann, to name but two.  Jonathan Israel in his magisterial The Dutch Republic. Its
Rise, Greatness and Fall made little reference to the argument of the supporters of the
House of Orange in his chapter on the  1650’s, subtitled significantly ‘the making of
True Freedom'.19 The eminent historian Pieter Geyl had set the tone. Reviewing key
Orangist pamphlets during the stadholderless period Geyl made little attempt to conceal
his disdain for their writing and their principles. Early in his article Geyl advised his
reader of his judgment that in comparison with the writings of their opponents, ‘de
Prinsgezinde geschriften leveren alles bijeengenomen niet een veel aantrekkelijker
beeld op'. Compared to the proponents of ‘true freedom’, ‘de Prinsgezinde
strijdliteratuur is minder omvangrijk en minder indrukkend'. In adopting the impersonal
voice, Geyl did not fail to convey his very personal view.  ‘Men krijgt sterk de indruk
dat de Staatsgezinde theorieen aantrekkkelijk waren voor de meest ontwikkelde en
meest onderzoekende geesten.’20 I recognised my calling.
Notwithstanding Geyl's personal attachment to the cause of the party of Holland,
his work on the Orangist pamphlets brought to the attention of historians some of the
key publications. However, the most well informed study of the principles of the
1   For further discussion see J. Lesley Price. Holland and the Dutch Republic in  the Seventeenth  Century 
(Oxford: Clarendon.  1994). pp. 57-67.
^ Eco.G. Haitsma Mulier. The Mvth o f Venice and Dutch Republican thought in the seventeenth century 
(Assen: Van Gorcum.  1980): Ernst H. Kossmann.  ‘Dutch Republicanism", in  Politiek en  Geschiedenis 
(Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.  1987). pp. 21 1-233.
Iy  Jonathan 1. Israel. The Dutch Republic tits Rise Greatness and Fall (Oxford: Clarendon Press.  1995)
20 Pieter Geyl.  ‘Het stadhouderschap in de partij-literatuur onder De Witt', in Pennestrijd over Staat en 
H istoric. (Groningen.  1971). pp. 3-71  (pp.  18. 39).Orangists as expressed in their pamphlets came in a chapter by van de Klashorst entitled 
‘Metten schijn van monarchic getempert. De verdediging van het stadhouderschap in de 
Partijliteratuur'. This was the first research which treated the Orangist writings with the 
depth and scholarship which had previously been devoted to the supporters of John de 
Witt. Taking certain of the best known Orangist polemical works, the author 
investigated the Orangist stance towards such issues as provincial sovereignty, the role 
and authority of the States General and the function of the stadholder. Understandably 
the writer, an historian of political thought, concentrated on those Orangist pamphlets 
which offered most to his field of study; the more ephemeral publications and the 
literary and visual imagery which the supporters of the House of Orange cherished, 
were not under consideration. The Orangists were to be judged alongside the brothers 
de la Court, Franciscus van den Enden and Spinoza on the intellectual content of the
corpus of their literature. It is telling that van de Klashorsf s contribution was published
->  *
in a volume entitled Pieter de la Court in zijn tijd. ~
Orangist studies such as biographies of William III have inevitably concentrated 
on the years after 1672 and an analysis of political polemic and imagery has not usually 
formed part of their brief. However any student of the period  1650-1672 would be
advised to refer to the first volumes of Japikse’s Prins Willem HI -  de Stadhouder-
->  ->
Koning and Nesca Robb's William of Orange." Wouter Troosf s Stadholder-koning 
Willem III: een politieke biografie published in 2001  is the most recent work on the 
subject.23 Herbert Rowen's biography John de Witt,  Grand Pensionary of Holland 
1625-1672 provides a detailed account of events from  1650-1672 and is particulary
-l G.O. van de Klashorst.  'Metten schijn van monarchic getempert. De Verdediging van het 
Stadhouderschap in de Partijliteratuur'. in P ieter de la Court in zijn  tijd x d. by Hans Blom and 1. W. 
Wildenberg (Amsterdam: Maarsen.  1985). pp. 93-136.
" N. Japikse. Prins  Willem III -  de Stadhouder-Koning. 2 vols (Amsterdam.  1930). Nesca Robb.  William 
o f Orange. 2 vols (New York: St Martin's Press.  1963 / London: Heinemann. 1966)
■' Wouter Troost. Stadhouder-koning  Willem  III:  een politieke biografie (Hilversum: Verloren. 2001 )10
")  4
useful on contentious issues such as the Public Prayer debate."  An invaluable primary 
source for these years is found in the narrative of Lieuwe van Aitzema.  Modem 
studies have concentrated on ideas rather than individuals and the companion volumes 
entitled Vaderland and Vrijheid examine contemporary use of such terms.26
Herbert H. Rowen’s The Princes of Orange.  The Stadholders in the Dutch 
Republic provides a valuable introduction to the role and functions of the stadholders 
and captains general.27 The German scholar Olaf Morke chose as his field of research 
the court of the House of Orange and his work led him to examine the functions of the 
stadholder and certain of the symbolism which the Orangists deployed. His 
‘Stadtholder’oder ‘Staetholder’ traverses a very different landscape from that pioneered 
by van Klashorst.28 Inevitably the bulk of his book concentrates on the period before the 
death of William II but there are valuable insights to be gained. A short section of the 
book does deal with Orangist pamphlets in the stadholderless period. Jonathan Israel in 
a publication of 2004, Monarchy, Orangism and Republicanism has argued that a 
‘republican’ standpoint particularly in respect of religious toleration and indeed 
difference to religion in general did not preclude individuals from loyalty to the House 
of Orange.29 My work was largely written before the appearance of Israel’s pamphlet 
but it is certainly a question which is examined in this thesis and I hope that readers will 
conclude that ‘republicanism’ and Orangism were compatible and that by no means all 
Orangists were supporters of the public church.
" 4  Herbert H. Rowen. John de  Witt,  G rand Pensionary o f H olland 1625-1672 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  1978)
25 Lieuwe van Aitzema. Historie oft  Verhael van Saecken  van Staet en  Oorlogh,  in en omtrent de 
Vereenighde Nederlanden, 14 vols (The Hague.  1667-1671)
26 Vaderland.ed. by N. C. F van Sas (Amsterdam: University Press. 1991);  Vrijheid,ed. by Eco G. Haitsma 
Mulier and Wyger R.E. Velema (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.  1999)
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Cambridge University Press.  1988)
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On the relations between the Reformed community and the House of Orange in 
the years  1650-1672, M.T. uit den Bogaard’s Den Gereformeerden en Oranje tijdens 
het eerste Stadhouderloze Tijdperk published in  1954, remains the only comprehensive 
guide.30 Its source material drawn from the political pamphlets of the period provides an 
invaluable introduction. It is a comment on Orangist studies that this work, published 
half a century ago, remains the only book on the subject. The Orangists and their 
relations with England during both the Protectorate and after the Restoration is the 
subject of  Pieter Geyls’ Orange and Stuart, first published in  1969.31 The core of the 
material is drawn from diplomatic sources and the correspondence of John de Witt but it 
provides a useful background when considering the pamphlet literature dealing with this 
issue.
The supporters of John de Witt sought to buttress their legitimacy by attacking the 
record of the previous Orange stadholders. For the Orangists, it was essential to win this 
struggle for the past, for gratitude for the heroic actions of his forefathers played a large 
part in the argument for the granting of the stadholderate to William III. Haitsma Mulier 
and Janssen’s Willem van Oranje in de Historie 1584-1984 provides a couple of helpful 
chapters on this subject.32 Jacob Bax's Prins Maurits in de volksmening der 16e en 17e 
published in  1940 is a repository of references to the Prince with particularly valuable 
sources in the areas of poetry and drama.33  Coenraad Tamse in his Het Huis van Oranje 
en atidere politieke mythen casts a wider view over the Orangist myth and its place in 
Dutch history.34 An overarching introduction to the subject remains Kampinga’s De 
opvatting over onze oudere vaderlandsche geschiedenis first published in  1917.
30 Maximilien Th. uit den Bogaard. Den  Gereformeerden en Oranje tijdens het eerste Stadhouderloze 
Tijdperk (Groningen: Djakarta.  1954)
3 1  Pieter Geyl. Orange and Stuart  1641-1672,(London: Phoenix Press. 2001)
3' Willem  van  Oranje in de Historie  1584-1984x d . by Eco G. Haitsma Mulier and A. E. M. Janssen. 
(Utrecht.  1984)
3  Jacob Bax. Prins Maurits in de volksmening der 16e en  17e eeu\v,(Amsterdam: H. J. Paris.  1940)
34 Coenraad A.Tamse. Het Huis van  O ranje en andere politieke mv///e/j,(Amsterdam: Bert Bakker,
20002)
° H. Kampinga. De opvatting over onze  O udere  Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis (The Hague. 1917)12
The frenetic pamphleteering of the crisis year of 1672 has cried out for scholarly 
investigation. Roorda in Partij en Factie provides illuminating insights into the nature 
of the political struggle of the time.36 Pieter Geyl in his Democratische tendenties in 
1672 examines a selection of pamphlets which purported to emphasise popular rights 
and privileges against the patrician oligarchy and supported the claims of the Prince of 
Orange.37 In my work on the popular rhetoric of Orangism, I have widened the scope of 
the discussion by including political rhetoric from the period before 1672 and deploying 
sources from poetry, drama and visual imagery.
On the subject of Dutch pamphleteering in general, the standard work is Craig 
Harline’s Pamphlets, Printing and Political Culture in the early Dutch Republic.
While Harline's work provides valuable information about the production and 
circulation of pamphlets, it deals less with the contents. However, I have found of 
inestimable value Hubert Carrier’s life work, the two volumes of La Presse de la 
Fronde.39 There is much in this French work which appears to have direct relevance to 
the Dutch pamphleteering tradition of the mid seventeenth century and Carrier and his 
compatriot Christian Jouhard in Mazarinades.La Fronde des Mots pose questions which 
are beyond the scope of Harline's book.40 Simon Groenveld's De Prins voor 
Amsterdam deals specifically with the political pamphlets of 1650.41
Comelissen in an article of 1939 entitled ‘Vondel en de vrijheid’ opened the way 
for consideration of the political dimension of seventeenth century drama. Poelhekke's 
Vondel en Oranje of 1967, though a relatively slight work, examined the political
n
context of the great dramatist's plays and poetry.  “ More recently Henk Duits in Van 
Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse opstand and Bettina Noak in Politische Aujfassungen
3() Roorda. Partij en  Factie,
3   Pieter Geyl. Dem ocratische tendenties in  1672 (Amsterdam: Noord Holland. 1950)
3 i>  Craig Harline. Pamphlets,Printing and Political Culture in the early Dutch Republic (Dordrecht: 
Nijhoff.  1987)
39 Hubert Carrier. La Presse de la  Frondef 1648-1653). 2 vols (Geneva: Librairie Droz,  1989-1991)
40 Christian Jouhaud.  M azarinades. La  Fronde des Mots (Paris: Aubier.  1985)
4 1  Simon Groenveld. De Prins voor Am sterdam  (Bussum.  1967)
42 Jan J. Poelhekke.  Vondel en Oranje (Zutphen:Walburg. 1979)13
in niederlandischen Drama des 17 Jahrhunderts have examined a selection of plays and 
reflected on their connections to contemporary political thought.43 These works have 
informed my thinking, albeit I am in many cases dealing with plays which are not the 
subject of investigation by these two authors. In the case of ‘occasional’ poetry written 
to commemorate an event or defend a particular standpoint, I have used the appropriate 
volumes, many of which have not been republished since the seventeenth century. For a 
comment on ‘occasional’ poetry as a genre, Schenkenveld-van der Dussen’s article 
entitled ‘Poezie als gebruiksartikel: gelegenheidsgedichten in de zeventiende eeuw’ 
provides an introduction within the Dutch context.44 Wolf  Segebrecht’s Das 
Gelegenheid Gedicht although set in a German framework has much to offer the general 
reader.45
Dutch art has provided a more fruitful field for investigation than Dutch literature 
and drama. In the case of the House of Orange, the two volume catalogue Onder den 
Oranje Boom provides a fascinating insight into the world of portraiture and fine arts as 
collected and commissioned by the Dutch Princes of Orange and their German 
relations.46 Focussing on one work of art, Lyckle de Vries' monologue on Jan Steen’s 
Prinsesdag is an intriguing example of the political content of what appears at first sight 
to be a characteristic genre painting.47 Staring’s article of 1950, ‘Portretten van den 
Koning-Stadhouder’, marks the only attempt so far to list and date the various portraits 
of William III.48 The iconography of the Oranjezaal has been researched by Hanna 
Peter-Raupp, albeit not without some dissent from Dutch art historians.49 Political prints
4' Henk Duits.  Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse O pstand (Hilversum: Verloren.  1990); Bettina Noak, 
Politische Auffassimgen  in niederlandischen Drama des  17 Jahrhunderts (Munster: Waxman, 2002)
44 Maria Schenkeveld-van der Dussen.  ‘Poezie als gebruiksartikel: gelegenheidsgedichten in de 
zeventiende eeuw'.in Historische Letterkunde ed. by Marijke Spies (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 
1984), pp. 75-92.
4 : <  Wulf Segebrecht. Das Gelegenheits G edicht (Stuttgart: Metzler,  1977)
46 O nder den  Oranje Boom, Exhibition Catalogue. 2 vols (Munich: Hirmer.  1999)
47 Lyckle de Vries. Jan Steen.Prinsesdag (Bloemendaal: H. W. Becht.  1992)
48 A.Staring.  ‘Portretten van den Koning-Stadhouder'. Nederlandsch  Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek,  3 
(1950/1951). pp.  151-196.
4 V  Hanna Peter-Raupp. Die Ikonographie des Oranjezaal (Hildesheim: New York: Olms.  1980)14
are catalogued in the collections of Muller and the Atlas van Stolk and medals in the 
volumes of Gerard van Loon and Pierre Bizot.50
The challenge I have set myself is to describe the language of  Orangism in the 
critical years of the third quarter of the seventeenth century. Boundaries must be set. I 
have not investigated the engravings of the young prince William El on drinking vessels 
or the ‘oranjepijps' which bore the arms of the House of Orange though I am full of 
admiration for those who have.51  I hope that this work, however inadequate, wilj 
illuminate for readers a vital and poorly researched area of Dutch political life during a 
critical period in the history of the Republic.
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A DEFENCE OF THE STADHOLDER PRINCE
‘Can the United Provinces function without a governor?’1  The question was posed by 
Petrus Scriverius in his work entitled Histoire des Contes d ’Hollande et Estat et 
Gouvemement des Provinces Unies du Pays Bas published posthumously in 1664. In 
practical terms the answer to Scriverius might well be yes. At the time of the book’s 
publication the Republic had been fourteen years without a stadholder. During that time 
wars had been fought and differences between and within provinces had been 
satisfactorily resolved. Scriverius wrote of those in the United Provinces who believed 
that the terms of the Union of Utrecht with their provisions for a stadholder should not 
be binding in perpetuity and for whom the Orange stadholderate was an historic 
accident arising from ‘des diverses circumstances du temps'.2 Events might appear to 
vindicate their stance. Yet to supporters of the House of Orange the answer to the 
question posed by Scriverius could only be no. For them, not withstanding appearances, 
a stadholder was crucial to the survival and prosperity of the Republic. Their task 
throughout the years  1650-1672 was to marshall a credible argument for the necessity of 
a stadholder and expose the pitfalls and dangers resulting from his absence. This was 
not merely a work of abstract political polemic. The object of their endeavours was not 
just an institution but an individual, a child growing to manhood who was always 
present in the Republic and who was the focus of intense hopes and fears.
The mixed constitution
1   Petrus Scriverius. Histoire des Contes d'H oIlande et Estat et G ouvem em ent des Provinces  Unies du 
Pays Bas (The Hague.  1664). p.  194.
*  Scriverius. Histoire, pp.  194-197.16
The office of stadholder stemmed from the appointment of provincial governors by the 
sovereign in the Burgundian and Habsburg periods. After the Revolt, it could be argued 
that there was no further need of a stadholder since the authority whom he represented 
was no longer recognised by the Dutch. However, the need for princely leadership as a 
focus for unity in internal and external affairs ensured that the office of stadholder 
remained. Although formally subject to the Provincial States, the Orangist stadholders 
retained some sovereign attributes such as the power to appoint certain magistrates in 
most towns as well as membership of the Council of State and the command of the 
army and navy.3
One of the task of the supporters of the House of Orange was to propound a 
constitutional framework in which a stadholder prince played an essential role.  A 
pamphlet published following the death of William II and the birth of the young prince 
gives an indication of the theoretical argument which was to be deployed by the 
supporters of the stadholderate. The work in question I Conferentie van eenige 
Nederlantsche Heeren op de tegemvoordigen Staet deser Landen was not a defence of 
the late stadholder. indeed the anonymous author was highly critical of the actions of 
both William II and William Frederick, the Frisian stadholder who had commanded the 
troops in the thwarted attack on Amsterdam. However, this was to condemn the person, 
not the institution. The role of stadholder was essential to the constitution of the Dutch 
Republic. To say otherwise was to go against the wisdom of their forefathers and those 
maxims of the sages of antiquity who had warned of the dangers of change in the 
structure of the state. Experience teaches us, the author contended, that the best form of 
government is that ‘die gemengt is of derdelei, of iyets gemeen heeft met de 
Monarchicale. yets met de Aristocratische en iets met de Democratische Regeeringe’.4
' J. Lesley Price. Culture and Society in  the Dutch Republic during  the  17,h  Century (London: Batsford. 
1974). p.20.
4  Knuttel. no. 6899. np.17
The stadholderate as an institution represented the monarchical element within the 
Republic, without which the constitution was incomplete.
The main purpose of the pamphlet was not to discuss the virtues of the mixed 
constitution but to put forward the claims of John Maurice of Nassau as surrogate 
stadholder or captain general during the infancy of the Prince of Orange and to 
disparage the claims of other putative contenders for that role. This strategy explains the 
appearance in 1651 of a second  pamphlet, this time  entitled Grondigh Bericht nopende 
den Interest van desen Staet. The author one ‘Galeacco de Rivo Ursino’ steered an 
adroit course which was to characterise much of the succeeding Orangist polemic. 
Firstly, there was the question of utility. The Republic had need of ‘een bequaem en 
gequalificeert heere’. Secondly this ‘headship’ was placed within the comprehensive 
framework of a constitution in which different elements were mixed.  For this author, 
there were few examples of ‘pure’ forms of government in Europe; rather most were a 
mixture in which monarchy was tempered by aristocracy, or as in the Dutch Republic, 
aristocratic or democratic governments by a semblance of monarchy. Thus the 
institution of the stadholderate was a  ‘schijn’ or ‘schaduwe’ of monarchy. This 
language was not new. In a pamphlet of 1642 outlining the relations between the 
stadholder and the States of Holland, the anonymous author had described the former as 
‘de schaduwe eener Monarchic’.5 For the writer of 1651  this ‘schijn’ or ‘schaduwe’ 
appeared ubiquitous from the times of Moses and Joshua, indeed so ever present was it 
that it seemed to be ‘een ingheven der Natuyre,ende een algemeen Volckrecht te zijn’. It 
was integral to the prosperity and durability of any state. Sparta had the services of an 
‘opperhoofd’ or leader of the military to whom all power was devolved during times of 
war though sovereignty lay with the citizens and councils. Even the Roman Republic 
with its abhorrence of monarchy had two consuls or burgomasters who were held in
?  Knuttel. no. 4870. np.18
esteem above all others while in time of necessity a temporary head or ‘dictator’ could 
be appointed. The example ‘par excellence’ of this ‘schijn’ of monarchy lay in the 
Venetian Republic where an elected Doge averted all the inconveniences, indecision, 
discord and strife of an untrammelled aristocracy in an unchanging constitution which 
had ensured the survival and prosperity of the Republic for over eight hundred years.6
These two pamphlets of 1650 and  1651, both supporting the claims of John 
Maurice laid the theoretical framework in which a defence of the stadholderate as an 
institution could be mounted. Firstly, they cleverly avoided any clear definition of the 
stadholder’s powers providing the institution with the gloss of monarchy while citing 
examples such as Sparta and Venice which would reassure those who feared that the 
stadholders sought sovereignty in the Republic. Secondly, they deployed concepts 
which were not novel but familiar to an educated readership. The rediscovery of 
Aristotle's Politics w'ith the first Latin text in  1260 resulted in his definitions of 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy becoming commonplace in any debate of a 
constitution, real or abstract. Writers after Aristotle had conceived of an ‘anacyclosis’ or 
natural course or order in which the single Aristotelian forms inevitably degenerated 
only finally to return full circle. Polybius, however, had argued that this natural cycle 
could be prevented by the introduction of an equilibrium in the form of a mixed 
constitution of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements. Thus he argued 
‘experience', a key w'ord in the Aristotelian arsenal, teaches us that a mixed constitution 
produced stability and longevity, both highly desirable in any republic. This model, 
founded on Aristotle and Polybius, permeated political thought in the early Renaissance 
and was to remain in use in some circles until the eighteenth century. It also nourished 
its own language and imagery. For Aristotle the best constitution was similar to the best 
life in that both followed a ‘middle w av' consisting of a mean between the two extremes
6 Knuttel. no. 7009. pp.  1-9.19
. He argued that it was the perfect ‘balance’ between its different parts which kept a city 
state in being.  ‘Balance’, ‘harmony’ (a Platonic loan) and ‘moderation or middle way’ 
became key words in any discussion of what was desirable in a state.7
Thus the language and imagery of the mixed constitution as deployed by the 
Orangists was ubiquitous throughout central and western Europe. It formed the subject 
not only of theoretical debate but also applied to contemporary constitutional issues. 
Both sides in the English civil conflict of the seventeenth century availed themselves of 
the mixed constitution though Royalist apologists such as Filmer were later to discard it. 
In 1642 Charles 1  observed to Parliament that the wisdom and experience of their 
ancestors taught them that there were ‘three kinds of Government among men, Absolute 
Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy,all having their own particular conveniences 
and inconveniences’. However the king argued a mixture of these ensured the 
conveniences of all three without the attendant disadvantages ‘as long as the balance 
hangs even between the three estates’. Charles’ discourse was issued in pamphlet form 
and translated into Dutch .8 Equally the king’s opponents were prepared to deploy 
arguments for a mixed monarchy for this implied limitations upon royal authority.9
Most important for the Dutch discussion as Haitsma Mulier has described was the 
example of the Republic of Venice. Here was a prosperous sea going state which had 
successfully avoided domination by foreign powers. Its stability and longevity were 
attributed to its mixed constitution of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements 
which it was maintained had been preserved unchanged for eight hundred years.10 For 
the author of Grondigh Bericht the Venetian example was clearly pivotal, even in his
7   Garry W. Trompf. The Idea o f H istorical Recurrence in  Western  Thought ( Berkeley. London: 
University of California Press.  1979). pp. 5-47: Aristotle. The Politics (Harmondsworth,  1962). pp. 57. 
171.
*  His M ajestie 's Answer to the XIV Propositions o f both Houses o f Parliament (London,  1642). pp.  17-18: 
Knuttel. no. 4838A.
9 Zera S. Fink. The Classical Republicans; An  essay in the recovery o f a pattern o f thought in Seventeenth 
Century England (Northwestern University: Evanston,  1945). pp. 24-25.
1 0  Eco.G. Haitsma Mulier. The Myth o f Venice and Dutch Republican  Thought in  the Seventeenth  Century 
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choice of language. His ‘schaduwe’ or ‘schijn’ of monarchy while it had Dutch 
antecedents is strikingly similar to the language used in Gasparo Contarini’s sixteenth 
century study of Venice in which the Doge was described as possessing ‘una sembianza 
di Re’. It was Contarini’s boast, ‘che questa sola Republica hauesse il principato Regio 
il govemo de’ nobili, il reggimento de cittidini, de modo che paiono con una certa 
bilencia eguale haue mescolato le forme de tutti’.11
Within the United Provinces itself the mixed constitution had enjoyed a good 
press. In the early seventeenth century Heinsius had published an edition of Aristotle’s 
Politics, judging him to be the most acute commentator ever on these matters. Paulus 
Merula in his Diatriba statu Reipubliciae Batavae of 1603 had commented on the 
limited constitutional powers enjoyed by the previous Counts of Holland and had 
characterised the governance of the state both past and present as a happy mixture of 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. The momentum was not lost in the second half 
of the century. Boxhom in his lnstitutiones Politiciae published posthumously in  1657 
hesitated to prescribe an ideal constitution for the history and humours of the peoples of 
Europe and beyond varied so widely. However, after the customary caveat that well 
established deficiencies were better endured than the introduction of uncertain novelties, 
Boxhom did incline towards the mixed constitution as it combined all the best elements 
of the three forms. He acknowledged, as did others, that one element might predominate 
without destabilising the system.  12
In particular the pamphlets of 1650 and  1651  drew on concepts and language 
deployed earlier by Grotius in his Liber de Antiquitate Reipublicae Bataviae of 1610. 
This immensely influential work was first published in  1610 and dedicated to the States 
of Holland and West Friesland, whose official historian Grotius had been since  1604. 
The truce of 1609 had brought no solution to the problem of the constitutional
1 1  Gasparo Contarini. Della Republica et M agistrati di  Venetia.{ Venice.  1591), pp.  13,  15.
Harm Wansinck.  Politieke  W etenschappen aan de Leidse  Universiteir  1575-1650 (Utrecht: HES,  1981) 
pp.  105.  150.21
relationship between the stadholder and the States of Holland and Grotius’ work was 
intended to serve as a plea for the sovereignty of the individual province and its States. 
Ironically, given the intention of the work and Grotius’ later imprisonment as a 
confederate of Oldenbamevelt, the work provided the supporters of the stadholderate
a  i
with an armoury of argument and imagery.
Rather than a work of abstract political theory Grotius, in a fashion which was to 
characterise Dutch political polemic, couched his arguments in the context of history. 
Deploying the accounts of Tacitus and other classical sources, he described the so called 
Batavian Republic of pre and post Roman times. Grotius’intent becomes apparent in his 
dedication at the beginning of the book. He wrote that not only was this example of a 
Batavian state prescriptive for future generations for ‘oudheid komt God zeer nabij door 
een zekere gelijkenis met eeuwigheid’ but its fundamental constitution had remained in 
place until the present time. With a tribute to the longevity of this form of governance 
Grotius concluded that ‘immers, het duidelijkste kenmerk van een goed ingerichte staat 
is zijn lange bestaen'.
For Grotius an Aristotelian analysis of the Batavian Republic showed it to be 
essentially aristocratic in form, composed of the most worthy members of the province 
and towns but enjoying the services of an elected prince. Such a structure, he argued, 
typified a ‘middle way' between the twin rocks of monarchy and democracy. This 
‘middenweg’ he described as ‘als wat enerzijds verwijdered is van beide uitersten en 
anderzids onderdelen bevat van beide’, an image which future Orangists were to deploy 
to good cause. The republic received iegitimiteit door de aanwezigheid van vorstelijk 
gezag’. Within the bounds of such a constitution the natural liberties of the  Batavian 
people could flourish and they remained unsubdued by Rome, instead enjoying the 
status of confederates and allies.
’ ’ Gees van der Plaat.  ‘Lieuwe  van A itzem a's kijk op het stadhouderschap in de Republiek'.  BM GN.  103, 
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Grotius argued that this mixed form of governance had brought power and 
prosperity to Holland. Harmony had been disrupted by the later Habsburg counts, in 
particular Philip II of Spain who had played the tyrant, trampling on the liberties which 
were so fundamental to the Batavian tradition. However, following the abjuration of 
Philip’s sovereignty in 1581, Grotius concluded that these freedoms had been preserved 
by this same governance of States and Prince, the latter in the form of the stadholder 
William of Orange. Thus the original constitution of that ancient Batavian Republic 
which had first been recorded under Caesar had persisted for seventeen hundred years 
until the present day. Grotius continued ‘hierin heeft de sovereiniteit immer bij de 
Staten gelegen en ligt daar ook nu nog; maar wel op dusdanige wijze dat daaran 
vorstelijk gezag werd toegevoegd’. The author acknowledged that this form of 
constitution was not suitable for all peoples; some flourished better under a monarchy. 
Yet this governance,
voor ons de meest geschickte is, bewijst de ononderbroken pratijkervaring van zovele eeuwen. 
Zo lang dese staatsvorm bleef bestaan was alles rustig. Zodra er aan getoomd werd, onstanden 
opstanden en onrust. en deze kwamen niet eerder tot bedaren, dan dat aan het gezag zijn ware 
vorm was teruggeven.1 4
The work of Grotius both deployed existing concepts of the constitution of the 
fledgling republic and reinforced them. The language of balance and the mixed 
constitution had already been used in native Dutch political pamphleteering. A work of 
1607 had praised constitutions composed of three elements and, by implication, the 
Dutch model arguing that this form of government was ‘le plus juste, durable, et moins 
subject a tyrannie, parce que Ton sert de contrepoix a Tautre’.1 5 Following the model of
14 Hugo de Groot. Liber de Antiqnitate (Arnhem,  1995).  ‘Opdracht*. p.  7. Chap.  1(4), Chap. 2(14), Chap. 
5(12). Chap. 7(19)
I:>  Considerations D 'Estat sur le  Traicte de la Pai.x,  introduction by Charles Rahlenbeck (Brussels. Ghent, 
Leipzig.  1869). p.  17.23
Grotius, an anonymous author of 1612 referred to the government of the United 
Provinces as ‘eene Aristocratique Politie’ which none the less did contain princely 
elements.16 A pamphlet of 1618 concurred arguing that the Dutch Republic was ‘een 
vrije Aristocratijque Regieringe vande beste des landts’ which was ‘voorgeluchtet van 
een voortreffelikck inde aensiaenlijc Hooft’. 17
Significantly of the pamphlets mentioned, that is the three from the earlier part of 
the seventeenth century and the two of 1650 and 1651, none concentrated entirely on 
the issue of the mixed constitution. For the writers of 1607,  1612 and 1618 the key 
issues to which they devoted the bulk of their attention were the integrity of the Truce 
with Spain and the relations between sections of the political establishment and the 
national church. For the author of 1650 the primary task was to buttress the cause of 
John Maurice of Nassau. Even for the author of 1651, his admiring discussion of the 
historic attributes of the mixed constitution quickly gave way to a defence of the 
stadholderate on more utilitarian grounds. This was to be the case with many writers 
who touched on the subject briefly only to pass on to more pressing contemporary
I fi
issues.
For the remainder of the  1650’s discussion of the mixed constitution with relation 
to the stadholderate virtually disappeared with one exception. An Orangist work 
Bedenckitige op de Deductie of 1654, while largely concentrating on the issue of the 
Union, did argue that some form of headship was not inappropriate. The author 
contended that even in the scriptural era of the Book of Judges, which he described as a 
‘treffelijcke aristocratie', God had an eye to the advantages of the mixed constitution 
and ‘de opper macht altijd tot een hoofd gecontreert’. The dangers of the degeneration 
of a pure form of aristocracy to the malignant form of oligarchy was stressed. If, the 
author contended, Princes could stand accused of using their influence to benefit their
16 Knuttel.  no.  1991, p.  13.
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own interest, then the same could be said for of those ‘Opper-Regenten’ who with their 
family and factional connections could come to dominate towns and provinces.19
The Restoration of Charles II marked a perceived upturn in the fortunes of the 
House of Orange. It was expected that the English king would promote the interests of 
his young nephew. Mindful of English susceptibilities, the Act of Exclusion of 1654 in 
which William III was prevented from attaining the offices of his forefathers was laid 
aside. The restoration of Charles II certainly stimulated pro-Orangist sentiment in the 
United Provinces while terminating the Republican experiment in England. It may have 
been the combination of both of these factors which prompted Pieter de la Court to issue 
for publication in the years  1660-1662 several works, some probably penned by his late 
brother John which attacked the concept of monarchy and the stadholderate which they 
identified with it as implacably hostile to any form of freedom loving Republic. The 
nature of the works of the de la Courts and certain of those who followed them 
represent a change in the conceptual landscape of the United Provinces. Arguably this 
marks a split in the nature of States Party polemic'  for some anti-Orangist writers 
continued to share a common language with their opponents. A pamphlet of 1662 
Aesopus Defensor, almost certainly the work of the young Leiden jurist Uytenhage de 
Mist, conceded that the ‘middle way’ was the most secure. Hence the Dutch Republic 
was an ‘aristocratische regeeringe’ as that form lay between monarchy and 
democracy.2 1  In his Apologie ofte Verantwoordinge van den Ondienst der 
Stadhouderlijke Regeeringe of 1663, he reiterated his thesis that the government of the 
state of Holland was essentially aristocratic in nature. He fearlessly plundered the 
language of Grotius. As Grotius had valued a middle way ‘want nademael men in alle 
saecken het middelste prijsf so our author again concurring argued that the Dutch
19 Knuttel,  no. 7550A , pp.  32, 34.
20 Eco G.Haitsma Mulier.  ‘The language o f seventeenth century republicanism in the United Provinces: 
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model of an aristocracy without a head entirely fitted this concept for it lay ‘tusschen 
Eenhooftdige Regeringe ende gebiet van het gemeene Volck’. So complete was this 
aristocratic regime that a stadholder would simply be a ‘wanschepel’, a monstrous 
growth or deformity on the body of the Republic.22 Both these authors might challenge 
the Orangist view of a mixed constitution but in opting either for another mixed form or 
a pure type of aristocracy, they were still operating within the same framework in which 
the Aristotelian forms predominated and governance was in the hands of ‘de hoogste 
regeringsmacht’. Of Bodin’s concept of an indivisble dynamic sovereignty within the 
state, there was no sign.
The de la Courts erupted into this world of middle ways and balance. On the 
frontispiece of the  1661 edition of Consideratien van Staat ofte Politijke Weegschaal 
was an image of a set of scales consciously unbalanced. On the left hand the scales 
contained the forces of crowned monarchy, war and servitude. On the right, weighed 
heavily in their favour liberty, justice and civil law. Monarchy or singleheadship, 
bellicosity and slavery were outweighed. This image of deliberate imbalance mirrored 
the disturbing contents of the book. Beginning with an analysis of the human passion 
which owed much to Descartes, the author emphasised the importance of good 
governance in which the interests or ruler and ruled are inextricably shackled. The 
Aristotleian forms of government were placed before the reader with the proviso that, 
pace Bodin, a sovereign power could not be divided. Thus it ‘soo volgd dat de absolute 
magt om wetten te maaken niet kan zijn by een, ende een independente magt om die te 
doen executeeren, by een ander’. This emphasis on the siting of a sovereignty which 
cannot be divided into legislative and executive functions, brought a new emphasis into 
the polemic of Dutch political life. Clearly within such a framework there was no place 
for a stadholder who carried out the policies of the States in war. Such a figure not only
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contradicted the fundamental premise of the nature of sovereignty but, in the light of the 
author’s analysis of the nature of human passions, the stadholder would be compelled to 
defend his own interests by enfeebling the powers of his subjects.23 This element of the 
argument was to be reinforced by many concrete examples by Pieter de la Court in his
^ j
Interest van Holland of 1662.“
John de Witt, the cousin and namesake of the Pensionary, in a work of 1663 
reinforced the emphasis on sovereignty rather than the Aristotelian constitutional forms. 
Citing Bodin, he reinforced the indivisibility of sovereignty which, he argued, in all 
Republics is to be found only ‘in een Aristocratische Regeeringe by den geheelen Raat’. 
Unwilling to jettison traditional scriptural sources, the author contended that such a 
form of government had been chosen by God for his people Israel. However in citing 
Bodin’s marks of sovereignty, de Witt moved the argument much closer to the 
contemporary sphere. If sovereignty resided in, amongst others, supreme legislative 
power, absolute control of the army and selection of the magistrates, then the previous 
constitution of the Republic complete with stadholders represented a fatal fracturing of 
supreme power. Only in the absence of the Princes of Orange could sovereign authority 
as defined by Bodin rest where it rightfully should, that is in the hands of the provincial 
States.25
The pensionary John de Witt was deaf to the siren calls of the language of Grotius. 
In a letter of 1   November 1663 he remarked that his observations of eminent men had 
led him to observe that they were inclined to flatter those in authority which occasioned 
them to espouse arguments which were incompatible with both reason and truth.
Grotius, he opined, had in his work Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae sought to flatter 
the Princes of Orange in his portrayal of ‘een sorte van regeeringe, die men mixtum
23 Consideratien  van Staat ofte Politijke  W eeg-schaal (Amsterdam: Jacob Volckerts,  1661), pp. 23, 26, 
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noemt’. The Dutch Republic, de Witt asserted, was a pure aristocracy. Polybius might 
argue that Rome was an example of the virtues of the mixed constitution but Polybius 
was wrong. It was, according to de Witt, a democracy ‘als meest alle de politycque 
schryvers ende daeronder specialijk Bodin, sustineren tegens Polybius’. 26
The Orangist response to this polemic was instructive. The author of Ware Interest 
van Holland published in 1662, avowed as did Grotius that aristocracy was the 
predominant element in the constitution but since this form of governance was fatally 
prone to faction, an ‘opperhooft’ was essential to control and contain the ambitions of 
‘deze grooten Aristocratische Heeren’. Under such a government was ‘alles in goed 
Harmonie’. Foremost in the earlier section of the work was a calculated warning against 
the dangers of change. What had suited Holland in the past would serve the present. A 
good subject must never flirt with novelties ‘want die brenght gemeenlijck groote 
onghelegenhtheden m ede'.27 Thus past experience was the Orangist counterweight to 
the political abstractions of Bodin.
Den Klagenden Veenboer of 1662 also described the government of Holland as 
aristocratic and yet emphasised the need for an ‘ansienlijck hooft’ within the 
constitution, who would serve the best interests of the people. In depriving the state of 
this ‘balanceerder’, de Witt and his confederates had left the Republic vulnerable not 
only to internal strife, fanned by ‘pasquilsuchtige schrijvers’ but also likely to be preyed 
upon by foreign powers. The Princes of Orange had employed their authority in the 
services of ‘harmonie’ and prosperity. Provided there were laws and provisions to 
prevent any excess of power accruing to the stadholder this mixed constitution with an 
emphasis on the aristocratic element was ‘in de beste Consonantie en Harmonie al 
gefondeert op een pure Middelmatigheydt’ which avoided the inconveniences of both 
more monarchical and more popular forms of government, while incorporating elements
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of both.-  . In Hollands Opkomst of 1662, the writer re-emphasised the longevity of the 
mixed form of government which had flourished under the Batavians and the Counts. 
Like Grotius, this author favoured an aristocratic model with monarchical elements in 
the form of the stadholder which he argued had endured long and, for that reason, 
should not have been changed.29 Similarly the author of Bedenckingen op het Boek 
‘Interest van Holland’ advocated the Grotian model of a constitutional prince within a 
structure balanced between the polar ends of monarchy and democracy which avoided 
the evils of the pure forms.30 In a dialogue in a pamphlet of 1663 a fictional advocate 
argued for the incorporation of a princely element with reference to Grotius, this form 
of mixed constitution being by ‘de wijste vande werelt tot alleen tijdt voor de sekerste, 
equitabelste ende eerlijckste gepresen’. There was no better adage, he argued, than that 
a state or republic should be maintained by the same maxims that had built and 
sustained it for so long.3 1
These pamphlets saw a crystallising of the Orangist position. Grotius was now 
firmly centre-stage and with him the mixed constitution, the ‘middle way’, ‘balance’ 
and the longevity of the Dutch constitution. Clearly the Orangists were not prepared to 
mount a straightforward attack on the theory of indivisible sovereignty which their 
opponents had culled from Bodin. Indeed, pragmatically, there was no way that they 
could do so without, themselves being caught up in those treacherous waters. Rather 
they concentrated on what was alleged to have worked in the past. Experience was the 
most valued teacher. In the age of Descartes and Spinoza, such sentiments might appear 
an anachronism. Yet they reflected a very deep-seated wariness, endemic in many 
individuals and communities which distrusts abstract reason and values and places its
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trust in institutions which have proved their worth. As with Grotius in  1610, they 
equated longevity with stability and prosperity.
This theme was echoed in what was the first lengthy presentation of the Orangist 
case, a work entitled Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepalde Vryheid which 
appeared in  1669. The author of this work was almost certainly Pieter de Hubert, the 
Pensionary of Zeeland. The previous year 1668 had seen the Prince of Orange installed 
as First Noble of Zeeland and the attempt by Holland to enforce the Perpetual Edict in 
which political and military authority were to be permanently sundered and Holland 
was to eschew the stadholderate in perpetuity. The Prince having reached the age of 
eighteen which many considered to be his majority, Holland’s strategy had been ill- 
received by many of the other provinces. The States of Zeeland drew up a resolution, 
drafted by Hubert in which they resisted Holland, arguing that the stadholderate had 
been a source of both wealth and respect and was based on ‘de oude gronden ende 
maximen daer op de gemeene en provinciale regeeringe deser Landen zijn gefondeert’.
It was founded on ‘een pure middelmatigheyt’. Arguments founded on intellectual 
presuppositions were elbowed aside for in these matters abstract speculations counted 
for nothing, rather ‘de experientie en eygen ondervindinge is her krachtigste bewijs’.  “ 
The response of Holland came in a Deductie of the same year. This document argued 
that these old maxims based on Aristotelian notions; ‘dese School-siecke 
middelmatigheydt’ had long lost their force. Moreover they had no basis in reality for 
the stadholder had been no essential part of the constitution but merely a functionary 
and servant of the autonomous provincial states wherein sovereignty dwelt. The attempt 
of Zeeland to introduce ‘een Directeur ende Balanceerder’ would do no other than 
fatally diminish their hard won liberties and lead only to civil war.33
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Hubert’s Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepaalde Vryheit was an attempt tto 
argue the efficacy of a regime with a stadholder based on the concept of a mixed 
constitution. In his analysis Hubert openly acknowledged his debt to Grotius and much 
of what he wrote is no more than a repetition of the latter’s work of 1610. Longevity, 
for both authors, was certain evidence of  a well founded system of government.
Quoting Polybius, Hubert argued that the mixed constitution with elements of 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy was the best preservative for a state and it. was 
this form which had provided stability in the Netherlands for many hundreds of years 
since the Batavian Republic. Indeed for Hubert
‘t is zeer remarquabel dat deze Hollandsche Republyke van den beginne, dat is al voor de 
heerschappye van J. Caesar, tot deze Tyden van Prins Maurits toe, dat is omtrent duizent en 
zeven hondert jaren by een ende Deselve forme van Regeeringe was blyven staan.
Hubert drew attention to the evidence that this link between constitution and durability 
had been recognised in the previous century. He cited the Corte Vertoninghe of Vranck 
commissioned by the States of Holland and issued in October 1587 and incorporated the 
complete text in an appendix to his work. In this work, a counter blast to the 
Remonstrance of Thomas Wilkes, the States had acknowledged that the provinces of 
Holland had been governed for seven hundred years by counts and countesses ‘den 
welken by de Ridderschap, Edelen ende Steden, representerende de Staten van de 
zelven land, de Heerschappye ende Souverainiteit der zelver Landen weetelyk is 
opgedragen en gedefereert geweest’. During that time, the document stated the 
Provinces had suffered no foreign incursion but rather increasing prosperity. Only the 
Republic of Venice could boast of a similar longevity and stability.
Hubert’s use of this text is interesting. The  content of the Corte Vertoninghe is 
open to differing interpretations but the text has been usually understood to imply a 
popular sovereignty residing in the nobles and towns and administered by the provincial31
States.34 Hubert deployed the text not to question the sovereignty of the States but to 
emphasise the continual presence of a single head and the benefits which has flowed 
from this. Hubert did acknowledge that all had not been plain sailing. In his judgment, 
the ideals of Carol Roorda and later Oldenbamevelt had resulted in ambitious heads 
building castles in the air on the basis of some notional unlimited freedom but 
experience taught that the best form of government was that propounded by Grotius and 
Merula in which the Republic was ‘getempeert uit drie pryswaardige stoffe van 
Regeeringe’, the stadholder representing the monarchical, the States representing the 
aristocratic and the towns representing the democratic element. By this mixed 
constitution, ‘middelmaaf was attained and the dangers of single rule on the one hand 
and licence and anarchy on the other circumvented. Under such a system the Dutch had 
flourished and the attempt by de Witt and his supporters to enact a fundamental change 
in the constitution was ill informed and profoundly dangerous. Hubert was not ashamed 
to enlist the support of Machiavelli in relating the adage of the latter, found in the 
Discorsi, ‘dat men noch altyd de schaduwe van de oude Regeeringh behoorde te 
houden’. This was to take a remark entirely out of context but Hubert was on firmer and 
for Orangists very familiar ground when he urged sagely that, ‘in zaken van Politie is de 
ervarenheid de beste Meestersche’.35
The mixed constitution was to serve the Orangist cause, even after the restoration 
of the stadholderate.In  1675 the advocate Petrus Valkenier published  7 Verwerd 
Europa. In this work Valkenier divided his fellow men into three main categories, those 
who were by nature slavish, those who were lovers of ‘de goude Vryheif and those who 
fell between these two. The constitution of the republic was dependent on the
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predominant nature of the inhabitants. The slavish inclined to the rule of one head and 
nowhere could this be more easily be seen than in the example of the national enemy 
France where the French ‘als eselen de last van een algebiedend Hooft gewillig dragen 
en glorieeren, dat sy in ‘t gehoorsaam van haare koningen blind zyn, en hem als God 
veneeren’. Aristocracy and democracy were the preferred form of rule for those who 
valued freedom. However Valkenier saw these pure forms as prone to degeneration, 
aristocracy to oligarchy and democracy to that tumultous confusion the like of which 
had been seen in the Neapolitan revolt of Mas Anjello and more recently in ‘de generate 
Revolutie’ in the Netherlands of 1672. The solution, for the freedom loving citizen, as 
advocated by Polybius and Valkenier, was the mixed form of constitution which
So getempeert is uyt de dry voorschreven Formen, dat die alle dry daar in wel gerepresenteert 
werden maar gene daar in predomineert en dewelke besaat in de beste consonantie en harmonie, 
zynde gefundeert op een pure middelmatigheyt en gecureert van alle fauten en periculen, die 
elke soorte van Regeeringe onderworpen is.
Thus the Dutch constitution incorporating a stadholder representing the monarchical 
element was a reflection of the freedom loving nature of the citizens of the Netherlands, 
in contrast to the absolute monarchy appropriate for the slavish desires of the French. In 
this instance the mixed constitution was no longer directly associated with a particular 
faction or party but was now held to be emblematic of the Dutch nation in its life or 
death struggle against the French; freedom against slavery.
For Valkenier, as for earlier Orangist writers, this form of government was linked 
to prosperity, longevity and, vitally in the climate of 1675, freedom from foreign 
incursion. Valkenier argued that as long as Sparta had a ‘tempered’ form of 
government, she had been able to ward off all aggressors. The Venetians had enjoyed 
their mixed constitution for over twelve hundred years ‘sonder eenig rimpel of kreuk 
van bejaartheyt en verval te toonen’. Not only had Venice enjoyed wealth and 
independence, but she had, like the republic of Genoa, been content, ‘sich met sijn33
tegenwoordigen Staat vemoegt houde’. This was in sharp contrast to the European 
domination sought by Louis XIV. England with its King, Lords and Commons was 
cited as yet another example of a mixed constitution; a comment which combined a 
degree of accuarcy with an acute sensitivity to the needs of Dutch diplomacy in relation 
to Charles II.
Valkenier reinforced the message which Hubert had propounded in 1669. Like 
Hubert he laid particular emphasis on the  1587 Placard of the States of Holland, and its 
statement that the constitution of Holland and Zeeland had enjoyed a mixture of countly 
authority and States governance for eight hundred years or more. This form of 
government in Valkenier’s analysis had continued until the Great Assembly of 1651 
‘met sulke voorspoet, dat de hele wereld die admireerde, en stelde tot een exempel van 
een volmaakten Staat’. His insistence on the necessity of a stadholder was couched in 
language and imagery which was only too familiar. He wrote that ‘de nootsaakelijkheit 
van een Stadhouder ofte illustre Hooft is van sulken gewicht, dat aan de Decisie van dit 
Politijk Poinct dependeert de Balance van de Geunieerde Provintien’. Was it not the 
illustrious Bodin who had said that many-headed regimes always suffered from external 
aggression or internal discord and that where the government of the many flourished 
this was not due to their mutual counsel, ‘maar alleen van een van de Verstandigste, 
diese in de Balance heeft gehouden, en als een Koning geregeert’? 36
The practical advantages of a single head
Valkenier’s comments on the dangers attendant on a many headed-regime provide a 
suitable introduction for a consistent element in Orangist polemic. Simply expressed, 
this stressed the practical advantages of a single head within the government. On 
occasions, this element of headship was interwoven within the rhetoric of the mixed
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constitution. At other times, the advantages of an ‘opperhoofd’ were presented on 
purely pragmatic grounds without reference to any ideal constitution. This partial 
emphasis on the utilitarian aspects of the stadholderate was considered and deliberate. 
Supporters of the States Party were often to opine that while the stadholderate had 
evolved in the past as as representative of the sovereign, now that the sovereign, that is 
the provincial states, was present, there was simply no requirement for any individual 
stadholder. This argument was promulgated in the Apologie of 1663 where the  . 
stadholder was described as ‘een Houder ofte Bekleder van een andersmans plaets, die 
self absent ofte niet tegenwoordig is’ with the accompanying conclusion that now such 
a position was surplus to requirements for ‘de Hooge Overigheydt selver tegenwoordig 
is’. 37 This was not an arena of debate which the Orangists wished to enter. Rather they 
emphasised both a constitutional framework and equally important, the practical 
advantages, of a single head.
Valkenier placed this theme within the language of the mixed constitution. In his 
depiction of events since  1650 and the end of the stadholderate an intended pure 
aristocratic form had degenerated, as such forms would, into an oligarchy. In 
Valkenier’s words the government of de Witt had ‘uit een Getemperden en Perfecten 
staat eene puyre Aristocratie ingevoert, dat sy in een Oligarchic verbasterde en lichtelijk 
ook tot een Monarchic hadden konnen ontaarden’. The rule of such an oligarchy would 
provoke a popular democratic reaction, the chaos of which would hasten the onset of a 
monarchical form of government, intent on restoring stability and order. For Valkenier 
1672 had witnessed a ‘generale Revolutie en Omkeeringe van de Aristocratie’, the 
restoration of the stadholderate substituting instead ‘de oude getempeerde Regeeringe 
by dewelke desen Staat altyd hadden welgevaren’. 38 Thus the stadholderate became not
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a vehicle for monarchical pretensions but the pivotal part of a mixed constitution 
intended specifically to prevent the excesses of single head government.
This theme was not Valkenier’s alone. A print of 1674, issued at the time when 
the stadholderate was proclaimed hereditary, depicts a figure entitled Anticurius van 
Loevesteyn. This creature, depicted in human form, was bom it was alleged in 1650 and 
portrayed at the height of his powers. His hat, which the figure presents as the hat of 
freedom, is sheer deceit for under the shadow of its broad brim is concealed his desire to 
be ‘Monarch over de vrye landen’ and, to this end, his mouth spews forth a host of 
named pamphlets slandering the House of Orange and its supporters. On his cuffs 
protruding beneath the sleeves of his jacket he bears the mottoes ‘Oligarchia’ and 
‘Monarchia’for it is insisted he hoped by means of marital alliance, intrigue and 
hypocrisy ‘in alle Steden de regeringh aen eenige geslachten, en daer na aen sich alleen, 
te trecken’. 39 The re-established stadholderate and the crushing of the Perpetual Edict 
have thwarted his strategy.
This theme was not new, though in the light of events of 1672, Valkenier 
developed it more thoroughly than most commentators. It is characteristic of Orangist 
polemic that at times of acute tension within the body politic, the dangers of a pure 
aristocracy degenerating into a closed self seeking oligarchy were emphasised. This 
plaint surfaced in  1650 when the contentious issue of the decommissioning of troops 
brought fundamental issues of sovereignty to the fore culminating in the Prince’s 
aborted attempt to occupy Amsterdam by military force. A notorious Orangist pamphlet 
of that year entitled Bickerse Beroerten deployed the type of argument which Valkenier 
was to use. The anonymous writer of 1650 reiterated the judgment of classical 
authorities in contending that an ‘Aristocratique oft Borgerlicke Regeringhen’ could not 
exist in perpetuity for such would always be destroyed either by foreign aggression or,
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more commonly, by internal strife. It was characteristic of many-headed government 
that ‘die niet altijdts zijnde van een humeur ende drift’ and without any single head or 
monarchical element to control this disparate self interest, the state would be tom apart, 
‘hebbende geen persoon noch middel om hen in blance te houden’. The author 
commented that ‘ick bekenne dat dese Sieckte gemeyn is in alle Aristocratique 
Regeeringen’.40
A similar warning was issued by the author of Haegh’s Hof-Praetje in 1662. He 
argued that the heart of man was, by nature, proud and ambitious and sought rather his 
own interest than that of the common good. This view, expressed in language very 
similar to that of de la Court, led to the contention that ‘is men geen hooft, men soeckt 
het te werden’. The author alleged that this was indeed what had happened in some 
Dutch towns where, in the absence of a stadholderate, certain great families ruled like 
princes, elevating their friends and relatives to office and all under the soubriquet of 
popular government. This form of governance could not persist for the experience of 
classical Rome demonstrated that what had begun as a collegiate form of government 
had been reduced to that of a Triumvirate and finally a single Emperor. Glancing across 
the channel, he pointed to the many headed Republic from which the Protectorate of 
Cromwell had issued forth.  Such a development was an inevitable concomitant of the 
disorder and disunity resulting from many headed rule. This could be seen, he alleged, 
in the factious nature of some town politics in the United Provinces since the death of 
William II, a situation which he compared in an excess of hyperbole, to the late 
medieval struggles of Hoeks and Kabeljauws. 41 His language was echoed by the author 
of Hollands Op-komst of 1662. In refutation of the attack on a single head in de la 
Court’s Interest van Holland, this author contended, from biblical sources, that when 
there was no ‘opper-hooft’ in Israel, ‘elke deed wat hy wilde’. If there was no prince,
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then each man tried to become one. Like, Valkenier, he argued that in the multi-headed 
government which ensued, stronger characters would prevail and there would be an 
inexorable movement towards monarchy. The English Republic and the emergence of 
Cromwell as Lord Protector was held once more to be evidence to support this theory. 42 
In line with this argument John de Witt was depicted at critical times in Orangist 
polemic as another Cromwell. Both had deposed the lawful ruler and imposed an 
oligarchy dominated by a personal autocracy.  In 1653 with demonstrations raging in 
favour of the young Prince William HI, the author of Ondeckinghe van den 
Nederiantschen cancker fulminated that de Witt sought peace with England as he and 
his fellow regents were ‘van Ghelijke Maximen met haar’. Both sought to establish a 
military oligarchy, root out all descendants of Orange and Stuart and reduce their fellow 
citzens to slaves.43 In the crisis year of 1672 a pamphlet purported to catalogue the 
contents of John de Witt's library included alongside the works attributed to de la Court 
and Spinoza’s Tractus Theologico-Politicus,di work entitled De verresen Cromwel with 
the subtitle in de Person van M.Ian. 44 A pamphlet of late August  1672 published in 
Amsterdam accused de Witt of attempting to smother the infant William III in his 
cradle, both literally and figuratively we must presume, and asserted that he would share 
the netherworld with the regicides Cromwell, Bradshaw and Peters. 45
At other less volatile times, Orangists were merely content to emphasise the 
disadvantages of a government with many heads and the sedition and chaos which they 
argued would ensue. Following the death of William II, a writer of 1650  bemoaned the 
fate of the United Provinces without the Prince describing the state as a  ‘body without a 
head', a ‘ship without a rudder’ and the ‘sheep without their shepherd’.46 These are
42 H ollands Op-komst ofte Bedenkingen op de Schaadelijke Schriften genaamt Graafelyke Regeeringe en 
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images of leaderless disorder. The disasters of the naval war against England in 1653 
accompanied by pro-Orangist demonstrations fanned by hunger and unemployment 
provided the setting for further rhetoric bemoaning the absence of a single head. In a 
poem commemorating the death of Admiral Harpertszoon Tromp in 1653 the poet Jan 
Six van Chandelier compared the loss of this ‘prins te water’ with the death of William 
II, the ‘prins te land’.  This was a double blow for the Republic for in Six van 
Chandelier’s words
Nu hanght het hoofd van Nederlands hoofden,
Noch meer bedeest, om dien ontroofden.
For this writer the consequences of the death of the stadholder were clear. He asked 
rhetorically
Wat schiep de dood des Prins te land,
Ons niet al schaade, twist en schaand?4 7
Jan Six van Chandelier was to repeat this theme in a poem of the same year 
entitled ‘De Koninghlyke Regeeringe, met de Byen Vergeleeken’. He described the 
harmonious and industrious and bee-hive stricken with disaster on the death of its king 
or ‘groote Heer’.
Maar komt een dodelik teegenweer 
Den kroonedrager wegh te rukken,
Zoo springt de ronde hoep, aan stukken.
Het heele ryk dat valt om weer.
Geheime tweedracht ingelaaten,
By’t goudgeel voksken, stookt het vier 
Van twisten onder ‘t kleine dier.
47  'Uitvaard van Marten Harpertszoon Tromp, Ridder’, in Jan.  Six van  Chandelier.Gedichten, 2 vols, ed. 
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This internal disorder not only shatters the harmony and prosperity of the kingdom but 
it also leaves it vulnerable to attack from hostile forces beyond its frontiers, in this case 
the England of Cromwell. Thus following the death of stadholder William II.
Daar werd geen honigh meer gebooren, 
‘t Gemeene best gaat verlooren 
Ten beste van de plunderingh.
The English fall upon the stricken kindom like ravenous birds of prey. However there is 
a remedy for the kingdom’s ills. Six van Chandelier advises
O vorsteloose hoonigby,
Indien ghe wilt in ruste bloeijen,
Zoo laat Oranjes telg, aan ‘t groeijen, 
Beschaaduwen uw landery.48
Six van Chandelier's remedy was finally to be adopted. Faced not only with the 
catastrophic French invasion but also the threat of internal dissolution, the Prince of 
Orange was appointed in  1672 to the office of captain general which had been held by 
his forefathers.  An anonymous author commended the States of Holland for their action 
and relished the advent of the king bee in these perilous times.
G’lijck onder Bye-vlught veld-toghtigh tot het stormen,
Op weyde, en Thuyn-lof, om haar winter schuur te vormen, 
En kleyne huysjes vol te laen met morgen Dauw, 
Wannerder twist onstaet ontrent verwarde benden,
Haar Koningh, door sijn komst weet ‘t onheyl af te wenden, 
Verstelt dit Raedt-  besluyt ‘t onredelijcke Grauw.49
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However, usually the images of disorder conjured up by the Orangists were more 
prosaic and repetitious.. The author of a pamphlet of 1651 argued that the pure 
aristocratic form of government was prone to discord and hence tardiness in decision 
making for ‘veel hoofden, soo veel sinnen’.50 Jan Zoet, an ardent Orangist, 
characterised the confusion of multiple leadership in homely imagery. In his poem Veel 
Hoofden, veel Zinnen, he set the scene.
Daar veel Hoofden, steeg van zinnen,
Zijn vergaadert in den Raad,
Om den Rokken af te spinnen,
Oh! daar werd gestaag den draad.5 1
An author of 1662  urged the States of Holland to contemplate the restoration of a 
stadholderate for
.. .door ‘t heffen van een Hooft,
Soo wort ons Vaderlandt van alle twist berooft.5 2
By  1672, the many-headed Hydra had become emblematic of the government of de 
Witt, a monster whose chief heads had, in the words of an Orangist writer, been sliced 
off by the death of the two brothers in the Hague in August of that year.53
There were indeed practical disadvantages, Orangists argued, in the absence of a 
head. Polemic made much of the tardiness in decision making which was alleged to be 
characteristic of a many-headed government. This was particularly pertinent at times of 
war. A pamphlet published in  1652 purported to contain comments made by English 
members of Parliament to a servant of Charles II in which they indiscreetly revealed 
what they believed to be critical Dutch weaknesses. Chief among these was the inability 
of the Republic's government to reach speedy decisions. Also characteristic of the
50 Knuttel.  no. 7009, p. 8.
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Republic it was alleged was a high level of corruption. A many headed government left 
numerous individuals involved in decision making and open to bribery to reveal secrets 
and influence strategy.54 In a pamphlet of the same year a fictional merchant bemoaned 
the fact that ‘onse Provincien dikwijls te lang delibeereeren, eer sy tot goede resolutie 
konnen komen’.This was ‘een gemeene plaag hier te lande’. The common people, he 
alleged, were deeply mistrustful of such delays and believed that the regents involved 
many have been bribed by powers hostile to the Republic.55 The author of Haeghs Hof- 
Praetje of 1662, writing in peacetime, asserted that a stadholder was essential for 
speedy resolution and secrecy both of which were now lacking.56 War in 1672 saw a 
return of these accusations. In a work of that year the author contended that a single 
head could act swiftly and resolutely without reference to numerous competing 
interests. Moreover, the government leaked like a sieve. He quoted Jan Evertszoon, the 
Admiral of Zeeland, who fulminated that in the Dutch Republic his orders were known 
to the enemy before he had ever had the chance of opening them.57
There is no doubt that secrecy was more difficult to achieve in the Dutch Republic 
than elsewhere. From  1650 to  1672 all commanders at sea and on land sent their 
dispatches to the States General and attempts to limit access to sensitive material were 
thwarted. Of the correspondence arriving for consideration by the States of Holland, 
there was little discrimination made between items for public review and those of a 
more secret nature.58 The Orangist’s complaints may have been entirely related to the 
problems of maintaining secrecy in the Republic. However, there was a long tradition in 
political writing which emphasised the problems of government without a single head. 
Francesco Guicciardini in his ‘Considerations upon the Discourses of Machiavelli’ 
expressed a view common in early modem Europe when he wrote,
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I will say that the advantage of princely rule is that affairs are governed much better, in a more 
orderly manner, and with greater speed, security and determination, when they depend on the 
will of one man alone, than when a number of people are involved.59
It may be that the Orangists were both commentating on contemporary realities and 
drawing on the rhetoric of the past when they castigated their opponents.
The industrious hive
Jan Six van Chandelier’s hive of bees with their king had been both harmonious and 
productive. Before the death of William II in 1650 Orangist rhetoric had often presumed 
that the presence of a stadholder had created circumstances in which trade and 
commerce could flourish. In a print of Prince Maurice designed by Adrian van 
Nieuwelandt and engraved by Symon de Pas under the privileges of the States General 
prominent on the far left of the composition was the figure of Trade bearing a ship in 
her left hand and a smaller vessel on her head. This plate was also to be used in honour 
of Frederick Henry and William III.60 Seafaring and commerce also had a place in a 
print of Frederick Henry dated to  1647 and reproduced in a work of Commelin in  1651. 
Here the seated stadholder is flanked by the figures of  freedom and vigilance with a 
bare breasted figure of commerce carrying the body of a ship.61
It is interesting that during the  1650’s Orangist propaganda made virtually no use 
of these themes. To be fair, they were not under challenge. From 1652, polemic was 
concerned with the conduct of the war against England and in  1654 and 1655 the 
predominate issue was the Exclusion of the young prince of Orange.  This situation 
changed abruptly in  1662 with Pieter de la Court’s Interest van Holland. For de la Court 
it was axiomatic that princes and monarchs did not aspire to the welfare of the majority
59 Francesco Guicciardini. Selected Writings,  ed. by C. Grayson (Oxford,  1965), p. 63
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but rather sought their own interests even at the cost of common misfortune. They 
favoured the villages and countryside at the expense of the towns whose power and 
influence they feared. The prosperity of the province of Holland which could be 
observed by all was no work of the stadholders but the result of the religious toleration 
which attracted individuals and skills from far beyond the frontiers. The stadholders had 
indeed harmed commercial development. It was the stadholder and his supporters in the 
States General whose counsel had resulted in the mismanagement of the West India 
Company. Frederick Henry had neglected to clear the seas of pirates, instead 
withdrawing funds from the Admiralty. It was even alleged that William II had paid 
Sicilian corsairs to seize the ships of Amsterdam. To those who complained of heavy 
taxation and its effects on commerce, de la Court insisted that such levels of taxation 
were but a legacy of the unnecessarily belligerent policy of successive Orange 
stadholders.62
De la Court’s argument was taken up by others who were critical of the Orange 
stadholderate. The author of Den Oprechten Stadthouder acknowledged that he could 
not support all the arguments of de la Court against princes and he deplored the fact that 
arguments such as these were rehearsed before the common people. However he 
concurred with de la Court’s thesis that the Holland towns furthered their own interests 
best in the absence of a stadholder for ‘dese dwinglandy der Vorsten en willen geen 
koop-steden lijden’. He drew on the example of the city of Naples where merchants and 
tradespeople were hampered by the heavy taxes on goods imposed by their King and 
thus lost trade to other towns.63 In a pamphlet of 1666 a fictional Amsterdammer opined 
that the stadholders had milked his townsmen of all their wealth to reward their soldiers 
and lackeys to the detriment of the province’s prosperity. 64 In a pamphlet of 1672 an 
anonymous supporter of the States Party argued that the Perpetual Edict of 1667 had
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upheld not only the freedom but the prosperity of the province. Previously, during the 
time of the stadholders, only eight or nine East Indiamen returned each year but now 
eighteen, nineteen or twenty were returning annually loaded with cargo. The treaty of 
commerce with France in  1662, the Peace of Breda with England in 1668 and the Triple 
Alliance of 1668 between the Dutch Republic, England and Sweden were all lauded as 
precursors of increasing commerce and prosperity. 65
The Orangists were stung to respond and the presumed link between the 
stadholderate and prosperity quickly became a consistent feature in Orangist rhetoric. 
Parival in his Ware Interest van Holland of 1662 argued that merchants and traders 
needed a stadholder ‘om bevrijt te zijn van het oproer des gemenen volks’. Venice had 
shown the way with her Doge. Contrary to the arguments of de la Court, it was in the 
interests of governors, as Parival called them, to enrich their citizens. Here was no 
divergence of interest. It was Maurice who had presided over the setting up the great 
trading companies such as East and West Indies Company and the Muscovy Company. 
He had encouraged the whaling industry and all had benefited from the attacks on the 
great Spanish silver fleets. The debacle in Brazil had taught the world how unfit trading 
interests alone were to govern a colony. De la Court might argue that the stadholders 
sought only to enrich themselves at the nations costs but Parival drew the finger of 
accusation at the regents of Holland with their ‘cierlijcke gebouwen, kostelijk huisraet, 
karossen, paerden en andere tekenen van overvloedt’.66
The attack continued in the following year. The author of den Herstelden Prins 
pointed to the examples of Venice and Genoa where prosperity and commercial success 
occurred under a government with an ‘opperhoofd’. Emphasising the virtues of a 
government with a ‘schijn’ of monarchy he urged his fellow countrymen and 
countrywomen to reflect on the French adage, ‘trois choses font profiter rhomme, la
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Science, La Mer et la Maison Royale’.  In another pamphlet of 1663 a fictional 
minister of the Reformed Church alluded to the heavy burden of taxation currently 
borne by his fellow citizens and in sharp contrast to de la Court opined that single heads 
or monarchs were often more responsive to their subjects needs. A fictional Geldersman 
referred pointedly to the burdensome cost of enlarging towns and building new town 
halls. In his view the fishing industry was still vigorous but other sectors of trade and 
industry were now declining particularly in contrast to such countries as France. All 
things objectively considered, the author asserted that the stadholders had encouraged 
wealth and prosperity and the nation was the poorer for their absence. 68
The intense polemic of 1672 saw a return to the theme. An anonymous author 
returned to the attack against the presumptions of de la Court’s Interest van Holland and 
his contention that the stadholderate had played no part in the nation’s prosperity. On 
the contrary, he protested, ‘soo en kan men oock niet ontkennen dat geduerende de 
directie en ‘t bewint van de Princen van Orangie, de gronden en fondamenten van onse 
Negotie gheleyt zyn.69 A poem of the same year, published in pamphlet form, 
emphasised that, contrary to the rhetoric of de la Court, the interests of prince and 
people were one and the same. The author wrote of the Holland maid who planted an 
orange tree in her garden which provided shelter and fruit. The interdependence of the 
two was total for ‘de voorspoet van den een de voorspoet was van d’ander’. However 
the figure of ‘Nijdt’ broke into the garden, hacked down the tree and lulled the maid to 
sleep. Disaster was averted when a young twig  of that tree sprouted heavenwards to 
restore the honour of his forefathers and ‘de Tuyn van Hollant weer doen bloeyen als 
voor heen’.70
67 Knuttel, no.  8806A, pp. 7, 9.
68 Knuttel, no.  8806D, pp. 6,  10, 24, 229, 272..
69 Knuttel, no. 9954, p.30.
70 Knuttel,  no.  10628, np.46
Clearly this was an occasion where the Orangists had not taken the lead but had 
been stung into action by the polemic of their opponents. They had identified that de la 
Court’s rhetoric struck at the core of their argument with its assertion that princes and 
stadholders looked only to their own interests and not the common good. It was vital 
that the States Party should not be able to depict themselves as the guardians of the 
nation’s welfare. Hence not merely the counter arguments but the language of the 
interpendency in the image of the garden which flourishs under the shelter of the, tree 
and whose fertility is impaired until the severed trunk grows again.
What type of Prince
The Orangists used both constitutional and utilitarian arguments to justify the existence 
of a stadholderate but we may well ask what type of institution they intended. In 
examining this, it is important to bear in mind that factional polemic is often shaped by 
the arguments of opponents and this can be seen in the Orangist defence of the 
stadholderate. Following the death of William II, writers hostile to the House of Orange 
argued consistently that the stadholders had aimed to become monarchs rather than 
servants of the provincial States. This strategy played on genuine apprehensions among 
some sections of the community. Aitzema recorded in January 1651 that at the baptism 
of the young prince William III, ‘som did not take it well that the halberdiers went by 
the Coach sides of the young prince, nor that the childe was covered with Ermyn-fur, 
black on white, that being royal’.71 Political pamphlets exploited the theme. A writer of 
1655 described how the Emperor Augustus in order to vest himself with supreme 
authority had deceived the magistrates by appearing to uphold the old forms of 
government and mouthing slogans of freedom. He had kept the old title of Prince with 
which the people were familiar and had eschewed the title of King, ‘hoewel hy de
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macht van ‘t Rijck als een Heer ofte Koninck in sijn handt hadde ghebruyckte’. 
Similarly in France Charles Martel had always referred to himself as ‘First Noble’ 
though he had exercised all the authority pertaining to a king.72 The moral was clear. 
The stadholders might retain their title and the outward forms of the constitution while 
exercising monarchical authority. A pamphlet of 1663 was more direct. In the view of 
this author, the former stadholders had acted against the privileges and prestige of the 
States ‘omme dese alderwettigste Regeeringe met gewelt ende listigheyt de voet te 
ligten, ende op haer selven allenig Monarchael over te brengen’.73  The threat of 
monarchy reared its head once more when a fictional citizen of Delft assured his 
travelling companions on a barge from Dordrecht to Rotterdam that those who 
supported the Prince were not true Hollanders. They wanted, he asserted, a crowned 
head at the expense of the country’s freedoms and privileges.74
The situation was complicated from the Orangist point of view by the strategy of 
the brothers de la Court. In their Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat published in 
1660 they made it plain that, in their analysis kings, princes and stadholders were one 
and the same. They wrote of Holland as now liberated from a long enduring slavery 
under Emperors, Counts and Princes and deplored those writers who filled their books 
with ‘schand en schaedlikke Monarchale pluimstrijkeryen’. They defined a monarchy as 
a state in which one person alone gave all the orders and the others obeyed. They 
acknowledged that monarchy might have its advantages. The single head might protect 
his people the better to increase his own power against external enemies and internal 
foes. He could seek counsel from whosever he wished and did not need long 
deliberations with other interested bodies. However, a monarch was subject to all 
human passions and surrounded by flatterers. There was no individual or body to inhibit 
his natural inclination to concentrate power in his own person. Monarchs came to power
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in different ways. Some inherited the crown. Others usurped the authority of those 
whom they had represented just as ‘ ‘t gelukte den Prince van Oranjen als Stadhouder, 
te schoppen den koningh Philips van Spanjen als Graven van Holland’. However the 
vigour and vitality of the usurper was often diminished and corrupted in the offspring, 
as seen in the persons and policies of Frederick Henry and William n.7 5  In this analysis, 
the Orange stadholders did not aspire to monarchical power; in effect they already 
enjoyed it.
Orangists therefore had to be cautious in the arguments they deployed to defend a 
single head. As we have seen many Orangists writers argued that the stadholderate 
represented the monarchical element in a mixed constitution. They were, however, 
usually careful to refute any suggestion that the stadholder functioned as a monarch. 
Some sailed closer to the wind than others. For David Blondel writing in 1653, the 
advantage of some type of single head was apparent for,
il est indubitable que plus les ordres du gouvemment aboutissent a l’unitd, et approchent des 
perfections de 1 ’Estat Monarchiques qui semble estre un image plus expresse de l’empire de 
Dieu; plus ils sont efficacieus, faciles et de prompte execution.76
It is not likely that Blondel here was recommending monarchy for the United Provinces. 
He may simply have been reiterating a view common in the universities where political 
systems were discussed in the abstract withour reference to the vagaries of individual 
states. Boxhom in his posthumous Institutiones Politicae of 1657 had described 
monarchy as the oldest and most secure form of government but there was no 
suggestion that this was a recipe for the Dutch Republic.77 More pertinent perhaps is the 
fact that Blondel was a prominent French Calvinist who was amongst those who had
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seen a strong monarchy as the sole means of securing religious toleration in France. 
Appointed as Professor at the Athenaeum in Amsterdam in 1650, he may not have been 
sensitive to the different political nuances in the Dutch Republic of that time.78
Other writers were more cautious. Parival writing in 1662 argued that headship 
was intrinsic to human relations. Only the beasts without the power of reason had no 
‘opperhooft’. In human society, ‘de onderdanen hebben een Meester, de zoldaten hun 
kapiteyn, de jonge kinderen hun Opperhooft, namentlijck hun vader’. However this was 
no explicit plea for monarchy. He attacked de la Court’s analysis on the grounds that 
‘hy tusschen het woort Gouvemeur en Monarch, gheen onderscheidt maekt’. For Parival 
there was a clear distinction between monarchs who are constitutionally able to demand 
obedience and whose nature and that of their servants favours ‘strengheit’ and the 
position of a governor or stadholder.79 The author of Bedenkingen Op het Boek ‘Interest 
van Holland’ of 1662 also drew on the animal kingdom though his kingdom of the 
beasts was strictly hierarchical in nature. The lion was monarch of all the animals while 
the eagle ruled amongst the birds and the whale amongst the fish of the sea. However, 
this author emphasised that such analogies were not to be read as an argument for 
monarchy for such an institution  ‘strijt tegen de nature der Inwoonders’. Rather the 
Republic required a ‘head’ whoser power was limited and dependent on the States 
General.80
However de la Court’s conflation of monarchy and the stadholderate led some 
Orangist writers of the 1660’s to adopt the strategy of defending both institutions. In a 
pamphlet of 1663 den Herstelden Prins the author argued that de la Court’s criticisms 
of monarchy were invalid. Monarchs did not seek to render their subjects powerless for 
the interests of both king and people were inextricably linked. Just as David and
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Solomon ruled their kingdoms wisely, there were present day monarchs whose authority 
was equally beneficent. If faults there were, then these must be imputed to individuals 
and not to the institution itself. The benefits which the author alleged flowed from 
monarchical rule were also clearly held to be present in a government with a stadholder 
or prince. However, the stadholder was no monarch for the States could impose limits 
upon his authority whereas, in this analysis, the monarch or Count ruled unfettered. The 
States conferred part of their authority and lustre upon the person of the stadholder who, 
in his turn, bestowed to the Republic and the world beyond the splendour bestowed 
upon him and his own personal glory as one of the great princely families of Europe. 
Such a single head or ‘opperhoofd’ was in no wise incompatible with a Republic. 81 A 
pamphlet published of the same year similarly asserted that monarchs and single heads 
were both bound to the common welfare of their subjects and their endeavours in this 
matter might outdo those of a headless Republic.82
Pieter de Hubert writing in  1669 equally emphasised that the stadholderate was no 
monarchy for such a form of government was alien to the Dutch. Drawing on the 
history of the Batavians and their predecessors he argued that the so called kings of 
those times were rather princes to whom powers had been delegated. The Prince of 
those times was merely ‘primus inter pares’, elevated beyond his peers by his eminent 
qualities but circumscribed by the laws established by them. This limited authority was 
the hallmark of a state with a prince who directed peace and war but who was no 
absolute monarch. Moving easily like Grotius from that distant time to the present, he 
sketched a Republic in which ‘de hoogste Regeeringe is geweest by de Staten dezer 
landen’, the States enjoying what he described as ‘macht’, perhaps here the ultimate
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sovereignty while the prince is endowed with ‘gezag’ emanating from the authority 
bestowed on him by the States as a result of his own pre-eminence.83
One pamphlet however argued that the powers of the stadholderate should be 
extended and the author firmly embraced the language of monarchy.  This work Het 
Hollandts A.B.Boeck was printed in  1672, probably in or about the month of July.  Its 
unknown author opined that after extensive reading and study of different forms 
political structure, he considered monarchy to be far superior to any other form of 
government. This single headed form of government was indubitably the oldest. Adam, 
the first man, had been king over the newly created world while God himself had 
assumed the role of sovereign in the early history of Israel. Nothing could more 
adequately bear witness to the authority of monarchical governments ‘als dat sy zijn die 
Godt op der Aerde representeerf. This author reverted firmly to the language of head 
and body. Each body or state could only have one head otherwise the state would be no 
more than a monstrous hydra. He conceded that monarchy could more easily degenerate 
to tyranny than aristocratic or popular governments but argued that the ill was more 
easily cured for with the death of a tyrant his abuse of power ceased and the people 
were free to elect any future king. Sickness in a government of many heads, however, 
infected the whole body politic and was far more difficult to eradicate. This argument 
may refer back obliquely to the death of the stadholder William II whom some would 
have characterised as an aspiring tyrant and whose death resolved this issue. States 
Party polemic did make much of the fact that there was, in practice, little to hinder a 
stadholder bent on personal sovereignty. Death had provided the answer as the author 
suggests.
From monarchs the author moved smoothly to princes and the argument that a 
single head and prince was essential to the security and prosperity of the United
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Provinces. The history of the provinces under the Counts bore testimony to this 
contention. However, he considered that the present circumstances required a 
reappraisal of the powers available to the Orange stadholderate. Many of the enemies of 
William HI were still in power both at civic and provincial level and they were plotting 
revenge. He argued that in this particular perilous situation the powers of the stadholder 
and captain general were too limited and urged that a greater honour would be gained 
by the state if ‘den Heere en Prince soude mogen doen ‘jure potestatis’, t ghene de 
Stadthouders en Capiteynen Generaels gedaen hebben by toelatingen en concessie’.The 
Prince of Orange by virtue of his birth and royal connections was eminently suited to 
this sovereign authority .By means of sound laws and privileges there could be ‘een 
goede harmonie tusschen de macht en authoriteyt den Prince competerende en de 
gerechtigheyt des volx’. Structures of  authority could be so well devised ‘dat de Prince 
is Souverayn en de Magistraet als sijn Parlement’. 84
This pamphlet must be treated in context. By early July 1672 cities such as 
Dordrecht were compelling their regents to sign a document renouncing the Perpetual 
Edict. William 1 1 1  would then be able to become stadholder of Holland as well as 
captain general. With enemies of the stadholderate still holding authority in many other 
cities, Valkenier supported by a group of Amsterdam regents was speaking of a plan to 
make William Count on terms similar to those offered to his forefather William 1  before 
the latter’s untimely death.85 We can trace this development in pamphlet literature. One 
writer warned all lovers of the Fatherland and supporters of the Prince of Orange that 
the hatred of some regents for William HI was so great that it was impossible to restore 
the country to her former glory while they still held authority. As stadholder William 
would not have the authority to challenge them. The only solution was that William 
should be declared Count of Holland for his lifetime and his successors should inherit
84 Knuttel, no.  10598, pp. 4-18.
85 Japikse.  I,  206-207.53
the office. This strategy would also result in peace with England and the Elector of 
Brandenburg, the Prince’s uncle, would then be well inclined to the Dutch.86 Another 
writer argued that it was essential that the prince had the power necessary to drive out 
both external and internal enemies and this could only be achieved if he were elevated 
to the position of count.87  A poem of 1672 entitled Aenspraeck tot de Bedruckte 
Hollandtsche Bruydt urged the nation, ‘Orangien zy u Hooft, u Vorst, u GraafP.88
Works such as these must be seen as evidence of a movement among certain of 
the supporters of the Prince of Orange but they cannot be held to be representative of all 
those who favoured the restoration of the stadholderate. William IQ did not become 
Count and it would appear that there was no great desire among the Orangists of the 
political classes that he should do so. That there were many Orangists who did value the 
checks and balances inherent in the position of the stadholderate can be seen by their 
unenthusiastic reaction in  1675 to the suggestion that William III should become Duke 
of Gelderland.
Following the re-incorporation of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland into the 
Union of Utrecht in  1674, in January 1675 the three quarters of Gelderland offered 
William the Dukedom of the province and the countship of Zutphen. There is little 
doubt that the move was encouraged by the Prince’s circle and he himself was aware of 
it. Not only would William HI receive the title of a sovereign within the province but 
since Gelderland was by tradition the first among the provinces, it might be expected 
that others would come forward with similar offers. The province of Utrecht approved 
the decision but Holland demurred. Towns where the Orangists were strongest such as 
Haarlem, Leiden and Enkhuizen were in the vanguard of those who disapproved. The 
States of Zeeland advised him to follow the example of the scriptural Gideon who had
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spumed the offers of monarchy after he had freed his people from the ravages of the 
Midianites.89
The rhetoric which ensued bore many of the features which had characterised the 
pamphlets against the House of Orange during the years 1650-1672. For one writer of 
1675 William EPs elevation to the Dukedom of Gelderland was indicative of that same 
‘hoogmoedige geest’ which had characterised his father William IFs attempts to gain 
sovereignty in the Republic. The court was awash with nobility and soldiery all seeking 
to fulfil their own amibitions by encouraging the pretensions of the stadholder. This 
author was prepared to tolerate headship of a limited kind such as occurred in those 
worthy states of Venice and Genoa but he preferred the example of the Swiss who
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eschewed any form of headship amongst them.  Another writer repeated this theme 
when he warned both regents and subjects that their passion for the Prince of Orange 
would cause them to fall victim to the machinations of the nobility and soldiers who 
surrounded the prince and scorned the towns and citizens of the Republic.91 Yet another 
pamphlet allegedly printed in Antwerp contended that the prince of Orange sought 
sovereignty and urged the provinces to make a new Union with one another and compel 
the Prince to promise, ‘dat hy met de digniteyten en ampten van sijne Voorsaaten te 
vreeden wesen sal, en nooyt tegen de Staat yets te contrarie tenteeren’.92 Here, the 
stadholdership of William III was accepted, at least in theory, but the author argued that 
the balance of powers within the Republic had been fatally altered and it was vital for 
the provinces together to take action together to correct this.
What is noticeable at this period is the absence of Orangist propaganda in favour 
of the Prince assuming the title Duke of Gelderland. It is as if there is a common 
consensus that this is a step too far. A print of 1675 by Romeyn de Hooghe depicted the
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offer of the dukedom to William. Even here there was a note of ambiguity. William was 
depicted as a Roman General carrying the hat of freedom. To his right was sited a 
woman grasping the seven arrows representing the seven provinces with her foot resting 
on a foot warmer bearing the word ‘Unio’. A woman bearing the motto ‘dankbare 
veriooningh’ is about to lower the crown of the Dukedom onto William’s head while 
above them in the clouds his illustrious ancestors the Emperor Adolf, Rene de Chalons 
and the Orange stadholders look down. All this is properly celebratory but there are 
hints of unease. William is depicted drawn in Victory’s chariot by  a figure portrayed as 
an athlete with a lion’s skin who bears the motto ‘drift der Gemeente’.93 It is a 
perturbing notion that a strategy is being led, not followed, by the voice of the people 
and there may be here some implied criticism of the absence of wiser counsels.
Certainly on 20th February  1675 William turned down the offer fulminating that his 
enemies were accusing him of seeking to extend his own power as a result of the war.
It would appear that those few pamphlets of 1672 advocating the Countship for 
William HI marked the high water mark of certain Orangist aspirations. As we have 
seen most Orangist writers placed the seat of power firmly with the provincial States 
though they were not always explicit as to where the boundaries of the authority of the 
prince lay. In part this was the result of semantic confusion and ambiguity. Orangists 
commonly used such terms as  ‘rudder’ and ‘steersman’ to refer to the person and 
authority of the stadholder. In 1650 a pamphlet bemoaning the death of William II 
referred to the bereaved Republic as ‘een schip sonder roer’94 while verse on a print of 
1672 at the height of the French invasion bewailed the fate of the Netherlands Maid 
who ‘zit alleenelijk op ‘t Schipje zonder roer’.95 The pamphlet Grondigh Bericht 
nopende den Interest van desen Staet of 1651 referred to the stadholder as the 
‘stierman’ of the Republic but emphasised the mutual dependency of Prince and
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provincial States.96 These usages were not novel. In a pamphlet entitled A 
Remonstrance to the States General about the restoration and maintenance of the States 
of Holland published in 1584 following the murder of William of Orange, the author 
contended that the enterprise faced shipwreck and it was essential to appoint a new 
helmsman to ensure that the vessel safely reached port. Prouninck’s Apology of 1587 
again deployed the analogy of the ship when he argued that in a storm a ship at sea must 
be navigated by a helmsman of high rank.97  These publications clearly referred to the 
necessity of a single head at a time of war but they were no appeal for a monarchical 
type of government. In the publication Aden van de Vredehandel gheschiet te Colen the 
spokesman for the States General, Aggaeus van Albada drew on a reference from the 
work Vindiciae contra tyrannos of 1579 when he argued that the prince was but a 
custodian and executor of the law and a servant of the ship of state. The prince did 
indeed hold the position of steersman but it was the whole people who were masters of 
the vessel. 98 We may presume that Orangists writers of later times deployed this 
language in the same way, in which case they were clearly arguing for limited executive 
authority.
Orangists were also inclined to describe the stadholders as ‘pillars’ of the 
Republic. In an elegy on the death of William II an unknown author wrote of the former 
stadholder, ‘ghy waert de starcke suyl daer op men had gebout’,99 while an author 
writing on the same theme declaimed that William was the ‘zuyl van ‘t Vaderlandt’.100 
This imagery recurs in visual form in  1672 in a print by Romeyn de Hooghe to 
commemorate the appointment of William HI as Captain General of the Republic’s 
forces. The prince is sited behind a table taking the oath of office while behind him
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stands the female figure of Freedom. A set of two pillars on either side of him bear the 
heads and shoulders of the previous Orange stadholders, William I, Maurice, Frederick 
Henry and William II.  101 Clearly the pillars are a crucial part of the building for without 
them the structure will collapse but the imagery does not help us to define any further 
the authority of the stadholderate other than to point to the fact that the institution was 
essential in the Republic. In this last case, it could well be read that it was the force of 
arms of the stadholders which had been essential to the building of the new state.
It is significant that supporters of the States Party were increasingly seeking to 
conscript such images for their own purposes.  In the anthology of poetry entitled Den 
Herstelden Apollos Harp published in 1663 there was included in the appendix a 
virulently anti-Orangist poem in which the representatives of the States of Holland and 
West-Friesland, having cast off the yoke of Spain and fetters of Orangist domination, 
were collectively the helmsmen of the ship of state.
Ghy Vaders van het vaderland 
Die nu bevrijd van juck en boeyen,
Het groote stuyr hebt in de hand
Van ‘t schip daer w’allegaer aen roeyen.1 0 2
On the death of William II Jacob Cats said  that in a church or great hall there were 
pillars and crowns or coronas, that is  circular candelabra, and so it was in the Dutch 
Republic. The pillars were the provincial states and the Prince of Orange the crown or 
candlesticks. The pillars remained steadfast and unaltered, bearing up the building and 
without them there could be no lights or candelabrum.103  Likewise, the poet Joachim 
Oudaan, long an admirer of de Witt and his policies wrote in 1666 of the regents 
Huigens and Boreel
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O Heeren, die met hem (de Witt) zoo moedig en getrou,
Als zuilen aan’t gewelf van ‘t groote Staats gebouw,10 4
The deployment of this type of imagery suggests that both sides were determined that 
such imagery should not be the sole property of the other.
Whatever the role of the stadholder, Orangists were quite clear that such an 
institution was compatible with the concept of freedom. States Party writers on the other 
hand were clear that freedom and the stadholderate were incompatible. The author of a 
pamphlet of 1655 drew on classical analogies. Scipio, the armed saviour of the Roman 
Republic, had been accused of financial irregularity and rather than throw himself on 
the sympathies of the mob he quit Rome for exile. Both Livy and this author 
commended this action for in a free republic it was too dangerous that any one person 
should be ‘het Hooft ende Suyl van den Staef. Likewise in the Dutch Republic, it was 
the role of the States of Holland to conserve the freedom of the province and they could 
not function in this role if the young prince William III were promoted as stadholder.105 
The affection which Scipio enjoyed among the Roman populace was here clearly 
perceived as antagonistic to the maintenance of freedom, a theme which was taken up 
by the unknown editor of the anthology of poetry Den Herstelden Apollos Harp of 
1663. In his view the ‘gemeente’ were influenced by their ‘teachers’, the Reformed 
Ministers, to demand a stadholderate which was inimical to the cause of freedom and
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the States of Holland who were its true defenders.
How then did the States Party writers define freedom. A writer of 1662 saw it in 
terms of the Republic being able to choose the fittest to rule. He wrote that
104  ‘Staats-Zorg van den recht Edelen Standhaftigen, en Onvermoeiden Heere, den Heere Johan de W ith’, 
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het eerste rechte teeckenen van vrye gemoederen zijn, te derven discreperen, door discrepatie 
verscheide dienstige en oirbare middelen te beramen, ende uyt die selvighe dan, de 
aldervorderlijckste ende salutairsten voor den staet, te verkiesen.1 0 7
This state of affairs was not possible where a stadholder and his court served as a focus 
for ambitious regents who were prepared to support the interests of the Prince of Orange 
rather then the common good.
Orangist apologists were eager to emphasise that the presence of a single head did 
not prevent promotion by merit. In the Proposition of the States of Zeeland issued in 
1660, it was argued that the element of majesty in the person of a single head prevented 
anarchy and confusion but at the same time anyone among the people could ‘door sijne 
meriten en deuchden te kunnen deel hebben aen alle fimctien en bedieningen’. Sea 
captains such as the elder Tromp were proof of this.108 More commonly, however, 
Orangists argued that much of the States Party rhetoric was fuelled by self interest 
rather than any commitment to an abstract concept of freedom. The author of den 
Herstelden Prins of 1663 contended that when men said there was no freedom in a 
government with a prince, they simply meant that such a regime did not suit their own 
selfish interests. In any regime, even that which was many-headed, there were those 
who were denied advancement and they frequently resorted to cries of freedom and 
sought to overthrow and change the form of government. This situation had the 
paradoxical effect that ‘so isser in geen staat van Regeringe vrijheid, en met sulcke 
vrijheid soude oock geen Staat noch Regeringe konnen bestaan’. Thus problems arose 
not because of the type of government but because of the nature of men and their 
ambitions.109 Orangists, echoing the language of past defenders of princely or single 
headed governance such as Castiglione, were keen to emphasise that freedom could
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simply mean licence.110 In a pamphlet of 1672 an Orangist author P.T. argued that 
freedom often implied the ability, ‘om alles te seggen en schrijven’ particularly when it 
was offensive to the House of Orange. Some people, he argued, meant by ‘freedom’ the 
freedom to ignore or disobey laws and governments with which they were in 
disagreement. No form of government could survive in such circumstances.111 Here the 
task of the governor is not only to maintain his subjects freedoms and privileges but 
also maintain the security against internal disorder or external aggression without which 
freedom is of little account.
The fullest development of the Orangist argument can be found in Pieter de 
Hubert’s Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepaalde Vryheid of 1669. He linked 
freedom and licence when he argued ‘dat de grootste Vryheit daar in der daat is de 
meeste slavemye’ for it was evident that ‘algemeene en onbepaalde Vryheit beide voor 
Overheit en Onderdaan ten hoogsten schadelijk is’. It was to protect the subject against 
this potential perpetual conflict of interests that kings and princes were instituted. If 
freedom is defined, as he does as ‘een vermogen om te doen het geene man wiF then 
clearly it needs to be restrained by laws upheld by an ‘oppermaght’. Obedience to such 
laws is not just a duty but a privilege. Just as obedience to God is seen as the highest 
point of Christian freedom so obedience to a good king or prince is ‘de grootste 
vryheit’. It could be argued that this was simply an argument in favour of pure 
monarchy but Hubert’s tempers his thesis with the conclusion that while some peoples 
incline to monarchy, others of ‘de middelbaar slag’ favour an aristocratic government 
with a Prince ‘die boven andere in waardigheid uitmunt, de eerste in de Regeeringe is’.
This raises the question as to why such a law-giving government cannot have 
many heads. To this Hubert raises two arguments. One is that the people have since the
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times of the Batavian Republic been ruled by a combination of princes or counts and 
representative assemblies and this system has stood the test of time. Hubert drew on 
Pliny to argue that such princes were not the result of blind providence but were chosen 
by a higher hand and that regime which is shown by time to agree with the nature and 
temper of the inhabitants is called ‘natural freedom’. The other is the standard Orangist 
argument that a government of many heads means a conflict of interests. Like his fellow 
apologists Hubert is deeply suspicious of an attack on the stadholderate fuelled by the 
language of freedom for such rhetoric frequently conceals a wealth of personal interest 
and ambition. He commented drily that ‘meer werd gesproken van vryheit om te 
regeeren als om geregeert te werden’ and drew with approval on the adage of Diego de 
Saavedra Fajardo that those who spoke of freedom and the common good were often 
motivated by narrow self interest and their own desire to rule. He concluded 
emphatically with words from Machiavelli’s Discoursi, ‘dat ‘er veele menschen 
gevonden werden, die uit liefde tot onbepaalde Vryheit, dikmaals andere haten die zy 
hoorden te beminnen, en quaad voor goed vergelden’.112
The Person of the Prince
Orangist rhetoric was intent not only to defend the institution of the stadholderate but 
also to promote the cause of a particular individual, the young prince of Orange William 
III. In Orangist polemic the two were so closely bound together that it becomes difficult 
to separate the office from the individual. Arguments in favour of a stadholderate are 
almost inevitably immediately followed by the assertion that this office must be filled 
by the young prince and none other. There was also a very clear attempt to present the 
person of the young prince to the people both as himself and as the fruit of a great 
dynasty who alone was worthy to fulfil this essential office. It was an esential element
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in Orangist writing that the prince’s pre-eminence came both from the dignity conveyed 
on his forefathers and his own honourable princely status which in turn added its 
splendour to that of the Republic.
This can better be understood when we consider the rhetoric of the opposition. In 
the Apologie ofte Verantwoordiginge van den Ondienst der Stadthouderlijcke 
Regeeringe of 1663, it was argued the provincial States were the sole source of the 
lustre attendant on the stadholderate. Thus it was, the author argued, quite improper of 
Louis XU! of France to style the stadholder Frederick Henry ‘hoogheyt’ while the States 
General were merely ascribed the title ‘Heerlyckheeden’. The lustre of a servant can 
and must only come from his master. Now that the States had taken the decision, which 
was rightfully theirs, to abolish the stadholderate in the majority of provinces this lustre 
had returned to them as its source. 113  An author of the same year argued that any 
authority and lustre pertaining to the stadholders came from the sovereignity enjoyed by 
their masters the provincial States. The Princes of Orange had never enjoyed ‘hooge 
overheit’ in the Republic and it was thefore inappropriate that the young prince should 
be styled William III. He was the eleventh of that name to be Prince of Orange but that 
was a matter of no relevance to his standing in the United Provinces where he was but a 
private citizen like any other. The writer conceded that the mass of the citizenry did not 
sufficently understand or respect this distinction.114 To assist them in this matter the 
arms of the Prince of Orange had been removed from all public places and his colours 
replaced by black and white.115
In contrast to this, Orangist writers asserted not only the services of the House of 
Orange to the Republic but the lustre which their ancient and princely family has
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conveyed with it. This is exemplified in a poem by Henrik Bruno’s of 1660 in which he 
wrote of William Hi’s princely and imperial lineage.
O groote Prins, o Spruyt van soo veel Princen looten,
Die, als een warde Neef, van Keysers stam gesprooten,
Van soo veel koningen, gekroonde hoofden zijt,
Die nae uw Vaders doodt, ons met uw sterr’ verblijt.116
Orangist propaganda was eager to affirm that the Prince had the right to wear a crown, 
not as stadholder but as a result of his inheritance of the principality of Orange. In a 
print of 1653 the young prince was shown full length wearing a feathered cap. In his 
right hand he carried a staff of office and with his left hand he stroked the muzzle of a 
Netherlands lion. On the left stood a table on which rested a crown. To the right was a 
window in front of which was placed a flowerpot in which a sprig of orange was 
growing. Above the plant was the motto of the House of Orange adopted by Maurice 
‘Tandem fit Curculus arbor’. The crown placed within this print can only refer to the 
principality of Orange and emphasises that William HI enjoys princely status regardless 
of his circumstances within the Republic. Inevitably, this reference was linked to the 
restoration of the prince of Orange as stadholder. In a poem placed below the image J. 
Burghoom urged the provinces,
...laet de wel-gevlochte Pijlen 
Zijn gegront op d’oude stijlen,
Die den Prince Wilhelm gaff,
Tot hy quam in’t duyster graff.
...laet den Prins
...komen in des Vaderplaets.1 1 7
The occasion of the oath of loyalty given to William HI by the towns and citizens 
of the Principality of Orange on 7 May 1665 was allegedly marked by the appearence in
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the sky of a sun crown. A print of the same year celebrated this noteworthy event and it 
was only to be expected that contemporaries would reflect on its significance.
In a poem set beneath the print and entitled ‘Op ‘t verschynen van de Zonnekroon’ the 
poet related,
Toen Willem wiertgehuldt verscheen ‘er in de wolken,
Recht boven ‘t praaltoneel, een heldere zonnekroon,
Het staart gestamt verschijnt om rampen te vertolken,
Maar dit beloofde heil van d’opperhemeltroon.
Nu wacht Oranje vrucht tot welstant van haar Staaten.
Een loflijk Hooftprins leeft tot heil der onderzaten.
Clearly the author intended that this heavenly appearance marked not disaster but 
prosperity for the Prince’s subjects with the implicit implication that such benefits could 
accrue not only in Orange but in the Dutch Republic.118 In like manner, 
the entry of the Prince of Orange to the Council of State in  1670 was celebrated by the 
publication of a poem in pamphlet form by J. Orizant. Here the poet stressed William’s 
connections with the royal families of Europe and their emblems, the eagle, the lily and 
the rose but also emphasised the ancient lineage of the princes of Orange and their right 
to wear a crown.  The desireability of William’s elevation to the stadholderate was 
urged as the poet stated ‘stadhouders ampt staet me voor uwe Hoogheyt open’. 119 
The imagery of the crown recurs emphatically in  1672. In a work of that year, 
allegedly translated from the French, an unknown author tells of the power and 
privileges which accrue to William HI as the prince of Orange. He argued that not all 
princes were the same. Rather the authority which the Prince enjoyed in Orange was 
‘soo voortreffelijk dat ‘er geen Princen gevonden worden die sich van hooger besit- 
naem konnen seggen’. In Orange William had a sovereign power invested in his person 
and God alone stood above him. The author took his readers back to the time of
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Theofrid, Prince of Orange in the year 700.  He assured his readers that the early 
sources indicated that ‘daer is seker geen Souverain Prinsdom in Euroop van over soo 
langen tijt, als dat van Oraenje’ and that such sovereignty clearly predated that of the 
monarchs of France. In addition William was the grandson of a king, Charles I of 
England and the nephew of Charles n. As in the print of 1653 the author laid stress on 
the fact that the Princes of Orange had the right to wear a crown.120  A print of 1672 
showed a Netherlands’ maid ailing in bed being revived by the gift of an orange and the 
sight of a portrait of the young prince William HI. A note beneath the image assured the 
viewer that the Prince  had the right to wear a crown as a descendant of Bertrand van 
Baux who in 1178 was crowned Prince of Orange in 1178. A second note referred to the 
scene in May 1665 when a sun crown had appeared before the ampitheatre in Orange as 
if to imply that the heavens themselves supported this contention.121 It is probable that 
both print and pamphlet date from the period when William HI had been promoted to 
the position of captain general of the Dutch forces but was not yet stadholder. 
Propaganda such as this emphasised not only the desirability of further promotion for 
William but also that his position within the royal and princely families of Europe was 
as great if not greater than that of the foe, the King of France.
Sun imagery was also widely deployed with reference to William HI. The 
occasion of his first  birthday in November 1651 was celebrated in verse by Jan Keysers 
of Breda.. The poet made plain the great hopes centred on the infant prince.
De hoop van ons geluck, een MACHTIGH PRINS der aerde,
Een kleyn een-Jaerigh KINT  dat wilt van onse oogen 
Gelijck de Son den dauw ons droeve tranen droogen.1 2 2
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Viewing an image of the young prince and reflecting on the tragic circumstances of his 
father’s death another  poet was moved to declaim,
Dus soent de sonn’ deez Son, Oranjes bral en luyster 
Op-dagend’ uyt den nacht des grafs vermolsemd duyster1 2 3
birthday in November 1661 occasioned similar imagery when the 
the prince’s ancient lineage and his unique relationship to the United
Twaelf jaren zijt ghy oudt; uyt sulck een stam gebooren,
Van weder-zijts, o Prins, daer van datmen kan hooren,
Van daer de sonn’ sijn licht door soo veel teeck’nen draeght, 
Van daer hy onder gaet, van daer het weder daeght.
O aertsche Son des Landts! Godt d’Opper-son wil geven, 
Dat ghy hier langh voor ons voor-spoediglick mooght leven; 
In top van heerlickheyt. 1 2 4
Here the poet plays on the image of the sun as emblematic of the prince but also creates 
a pun on the role of William III as ‘son’ of the country, a reference to the position of the 
prince as putative ‘kind van staat’. A poem of 1664 on the birthday of the Prince urged 
its readers ‘set WILLEM op den waagen van sijn Voor-vaderen’ and combined 
prophesy and wish fulfilment when the author declaimed that ‘Sijn Son begint te rijsen / 
Na’t Hemels Opper-punct’. Here too the prince’s illustrious lineage was proclaimed ,
Wiens Stam den Arend draaght int’ midden door de wolken 
Die Roos en Lely eerd, mach immers wel een Pronk 
En puik den vorsten sijn genaamt. 1 2 5
123  ‘Op d’Af-beeldinge vande Vorstelijcke Pop, sijn doorluchtige Hoogheyd W illem Henrick Prins van 
Oranje’, in K lioos Kraam vol Verscheiden Gedichten (Leeuwarden,  1656 ), p. 290.
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The prince’s 
poet drew both on 
Provinces.67
The eagle referred to Adolf of Nassau who had been Emperor of the Holy Roman 
Empire in the late thirteenth century and was an ancestor of William. As grandson of 
Charles I and nephew of Charles II William also bore the insignia of the rose while the 
lily was emblematic of  his descent from the French crown through his grandmother 
Henrietta Marie who was the daughter of Henry IV.
Rising Orangist fortunes inevitably brought the imagery of the sun to the fore. In 
September 1668 William ID was declared First Noble of Zeeland. In effect this was 
bringing to fruition the Resolution of the States of Zeeland of 1660 in which they had 
argued that he should accede to the offices of his forefathers when he was eighteen 
though the date was anticipated by a couple of months. The whole affair having been 
carried out without the knowledge of John de Witt, there was an understandable 
atmosphere of euphoria in the reception given to to the Prince on his arrival in Zeeland 
on 18th and 19th September. A fictional Scipio urged that the praise due to his own great 
family as the conquerors of Carthage could justly be applied to the family of 
stadholders. Lauding Divine Providence he declared ‘elle vous a fait naistre comme un
196
nouvel Astre, et briber comme le soleil Levant pour dissiper nos tenebres’.
Orizant lauding the admittance of the Prince to the Council of State in  May 1670 used 
similar imagery when explained to his readers in a footnote that ‘gelijck de Zon, 
allenghskens hooger klimmende, kracthtiger wert, soo oock sijne Doorluchtigste 
Hoogheyt als een nieuwe Orangie Zon, opgekomen sijnde boven den Horizant onses 
Vaderlandts’.127
1672 witnessed a veritable sunburst. In a sermon preached at the Court in the 
Hague before Amalia von Solms to celebrate the appointment of William III as captain 
general the preacher Petrus van Balen described the times as
126 Knuttel, no.  9668, p. 25.
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gelijck, naa lange en koude nagten, de son in dit saysoen, sijn gelaten toont t’elkens hoger op de 
Horizont, Siet Haar Weduwlike Kamer, meer als twintig jaar bekleet in de rouw, de Soons 
Soon, een nieuwe en frische Son....
In a sonnet accompanying the published sermon William as in 1668 was the sun which 
drove away the mist and shadows.
.. .hier klimt een son die dryft den Nevel voort 
.. .een nieuw verresen Son.1 2 8
This aspect of the sun imagery was clearly felt appropriate for this time when a French 
invasion loomed for another pamphlet celebrating the Prince as captain general has him 
as the sun whose beams disperse the dark clouds.
Dus klaart de Nevel, op de Nederlantsche Volcken:
Oranje schift de drift dier swaareen dank’re Wolcken 1 2 9
William III having being declared stadholder of Holland, in Amsterdam orange flags 
flew from the church towers and it was said that the people were singing
Gelyck het eerste licht quam door het duyster breeeken,
Soo breckt d’Oranje-Son door Staetsucht Haet en Nyt,
De donckere Oorloghs-wolck tot sijn bederf ontsteecken,
Wort oorsaeck van sijn licht, hoe seer het Jan -Oom (de Witt) spijt.1 3 0
The death of the brothers de Witt in August 1672 led one anonymous author to 
reflect on the relative strengths of the Prince and his opponents. The Prince was ‘de 
heerlijcke Oranje Zon opgaende met zijn blinckende Stralen’, while the lustre of Jan
128 Knuttel, no. 9962, np.
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and Comelis de Witt was now ‘als een keerse gestelt in het licht van de heldere 
Middag  son’. He added didactically ‘Sic transit gloria mundi’.131 Victory against the 
French reinforced the imagery. For a writer of 1674 the sun of William 1 1 1  had dispelled 
the moisture of the French lily and he hymned
... O Son! Soo lang verduysterd;
We’er houden door een Wolk van haat en nijd;1 3 2
Orangist apologists were drawing on ancient traditional imagery. The image of the 
rising sun, Sol Oriens, new bom each day and by its beams driving away the forces of 
mist and darkness had been familiar since classical times and was regularly used in 
contemporary Europe. After the resistance of the Frondes had been broken in 1653, a
1  33
medallion was cast showing the rising Sun-God dissipating the darkness.  In a 
pamphlet of 1664 a supporter of the principles of John de Witt rhapsodied that since the 
death of William n, ‘de Zon der waerheyd is door alle mist gebrooken’.134  Images of 
the sun could also imply harmony. Apollo the Sun God had often been depicted 
regulating on his lyre the music of the spheres and establishing harmony, equilibrium 
and concord between the elements. 135 However images of the sun also conjured up 
images of monarchy. Ripa in his Iconologia had emphasised the conjunction of sun and 
kingship when he wrote
en daerom is hy als een koning midden in ‘t Rijck. En soo het ons geoorloft is eene Republique 
of gemeene Staet, van de seven Planeeten te versieren, wy souden seggen dat de Sonne een 
Koningh is van alien, gelijck hij oock in waerheyt. 1 3 6
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This imagery was reinforced in Ripa’s entry for monarchy which depicted a seated 
figure with his kneeling subjects and the halo of the sun around his head.137 Certainly 
in June 1662 Louis XIV adopted the sun as his symbol but the sun and the French 
monarchy had a more sustained link. King Charles IX had appeared at carnival time in 
1571 dressed as the sun to be serenaded by a ‘Comparaison du Soleil et du Roi’ 
composed by Ronsard. In 1581 Henry IQ appeared at the celebrations of the marriage of 
the Duke of Joyeuse as the sun driving his chariot.138 It is instructive to examine the 
sun imagery deployed by Dutch writers on the occasion of the Restoration of Charles Q 
to the English throne in 1660. A poem of 1660 by Havius on the Restoration deployed 
the same pun that had been used for William IQ when he rejoiced ‘nu rijst de Son voor 
Engeland op’. Lambert den Bos in verses of the same year urged the archetypal mother
11Q
of all Britains , ‘siet uw gewenschte Son verrijsen’.  This type of imagery was 
identical to that deployed to herald advancement of the fortunes of the young Prince of 
Orange.
Does this mean that Orangists in some senses saw the stadholderate as a proto- 
monarchy. This type of language could leave them open to such an accusation. However 
Orangists would argue that such language was appropriate for  the Prince of Orange, a 
sovereign prince in his own right, added lustre and respectability to the Dutch Republic, 
particularly in the eyes of neighbouring monarchs. In a declaration of 1652 urging the 
adoption of a single head the States of Zeeland asserted that the Prince of Orange was 
the most suitable candidate not only because of the services rendered by his forefathers 
but with respect to his illustrious lineage and princely birth which added lustre to the
137 Martin Warnke,  ‘La democratic entre images ideales et caricatures’, in Emblemes de la liberte,  ed. by 
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Republic.140 In a pamphlet of 1660 the anonymous author argued that the wealth and 
prosperity of the Republic had engendered suspicion and  envy among its neighbouring 
states but that this was mitigated by the presence of the stadholder Princes of Orange 
who ‘heeft de voorsz. ende dergelijcken nijdigheyt van de Gekroonede Hooveden seer 
gebrocken’. The presence of a member of this ancient and respected House, sovereign 
princes in their own right, and their princely court in the Hague served to convince 
foreign observers that this fledgling Republic was, in reality, a state very like their 
own.141 In the Consideratien of the Gecommitteerde Raden of Zeeland in 1668 it was 
contended that a stadholder Prince of Orange represented the external splendour of 
government both within and beyond the Republic, ‘haer uyterlijck gevende den glans 
van een Koninck’.142 Sir William Temple noted that while sovereignty resided in the 
States General, a view not all would have shared, the Prince of Orange represented the 
‘Dignity of this State’ both in his person and in the splendour of his court. Temple 
added that
men are generally pleased with the Pomp and Splendour of a Government, not only as it is an 
amusement for idle people, but as it is a mark of the Greatness, Honour and Riches of their 
Countrey. 1 4 3
Orangists would have found it easy to agree with that sentiment. However, at a time 
when sovereignty was intimately connected with status and display, observers both 
within and beyond the Republic might contend that the Princes of Orange appeared 
much more than mere servants of the provincial states.
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The image of the prince.
It was a critical factor in Orangist polemic that whereas others might argue for a 
particular view of the Republic, the Orangists had an individual in whom their hopes 
and aspirations were centred. A frail posthumous child became the focus of their hopes. 
His image was to be kept before the people. Portraits were one way of doing this. 
However, now there was no stadholder’s court commissions for portraits  were fewer 
than in the past. This was but in part the result of the death of William II. Elizabeth of 
Bohemia, the Winter Queen, a noted patron had fallen deeply into debt in the second 
half of the 1640’s and in 1651the painter Gerrit van Honthorst had granted the destitute 
Queen a loan of 35,000 guilders.144  Nonetheless  a number of portraits of the young 
prince were commissioned in the years after his birth to 1672. In considering these 
works, it is wise to remember that not all of them were intended for owners or 
institutions in the Dutch Republic. A work by Adrian Hanneman of 1664 depicting the 
Prince in three quarter length profile, in armour and  bearing a baton of office with a 
helmet beside him is known to have been commissioned by the court in England, one 
copy going to his grandmother Henrietta Marie and the other to his aunt Anne Hyde, 
Duchess of York. Another similar portrait by or after Raguineau was sent to the 
parlement of Orange in 1667 while a work by Jan de Baen of the same year was 
probably sent as a gift to the Elector of Brandenburg. 145 It is certainly the case that 
many portraits of the young prince have ended up in royal collections in England and 
Prussia and it does appear likely that these were either commissioned by foreign royal 
houses or were dispatched from the court at the Hague to encourage foreign powers to 
keep the person and the interests of William III in mind.
Orangists were proud of William’s connections with the great royal dynasties of 
Europe and in at least one work, these were emphasised. This painting, an exquisite
144 Richard J. Judson, Rudolph E. Ekkart,  G errit van Honthorst (Doornspijk: Davaco,  1999), pp.  38-39.
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cartouche of fruit and flowers surrounding  a portrait of the prince was by Jan Davidsz. 
de Heem and appears to have been painted in the 1660’s.146 Certainly the image of the 
prince wearing blue and white cravatte and orange sash appears to be that of a young 
adolescent rather than a man. William was ringed on either side by two eagles, symbols 
both of princely birth and his descent from a Holy Roman Emperor and two homs of 
plenty symbolising the wealth and prosperity which had flowed from the Orange 
stadholderate in the Dutch Republic. Below the prince were strewn the pink and white 
roses of England and the lilies of France symbolisng his link with the crown of England 
through his mother Mary Stuart and his family ties with the lineage of Henry IV of 
France through his grandmother Henrietta Marie.147
We do not know who commissioned this work. However some paintings were 
clearly designed for public display .An example of a portrait which was intended for 
public view in the town hall of the Orange Barony of Breda was a work of 1652 by 
Gerard Honthorst showing the infant prince with his mother Mary Stuart.148 In this 
portrait the full length figure of Mary Stuart, clad in mourning, is depicted standing in 
front of a balustrade. In her arms she holds the infant William HI. He points with his left 
hand to a nearby orange tree with both blossom and fruit growing in a pot while in his 
right hand he held up a small orange branch to his mother’s face as if to console her in 
her grief. His father was dead but the ‘oranje spruit’ remains, the hope of the family for 
the future.
Honthorst had painted many portraits of the House of Orange and where children 
were included the orange branch was a regular feature. In a work of 1647 Frederick 
Henry and Amalia von Solms were shown with their three youngest daughters Albertina
146 Dutch  Flower Painting  ]600-1750,  Catalogue edited by Paul Taylor (Dulwich Picture Gallery,  1996), 
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Agnes, Henrietta Catherine and Maria.  149  In the centre of the portrait stood Amalia 
with the youngest daughter Maria. In her left hand Amalia held a sprig of orange tree 
with the blossoms clearly visible with the little Maria clutching the bottom end of the 
stem. Thus Honthorst’s work of 1652  drew on iconological themes traditionally 
associated with the House of Orange. A similar approach can be seen in his portrait of 
William HI and his Aunt Mary, the daughter of Frederick Henry and Amalia von Solms. 
The young Mary was seated beneath a tree holding in her left hand a floral garland. The 
infant William HI to her right holds a collection of flowers in his apron from which 
Mary appears to select an orange blossom to add to her garland. Above the two children 
the sky is heavy with cloud but in the background sunlight streams down on the 
landscape. It can be argued that this configuration is a reference to a glorious past or the 
hope of the future.150
As the prince grew older his image appeared not only in portraits but in prints. 
Artists such as Abraham Raguineau, who tutored the Prince, Adriaan Hanneman and 
Jan de Baen produced images of William III some of which were reproduced in print. 
Print makers such as  Philippe and van Zijlvelt worked on images produced by 
Raguineau and ensured that they reached a much wider audience than that attained by 
the original painting.151 The function of such an image can be deduced from Jan Steen’s 
painting ‘Prinjesdag’ which Lyckle de Vries dates to approximately 1665. The scene is 
an inn in which a group of people sit drinking and reading. One man peruses a 
newspaper while next to him sits another with a knot of orange ribbons on his hat. With 
a third man he appears to be discussing the contents of a pamphlet. Above a box bed at 
the rear of the room hangs an image of the young prince bedecked with orange ribbons. 
The light hanging from the ceiling is also decorated with an orange branch. In the centre
149 Canvas 263.5 by 347.5 cm., Amsterdam Rijksmuseum., Inv. no.  874.
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of the painting a man, seemingly the owner of the premises kneels before the image of 
the prince, drinking an extravagant toast, his sword unsheathed.  Before him on the 
ground lies a piece of paper on which is written ‘Op de gesundheyt van het nassous 
basie, in de ene hant het rapier inde andere hant het glaesie’. Lyckle de Vries has argued 
convincingly that Steen’s work is not simply a sample of his genre paintings but is a 
biting satire on the support which the Orangists enjoyed among the less discerning 
sections of the people.152 The sottish landlord kneeling before the image of the prince 
exemplifies a devotion in which emotion and drink take precedence over more rational 
considerations. Yet, leaving aside the implicit satire, there must have been many homes 
and places of public resort which were graced by images of William III.
Images could be used to manipulate events. An example of this are the allegorical 
sketches of Theodoor van Thulden. Van Thulden had been one of the artists 
commissioned by Amalia von Solms to decorate the Oranjezaal, her mausoleum to the 
memory of her husband Frederick Henry . These survive only in sketch form and clearly 
events or finances conspired to prevent the full artistic commission being completed but 
they are a valuable pointer to the message which Amalia and the Orangists sought to 
convey. Van Thulden was considered as perhaps the most outstanding Flemish painter 
of allegory after the death of Rubens and Amalia commissioned no less than six works 
from him. He had also enjoyed commissions from the town of ‘s Hertogenbosch and 
had prepared for them after the Peace of Munster in  1648 two allegories which were to 
be displayed in the town hall.153 Van Thulden was thus a natural choice when Amalia 
came to consider a series of works which would enhance the status of her grandchild 
William 1 1 1  and herself and impress upon the viewer his suitability for the offices of his 
forefathers and the necessity, indeed the inevitability of his becoming stadholder.
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The first of these works appears to have been produced in the period around 1654 
when the debate about the exclusion of William HI from any future office was raging. It 
was also the period when the province of Overijssel announced its intention to promote 
the young prince to the position of stadholder with William Frederick of Nassau, 
stadholder of Friesland as his lieutenant. In van Thulden’s work the young William with 
a plumed hat on his head is led forward by the figure of Time and presented to two 
female figures who are sited before an altar. The two women  symbolise both branches 
of the family Orange-Nassau and the two putti who embrace above their heads represent 
the bonds which unite the two parts of the dynasty. The godlike figure of Providence 
seated on a cloud and accompanied by the allegorical figure of fame proffers to William 
III an orange branch on which is inscribed a quotation from the Aeneid Book VI lines 
143-144 ‘Primo avulso non deficit alter / aureus’ which translated means ‘were the first 
broken, then there grows a second of gold’. The meaning of this is made clear when we 
see, sited in the right bottom hand comer, an image of Atropos, the Goddess of Fortune 
who has broken the golden twig which represents the life of William II. William III is 
the new golden orange sprig. His hopeful future is implied as a female figure bearing a 
flaming torch draws away the veil of mourning which had draped the two female 
figures.  154
Elements of this symbolism were redeployed in a work of 1660. The Restoration 
of Charles II of England and the decision of the States of Holland to rescind the Act of 
Exclusion raised Orangist’s hopes. These events clearly encouraged Amalia von Solms 
to commission further work from van Thulden intended to promote the cause of her 
grandson. Once again the two female figures of Orange and Nassau mourned the death 
of William II but on this occasion the winged goddess Providence pointed with her 
sceptre to a pot in the foreground from which emerged an orange sprig. William, clad in
134 Allegorie op  Willem III  als stam houder van de dynastie, Pen and pencil  in brown.  12.3 by  15.5 cms. 
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armour, approached the two women flanked by the figures of Time and Selene-Lucina, 
the goddess of birth.155 This work presaging the advancement of the prince was 
accompanied by two others both featuring William II and Amalia von Solms. In one 
sketch William bids farewell to his grandmother flanked by Minerva who urges him to 
follow the example of his forefathers. 156
In considering all these portraits and prints, it is wise not to forget that the young 
prince was a very visible presence in the Dutch Republic. From the very beginning of 
his life William HI enjoyed a  public presence in spite of the fact that John de Witt and 
his supporters were increasingly to insist that the prince was merely a private person in 
respect of the Dutch Republic. At his baptism on the 15 January 1651 at the Grote Kerk 
in the Hague the young prince was attended by members of the States General, the 
States of Holland and Zeeland and representatives of the towns  of Delft, Leiden and 
Amsterdam. Besides these dignitaries the church was packed with local citizenry who 
climbed on top of benches and lined the walls to participate in the spectacle. The 
disorder was such that Minister Tegnejus had to bang on the pulpit to command silence 
and large sections of the service were all but inaudible. At the moment of baptism all 
present rose on tip-toe and craned forward to get a better view of the infant. 157  This 
occasion set the tone for the prince’s public appearances which were greeted with great 
curiosity and often rapture among the populace.  In this respect, his position was very 
different from that of Charles II of England who spent his years after the defeat at 
Worcester in  1651 in exile on the continent. Not only did William IQ appear before the 
Dutch people but prints and pamphlets ensured that these appearances were transmitted 
to a wider audience.
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In June  1653 the young prince and his mother travelled to Breda where he was to 
be instituted as lord of the Barony. As they sailed through Dordrecht on their way to 
Breda the quays were black with people who cheered when his mother held the infant 
aloft for them to see. A merchant ship which lay at anchor fired cannon shot in his 
honour. At Breda on 9 June Mary and her son were welcomed by the burgomasters in 
front of the citizenry gathered in the market place and on 19 June were the guests of the 
town at a banquet at the town hall.158 Those who could not be present were enabled to 
participate vicariously with the production of a print by Santvoort. The print depicted 
Princess Mary led by the figure of Peace and flanked by Apollo and the Muses holding 
the young prince who sported a plumed hat. In the background could be seen the Grote 
Kerk of Breda.  159
On 4 November 1659, the Prince was admitted as a student at Leiden University 
and he was welcomed by the magistrates of the town and dignitaries of the university. A 
print of that year commemorated the occasion. The prince was positioned strategically 
in the centre before the ‘staartpaarf or horse of state. Beside the prince stood the figures 
of Hercules, representing Amsterdam and Pallas representing Leiden who trample down 
the forces of war and envy and are to assist the prince into the saddle. In the background 
was an image of the Prince’s court where the figure of ‘Godsgoedheid’ holding a 
sceptre held sway while to the right was an ominous image of a single ship amidst a 
storm tom sea and above it the punishing rod of God. The implication would appear to 
be that the Dutch ship of State was to be punished for its ingratitude to the House of 
Orange and to God.  160  For those who might need some explanation of the image, the 
Orangist poet Jan Zoet provided explanatory verse in the space below.161
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The following year the prince was present when his uncle Charles II was received 
in the Hague on his triumphal journey back to England. At a civic reception on 25 May 
William was seated with the King, his mother Mary Stuart and the Queen of Bohemia 
under the royal canopy, an event which was recorded in a print of the same year.162 
From 15 to 20 June 1660 the Prince of Orange and his mother were the guests of the 
city of Amsterdam and were entertained by a series of pageants and processions. Again 
a print commemmorated the occasion.  Even those whose sympathies were not 
normally in favour of the restoration of the stadholderate were commissioned to 
celebrate the occasion. Vondel’s poem ‘De Bruiloft van den Theems en Aemstel 
t’Amsterdam aan de Doorluchtigste Hoogheden Maria Stuart en Willem van Oranje’ 
hymned the new ties between the Dutch Republic and England, Amsterdam and London 
prefigured in the personages of the English Mary Stuart and her Dutch son.164 Jan Vos, 
who was no Orangist, was entrusted with the pageant and he recorded for posterity the 
arrangements for the event in his published Beschrijving der Vertooningen op de 
Staatcywagens.165 The wagons which paraded throught the streets bore tableaux 
honouring both the Orange stadholders and the late King of England though malicious 
tongues alleged that the all too lifelike depiction of the execution of Charles I which so 
shocked Mary Stuart had been designed for that purpose by Vos.166  In June of the 
following year the prince visited Utrecht. The prince, riding in a gilded carriage was 
welcomed by four companies of burghers bedecked with orange and blue tokens. The 
populace thronged the streets to see him and when he attended divine service at the 
Dom on Sunday, it was to the sound of the church bells chiming out the ‘Wilhelmus’.
162 Muller, no. 2156.
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This time it was a printed pamphlet which enabled all those who had not been present to 
appreciate the depth of welcome which the prince had enjoyed. 167
This form of propaganda ensured not only that William was kept in the public eye 
but also contained a subliminal message of better things to come. In September 1668 
William, in a surprise move, was made First Noble of Zeeland, a title formerly held by 
his stadholder forefathers. The event and the celebrations surrounding it were celebrated 
in pamphlet literature. The sermon of Johannes Thilenus, given before the Prince on 
23rd September at Middelburg, spoke of how good it was to have a prince who was not 
only alive to the realities of the world but also schooled in piety. A charge was laid 
upon him to defend the cause of religion and truth as his forefathers had done. The 
implication was clearly that the prince should and would succeed  as stadholder. In a 
poem attached to the sermon, the author van Hoorn bewailed, in images of storm and 
darkness, the current condition of the Republic. Where, he cried ‘is den ouden glans van 
suyver keer en licht? Waer is Eendracht’s Kroon?’ However salvation was on the 
horizon for the coming of the prince would cast rays upon the earth ‘als een nieuwe 
Son’.  168  Images of birth and rebirth proliferate. In a welcome given to the Prince by the 
church consistory at Middelburg reference was made to the symbol of the orange tree 
hacked off at the trunk only to sprout into life again. This, the speaker urged, was no 
mere symbol but reality for before them the young prince ‘als een cierlijcke Scheute 
ende edele plante voor onze oogen mogen sien her-leven’.169 Another author rhapsodied 
‘ick sie nu voor mijn oog Orangie-Prins geboren’.170 In these prints and pamphlets 
readers and viewers in a particular locality or throughout the provinces could be kept in 
touch with the person of the Prince and could share in Orangist hopes and aspirations 
for the future.
167 Knuttel, no.  8539.
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Conclusion
This emphasis on a sole individual might appear to be the antithesis of ‘republicanism’ 
but that is to play the game according to the rules of the brothers de la Court. In reality 
Dutch republicanism was far from monolithic.171 As previous historians have noted 
there were two main strands in Dutch republican thought. One strand was not opposed 
to finding a place for a stadholder prince within a constitutional framework based on a 
mixed government. The second, more outspoken and better known, was the anti- 
Orangist thought of the brothers de la Court which defined a republic in contrast to a 
monarchy and eschewed any single head.172 This latter emerged sifter the death of the 
stadholder in 1650 and reached its full expression in the  1660’s.173 Orangist rhetoric 
drew on the first and older tradition. Essentially pragmatic in character, this strand of 
republicanism was to prove both enduring and accommodating to changing 
circumstances and perceptions. We should not then be surprised when Jonathan Israel 
demonstrates that in the mid 1670’s it was possible for individuals to be both Orangist 
and republican.174 Many Dutch citizens would have seen no dichotomy and 
acknowledged both. As we have seen Orangists emphasised that the stadholder was not 
a monarch nor had any pretensions to monarchical power. Inevitably the imagery 
deployed to represent a single head bore overtones of monarchy but most Orangist 
writers took care to emphasise that while such a system had value for other nations it 
was alien to the Dutch experience. Yet Orangist polemic stressed very strongly the 
person of the young prince William HI and the possibilities available to the Dutch
171  Eco G. Haitsma Mulier,  ‘A controversial Republic’, in M achiavelli and Republicanism ed. by G.
Bock, Q. Skinner and M .Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1987), pp. 247-265 (p.263).
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Republic were he to be elevated to the offices of his forefathers. They emphasised his 
princely background and the respect in which his family was held by the crowned heads 
of Europe, to whom he was related. Rather than seeing this as an oblique attempt at 
monarchical pretensions, we should rather view it as a reflection of the lustre and 
splendour which supporters of the House of Orange believed the family brought to the 
Republic. Rather than threatening the basis of the new state, the House of Orange not 
only maintained and preserved its freedom but made a unique and irreplaceable . 
contribution.83
2
THE PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES -  A HEREDITARY STADHOLDERATE?
The death from smallpox of the young stadholder William II on 6 November 1650 left 
his widow Mary Stuart as the focus of all attentions. William’s body was not displayed 
in state as those of his forefathers had been, for it was feared that the sight of his 
disfigured face might cause even more distress to the heavily pregnant Mary. Confined 
in her chamber, walls and furniture heavily draped in black, the widow gave birth on the 
evening of Monday 14 November to a son. A delirious crowd in the Hague celebrated 
the news. Aitzema, an observer, remarked that you might be forgiven for thinking that 
they considered the newborn to be no less than their sovereign and hereditary lord. Such 
a position had been but narrowly averted. If William II had lived a week longer,
Aitzema contended, he would have urged the States of Holland to confer the 
stadholder’s charges on his son. This was the nub of the issue.1  The jubilation of the 
crowds at the Hague bore witness to the presumption that the office of stadholder in the 
majority of the provinces was expected to pass from father to son. Yet in the eyes of 
many in the regent patriciate of Holland, hereditary succession conjured up images of 
monarchy and the loss of those freedoms in whose defence they had fought against 
Spain. The task for the supporters of the House of Orange in the years  1650-1672 was to 
argue the neccesity of the offices of his forefathers being conferred on William III 
without trespassing on the dangerous ground which their opponents had prepared for 
them.
Some examination of the historical background is helpful.The former Dukes of 
Burgundy had exercised authority in the Low Countries either directly or through the
1   Japikse,  l,  11; Aitzema, Historie, VII,  126,  128, 203.84
medium of stadholders. Their role was to act as political and military leaders in the 
provinces, negotiating the administration of the policy of the prince while recognising 
local forms of self-governance. The stadholder also commanded the Duke’s troops as 
captain-general. Such a position could develop beyond that of exalted servant to one of 
‘overmighty subject’. To curb any potential moves in that direction Mary of Hungary, 
Regent in the Netherlands, had forbidden stadholders in office to nominate their 
successors. In that way, they would not come to consider the position as hereditary.2
The progress of the Dutch Revolt complicated this situation. In 1567 William of 
Orange had resigned his stadholdership of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, to which he 
had been appointed by the ruler Philip II in the latter’s capacity as Count of Holland. By 
the ‘Union’ of Holland and Zeeland in June 1575, the beginnings of an alternative state 
were being put in place with William of Orange as stadholder and captain general with 
the designation as ‘sovereign and supreme’ head for the duration of the war.3  In July 
1581 the States General had issued the Act of Abjuration in which they repudiated 
Philip II and his heirs in perpetuity. New oaths of allegiance were taken, whereby all 
office holders, magistrates and members of the civic militia declared themselves no 
longer bound by their former oaths of loyalty to the King of Spain and swore obedience 
to the States.4 Even before William’s assassination, a role had been envisaged for his 
second son Maurice, William’s oldest son Philip William having being seized by the 
enemy to be brought up as a Catholic in Spain.  In  1582, the States of Holland, Zeeland 
and Utrecht had agreed to finance Maurice’s studies since, they  opined, the young man 
was a person who could well be serviceable to his country in the future and there was a 
hopeful expectation that he would tread in the footsteps of his father William.5  It is not 
clear exactly what was intended by this statement. It may simply reflect the hope of the
2 Rowen, The Princes o f Orange,  pp. 2-4.
3 Rowen, The Princes o f Orange, pp.  13,  19.
4 Israel, The Dutch Republic,  p. 209.
5 Arie Th. van Deursen, M aurits van Nassau (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2000), p.  1685
three provinces that Maurice would serve his country in a military capacity as his father 
had done. No clearly defined political role is implied. However, the controversial offer 
of Countship extended by Holland to William in 1583 had included a clause ensuring 
that in the event of William’s death, the States of Holland would have the right to 
nominate one of his legitimate sons as successor.6 Here we can discern elements of a 
dynastic principle, though one which as a result of William’s assassination could not be 
put into practice.  After William’s death the government of this fledgling Republic was 
entrusted to a Council of State of eighteen members. All were deputies of the provinces, 
including Brabant, Handers and Mechelen with Maurice as the sole individual member. 
This position recognised the unique contribution made by the House of Orange to the 
new state. Furthermore, it was plain to many in the States of Holland that the House of 
Orange, in the service of the province, could act as a powerful counterweight to any 
foreign prince or governor-general who might be imposed on them as a condition of 
military and financial support. Thus it was that the States of Holland and Zeeland in 
November 1585 appointed the seventeen year old Maurice as stadholder barely a month 
before the arrival of Leicester as governor-general of the United Provinces. In January 
1587 Maurice was proclaimed captain general of the armies of Holland and Zeeland.7
The actions of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland had clearly been shaped by 
the exigencies of war. The House of Orange in the person of William or Maurice served 
to supply both military leadership and a quality of ‘headship’ which could function as a 
unifying factor within the nascent republic and a counterbalance to those forces from 
without whose support was judged essential for the maintenance of the new state. 
Moreover, following the death of Adolf van Nieuwenaar in 1589 Maurice was chosen 
as stadholder of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland. Rather than perceiving this as an 
ominous extension of the authority of the House of Orange, Oldenbamevelt amongst
6 Adrian Kluit, Historie der Hollandsche Staatsregering tot aan met het ja a r 1795,  5  vols (Amsterdam, 
1802),  I, 344.
7 Israel.  The Dutch Republic,  p. 224:  van  Deursen, Maurits van Nassau,  p.  37.86
others encouraged this development seeing it as enabling an increase in the  influence of 
Holland by means of its stadholder.8 There was every reason to applaud the fact that 
Maurice had, in due course of time, succeeded to the offices of his father and little cause 
for complaint. If, as future detractors suggested, these developments represented a 
strategy of self-centred Orangist dynasticism, it could equally be argued that sections of 
the new Republic were using the House of Orange to further their particular interests.
Maurice was to die without legitimate offspring. In 1624, aware that his health 
was failing, Maurice asked the States General if they would permit him to nominate his 
younger brother Frederick Henry as deputy-commander of the armed forces. The States 
General, conscious of the constitutional issue at stake, made plain that they and not 
Maurice must make the appointment which they duly did on 12 April 1625, eleven days 
before Maurice’s death. Following the death of his brother Frederick Henry was 
declared captain general and admiral general of the Union by the States General. 
Unusually, this was done without the customary prior approval of the member 
provinces, the States General and in particular the province of Holland arguing that any 
delay might leave the army restive and Spain free to exploit the uncertainty. In theory, 
the States General would have been free to appoint a foreign captain general such as 
Count Ernest Casimir Count of Mansfeld or Duke Christian of Brunswick but there may 
well have been a perception that these gentlemen might take a less politically sensitive 
approach to high office in the Dutch Republic than a member of the House of Orange. 
What was undeniable  was that the military successes achieved by Maurice and his 
resulting fame throughout Europe had brought lustre not only to the name of the House 
of Orange but also to the Republic. The House of Orange was now irrevocably linked to 
the national struggle against Spain. It can be no surprise that on  1  May 1625 Frederick
8 Israel. The Dutch Repubic,  p. 237-238.87
Henry was named stadholder of Holland and Zeeland while Utrecht, Overijssel and 
Gelderland were urged to follow suit, which they duly did.9
Before his death Maurice had urged his younger half-brother to marry his mistress 
Amalia van Solms. No doubt Maurice hoped that in this way the House of Orange, as 
descended from William 1, would be perpetuated. On 27 May 1626 Amalia gave birth to 
a son who was christened William in honour of his illustrious grandfather. It is 
instructive to record the reactions to this birth of a son to a serving stadholder. A 
deputation from the States General congratulated Frederick Henry, expressing the 
fervent hope that the young prince, growing up in the fear of God, might follow in the 
footsteps of his father, grandfather and uncle and be, in due course, a worthy instrument 
for the defence of freedom. Frederick Henry responded by declaring that a servant of 
the States was bom who would indeed follow in the footseps of his forefathers. He 
urged the States General to be as a father to the young prince.10 On both sides the 
excesses of rhetoric cannot disguise the explicit assumption that the child would 
succeed to his father’s offices. In  1626 Vondel had published a poem entitled 
Begroetenis aan den doorluchtigsten en hooggeboren Vorst Frederik Henrik which 
expressed similar sentiments. The work was intended to celebrate the nomination of 
Frederick Henry as stadholder in the majority of the Dutch provinces. Vondel saluted 
Amalia van Solms, whom he depicted as welcoming the conquering hero, her husband, 
on his return from his campaigns. The poet urged her
Omhels uw bruidegroom, gij prinselijke bruid,
Zo dat er rijze eerlang een vrome Oranje spruit,
Daar ‘s vaders hart in leeft, die rustig aan derf spannen 
Met vijanden van prat gepurperde tyrannen.1 1
9 Rowen,  The Princes o f Orange, pp. 56-59.
10 Jan J. Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik.  Prins van  Oranje (Zutphen: Walburg,  1978), p.  152.
1 1   Vondel. Volledige Dichtwerken en  Oorspronkelijk Proza,  ed.  by Albert Verwey (Amsterdam: H. J. W. 
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The child which will result from Amalia and Frederick’s mutual affection is to 
perpetuate the policy of his father and forefathers in the struggle against tyranny.
Amalia having acted as advised, Vondel celebrated the birth of her son with a 
poem entitled Geboortklok van Willem van Nassau. In this lengthy work, the poet 
imagined  Philip, King of Spain, in his palace the Escorial, brooding on his failing 
fortunes as Fame brought him the news of William’s birth.
Prins Wilhelm, eer te Delf door mordenaars pistolen 
Geschoten, liet de wraak de vierschaar Gods bevolen;
Die weer een Willem wekt uit Henrik zijnen zoon:
Zwicht Spaanse Koningstaf; zwicht Duitse Keizerkroon.1 2
Here Vondel clearly depicts the birth of the second William as an act of God designed 
to wreak justice on the assasins of his grandfather and their associates. Again, there is 
an implicit assumption that the newly bom infant will, in the course of time, continue 
the struggle initiated by his murdered grandfather, whose name he bore. In practical 
terms, this assumes at the very least, a significant military role. It might be easy to 
dismiss Vondel’s language as poetic bombast but events bore them out. In  1630 the 
young William was appointed by the States General to the post of general of cavalry, a 
position which had been held by his father before him. In  1630 and 1631 Utrecht and 
Overijssel, followed by Holland and Zeeland, bestowed on the young prince the 
‘Survivance’, that is to say that on his father’s death William would succeed him as 
stadholder in those provinces. This clearly marks a step in the direction of an hereditary 
stadholderate but it is not clear how far it was binding in all circumstances. Rowen, 
examining the issue, states that if William were not of age when his father died, Holland 
and Zeeland would feel free to reconsider the matter. There was a feeling that the
12 Verwey, p. 741.89
promotion of a minor to the stadholderate, while he was unable to exercise the powers 
attendant on the office smacked too closely of monarchy.13
There appears to have been an appreciable distinction between the 
‘Survivance’and any suggestion of unfettered hereditary succession. Instructive in this 
instance is the painting by Gonzales Conques of the young William II receiving the 
‘Survivance’ which was commissioned by Amalia von Solms for the Oranjezaal and 
dated 1650. Against a background of smoke and artillery, symbolising Frederick 
Henry’s recent military triumphs, the Holland maid in plumed helmet and bearing the 
cap of freedom, hands to the infant prince a scroll bearing the ‘Survivance’. Frederick 
Henry, armoured and bearing his staff of office, stands behind his son but his face is 
turned to one side and he makes no gesture towards his offspring. The Oranjezaal had 
originally been intended to contain a series of portraits of European monarchs but after 
his death Amalia had dedicated it to the memory of her husband and the elevation of 
both himself and the House of Orange. Arguably, it is the House of Orange at its most 
bombastic.  It is believed that Amalia was influenced by Ruben’s sequence of twenty 
four paintings of 1621  in the Palais de Luxembourg  and his work on the Banqueting 
Hall in London in  1629. Therefore, it may be interesting to see how in these two foreign 
examples hereditary succession was depicted. In the example in Paris, Henry IV 
conveys the ‘orbis mundi’ symbolising governmental power to his wife Marie de 
Medici who is to act as regent on behalf of their son Louis XIII. The dauphin stands 
between them, one hand linked to his mother and the other touching the globe to signify 
that power will pass to him when he attains his majority. No institution of government 
takes part in the transference. In Whitehall, James I lolling somewhat indolently, 
himself points to the young child before him, who is probably Charles I, to indicate his 
succession while Minerva and Hercules flank the child. Again there is no representation
13 Rowen.  The Princes o f Orange,  p. 71.90
of any organ of government in this transaction.14 Such a form of depiction would have 
been entirely out of place in the United Provinces.
Subsequent critics of the House of Orange were to depict the ‘Survivance’ as 
elements in a strategy intended to subvert the constitution of the Republic to replace it 
finally by an hereditary monarchy. It may, therefore, be salutary to look at the progress 
of the stadholders of Friesland, where circumstances followed very much the same 
pattern. William Louis of Nassau had been appointed stadholder in Friesland by, 
William of Orange. William Louis had died childless during the twelve year truce and , 
like Maurice, had been succeeded by his younger brother Ernest Casimir. In 1632 
Ernest Casimir’s older son Henry Casimir was awarded the ‘Survivance’ by the States 
of Friesland. This was not a moment too soon as Ernest Casimir was to die in battle 
later that year, prompting Frederick Henry to attempt to obtain the northern 
stadholderate for himself. The States of Friesland, no doubt apprehensive of the 
manoevres of the more powerful branch of the family, confirmed Henry Casimir as 
stadholder and sought to pressurise the neighbouring province of Groningen to adopt 
him as stadholder in their turn. This Groningen rather grudgingly did, insisting however 
that Henry Casimir would not be able to influence the choice of his successor in their 
province. Dying of his wounds following a skirmish at Hulst in 1640,  the unmarried 
Henry Casimir wrote to the States of  Friesland urging them to adopt his brother 
William Frederick as successor. Frederick Henry again intervened and on this occasion 
was able to persuade the States of Groningen to elect him as stadholder. William 
Frederick was adopted in Friesland but in order to win Frederick Henry’s support he 
assured him that the Frederick Henry’s young son William would be assured of the 
‘Survivance’ in Friesland if he, William Frederick, were to die without heirs.1 5
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It seems that we can discern a gradual evolution in which the States of the various 
provinces were persuaded to agree to a ‘Survivance’ while the existing stadholder was 
still alive. As the example of Groningen indicates, not all were prepared to have a 
successor thrust upon them. Unease also increased in Holland. In 1641 William married 
Mary Stuart, daughter of Charles I of England, a match intended to restore that 
monarch’s ailing fortunes by means of Dutch support. Critics of the marriage feared that 
the stadholder would henceforth pursue a policy favourable to the English Royalists to 
the disadvantage of the Republic’s political and economic interests. Moreover, 
impecunious as Charles I undoubtedly was, it seemed improbable that he would 
countenance the marriage of his daughter to a mere princely ‘condottieri’, whose family 
had no long term political power base. There must have been an implicit assumption 
that any son of the match would succeed to the offices held by his grandfather and 
father.  In December 1646, Frederick Henry’s daughter  Louise married the Elector of 
Brandenburg. These marital alliances taken in conjunction with the survivance could 
reasonably be perceived by some as an attempt to establish an Orangist dynasty whose 
international power and prestige would render them increasingly immune from the 
control of the provincial States. The action of the States of Holland in refusing to 
confirm William II as stadholder until the Treaty of Munster was confirmed indicated 
that in their eyes at least the implicit dynasticism of the ‘Survivance’ should not be 
pushed too far.16
Before the death of William II in  1650, there had been no need for the supporters 
of the House of Orange to develop any considered argument concerning the link 
between the House of Orange and the stadholderate.17 For one thing, there had been no 
sustained argument on the part of any erstwhile opponents. The ‘Survivance’ of 1630 
and 1631 had occasioned no exchange of political polemic. Instead, there had evolved a
15 Luuc Kooijmans, Liefde in Opdracht (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker,2000), pp.  11,13, 27, 29, 33, 35.
16 Israel, Dutch Republic,  pp. 537-538;  Kooijmans, p. 96;  Rowen,  The Princes o f Orange,  p. 83.
17 Van Deursen, M aurits van Nassau, p.  216.92
treasury of imagery, both visual and literary, which emphasised both the regenerative 
elements of the family history and its symbiotic relation with the new state. In 1544 
William I had inherited the principality of Orange in south-eastern France. Henceforth 
the family and its progeny were symbolised by the orange tree. In addition, after the 
assassination of his father Maurice adopted the emblem or ‘pictura’ of a severed tree 
trunk from which a sprig or branch sprouted, bearing the motto ‘tandem fit surculus 
arbor’ or ‘finally the sprig will become a tree’. This image was brimming with classical 
and biblical references. In Virgil’s Aeneid Book 6 in a section begining at line 143, the 
prophetess tells Aeneas of the golden bough dedicated to Juno which every time it is
| o
tom from its place never fails to reappear.  The image could also be found in the book 
of the Prophet Isaiah in which God, spurring on the Arameans and the Philistines 
against Israel, cuts off Israel’s ‘head and tail, palm frond and reed’, only to inaugurate  a 
later golden age when a branch would grow from the stock of Jesse and a shoot will 
spring from its roots. The wolf would lie down with the lamb and the land would be 
filled with the knowledge of the Lord. (Isaiah 9:14;  11:1,6, 9)19 Imagery such as this 
was not unique to the House of Orange. In the Florence of 1469 the standard of the 
twenty year old Lorenzo de’ Medici was decorated with the trunk of a bay tree with 
several withered branches and in the middle a single green shoot. The bay tree (lauro) 
was a pun on Lorenzo and he was the flourishing young branch.20 Associations such as 
these suggested that the severed trunk and shoot symbolised not only the regeneration of 
a particular family but also that that family’s fate was inextricably bound up with the 
most profound well being of the state which it served.
18 Gerhart B. Ladner,  ‘Vegetation Symbolism and the Concept of the Renaissance’  in D e Artibus 
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Examples of this imagery abound. In 1647 the death of Frederick Henry 
occasioned a flood of verse, some of which was published in print or  pamphlet form. In 
one work the author mourned the death of the stadholder but urged his readers to 
restrain their grief for ‘siet daer een jonghe Spruyt van dees Nassouschen Vorst’. In 
another  poem, accompanying a print, the writer similarly encouraged his readers to dry 
their eyes and look to the future urging them to wish that ‘uyt d’Jonghe Boom (William 
II) weer goede tachen spruyt’.21 Vondel’s poem on the birth of William II in 1626, 
employed the occasion of this ‘regeneration’ to develop the image of the  fully grown 
tree. Amalia van Solms dreams that ‘uit mijn ledekant/ Een boom wies hemelhoog, 
gelaan met goude oranjen’. In spite of the hail and storm unleashed by the Habsburgs, 
‘Holland in zijn schaad’we een weeldig leven leidde/ Gelijk het guide volk in guide 
werelds eeuw’.22 Here the birth, or ‘regeneration’ of a future Prince of Orange is 
associated with the security of Holland and the ushering in of a golden age.
The severed trunk with the shoot was not the only image of regeneration which 
was applied to the House of Orange. The shocking and untimely death of the Prince of 
Orange coupled with the election of his second son Maurice as stadholder and the later 
role of Maurice as defender of the new Republic and one of Europe’s greatest generals 
suggested to many that the House of Orange possessed a quality which transcended 
death. The dramatist Gijsbrecht van Hogendorp illustrated this theme in his work on the 
death of William I Treurspel van de Moordt begaen aen Wilhelm by der Grade Gods 
Prince van Orangien, which was published in 1617 and performed at Samuel Coster’s 
Nederduitsche Academie. In the introduction the playwright referred to William as the 
leader who had laid the foundations of the Dutch struggle for freedom, which had been 
continued by his sons Maurice and Frederick Henry. As van Hogendorp expressed it 
‘gelyck den eenen Phoenix den anderen herbaert uyt zijn assche, also heeft oock desen
21  Knuttel, no. 5572, np.;  Stolk, no.  1928.
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wijdtberoem Prince uyt zyn bloedt naeghelaten alsucke Helden’.23  This phoenix image 
recurs in a poem of Jacobus Revius Op de geboorte van Prins Willem II written in 1626. 
Revius firstly described the death of the phoenix and its renewal from its own ashes. He 
then applied this image to the House of Orange.
Den phoenix van ons lant, Prins Willem van Orangien,
Ontsielet voor den tijd van’t Godvergeten Spangien,
Door Henrick Frederick met sijne bedgenoot 
Veijonget veertich jaer en langer na zijn doot;
En Nederlant verblijt siet in sijn cleyne leden 
Den brant, om in te gaan weerom de oude treden.
Here the birth of William II represents the rising from the ashes of his like named 
forebear, over forty years after the latter’s death. Even the tiny limbs of the new-born 
are emblematic of this rebirth. The murderous bile of Spain has not ultimately prevailed 
against Orange or the Dutch Republic.
Waet baet u moordery, o Castellaensche Moren!
Wt Willem’s edel bloet is Willem weer geboren.2 4
These images of regeneration and resurrection, linked as they were to the fate of the 
Republic, bore a profound message perhaps all the more insidious for not being 
expressed in a direct and open form of political polemic. Rationally all knew that the 
stadholder was but a servant of the state whose appointment both as political leader and 
captain and admiral general was entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the provincial 
States. Yet alongside this there was a sense that the fortunes of the Republic were so 
bound up with this family that the continuance of one was dependent on the continuance 
of the other. This duality can be witnessed in the work of one poet Constantijn
23 F.  Kossmann, D e spelen van Gijsbrecht van Hogendorp (The Hague,  1932), p. 49.
24Johannes van Vloten,  Het Leven en de  Uitgelezen Zangen en Dichten van Jacobus Revius (Schiedam, 
1863), pp. 92-93.95
Huygens. Huygens wrote two poems which referred to the succession of Frederick 
Henry as stadholder. In one the metaphor of a ship is used. The steersman, who has 
guided the ship for forty years, dies and the ‘reders’ or shareholders select another in his 
place who is none other than the ‘jonge vaer’.The metaphor Huygens deploys serves 
well to indicate the relationship between the States and the stadholder, the States as 
shareholders choosing the steersman. In his Panegijre of 1626 however Huygens 
eulogises the achievements of Maurice and mourns his death, ‘que nous laissa le grand 
Maurice’ but rejoices that ie  voyons tant renaistre/ Au frere qui nous est rendu’.25  Here 
symbols of resurrection replace the material world of the ship and the shareholders. 
Maurice is like the phoenix reborn, in this case in the role of his half brother as 
stadholder. Huygens is able to portray the succession of Frederick Henry both in a 
down- to-earth metaphor and in the more mystical symbolical language appropriate to a 
great princely dynasty.
In the face of these images of resurrection and regeneration the arguments of the 
opponents of the House of Orange were both clear and consistent. Their fullest 
expression can be found in the Deductie of 1654 in which John de Witt offered a robust 
attack upon the hereditary principle within a republic. In a  republic no-one had the right 
by birth to high office for such was a fundamental attack on the citizens’  ‘diergekochte 
vryheit’. On the contrary, it was a basic axiom of the republican ideal that ‘de hoochste 
digniteyten voor de deucht open staan’. De Witt drew on biblical and contemporary 
examples. The sons of Gideon, a putative captain general, had not succeeded to their 
father’s post. The Venetians, Genoese and Swiss had never permitted any captain- 
general to hold office for life, far less permit his offspring to inherit the post. Finally de 
Witt postulated a state in which the successors of great men were not their bodily 
offspring but those imbued with their spirit and their virtues.
25H. H.Verstegen, Het Phoenix M otief  (Nijm egen,  1950), pp. 66, 82;  ‘Scheeps-Praet, ten overlyden van 
Prins M auritz\  D e Gedichten van  Constantijn Huygens, ed. by Jacob A. Worp, 9 vols (Groningen,
1893), II,  125-126; Worp, n, 51 -52.96
Kinderen ende Nakomelingen van Doorluchtighe Vorsten ende Helden niet zijn die geene die 
uyt haere lendenen werden ghebooren, ende nae de Burgerlijcke Wetten Erfgenamen zijn van 
haer tijdelijcke goederen, maer die gheene die waerlijck zijn Affetselen van haere zielen, ende 
die haere voetstappen naervolgende, metter daet betoonen dat zy waerlijcke de eeuwige 
schatten vande selve Vorsten, ende Helden namentlijck hare deuchden hebben geherideert.26
Implicit in de Witt’s thinking is the necessity of enacting Republican principles in 
such a way that the state is constantly rejuvenated by office holders who place the 
interests of the Republic above that of the family and any degenerate falling off into the 
evils of  hereditary office and dynasticism is prevented. This theme was re-examined in 
Consideratien van Staat ofte Polityke Weeg-schaal of the brothers de la Court which 
was published in 1661. The writers’ aim was to ‘outweigh’ the arguments in favour of 
crowned monarchy and its servitude and bellicosity in favour of liberty and justice. 
Given the nature of human passions and their all-consuming self interest it would be 
unthinkable that such a regime wedded to liberty would ever authorise the bearing of 
certain offices within one family for eternity for this would be totally incompatible with 
its fundamental liberties. Where popular election was followed by gifts such as the 
‘Survivance’, the inevitable outcome was an absolute monarchy and misery for the 
nation’s subjects. Moreover, any hereditary system contained within it the seeds of its 
own decay. As the examples of David, Solomon and Rehaboam  illustrated, the virtues 
of great men were rarely passed on in full to their sons. Hereditary succession implied 
degeneracy. Birth must not convey office on any individual; rather the regents of 
Holland must educate their sons in virtue and service to the Republic knowing that 
promotion would be based on merit alone. Only in this way could the Republic be 
preserved for eternity.27 Visual imagery reinforced this message. Dominating the 
Burgomaster’s chamber in the new Town Hall in Amsterdam  was a painting by Jan 
Lievens in which Suesa, a consul of Rome, demanded that his illustrious father Quintus
26 Knuttel, no. 7543, pp. 46-48, 51-52, 70.
27 Consideratien  van Staat ofte Polityke  W eeg-schaal (Amsterdam,  1661), pp.  30,115, 248, 266.97
Fabius Maximus should dismount from his horse in his presence in deference to Suesa’s 
office as consul. The inscription below, penned by Vondel reinforced the theme that the 
father must dismount in the face of the ‘Stad’s eer en aghbaarheid, / die kent geen 
bloed’.28 This was a state which recognised no obligation due to birth.
Set against the clear cut enunciation of these principles, the position of the 
Orangists appeared less convincing. Seen from the perspective of November 1650, it 
was difficult to argue that the offices of William II should pass to a babe in arms. Could 
it now be time, in the interests of utility, to separate, at least temporarily, the restored 
office of stadholder and captain general from the young William ID. In that way, 
according to the dictates of reason, the stadholderate as an institution could be defended 
without bedevilling the argument by setting forth the claims of a newly bom child. A 
surrogate could be appointed to fulfil the office of stadholder and serve as lieutenant 
captain general until the young prince reached maturity. This possibility was discussed 
during the first Anglo-Dutch war when many pamphleteers bemoaned the absence of a 
captain general. There were two main contenders for this role, John Maurice of Nassau 
and William Frederick, stadholder of Friesland.
Both argued their suitability. John Maurice was a stadholder for the Elector of 
Brandenburg in the states of Cleve and Mark and thus well connected within the Empire 
and he had rendered service in the past to the West India Company. The principles of 
hereditary descent were not neglected. John Maurice was the son of the second son of 
Count Jan of Nassau who was widely seen as the architect of the Union of Utrecht while 
William Frederick it was said could only trace his descent from the sixth son of the 
Count. It would be a ‘groot ongelijck’, argued one of John Maurice’s supporters to 
promote William Frederick before him.29 William Frederick had married Albertine the 
daughter of Frederick Henry and Amalia von Solms in 1652 and hence he was very
28 Katherine Fremantle, The Baroque Town Hall o f Amsterdam (Utrecht: Haentjens, Dekker, Gumbert, 
1959), p. 67, note 5.
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much more linked with the Court at the Hague. However, they were by no means 
favourable to his cause. In a letter of July 1653, John de Witt informed his 
correspondent that Amalia von Solms had set her face against any surrogate role for 
William Frederick saying that she would leave the country if he was appointed.30 These 
sentiments surfaced in pamphlet literature. In a pithy publication of 1653, the male 
protagonist Claes stressed that the Princess Royal Mary Stuart feared that William 
Frederick as a surrogate lieutenant would thwart any chances of her son succeeding to 
his father’s offices.31
It is clear that there was extreme sensitivity regarding the primacy of the claims of 
William ID, based on his birth. In the early 1650’s  both the principal contenders in 
speaking of surrogacy had usually stressed the temporary nature of any appointment. 
The anonymous author arguing the case of John Maurice in 1650 had emphasised that 
he was unlikely to live longer than twenty to twenty-five years by which time William 
III would be well placed to succeed him. John Maurice was moreover unmarried and 
childless.32 It was not until  1652 that John Maurice decisively broke with the House of 
Orange and put himself forward as admiral general in his own right rather than in a 
surrogate role.33 A pamphlet of 1653 had pointed out that William Frederick, newly 
married in 1652, had no sons and even were they to be bom subsequently they would be 
younger than the Prince of Orange and pose no threat to his appointment to his father’s 
offices.34 As events were to prove neither would be successful in their campaign. John 
Maurice had no real power base within the Republic while William Frederick’s 
intentions were deeply distrusted by the Court in the Hague as well as by sections 
within his own province of Friesland. The ending of the war against England in 1654
30 Brieven van Johan de  Witt,  I, Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap. 3rd Series no 42 
(Amsterdam,  1919),  101.
31  Knuttel, no. 7442, np.
32 Knuttel, no. 6899, np.
33 Knuttel, no. 7221, np
34 Knuttel, no. 7441, np.99
and the Seclusion of the same year largely brought to an end discussion of a surrogate 
for the young prince.
How then did the supporters of the House of Orange conceive of the 
stadholderate? Did they in effect see it as an hereditary institution but were unwilling to 
grant hostages to fortune by saying so openly. And if it were hereditary, how was this 
compatible with the sovereignty of the provincial States and their liberties? Firstly, it 
would be dangerous, as we have seen, to assume that there was one corporate 
viewpoint. Secondly,  we have to tread carefully between what was written in political 
polemic and what was implied in other forms of literary and visual expression. Writers 
of political pamphlets had to hone their argument carefully. Authors who supported de 
Witt would be only to eager to seize upon careless words. Imagery whether verbal or 
visual can convey much and is much more difficult to argue against.
In 1650 neither the supporters of the House of Orange nor their opponents had 
had occasion to finely hone their arguments and what emerged appears to show a 
divergence of views. In addition, the death of William II elicited a response from the 
Orangists that was as much emotional as rational. The city of Amsterdam had issued a 
medal showing William II as Faeton struck down from his chariot, to illustrate the 
theme that pride comes before a fall. An Orangist response came swiftly. An 
anonymous poet on a single printed sheet, warned the city fathers that times change and 
they themselves might soon find their arrogance humbled. Plague and famine would 
strike the land as a consequence of their attempt to rob William of his ‘erf gesach’.35 
Rather more judicious was the approach of another Orangist writer who described the 
stadholdership of William II as that which ‘hem van Godt ende de hoogste Regeeringe 
deser Landen op de schouderen geleit is’.  Intervention from the heavens, in this case 
from the dead stadholder, featured in another pamphlet in which William II, unable to
35 Knuttel, no. 6892, np
36 Knuttel, no. 6851, np.100
serve his country any longer in his mortal state, urged his fellow citizens from above
that if his yet unborn child is a son, ‘laet hem niet missen  alle Eere, Digniteyt, de
Plaetsen, de Ampten, de Bedieningen, van sijn Voor-vaderen’.37 This emphasis on a 
hereditary stadholdership dependent on the consent of the States and by implication 
their citizens may account for the re-publication, presumably in the last two months of 
1650, of the article of Survivance for the States of Holland and Zeeland of 1631. The 
publisher Michiel Stael of the Hague gave no reason for this re-edition but the text 
speaks volumes.
Als te weten dat soo wanneer het Godt Almachtigh sal ghelieven Syn Hoogheydt vol van Jaren 
ende Glorie met dese Werelt tot sich te halen dat oock als dan het voorsz Stadt-houderschap 
...op Syne Hoogheydts Successeurs ende Descendenten geconfereert ende in deselve 
gecontinueert ende geperpetueert mach werden.3 8
The publication of the Deductie in 1654, and the Seclusion of William HI from 
the offices of his forefathers compelled the Orangists to refine their arguments. De Witt 
had declared that any hereditary principle was incompatible with the ethos of a 
Republic. Rather it was emblematic of the monarchical and tyrannical tradition. The 
Orangist author of Bedenckinge op de Deductie van de Ed. Gr. Mog. Staten van Holland 
responded carefully. Firstly, he adjudged that the young Prince of Orange should 
receive a ‘preference’ to high office on account of the services of his forefathers to the 
state. He examined de Witt’s contention that the true children of the great were not 
those of their bodily progeny but their spiritual descendants and found it wanting. For 
this writer many of their fathers’ virtues were reborn in their princely offspring ‘dat inde 
Ambachts luyden kinderen so licht niet gheschiedt’. Lions did not spring from apes, nor 
eagles from doves. Moreover, although the author did not specifically state that the 
stadholderate should pass from father to son, he did contend that hereditary succession
37 Knuttel, no. 6869, p. 6.
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per se was by no means incompatible with the maintenance of liberties and privileges.
In the case of the Maccabees the role of captain general, as he defined it, passed from 
father to son without curtailing Jewish freedoms. Similarly in Rome, the position of 
Consul had passed from father to son without leading to monarchy. To the allegation 
that hereditary princes abused their powers to the benefit of their dynasty, the author 
contested that those of the regent class were by no means averse to favouring their 
families in the allocation of office. Finally, it was a mark of gross ingratitude that 
‘datmen niet en laet diens Prins genieten de eere, die syn voor-vaders habben 
gemeriteert, altijt van kint tot kint te besitten’.39
The attacks on the hereditary principle mounted by the brothers de la Court in the 
early 1660’s led Orangists to be very cautious in how they expressed their support for 
the young prince. The proposition of the States of Zeeland of 1660 in proposing that the 
Prince of Orange should be vested with the offices of stadholder and captain general 
was much more discriminating in its use of language. Given the Prince’s comparative 
youth, the States proposed that he should be ‘designated’ so that he would assume 
executive authority at the age of 18. To those who might protest that ‘designations’ 
‘smaecken naer survivances die Odieus sijn en van sequele en daerom oock in 
verscheyden Provintien bij particuliere wetten en resolutien geprohibeert’, the document 
argued sensibilities regarding ‘survivance’ were understood but that ‘designation’ 
although not previously used, was appropriate in these circumstances.40 
The author of Hollands Op-komst of 1662 sought to disentangle the stadholderate from 
any hint of dynastic monarchical ambitions by insisting that all knew that  the institution 
was elective not hereditary.41 Den Herstelden Prins of 1663 argued that the succession
39 Knuttel, no. 7550A, pp.  14, 28, 32, 36-38.
40 Knuttel no.  8365A. p. 5.
41  ‘Bedenkingen, op het Boek de Graafelijke Regeeringe van Holland’, forming the first section of 
H olland’s Op-komst oft Bedenkingen op de schadelijke Schriften genaamt Graafelijke Regeeringe en 
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of William III to the offices of his forefathers at an appropriate age was vital to the unity 
and prosperity of the Republic but that did not imply that
de Ampten altijt voor successijf moeten gehouden worden maar blijven de selve niettemin 
evenwel electijf, en mogen vrijelijck aan andere geconfereert worden, als den dienst van de 
Republicque daar aan gelegens is, ofte de Regeerders van de lande verstaan sulcks best te zijn’.
As the example of the Holy Roman Empire showed election could often result in 
members of the same family being chosen but did not prevent consideration of other 
suitable candidates.42 In a poem of 1670 celebrating the entry of William HI to the 
Council of State the author Orizant argued that following the exemplary deeds of 
William and Maurice it was entirely appropriate that their descendants should succeed 
to the position of stadholders and captains general ‘by verkiesinge ende designatie, soo 
lange alser een Prince uyt dien bloede was’ 43  In March 1672, William m  was chosen 
as captain general. In a pamphlet entitled Viva Hollandia, the author while celebrating 
the appointment makes clear that it came to the Prince not as the result of his birth but 
as the gift of the sovereign States in whose disposal the appointment lay for ‘men kent 
in Holland geen erfrecht of Successie van de vader op de Soon wegen de hooge 
bedieninge van Capiteyn Generael’.44
Cautious as these utterances were, there were other strands of Orangist rhetoric 
which suggested that, in practice, it was inconceivable to many of the Prince’s 
supporters that a restored stadholder would not be the direct descendant of the late 
William II, constitutional niceties notwithstanding. The supporters of the House of 
Orange would always argue, contrary to de Witt, that the qualities intrinsic to leadership 
were transmitted by birth. Orangist rhetoric set its face against the classical republican 
tradition as understood in seventeenth century Europe.  The poet Vollenhove, mourning
42 Knuttel, no.  8806A, p. 109.
43 Knuttel, no. 9824, pp. 3, 43 (note s), 54.
44  Viva Hollandia o f Nederlands Vreugde-Basuyn over het verkiesen  van  Wilhelm III...tot Capiteyn 
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the untimely death of William II in  1650, wrote that had he progressed beyond the 
volatility of  youth, ‘men had in u’t verstand uws Grootvaers zien herleven,/ Uws ooms 
beleid en moed, uws Vaders oorlogs-deugd’.45 Verse provided a highly appropriate 
vehicle for this type of sentiment. Johan Schulter, a minister in Breda, celebrated the 
Prince of Orange’s birthday on 14 November 1664 with the observation  that 
‘FREDERIKS groote ziel in Hem begint t’herleven’. William II being judiciously 
omitted, Schulter expressed his profound wish that that the nation ‘set WILLEM op den 
waagen/ Van sijn Voor-vaderen’.46 The appointment of the Prince as First Noble of 
Zeeland in 1668, a position formerly held by his forefathers occasioned reflection on the 
transmission of virtues. An anoymous writer assured his readers that, ‘la nature et 
l’experience nous apprennent constamment cette verite, que les esprits animaus des 
Grands Homes (sic) se transmettent ordinairement a leurs descendans, leur inspirent la 
me  me valeur.47
The author of the Bedenckinge of 1654 had also emphasised the centrality of 
‘gratitude’ in the granting of high office to the House of Orange. This concept was to 
become an essential element of Orangist polemic and therefore merits consideration. 
‘Gratitude’ and ‘ingratitude’ had already an established place in Orangist thinking 
before the death of William II. In  1649 the Chamber of Rhetoric of Flushing performed 
an entertainment to welcome William II to the town. The head of the Chamber, Vincent 
Matthyssen, in his address to the Prince, Burgomasters, Sheriffs and Town Council, set 
the tone for the substance of the performance. The theme was to be the gratitude which 
the town and nation owed to the House of Orange. Ingratitude was an offence against 
nature.
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De Aerde, soo de Oude getuygen, en heeft noyt onnutter last gedragen, als ondanckbare 
Menschen, want die zijn in de gheligentheyt slimmer als de Beesten, ja selfs wilde en 
onghetemde die, soo sommige Schriften luyden, voor Weldaden aen haer bewesen, hun 
danckbaer daer over aen den Dader hebben betoont.
The Chamber of Rhetoric, by reminding the audience of the deeds and virtues of the 
House of Orange, would guard against ingratitude for ‘  ‘t welck die Memory schrift, 
daer op volght Danckbaerheyt’.48  Gratitude was also the theme of an enchanting poem 
by Jacobus Revius, written as the life of Frederick Henry was drawing to its close, in 
which the poet depicted the Dutch Republic as a heavenly kingdom, the stars being the 
flickering candles in the windows of the burghers. The candles had been lit as a symbol 
of gratitude to the ailing stadholder, whom the citizens wished to keep with them for a 
while longer.
Aenschout, genadich Vorst, hoe om te laten blijcken 
De liefde uwes naem, het danckbaar Vaderlant 
Soo menich huys bynae soo menich baken brant,
De aerd’ in desen nacht den hemel schijnt te lijkcken.49
More prosaically, charges of ‘ingratitude’ could be levelled against those who 
opposed the policies of the Prince of Orange. In their Whit Sunday sermons of 1650, 
several ministers of the Reformed Church criticised those who opposed the strategy of 
the Prince of Orange and his refusal to consider further reductions in the military, 
accusing them of ‘ondanckbaerheyt’. They lambasted his opponents on the grounds that 
they ‘weynich aensach de meriten ende diensten van syn Hoogheyt ende der selve 
voorgangers, Vader, Oom ende Groot-Vader hadden gedaen’.50
48 Triumphe ofte  Vlissinge  Vreught; over het Onfangen vanden Hoogh-geboren Prins Wilhelm. 
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However, after the death of William II, the concept of ‘gratitude’ assumed a much 
more prominent position and became overtly, or by implication, linked to the succession 
of William III to the offices of his father. The States of Holland reacted sharply in 1652 
to a series of sermons by prominent Reformed ministers, particularly Jacobus Stermont, 
in which the war with England and other natural disasters were portrayed as woes 
brought upon the country by ‘ingratitude’ to the House Of Orange in not promoting the 
interests of the young prince. Stermont was temporarily denied the pulpit on the 
grounds that he sought to inflame the common people and bring the nation once again 
‘onder een onwettige slavemy van ‘t huys van Oraignen’.51 The author of 
Considerations de Religion et D ’Estat sur la Guerre Anglaise of 1653 believed that the 
young prince must be appointed to the offices of his fathers, given their services to the 
nation even if some lieutenancy was neccessary in view of his tender years, for Ton ne 
pourrait sans faire tort a leur heritier, faire porter la nomination sur autre que sur lui’.52
The concept of ‘gratitude’ laid great emphasis upon the former services of the 
House of Orange and the need to reward the young prince for the actions of his 
forefathers by confirming him in their offices. At the same time however, it avoided any 
direct implication of hereditary succession as an integral right of birth. The author of 
Ware Interest van Holland of 1662, a counterblast to de la Court’s Interest van Holland 
deployed the concept in such a way that the case for the young prince was made without 
any slight or affront to Holland’s basic liberties. While William III should be appointed 
to the position of captain general as a token of ‘gratitude’ for the services of his 
forefathers the sovereignty of the republic rested, as all knew, in the individual 
provinces.''  This strategy supported the cause of the young prince without any 
suggestion of automatic hereditary successsion with its smack of monarchy and made it 
clear that the captain general or stadholder was merely the servant of the States. In  1669
51  Knuttel, no. 7325, pp.  11-12.
52 Knuttel, no. 7427, p.  86.
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Pieter de Hubert, casting his eye over the past hundred years, linked the succession of 
William H as stadholder to a sense of gratitude for the services of his forefathers. ‘Deze 
Act van Survivance was meestendeel gecoucheert op het fondament van de 
onwaardelijke diensten van den Huize van Orange.’54 The notion of ‘gratitude’ as the 
source of the Orange stadholderate and captain generalcy was to become sufficiently 
widespread as to be assimilated by foreign commentators. William Temple in his 
Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands explained to his readers that 
the elevation of Prince Maurice to offices of state in the place of his dead father was so 
‘that they did all the honour that could be done to his (William’s) Memory’.55
‘Gratitude’ became effectively short-hand for all that supported the succession of 
William HI to his father’s offices and ‘ingratitude’ all that militated against it. In a play 
of 1661 entitled Droef-Bly-eyndig Vertoog op  ‘t Belegh en Over-gaen van Middelburgh 
onder ‘t Beleyt van Wilhelmus den Eersten Prince van Oranje the Zeeland dramatist 
Claerbout extolled the actions of William of Orange at the siege and capture of 
Middelburg. The work is dedicated to prince William Frederick. This should almost 
certainly read William Henry, the young Prince of Orange, as the author describes 
William I as ‘Uw Hoogheyt’s Oudt-Groote-Vader’. The play, we are told is written for 
youth in order to incite their hearts ‘tot danckbaerheyt tot God, en de Uyt-voerders van 
sulcken grooten werck’.56  In or about 1669 Arent Roggeven had published his 
Nederlantsche Treur-spel synde de Verkrachte Belgica. This drama, which may have 
been based on a work by the poet Samuel Bollaert, had been performed in Middelburg 
by the local chamber of rhetoric and purported to detail the sufferings endured by the 
rebels from the abdication of Charles V on 25 October 1555 to the assassination of 
William I on 10 July 1584. The role of William of Orange in combating the ‘Spanish
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tyranny’ was clearly central to the performance. The author prayed that God would 
grant the charges entrusted to William I to the young prince of Orange ‘naer waerdie 
uwes Stam-Huys hoffelijcker memorie’.57
Gratitude could also take visual form. In 1659, the Elector of Brandenburg and his 
wife and Amalia von Solms visited the city of Amsterdam. The City Fathers, mindful 
perhaps of events occurring in England, the possibility of the return of the monarchy 
and  the close family links between Stuart and Orange, had the poet and dramatist Jan 
Vos organise a spectacle for their entertainment. Vos had not previously been known 
for his Orangist sentiments but he had a living to make. A procession of floats, some 
displaying the virtues of the Orange stadholders, made their way through the city. The 
fourteenth represented William HI, with the figure of Hope on the front of the float.
This was followed by a float on the front of which sat the figure of Fame and behind her 
Gratitude. Two winged infants unfolded an Orange sash. The motto read ‘de 
dankbaarheidt bestraalt D’Orangen Oorlogsdaden’.58  The procession did not establish 
an irrefutable link between the concept of gratitude and the potential resurgence of the 
fortunes of the House of Orange but the symbolism was not lost on observers. The 
veteran Constantine Huygens, now in charge of the Prince of Orange’s household, in a 
poem entitled Vorstelijcke Dancksegging aende edele heeren Buregermeesteren der 
Stadt Amsterdam made clear his appreciation to the City Fathers. They had shown the 
world their gratitude to the invincible Orange heroes who had lain long in their graves.
... En ghy haelts uyt dat Graf, en doetse weer verthoonen 
De hoofden van bevel, die oogen van gesagh,
Die ‘t vaderland soo geem, en Spagnien soo noo sagh’.5 9
57 Arent Roggeven,  ‘t Nederlansche Treur-Spel synde de  Verkrachte Belgica (Middelburg,  1669) 
‘Introduction’, np.
58 Jan Vos, Beschrijving der Vertooningen op de staatcywagens (Amsterdam  1659), np.; Derk P.Snoep, 
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1975), pp.  85-86.
59 Worp, vi, 265-266.108
The concepts of gratitude and ingratitude were deployed in works commissioned 
by the House of Orange. There is intriguing evidence of an uncompleted commission 
for Amalia von Solms by Theodor van Thulden in the years following 1650 of which 
only sketches remain. We are fortunate that van Thulden left written explanations of his 
allegorical works and the themes he includes are revealing. In a work provisionally 
dated 1655 and entitled De Tweedracht verdrijft de kunsten en de wetenschappen, 
discord, treachery, poverty and war are displayed as the consequences of ingratitude. 
The towering archetypal figures embody the fate which is already overcoming the 
Republic as it scorns to reward those who have served it best.60
In Orangist rhetoric it is noticeable that the concept of ‘gratitude’ is often linked 
directly to the tomb of William of Orange in the Nieuwe Kerk in Delft. For Pieter de 
Hubert writing in 1669 the erection of the tomb monumentalised the gratitude of the 
States General to William I and by implication to his descendants.61  The Reformed 
minister Schuler in his poem Oranie Fakkel of 1664 contended that the debt the nation 
acknowledged to the House of Orange was manifested in the tomb at Delft and added 
‘de ondanckbaarheid is een doodelijk dingh’.  " The unknown author of a work of 1664 
Apologie pour la Maison de Nassau emphasised his abhorrence of ‘ce monstre affreux 
qu’on nomme 1’ingratitude’. For him the presence of the mausoleum at Delft, 
emblematic of gratitude, rebutted all the accusations of Pieter de la Court against the 
House of Orange in his Interest van Holland.
This emphasis on the mausoleum shows very clearly that while Orangists were 
content to describe the role of the stadholder as similar in nature to that of the Doge in 
Venice, there were also fundamental differences. While poets such as Vondel in 1622 
hymned the monumental grave in Delft and the man within, personal memorials of
60 Theodoor van  Thulden.een Zuidnederlandse barokschilder, Exhibition Catalogue, ed. Alain Roy 
(Zwolle: Waanders,  1991) ,pp. 37, 77, 217, 220.
61  Knuttel, no. 9762, p.  128.
62 Oranie-Fakkel omvluchten met verscheiden  Oranie-bloemen en Blaaderen (Breda,  1664), np.
63 Apologie pour la Maison de Nassau (Madrid,  1664), pp. 33, 73-74.109
Doges were banned in the city church of San Marco in Venice and no Doges were 
buried there after 1354. It was even the case that on Trinity Sunday and All Souls Day, 
Doges were not permitted to attend the liturgy in San Marco because the votive masses 
sung on those occasions for deceased members of the family might have caused a Doge 
to entertain thoughts of dynasty.64 Orangist rhetoric displayed no such embarassment. 
The great gunpowder explosion in Delft in 1654 destroyed parts of the town but left the 
tomb of William I unharmed. For an anonymous author of 1655, this was no less than a 
providential act of God who had elected to chastise the rest of the town for the nation’s 
‘ingratitude’.65 An absence of gratitude was also the theme of a correspondent of 
Secretary Thurloe who reported to the Englishman that many believed that ‘les os des 
princes interres a Delft crieront vengeance de cette ingratitude et que cette destruction 
est un effect de ce cri’.66 The poet Jan Six van Chandelier likewise immortalised the 
preservation of this memorial of the nation’s gratitude to ‘haar planters, en 
beschermers’. In a veiled reference to the young William III, the yet unripened fruit of 
the orange, he wrote of the explosion,
Dat al het onweer, uit den hel,
Saam spanne, om die triomfstee uit te roeijen,
Oranjes bios, en groene schil
Zal eeuw, in eeuw doorrypen, en herbloeijen.6 7
Here the preservation of the tomb is adroitly coupled with the continuation and 
flourishing of the family and its fortunes.
This consideration of ‘gratitude’ and the image of the tomb calls inescapably to 
mind the series of approximately 48 paintings depicting the tomb of William of Orange
64  ‘Der Afbeeldinge van Prins W illem ’s G raf, Verwey, p. 977: Edward Muir, Civic Ritual in Renaissance 
Venice (Princeton; Guildford: Princeton University Press,  1981), p. 257.
65  ‘De oorlogen des Heeren der Heirscharen tegen de Vereenigde Nederlanden’, in Knuttel, no. 7705, p. 
26.
66 A  Collection o f the State Papers o f John  Thurloe ed. by Thomas Birch, 7  vols  (London,  1742), II,  650.
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in the Nieuwe Kerk in Delft which were produced in the years 1650 to 1671. Could 
these conceivably be seen as elements in Orangist propaganda.  The artists involved 
were Gerard Houckgeest, Emanuel de Witte and  Hendrick van Vliet and in 1650 all 
three were based in Delft, a town whose artists had often been linked to the nearby court 
at the Hague. Arthur K. Wheelock Junior in an article in Simiolus has suggested that the 
initial painting of the tomb in 1650 may have been an Orangist commission following 
the death of William II and that the stimulus for the change in Houckgeest’s style which 
observers have noted, may have been this commission and the events of 1650. The 
possibilty of such a commission is not unreasonable.  Certainly Barthold van Bassen, 
the likely teacher of Houckgeest had been involved in the construction of the 
stadholder’s palaces at Honselaarsdyck and Ter Nieuwberg and had painted an earlier 
work depicting the tomb of William I in a fantasy setting in 1620.  Church interiors 
had previously been deployed for polemic purposes. Saenredam’s Interior of the St 
Bavokerk, Haarlem with a Bishop's Tomb of 1630 had depicted a non-existent 
episcopal tomb as part of the chapter’s campaign for legitimacy which Rome 
contested.69  However, tempting as it may be to suggest an Orangist commission and a 
campaign of artistic propaganda, a degree of caution is advised.
It is true that some of the paintings of the tomb of William I do appear to suggest 
a polemic function. In two paintings by Houckgeest of 1650 and 1651, in which the 
tomb forms a central part of the painting, the figure of Liberty holding the hood of 
Freedom is positioned to catch the eye.70 In a work of Emmaunel de Witte of 1664 a 
single ray of sunlight illumines the motto ‘Te vindice tuta libertas’, (with your
68 Arthur K.W heelock Jr.  ‘Gerard Houckgeest and Emanuel de Witte: architectural painting in 
Delftaround  1650', Simiolus, 8 (1975/6),  167-185  (pp.  182-183, note 46).
69 Rob Ruurs,  ‘Functions of architectural painting, with special reference to church interiors’, in 
Perspectives.Saenredam  and the architectural painters of the seventeenth century, Catalogue (Rotterdam: 
Museum Boymans-van Beuningen; Seattle:  University of Washington,  1991), pp. 43-51  (pp. 43-45)
70 Nieuwe  Kerk and Tomb,  1650, oil on panel, 49 by 35 inches, Kunsthalle, Hamburg:  165, oil on panel, 
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protection liberty is safe) which is placed next to the figure of Fortitude. In reality 
Fortitude was coupled with the motto ‘Saevis Tranquillius in Undis’ (at peace amid the 
raging storm). Thus de Witte rearranged elements of the tomb to emphasise William’s 
service to the nation.71 However the iconography of  many of these tomb paintings is 
not always simple to decipher. Any depiction of a monument to the dead may carry a 
theme of vanitas. In a work dated to about 1660 Houckgeest depicts a tomb in the Oude 
Kerk in Delft  with an open grave being dug in the foreground.72 Similarly van Vliet in 
1667 positions an open grave with shovels and two skulls in the forefront of a painting 
of the tomb of William of Orange in the Nieuwe Kerk.73 We would usually assume that 
Houckgeest’s tomb in the Oude Kerk with the open grave intended to allude to themes 
of vanity and temporality and it seems reasonable to suppose that van Vliet’s painting of 
the tomb in the Nieuwe Kerk carried a similar nuance of memento mori.
Thus the best that can be said is that some of these paintings appear designed to 
emphasise the virtues of the dead stadholder. While the number of paintings, at just 
under fifty, may seem considerable, it has to be set within the context of an oeuvre such 
as that of van Vliet which encompassed over two hundred and twenty-five church 
interiors.74 In many of the paintings the position of the tomb itself is peripheral. These 
works form part of a visible fascination with the subject of church interiors which 
reached its apogee in the Netherlands around 1660, before gradually declining in favour 
of the exploration of outdoor scenes. A church interior by Emmanuel de Witte was 
priced at 150 guilders and with this value it is not surprising that they seem to have been 
acquired by wealthy collectors including the Kings of England and Denmark.75 
Although prints of certain of these paintings were subsequently used to illustrate
71  Danielle H.Lokin,  ‘The Delft Church interior  1650-1675’, in Delft M asters;  Verm eer’s Contemporaries 
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guidebooks on the town of Delft, it is difficult to date them and thus it is not possible to 
provide evidence that single prints of the tomb were sold for the edification of 
supporters of the House of Orange.
Leaving aside the concept of gratitude in all its manifestations, Orangists appear 
to have placed great worth in the use of symbols of regeneration and resurrection. The 
image of the severed trunk and the new shoot continued to be regularly deployed. The 
death of William II and the birth of his posthumous son made this a highly appropriate 
and emotive symbol. The posthumous birth of William HI lent itself naturally to tree 
imagery. For one writer of 1650
d’Oranje-stam tot aen de wortel toe geknodt,
(soo ‘t scheen) eer Godt een ander gaff 
Wt hem geschooten.76
As William III grew into a young man who was suitable to be appointed to the  offices 
of his forefathers, the shoot grew and flourished. The appointment of William HI as 
First Noble of Zeeland led one writer to ponder on the ways of Providence and the 
severed trunk, only to delight that ‘Uwe Hoogheyt als een cierlijcke scheute ende edele 
plante voor onze oogen mogen sien her-leven’.77 The shoot grew towards a stately tree 
as he succeeded to the offices of his fathers. When William HI became captain general 
in  1672, the poet Vollenhove portrayed this as a vibrant regeneration in which the 
orange tree, once struck down ‘herleeft, hergroeit, herbloeit in eene spruyf ,78  The 
supporters of de Witt faced with what was a veritable plethora of tree imagery argued 
lamely that  while such symbols had been appropriate for the death of William I and
76 P. H.  van Grevenbroeck,  Nederlandsche Swane=Sang op de  Wtvaert van Sijn Hoogheyt Wilhelm 
Frederick (sic) Prince van Oranien (The Hague,  1650)
77 Knuttel, no. 9677, p.  1.
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Maurice’s subsequent leadership of the Republic’s army, the severed trunk could not be 
used to represent William II for he had died a natural death.79
We see the culmination of tree imagery in the years after 1672 and the restoration 
of the stadholderate.One work of 1675 succeeds perhaps in bringing  together many of 
these themes. Geslacht-Rekening der Doorluchtigste Vorsten van Nassau en Oraenjen 
shows on the frontispiece a trunk of a tree. At the foot of the trunk is the face of 
William I, at the top in its leafy exuberance, William HI. The first part of the book 
detailed the achievements of the ancestors of the House of the Orange, beginning 
ambitiously with the year 682. The author described the military successes of William 
HI against the French, placing them in the context of the feats of his forefathers, 
immediate and distant. In the view of the author William, in the face of his own 
achievements and those of his predecessors ‘heeft... volkomen verdient het Erflijk Hooft 
van Onsen Staet te wesen’ which has been bestowed, nota bene, by the provincial 
States. Not only will he guard the freedom and prosperity of the state but also, 
‘dusdanige Hooft konnen wy niet wel missen; dewijl daer door de macht de Regenten in 
den toom moet gehouden worden, om dat sy de selvige niet tot onderdrukkinge harer 
Medeborgeren souden misbruiken.80
As we have seen phoenix imagery had been associated with the prince of Orange 
before 1650 but it was after the death of William II that it becomes such a notable 
element in Orangist imagery. The sudden and unexpected death of the stadholder and 
the birth of his posthumous son shortly afterwards occasioned a flood of phoenix 
imagery. One poem  characheristic of this genre was entitled Op de Nieuw-geboren 
Fenix van Oraengie, in stede des overleden Vorsts, den Prince Wilhelm -verresen den 
13 November 1650 by Samuel van Hoogstraten. Grief and joy were combined for ‘Zoo
79 Knuttel, no. 9663, p. 53.
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daar een fenix is verloren,/ Een jonge Fenix wort geboren’. 81 Regeneration was 
similarly hymned in another work.
Eer noch de tranen van ons’ oogen gewassen
Om dat de bleeckte Doodt Prins Wilhelm quam verrassen
De klock van vreugde ispeelt, om dat soo wel te pas 
Een and’ren Phoenix komt uyt sijn verstoven as.82
A poem by van Adrichem illustrates particularly clear the message behind the use of 
such a theme.
De Phoenix die... was verloren
Is door Godt’s liefdens vier weer op een nieuw herbooren
Thus Maurice, Frederick Henry, William II and latterly William HI had risen as a 
phoenix from the ashes of their predecessors. In the case of the infant prince of Orange 
in  1650, his birth clearly constitutes the rising of the phoenix but in the case of the other 
three stadholders, it can only be their accession to the office of stadholder which marks 
the regeneration from the ashes for all three were adults when their predecessor died. 
Thus the phoenix image refers not just to birth but to the transmission of office. The 
author makes it clear that this is so, giving expression to his hope for the newly bom 
William for he declares, in an excess of hyperbole, that it is the common prayer of all 
Holland, ‘als hy het ampt bekleet dat hem sijn vader laef .83 Phoenix image was not 
confined to poetry. In either 1648 or 1649 Go  vert Flinck had commemorated the birth 
and tragic early death of a son to the Elector of Brandenburg and his wife Louise 
Henriette the daughter of Frederick Henry with a painting now in the New Palace in 
Potsdam. The goddesses Minerva, Fortuna and Venus and Juno clustered around the 
open cradle of the heir. Putti bore the arms of Brandenburg and the electoral crown aloft
81  Knuttel, no. 6884, np.
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while Fame, ascending heavenwards, displayed a branch of orange fruit in her hand.84 
In 1650 Comelis van Dalen used Go  vert Flinck’s painting to design a print to celebrate 
the birth of William III. The arms of Orange were substituted for those of Brandenburg 
and the background to the work was now sited in the Vijverburg in the Hague. Instead 
of the electoral crown, a putto held up for attention a phoenix.85
In myth there was only ever one phoenix alive at any one time. After a life of five 
hundred years or more, the bird sets his nest ablaze, fans the flames with his wings and 
dies while from the ashes a new phoenix arises. Thus in both pagan and Christian art the 
phoenix symbolises both uniqueness and immortality, the individual being mortal and 
unique and the species immortal. In the case of Elizabeth 1  of England, the Virgin
oz:
Queen was described by her admirers as ‘sola phoenix omnis mundi’.  Similarly the 
uniqueness of Maurice was celebrated by Remy Bastien in 1618 in his poem Alllustre 
Prince Maurice in which he enthused, ‘Grand Maurice, tu es le Phenix de nostre 
aage,(sic)/ Des preux le parangon, vaillant, genreux et sage’.87 It is the second aspect 
immortality which casts light on the use of the phoenix imagery in relation to William 
111. Kantorowicz in his magisterial study The King’s Two Bodies describes the concept 
whereby the monarch has both a natural body, subject to mortality and a body ‘politic’ 
which does not die but is transferred from his mortal body at death to another. Thus this 
immortal part of the kingship migrates to his successor perpetuating  both a continuous 
succession of individuals and a corporate perpetuity of the collective which combine to 
form the concept of a royal ‘dignity’ which never perishes. It was highly appropriate to 
symbolise this migration by the emblem of the phoenix. As classical authors had 
related, the bird rising from the ashes was not conceived of his father but was his own 
father, leaping forth now as the son. The image of the phoenix  was symbolic of the fact
84 Govert Flinck, Allegory- on the Birth and Death o f the Crown Prince  William Henry of Brandenburg, 
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that the king’s reign, in one sense, suffered no interruption for the reign of his successor 
began at his demise. Thus dynastic continuity and hereditary succession was 
perpetuated.88  It is instructive to consider some examples of how this concept was 
deployed. A jeton or small medal devised in 1643 to announce the death of Louis XIII 
and the accession of his son Louis XIV, showed a phoenix in its mountain nest, 
illumined by the rays of the sun. The motto explained that ‘le Phoenix naist et s’eleve 
des cendres de son pere par l’lnfluence qui luy est envoyee du Ciel et du Soled’.,The 
same symbolism can be seen in a medal cast in the Netherlands in 1666 on the 
accession of Charles II of Spain. On the obverse side was the head and shoulders of the 
new monarch and on the reverse side a phoenix rose from the ashes with the legend 
‘renascitur’.89
These are foreign examples but there is every evidence that the Dutch deployed 
the phoenix symbol for the same purposes, for its use was widespread throughout 
Europe.  Ripa’s Iconologia which was first published in Dutch in Amsterdam in 1644 
showed under the heading ‘resurrection’ a woman holding in her left hand a phoenix.90 
Vondel writing in  1660 in expectation that the newly restored Charles II would visit 
Amsterdam before his departure assured the city’s citizens that
Gij zoudt hem zien, begrimd van’s doods grimmassen,
Naar d’Overdrift der wolken, droef en naar,
Verrijzen uit zijn vaders heilige assen,
Geofferd in den gloed op’t hofaltaar.9 1
Here the phoenix is Charles II, succeeding to the throne to which heredity bound him. 
Thus the symbol of the phoenix was frequently deployed in the case of an individual 
succeeding to a position of office which was theirs by hereditary right. Clearly this
88 Ernst H. Kantorowicz.,  The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in M edieval Political Theology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press,  1957), pp. 4,  13, 334, 383, 388-390.
89 Gerard van Loon, Beschryvinge der Nederlandsche Historipenningen, 4 vols (The Hague,  1723), II, 
536-537.
90 Ripa, p. 545.
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could apply in the case of the Prince of Orange. Certainly the image was widely used in 
relation to the Prince. An example can be seen in a painting by Govert Flinck entitled 
Allegory on the Memory of Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange with the portrait of his 
wife, Amalia von Solms. The work was commissioned by Amalia for her residence Huis 
ten Bosch, and as such is clearly intended to laud and perpetuate the fame of the House 
of Orange. Her dead husband is represented seated in armour on a tomb, a putto about 
to crown him with a laurel wreath. Amalia herself is seated in the foreground of the 
painting with a book open before her. Kneeling before her, as if to console her, is the 
figure of Hope bearing an orange branch as a symbol of the young prince. In the 
background, the sun breaks through the dark clouds to light upon a monument upon 
which a phoenix rises from the ashes. An angel in the left of the painting draws our 
attention to this hopeful symbol of a future Prince of Orange.92
The same year 1654 saw the production of the first medal showing  the young 
prince. A head and shoulders image of William III surrounded by a wreath of orange 
branches decorated the obverse side, while on the reverse was a phoenix rising from the 
ashes in the beams of the sun. Three years later two further medals were produced, one 
with the phoenix as in  1654, the other having instead on the reverse side a short verse 
inscribed.
A1 lag D’Oranje Boom Geknot,
Dat Eedel Spruitje werdt van Godt 
Gekoestert in Maria’s Schoot.
Dus leeft de vader na zijn Doodt 
Gelijk een Fenix in zijn Zoon.
Hy Groey in Bloey en Span de Kroon 
In Deugd en Prinselyk Verstant 
Tot Heul en Hail van’t Vaderlant.93
92 Theodoor H. L. Scheurleer,  ‘De woonvertrekken in Amalia’s Huis en het Bosch’, Oud Holland, 84 
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Here we see clearly images of regeneration and succession. The orange tree cut down 
by the death of William n, sprouts anew with the birth of his son. Just like the phoenix 
the death of the bird is also its resurrection for William II lives on in the person of his 
son. There is an assumption that William HI will succeed to some form of his father’s 
office as his growth in virtue and understanding prepares him to be of service to the 
nation in the future.
Any occasion of William’s promotion towards that end was inevitably maijced by 
phoenix imagery. When in 1668 William was elected as First Noble of Zeeland, a 
position which his forefathers had also held, a sermon was given on 23 September of 
that year at Middelburg by Johannes Thilenus to mark the occasion This was 
subsequently published with the addition of a poem by one N.van Hoorn in which the 
poet addressed William as ‘phoenix nieuw verresen, /Uyt Welhem’s dierbare As’.94 The 
prince’s membership of the Council of State in 1670 was celebrated in a poem by van 
Santen in which the author proclaimed ‘hier rijst een Phoenix nu uit den Oranjen-as’.95 
1672 inevitably saw a flood of phoenix imagery. William’s appointment as captain 
general and stadholder of Holland was in the eyes of one commentator no less than the 
work of God who ‘heeft hem ons ten dienst uyt Vaders asch gewekt / Gelijk een 
Fenix’.96 The rising of the phoenix from the ashes was clearly linked to the attainment 
of the offices of his forefathers. A medal of 1672 cast to celebrate the appointment of 
William III as stadholder of Holland had on the reverse side the Prince depicted as 
Pallas with on one side a conspicuously fully grown orange tree and on the other, in the 
distance a phoenix from the ashes. The accompanying legend ‘Nec Sorte, nec Fato’ 
might indeed imply that the Prince had now come to enjoy that which was righfully his 
by birth.97
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The catastrophe of the French invasion in 1672 brought to the fore a very different 
discussion of hereditary rights which is concerned less with the past than with the 
future. The vehicle for this new debate was a series of written demands presented to the 
burgomasters of the towns or the provincial States. Perhaps the first of these came on 8 
July 1672 in a petition delivered to the city fathers of Rotterdam. At this point William 
in had not been elevated to the stadholderate but in one version of the citizens’ 
demands it is requested that all the dignities vested in the Prince of Orange ‘sullen 
komen te vervallen op Sijn Ed. Nasaten soo daer souden mogen zijn’.98 Following 
William ID’s elevation to the stadholderate similar appeals resounded from similar 
sources. The same year 1672, sees the expression of the concept of ‘dankbaarheid’ not 
only in relation to William HI but also to any potential offspring. Apologie of 
verdediginge van  * t gene bij de Gemeente in Zeeland is gedaen tot herstellinge van Sijn 
Hoogheyt purported to laud the role of the citzens of that province in the restoration of 
William III to the offices and dignities of his forefathers. The unknown compiler 
reviewed the history of Zeeland, with its Counts and States, before proceeding to 
William I and his sons. After lauding the actions of William 1, he explained that his 
‘hooge gesagh...na dien tijdt Successive gheweest by de Heeren Princen van Oranjen’. 
This might be read as an unclouded statement of hereditary succession but later sections 
make clear the determining role of gratitude for
‘t Volck van desen Staet en kende niet anders vergelden de hooge verdiensten waer door ‘t aen 
het doorluchtigh Huys van Orangen verplicht is, dan met de eenigen Na-zaet te doen komen ‘t 
Hooge gesagh en waardigheden die het hier vooren heeft gehad.
The writer makes clear that the citizens of Zeeland wish the stadholderate to become 
hereditary in the male line of William III for the House of Orange was, next to God, the
98 Knuttel,  nos.  10145A,  10147.120
source of all the freedoms that they possessed and ‘vereyscht dat geen dankbaerheyt’? 99 
Here gratitude becomes nothing less than the motivating force for an hereditary 
stadholderate.
A similar document purportedly from the same source maintained that such an 
hereditary stadholderate had been promised by the Dutch ambassador to the King of 
England on the occasion of the marriage of William II and Mary Stuart. Mischievously, 
the authors cited as their source for this information an anti-Orangist pamphlet of 1650 
Trouwhertige Aensprake which had clearly conveyed the allegation with the intention of 
alarming its readers.100 They even quoted the name of the publisher Jan van Dalen of 
Leiden. A pamphlet which took the form of a letter from Rotterdam dated 10 July 1672, 
exemplifies the thinking at that time behind a call for an hereditary stadholderate. The 
writer contended that the magistrates of the city had become ‘trotsch en hoogmoedig’ 
seeking to enhance their own families and fortunes by promoting sons to offices and 
honours. Enriching themselves with the emoluments of office, they had reduced the rest 
of the citizens to a state of political impotence tantamount to slavery ‘hoewel oock vele 
onder ons uyt deftiger en waerdiger bloed, en Voorouderen van meerder verdiensten 
dan sy, gesproten waren’. In proposing a hereditary stadholderate, the author maintained 
that this would prevent the magistrates and their families ‘haer selven tot Heeren als en 
Vorsten over ons te maken’. A hereditary stadholderate would thus prevent any further 
transference of urban office within a small selection of families and open up the 
possibility of political authority to a wider, much more deserving group.101
From this period in the summer of 1672 an hereditary stadholderate appears to 
encounter little opposition. The number of pamphlets published in the years 1673-1675 
is of course less than the crisis year of 1672 and much of what is written concerns the 
course of the war. However, the scanty pieces which pertain to the subject are
99 Knuttel, no.  10262,  np.
100 Knuttel, no.  10264, p. 4
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suggestive. A poem on the occasion of the Prince’s birthday in 1673 saw William HI as 
a Joshua sent by God to replace the dead Moses, William II. However unlike the early 
Israelite leaders, the author, one E.C. plainly anticipated a hereditary succession for he 
wished that ‘men van u Zaet noch Spruytjen mogen sien’.102 An author of 1674 
congratulated William ED on his military endeavours against the French. He continued 
‘wy hopen ook, haast verder / Den vyand weg-gejaagd te sien: en U, ons Herder / Te 
houden erfelijck’.103 In the same year, the States of Holland pronounced that the 
stadholderate would be hereditary in the male line of the descendants of William HI. A 
print to commemorate the event was entitled The Death of the Perpetual Edict, referring 
to the decision of the States of Holland in 1667 to abolish the stadholderate in 
perpetuity. In a chamber whose walls are crumbling a man representing the Perpetual 
Edict lies dying. His hand rests on the hood of freedom under which there is an image 
of the castle of Loevestein, where both Oldenbamevelt, de Groot and the six members 
of the States of Holland of 1650 had been incarcerated. At the foot of the bed in the 
chair of state reclines an old man with the words ‘Seclusie’ on his head and in his right 
hand a paper which reads ‘wie kan tegen God’. The States Party and its rhetoric in the 
process of death, a woman, ‘goet raet’ enters from a door on the left bearing an orange 
branch in her left hand. In the upper right of the scene a phoenix rises from the ashes.104
Conclusion
Since the death of William I, the stadholderate had passed to his direct 
descendants, a development which had been institutionalised, albeit once, in the 
‘Survivance’ of 1631 and which had been mirrored in developments in the stadholderate 
in Friesland. In exchanges of political polemic most Orangist commentators emphasised 
that the stadholderate was elective. Thus in theory a number of suitable individuals
102 Knuttel, no.  10966, np.
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of the England of Elizabeth, there was a clear development of the symbol of the crown 
as suprapersonal, containing a validity greater than the merits of any one person105. The 
crown was greater than any head which wore it.  In contrast, the poetry and visual 
imagery of the seventeenth century  Dutch Republic appears to recognise no distinction 
between the services of the individual and the office itself. The role of stadholder, as 
servant of the Republic, clearly would not lend itself so easily to modes of expression 
appropriate for the Crown of England but that alone cannot entirely account for the way 
in which the institution and the House of Orange are so interwoven in literary and 
pictorial forms. This raises the tantalising issue of how far the stadholderate was an 
integral element in the constitution of the seventeenth century Dutch Republic and how 
far it existed as a political institution designed to recognise and reward the services of a 
particular princely family. This was certainly a question which de Witt and his 
supporters posed. What can be said is that after twenty two years without a stadholder, 
significant sections of the Republic had no desire to repeat the experience. A hereditary 
stadholder served their purpose but he was to be no monarch.
105 Ruth Nevo,  The Dial of Virtue: A Study o f Poems on Affairs o f State in the Seventeenth  Century 
(Princeton:  Princeton Univesity Press,  1963), p. 24.124
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A BODY SHATTERED - THE UNION AND THE STADHOLDERATE
In many early modem European states centralising authority was seeking to extend its 
power by promoting a sense of national consciousness. The writing of history and the 
defining of a ‘canon’ of national experience came to stand alongside regional and civic 
loyalties. In a state such as early modem France the monarchy could play a dynamic 
role as arguably the only institution which was able to control and suppress competing 
elements in society.1  The Dutch Republic had been bom of a struggle against such 
centralising authority in favour of provincial liberties. Whatever place the House of 
Orange held in the hearts of many Dutchmen, the stadholderate was not a monarchy. 
Rather the nascent Republic had to develop a national consciousness which was 
grounded both in the struggle against Spain and the values and experiences that were 
associated with this. In this, the idea as much as the substance of the Union of Utrecht 
fulfilled a key role.
By the mid seventeenth century defence of the Union of Utrecht had become an 
essential element in the normative language of contemporary political debate. In his 
illuminating insights into the world of the political text, Quentin Skinner has drawn 
attention to the conventions whereby printed political polemic of all parties and factions 
tends to share not only vocabulary but also principles and assumptions and most 
critically the criteria for testing knowledge claims. A principle may be conceived of as 
intrinsically politically true and right by many different competing groups and all will
1   Orest Ranum, National Consciousness,  H istory and Political Culture in Early M odern Europe 
(Baltimore; London,  1975), pp.  1,  11, 44-46.125
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attempt to relate their stance, however different, to its maintenance and enhancement. 
Thus differing groups within the Republic depicted ‘eendracht’ as an essential good and 
the Union of Utrecht as incorporating the foundations of the Republic. Their strategies 
for attaining and maintaining unity and the Union might differ but all groups attempted 
to avoid being cast as destroyers of unity while attempting to tar their opponents with 
that brush.
The Union of Utrecht had largely resulted from the collapse of the Pacification of 
Ghent and in particular the failure of  those in the centre who sought political 
conciliation with Philip n. It has been observed that as a result the rebels were 
compelled, almost against intention, to form a defensive confederation which came to 
include only the Northern provinces. After the Abjuration of 1581 signalled a definite 
break with Philip 13, the Union of Utrecht was the only document which regulated the 
relations between the provinces in the new Republic. From its inception the Union had 
two aims. Firstly, it was designed to enable the signatories to come together to resist 
Spanish hegemony. Secondly, the Union was designed to maintain that for which the 
rebels believed that they had fought, that is the rights and privileges of each of the 
individual provinces. From the start there were tensions implicit in these objectives. A 
struggle against an external enemy assumed that a degree of self sacrifice in matters of 
political and military autonomy would be expected from the seven provinces, yet a 
defence of the right of each province to enjoy its own privileges and to exact obedience 
from those resident within the province might be seen to be inconsistent with any 
sacrifice of privilege.3 In addition the provinces were manifestly not equal in resources. 
The northern and eastern provinces remained the theatre of war. Sparsely populated in 
comparison with Holland, they could contribute little to the common purse. For them
2. Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his critics,ed. by JamesTully (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,  1988), pp. 9, 20.
3 De  Unie van  Utrecht:  Wording en  werking  van een verbond en een  verbondsactie ed. by Simon 
Groenveld and H. L. Ph Leeuwenberg (The Hague: Nijhoff,  1979), pp. 99-100,  138.126
the Union could often best be perceived as a means of containing the ambitions of a rich 
and powerful Holland within a structure which granted them equality of voting rights. 
For Holland, the landward provinces served  successfully as a buffer zone against 
Spanish incursion in her own territory, while her large population and flourishing towns 
enabled her to act as the paymaster of the Union with all the corresponding political 
influence inherent in such a position.
As the development of the Dutch Republic shows, these competing tendencies 
were not entirely contradictory. However contemporaries were acutely conscious of 
them and internal fragmentation was perceived as being as real a danger as any military 
force assembled by Spain. The polemic surrounding the negotiations leading up to the 
Truce of 1609 bear witness to these fears. For the writer of Considerations D ’estat sur 
le Traicte de la Paix published in 1607 the provinces united need have no fear of 
military defeat at the hands of Spain but were peace to come and as a consequence 
factionalism to triumph, then the enemy would hardly have need to recourse to arms. 
For this author, as for so many others, bodily similes had a particular resonance. He 
wrote that ‘la Republique doit ressembler au corps humain auquel tous membres sont 
joincts’. Were the unifying forces of war to surrender to the confusions of peace then ‘il 
est bien certain que le corps enfin demeuroit tronque et inutile’. The inevitable 
consequence would be that ‘estans separez (sic) il seroit facile a l’ennemy de nous 
surmonter’. To buttress his argument he cited the example of the Greeks, who united in 
their confederations were able to resist the incursions of Xerxes but when he returned to 
Asia leaving them in peace and prosperity, they were unable to control their divisions 
and finally fell victim to the kingship of Philip of Macedonia and his son Alexander.4 
These concerns found expression in visual form. A print of 1607 showed Father Jan 
Neyen, acting on behalf of Spain in the peace negotiations, with a cross in his hand and
4 Considerations D ’Estat sur le  Traicte de la Paix, pp.  19-21, 36.127
the tail of a scorpion, offering an olive branch to two Hollanders who stoutly rejected it. 
Some copies of the print depicted Neyen with a Janus face and on his back a fox’s head. 
What the lion had failed to achieve by military might, the fox would gain by guile. The 
United Provinces at peace would degenerate into internal discord and Spain would 
achieve her objectives without recourse to costly military expeditions. No wonder then 
that the Hollander resolutely refusing the olive branch comments ‘this (sic) toch al 
bedroch’.5
This theme was repeated during the course of the Truce years 1609-1621, 
becoming more vociferous as the Republic was riven by religious and political 
animosities culminating in the trial and execution of Oldenbamevelt. In 1617 a 
‘liefhebber des Vaderlands’ described how Spain, estimating that the Republic could 
not be subdued by power of arms, had encouraged a Truce in which  the ‘fleshpots’ of 
peace and prosperity would engender ‘twisten en oneenicheden’ and the dissolution of 
the Union.6 This theme was amplified in a pamphlet of the following year which 
purported to reveal the advice given to the King of Spain by the unholy triumvirate of 
Lipsius, Puteanus and Campanella. Peace, the author asserted, was merely a 
Machiavellian device encouraged by these luminaries with the aim of lulling the Dutch 
into a false sense of security. Even now Spain was exploiting dissension within the 
Republic, encouraging the founding of new pernicious religious groups and sowing 
discord where there had once been harmony.7
Polemic of a similar kind characterised the years surrounding the peace of 1648. 
For a writer of 1647, observation of the natural world led inescapably to the conclusion 
that ‘tout changement subit est dangereux’. The United Provinces had been bom and 
bred up as a result of the struggle against Spain and had flourished thereby. Spain’s 
pacific policy was that of the serpent, the lion having failed to subdue the Republic by
5 Muller, nos.  1247,  1248.
6 Knuttel, no. 2460, pp. 3-4, 9-10.
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military force. The conflicts and confusions of the Truce years should convince any 
thoughtful reader that peace and political unity were incompatible. Those who argued 
for peace, he branded as Arminians and Jesuits, who were united in their wish that the 
constitution of the Republic should be undermined.8  The author of a pamphlet of the 
same year characterised this brand of argument as ‘ons d’Oorlogh heylsaem, de vrede 
ruineux sal wesen’. For those of the war party, ‘wy sullen in Binnelantsche twisten of 
oorlogh vervallen, als wy buyten geen Vyandt hebben, de voorige Treves heeft het 
bewesen’. 9  For yet another author, the peace negotiations represented nothing less than 
the United Provinces digging their own grave. He admonished his readers ‘u eenigheyt 
heeft u machtigh gemaeckt; u oneenigheyt sal u klein maken’. The absence of an 
external enemy would expose the fissures in Dutch society, setting province against 
province and town against town. Like his fellow writers, he pointed to the events of the 
Truce years as ample evidence of the justice of his convictions.10  The Frisian poet 
Gijsbert Japix in his ‘Gebed om vrede’ illustrated his fear that peace and unity might not 
be easy bedfellows.
Geef tot ieders voordeel 
Onze zeven Landen saam 
Lust tot minzaam oordeel,
Maak tot eendracht ons bekwaam.1 1
For those, on the other hand, who welcomed the prospect of peace, the Union of Utrecht 
was depicted as a strong bond which was well capable of weathering the changes which 
might result from a cessation of war.12
In all this we are faced with a conundrum. The Union of Utrecht was seen as the 
foundation stone of the Dutch Republic. Yet it had been forged in war. For those
8 Knuttel,  no. 5512, pp. 6,11,16.
9 Knuttel, no. 5500, np.
10 Knuttel, no. 5519, np.
11  Gijsbert Japicx Gedichten,ed. by D. A. Taminga (Baarn: Ambo, c.1989), p.  131.
12 Knuttel,  no. 5520, np.129
opposed to the Treaty of Munster of 1648 and they included the young stadholder 
William II among their number, this Union was on occasions depicted as a fragile 
growth, vulnerable to the depredations of those such as the leaders of the province of 
Holland, who, allegedly, placed their own factional and provincial interests above that 
of the common good. Peace would expose the Republic to the full force of these 
centrifugal forces, which as the years of the Truce demonstrated, threatened chaos and 
dissolution. Clearly those who argued for war had their own agenda. Some such as 
William II himself, were unhappy about a conclusion which did not include their former 
French ally. Others, and there were ministers of the Reformed church among them, 
mourned the official termination of any further attempts to liberate their ‘brethren under 
the cross’ in the southern provinces from the yoke of Catholic Spain. Yet, in the 
polemic literature of the time, it was predominantly on the  maintenance of the Union of 
Utrecht that they took their stand.
Whatever the practical truth or otherwise of these predictions, they  were reflected 
in the ruminations of foreign observers. A letter to Paris in March 1647 relayed rumours 
that peace would foreshadow an attempt by Holland to manipulate the Union in her 
favour.
Quelques-uns croyent que la Hollande a dessein de changer la forme du gouvemement des 
Estatz-generaux, en y mettant plus grand nombre de ses deputez, et diminuant en mesme temps 
celuy des autres Provinces qui composent l’aisemblee, afin d’avoir une authorite dans les 
deliberations proportionee a sa puissance.
Others yet feared, he recorded, that Amsterdam was seeking to form her own province, 
intending to wield a superiority over her fellow towns, ‘approchante de celle dont jouist 
la ville de Venize dans l’estendue de la Republique’. The writer by now one of the130
cognoscenti of the rumour mill that was the Hague, added sagaciously, ‘ce sont peut-
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estre des chimeres qui s’esvanouiront en voyant le jour’.  Yet events appeared to 
support some at least of the pessimistic prognostications. A letter of 7 December 1649 
reported to Cardinal Mazarin the existence of a proposal in the States of Holland that an 
envoy, ‘en leur propre et prive nom, sans intervention ny part des autres provinces’ 
should be sent to England to conclude an alliance with the new regime. The Prince of 
Orange, he recorded, was bitterly opposed to any such suggestion, on the grounds that it 
would mark an irretrievable breakdown of the Union.14 No doubt William II had ample 
reason to be dismayed by a proposal intended to give succour to the mortal foes of his 
father-in-law Charles I. The allegation of a  threat to the Union was, however, not only 
real but also the politically acceptable way of voicing the chagrin of the stadholder and 
his supporters. Details obtained from an envoy of the Prince of Orange in France during 
February 1649 made clear that William II was prepared not only to align himself with 
the other six provinces in military action against Holland but also to request the 
intervention of divisions of French troops for the purpose. As the French Ambassador 
nicely observed in a missive of March  1649 to Count Frederick of Nassau, ‘il serait 
toujours a craindre qu’un Etat fonde sur 1’action des armes, ne vienne a souffrir dans 
soi-mesme par l’oysivite’.1 5
Similar sentiments, albeit more forcefully expressed, continued to resound in 
1650. A coterie of prominent Reformed ministers added their voices to those bewailing 
war. The appropriately titled Na - Ween vande Vrede published in 1650 and attributed to 
the Reformed luminary Wittewrongel described the Treaty of Munster of 1648 as a 
‘monstreuse vrede’. Never one to shirk from fuelling the flames, Wittewrongel 
reminded his readers that war had made them great. Peace, on the other hand  would
13 Archives ou Correspondance inedite de la maison D ’Orange-Nassau ed. by Guillaume Groen van 
Prinsterer, 25  vols in 5  series (Leiden and Utrecht,  1835-1915), 2nd series,  IV, 214.
14 Groen van Prinsterer, IV,  317.
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make them small. He emphasised that ‘de Oorloge is u gheweest een Bandt van Unie en 
Eenigheydt;  de Vrede van Twist en Oneenigheydt’. Wittewrongel echoed Tacitus in the 
adage ‘een seeckere Oorloge is beter dan een onseeckere Vrede’ and inquired 
rhetorically of his compatriots ‘begintmen niet te sustineren dat de Unie met de Oorloge 
uyt is’?16 Maximillian Teellinck, a noted Reformed minister from Zeeland, argued in 
1650 that ‘ons land is door de bedriegelijck Vrede bedorven’. In his Vrymoedige 
Aenspraeck Aen Syn Hoogheyt De Heere Prince van Oraenjen he urged upon the 
stadholder and his fellow compatriots a series of maxims of which one was to hold 
firmly to the threatened Union of Utrecht.17 Another pamphlet of the same year spoke of 
the fear that ‘de Unie die in den tijdt van een heeten en bloedighen Oorloghe was 
ghemaeckt, die en soude in den Vrede ons niet meer verbinden’.18  In this climate of 
concern it is not surprising that the classic tractate from 1579 Verhandelinghe van de 
Unie which had already been reprinted once in 1646 and again in 1647 enjoyed no less 
than seven editions in  1650.19
By 1650 internal tensions had been aggravated by Holland’s demand that the size 
of the army be reduced, in part to mitigate the effects of the heavy taxation levied to 
support the military. The Prince of Orange argued that such reductions would 
compromise the security of the Republic. A bout of horse trading reduced the issue to a 
discrepancy of a few hundred men  but neither party was willing  to make further 
concessions. The crux of the issue was whether Holland as a sovereign province could 
satisfactorily, within the bounds of the Union of Utrecht, dissolve those sections of the 
army whose upkeep she paid, without the agreement of the States. If she were free to do 
so, then the very foundation of that common defensive alliance was fragile, threatened 
paradoxically by that provincial sovereignty which the Union had been created to
16 Knuttel, no. 6756. pp. 2v, 3v, 4r.. A pamphlet of 1652 gives the author as Wittewrongel and this was 
not contested. See Knuttel, no. 7301, p.  10.
17 Knuttel, no. 6857, pp.  11-13.
18 Knuttel, no. 6852, p. 2r.
19 W illem Frijhoff, Marijke Spies,  1650 Bevochten Eendracht (The Hague:  SDU,  1999) p. 79.132
defend and maintain. Satisfied that he had the support of the other six provinces, the 
stadholder moved to render Holland impotent by fermenting discord within her ranks. In 
June 1650 a majority vote of a poorly attended States General authorised the stadholder 
as captain general of the Union to visit every Holland town which had voted for 
unilateral disarmament. His aim was to persuade or compel them to recognise that their 
vote violated the terms of the Union. His success was far from assured. Delft, while 
willing to attend to the stadholder, refused to admit his military escort and Amsterdam 
proclaimed that while they would receive William as stadholder, they were not prepared 
to countenance him as head of a Generality visitation. The city’s intransigence and 
William’s fury left the way clear for the events of July 1650, in which the swift arrest of 
six leading Holland regents signalled the coup against Amsterdam led by William 
Frederick of Nassau. A providential mist ensured that the latter miscarried but 
Amsterdam was compelled to dismiss the brothers Bicker from the town council and 
accept new troop levels to be agreed by the provinces together in the States General.20
The war of polemic which accompanied these developments is worthy of 
consideration, not only for its own sake, but also because the language and argument 
prefigures the debate of the stadholderless years. Particularly noteworthy is a tract of 
1650 entitled Bickerse Beroerten, whose anonymous author ascribed to himself the 
sobriquet ‘een patriot des Vaderlants’. He began by describing the United Provinces as 
an ‘aristocratique oft Borgerlicke Regeeringhen’, which by its very nature was prone to 
internal discord and faction. Although sovereign power was shared between the seven 
provinces, they were often in disagreement on fundamental issues and without some 
superior authority to weld them together ‘scheyden de Bontgenoten en komt die 
Republique fonder’. He alerted his readers to the examples of Athens and Sparta, the 
one more powerful on sea and the other on land. Seemingly invincible, they succumbed
20 Israel,  The Dutch Republic, pp. 603-607.133
to the control of Philip of Macedonia, ‘hebbende geen persoon noch middel om hen in 
balance te houden’. Similarly the twelve tribes of the ‘Jewish Republic’ were brought 
low by fratricidal strife and only then did they fall victim to their foes. In a return to 
events closer to his own time, the writer referred to the prophesy of Escovedo, the 
Spanish adviser of Don Juan, that ‘de Nederlantsche Republique niet met Wapenen van 
buyten, maer met haer eyghen Twist soude noch vervallen’. Lipsius’ treacherous 
counsels were once again cited.
So far this could be classified as the standard alarmist fare of the time but the 
author then dug deeper. His work now proceeded to emphasise the importance of 
‘balance’ which would obviate much of the internal discord and give a key role to the 
stadholder. In so doing he could argue that he was merely reiterating the intentions of 
those who had drafted the Union. Clause IX of the document advised that in cases of 
peace, truce or war, or disagreement about levels of contribution to the common purse, 
the stadholder should attempt to resolve the dispute. For the writer of 1650 the 
stadholder was a chosen ‘Belyder ende Beslisser van alle verschillen’, for without his 
active intervention one province might well oppress another leading to a crisis of unity. 
A threat to this balance had come in the years of the Truce and was now in danger of 
recurring. A coalition of a few families was threatening the authority of the stadholder 
and the States General, all in the name of the absolute sovereignty of the individual 
province. This was all too clearly a reference to Holland’s policy of further reducing the 
military, in spite of the opposition of the Prince of Orange and the States General.
The author placed his finger squarely on the contradiction inherent in the Union of 
Utrecht. The Bickers of Amsterdam and their patrician allies, he argued, saw Holland as 
a sovereign province and any attempt to command her in the interests of the common 
good as an attack on her sovereignty. Hence the resistance of many of the Holland 
towns to the stadholder when he visited them on behalf of the States General. For the134
writer, their understanding of the spirit of the Union of Utrecht was deficient. Once 
provinces came into the Union as confederates, they necessarily surrendered some 
portion of their freedom of action and by definition, their sovereignty. Without this 
surrender the Union was unworkable. To support his argument he deployed the 
metaphor of marriage, the oldest and most natural form of Union. Here the partners 
gave up their previous freedoms to abide with each other for the rest of their lives. The 
family they raised was, in turn, free and sovereign within its own home but in matters 
other than the purely domestic the family had to consider the welfare and interests of 
their neighbours in the wider community.
Pondering on this structure, the author declared that there was no sovereign state 
without a sovereign, whether individual or collective. It was essential for the Republic 
that there was ‘een oppersten Souvereyn’. This could not be the individual provinces as 
they were often in dispute with one another, which only assisted the machinations of 
Spain. Logic declared that sovereignty in the United Provinces resided in the States 
General, representing the provinces in their collective, in co-operation with the Prince 
of Orange as stadholder. This was a mutually dependent partnership. He wrote, ‘de 
Authoriteit der geunieerde Staten Generael als geduerige Souvereyns werde 
gemaintaineert door de macht vanden Prince als Gouvemeur ende ter wederzijden de 
Staten-Generael hare macht employeren om te stijven de Authoriteyt des Gouvemeurs’. 
This is clearly not the dynamic, creative sovereignty as depicted in the writings of 
Bodin. The imagery deployed evokes rather the world of Aristotelian moderation and 
balance. ‘De Unie van Utrecht stelt een juste en wijse balance tusschen de Authoriteyt 
der Staten ende des Gouvemeurs op datse d’een d’ander met haer machtstijf den twelck 
als het Compas is.’2 1
21  Knuttel, no.  6843, np.135
The language deployed and the concepts implied in this pamphlet deserve some 
consideration.  The language of balance evokes a cosmology, endemic in Europe not 
only in political polemic but in drama and verse, in which a natural orderliness is to be 
achieved within the state, as within the cosmos. Just as an individual should strive to 
attain a balance of humours for his physical and psychological welfare, a state must 
achieve a balance of political forces, eschewing the world of the autocrat or the tyrant. 
As the Englishman Walter Raleigh was to commend, a state required a ‘just measure of 
mediocrity’.22 Likewise,the language of family represents the centrality of that 
institution within this hierarchical, yet harmonious cosmos and its implications as a 
pattern for wider social relationships.  Even the role of the stadholder as ‘reconciler’, as 
advocated in the pamphlet, belongs to the natural order of things being ‘uyt de nature 
gesproten’. For our anonymous author, men were creatures capable of rational discourse 
and behaviour and what could be more appropriate than the sending of the stadholder by 
the States General to the Holland towns to engage in a reasoned and fruitful exchange of 
views.  The stadholder William II is the ‘governor physician,’ soothing the intemperate 
fevers with the balm of moderation and balance.
The image is not unique to the author of 1650. Vondel, commemorating 
Amsterdam’s welcome to Frederick Henry in 1628, defined both the personal qualities 
of the stadholder and those inherent in his office, when he wrote
Waar ge komt uw reden zetten 
Krijgen keuren en Stads wetten,
Nieuwe kracht, en haat en twist 
Stuiven weg als rook en mist.2 3
22 Greenleaf, p. 28.
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Similarly an anonymous author of 1650 condemned in verse the ungracious welcome 
accorded William II on his visit to Delft in June of that year. He emphasised the role of 
the Princes of Orange as reconcilers of the provinces in the interests of their greater 
good.
Socht niet Willem dat de landen 
Minnelijck te samen spanden,
Als een eenich middel dat 
Ons kost schaffen vryheits schat.
But now sections of the community, in particular the province of Holland, threatened 
this precious unity and the role of the stadholderate which maintained it.
Eendracht heeftmen willen steuren 
En weer van malkander scheuren,
Doen de Vorst ter neder viel 
Die dees Landen t’samen hiel.2 4
Language such as this and the concept of an hierarchically ordained and harmonious 
universe which it reflected had already suffered a critical mauling at the hands of 
Montaigne and his fellow Pyrrhonists. The Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth 
century would increasingly replace qualitative with quantative relationships.
Yet, in the polemic of the supporters of the House of Orange and indeed, in the work of 
certain of their opponents, this framework of cosmic harmony continues to predominate.
The arguments of  Bickerse Beroerten were echoed in other  publications of 1650 
. Het Recht der Souverainiteyt van Hollandt rehearsed the arguments of the province of 
Holland against the sending of the stadholder and the deputation of the States General 
before presenting the opposing view. He argued that the actions of William II were 
designed specifically to maintain the Union in the face of Holland’s particularism.
24 Knuttel, no. 6753, np.137
Neither the province of Holland or the city of Amsterdam enjoyed absolute sovereignty 
within their own provincial or civic bounds, when the matters in question involved the 
issue of the Union.  Drawing on article 24 of the Union, he argued that all provinces and 
towns had sworn to uphold the decisions of the Union as a whole, for the Union bound 
them together, in perpetuity, as one province. For this author as for that of the Orangist 
Oogen-Salve voor de Blinde Hollanders of the same year, the centrifugal forces of the 
new Republic required an ‘oppersten Souverain’ and both authors argued that this could 
only be ‘de Heeren Staten Generael ghesamentlijck met Sijn Doorluchtige 
HOOGHEYDT’. Sovereign authority rested with the States General maintained by the 
‘macht’ of the Prince of Orange.  Once again the language of balance was deployed.
‘De Unie van Utrecht stelt een rechte Balance tusschen de authoriteyt van der Staten 
ende des Gouvemeurs’, concluded the author of the first pamphlet while Oogen-Salve 
voor de Blinde Hollanders described a constitution where the authority of the stadholder 
was derived from the States General and thus the authority of both ‘soo wijselijck waere 
ghebalanceert’. Similarly the system of voting in the States General ensured that the 
powerful province of Holland did not overwhelm the less populous landward provinces 
for it ensured that each of these was ‘soo veel in gesach ende overstemminge alse de 
meeste’. Each province represented an essential member of the body politic and to 
ensure health no one limb or organ should dominate the others. The objective of this 
system of balances was that ‘eendracht’ which harnessed the energies of the provinces 
to their common good as opposed to the ‘tweedracht’ which left them fatally vulnerable 
to their enemies.25  .
There is a sense in which Orangist polemic had attempted to seize the moral high 
ground in order to defend the actions of the stadholder in the months of June and July 
1650. Unity and the sacrifices which it demanded appealed both to the altruistic spirit
25 Knuttel, no.  6740, pp. 6v-8r,  lOr; Knuttel, no. 6852, pp. 3v-5r.138
and to that nagging envy of the province of Holland and the city of Amsterdam which 
found an echo in many comers of the Republic. Anti-Orangist polemic acknowledged 
this. Searching for the reasons for the attack on Amsterdam, an anonymous poet mused
... was’t nijt, om dat zoo braaf 
Elk Koopman gaat gelijk een Graaf.
Holland, he asserted, could not be blamed for her prosperity and indeed her wealth had 
enabled her to offer resources essential to the survival of the  Republic.
Want zonder mijn niet heel end’ alien 
De staat van’t landt al lang vervallen.26
The latter sentiment was undoubtedly true but that must have made it no more 
palatable. It was as if Holland were constituting herself and the ideals which she 
purported to represent, as the focus of the Republic rather than the States General and 
the stadholder. The rhetoric of Bickerse Beroerten was challenged. In Het Tweede Deel 
van  (t Hollands Praetjen of 1650, a fictional Hollander informed his companions that it 
was certainly the case that the Orangist rhetoric was fatally misinformed. Foreigners 
unaware of the political nuances of the Dutch Republic might assume that the States 
General was the supreme authority but history revealed that power in the Netherlands 
rested with ‘de Alinge Gemeente’. Thus ‘de Souveraine regeeringh van yeder Provintie 
by ons bestaaf. He compared the Republic to the cantons of Switzerland. There, too, 
outside observers assumed that there was a single sovereign authority but, in reality, 
each canton was sovereign, bound only by a league or confederation. Such a 
confederation was the Union of Utrecht which was symbolised by not one single arrow 
but seven arrows bound together. The Hollander equally would have no truck with talk
26 Knuttel, no. 6797, np.139
of the Union as a ‘marriage’ for ‘de seven landen syn in der daet geen een’. The 
provinces had simply bound themselves together, to act as one, in the face of the 
common foe. To place sovereign authority in the States General and the stadholderate 
was a fundamental betrayal of the liberties of the citizen as exercised at civic and 
provincial level as for this Hollander ‘soo moet het goet der Onderdaen altijt 
gheprefereert worden, voor de Hoogheydt van de Generaliteyt en Stedehouder’.27  The 
role of the stadholder was not to act in any sovereign capacity but to protect the liberties 
and privileges of the citizen .
In Het Rechte Tweede Deel van’t Hollands Praatje published in 1650 a fictional 
Brabander inquired rhetorically of Holland, ‘waar is nu haar sovererainiteyt, dewijle 
haren Gouvemeur niet alleen de souverayniteyt van de steden , maar oock van de 
geheele Provincie, onder sijn voeten treed?’ The Brabander taunted  the fictional
Hollander saying ‘wy zijn  vrijer volck onder onsen eygen Prince en Heer, als gy zijt
onder uwen Gouvemeur’. Such a jibe was intended to cause the reader to reflect on the 
liberties and privileges of the Holland citizen and how these had been trampled 
underfoot in the name of the Union. The fictional Hollander permitted no hostages to 
fortune. His fictional contemporary from Gelderland, referring to the commission issued 
by the States General on 5 June, queries tentatively ‘zijn sy niet neffens sijn Hoogheyt 
Souveraynen van alle de Provincien te samen?’ The Hollander’s response is robust. 
‘Neen, sy seeker niet, want elcke Provintie is Souverayn op hem selven.’28
Thus before the untimely death of the stadholder William II in November 1650, 
certain battlelines had been drawn in the war of polemic. For supporters of the House of 
Orange, the Treaty of Munster of 1648 posed a threat to the Union of Utrecht. The 
Union was depicted as fragile and requiring political and constitutional resources to 
sustain it. Precisely because of the centrifugal tendencies in the Dutch Republic,
27 Knuttel, no. 6832, np.
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exemplified in the province of Holland, sovereignty must be found in the States General 
and the stadholder together, the latter acting to preserve the balance between the 
provinces and to reconcile their differences. For those, on the other hand, who 
represented the majority in the province of Holland, it was provincial sovereignty which 
is the key to the maintenance of their liberties.  Stadholder, Union and States General 
are all of service in so far as they maintain and defend provincial sovereignty but they 
must abrogate no sovereign power to themselves. The Union is strong in so far as 
provincial liberties are defended. As the anonymous author of a poem Vertroostinge 
over de Doodt van zijn Hoogheit explained, in the case of William II, the death of the 
stadholder providentially restored to the provinces their original freedoms, that is all 
that is associated with their sovereignty.
Uw doot alleen, doorluchtigh Heer 
Heeft alle heerschappy verdreven,
Den vroomen sijn ontrocken eer,
En ‘t Lant haar wetten weer gegeven.
Their sovereignty restored, the provinces are now free to work together in a true spirit 
of unity.
Ontfangst met danckbaerheyt de gunst 
Die u den Hemel doet ontluyken,
En voeght de liefde by de kunst,
Om die met eendracht te gebruycken.2 9
In this rhetoric, Holland is not merely a province within the Dutch Republic, but 
also embodies the very concept of provincial and civic liberties and privileges enshrined 
in provincial sovereignty. Thus the arguments deployed by the province and the 
fictitious Hollander can be used by any group within any province, which wishes to 
assert its privileges against another focus of authority. For example, the fictional Frisian
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in Het Rechte Tweede Deel van’t Hollands Praatje of 1650, commented that the first 
instalment of this pamphlet had been read by regents in Groningen and Leeuwarden 
with unalloyed pleasure, largely because  its contents had severely damaged the 
reputation of their stadholder Frederick William of Nassau. 30
The death of the stadholder enabled those who perceived themselves as defenders 
of the principles of Holland not only to argue that a stadholder was not essential to the 
function of the Union of Utrecht but also to emphasise that unity and provincial 
sovereignty were not mutually exclusive. The Great Assembly of 1651 was 
accompanied by a day of national prayer and  thanksgiving on 25 January in which 
God’s assistance was sought
ten eynde dat de noodige Eenicheyt, Liefde, Vrintschap ende goede Correspondentie tusschen 
die onderlinge Provincien werde gereleveert, gemaintineert ende deselve voor altijd 
religeuslijck ende onverbreeckelick onderhouden oock gecultiveert werde.
A national day of Thanksgiving, later that year, on 13 September, recorded the 
‘Harmonie, Eendracht, Liefde, Vrientschap, goede Correspondentie, Confidentie en 
Affectie’ which had been manifest at this Great Assembly of the seven sovereign 
provinces.31 A medal struck at the request of the States of Zeeland to commemorate the 
Great Assembly of 1651 depicted a high rock in the midst of turbulent seas, to which 
are attached the coats of arms of the seven provinces. The adjacent text tells of a world 
watching with uncertainty as to how the provinces would cope with the death of the 
stadholder and adds reassuringly that at the Great Assembly the united provinces, 
‘hebben eindelijck de Bondgenooten, na door de wille Gods de Religie, d’Eenigheid 
en de Krijsmacht verzekerd en malkander in ‘t rond de hand gegeven en met 
vriendschap affscheid genommen te hebben.32
30 Knuttel.  no. 6839, p. 5.
31  Nicolaas C.  Kist, Neerlands Bededagen en Biddagsbrieven, 2 vols (Leiden  1848-1849), I, 283-284.
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In a medal minted at the request of Jacob de la Court and intended for his 
grandson, the unity celebrated at the Great Assembly was represented on one side by the 
motto  ‘stant foedere Juncti’. On the reverse the Prince of Orange lay dead holding in 
his grasp a net in which are entrapped seven birds, representing the seven provinces.
The motto ‘vive la liberte’ emphasised that the death of the stadholder had now freed
33 the provinces which had been ensnared and overwhelmed by force.  The same theme 
was found in written polemic. In a pamphlet of 1651 a fictional Zeelander and a . 
fictional Frisian, both often cast in pamphlet literature as supporters of the House of 
Orange, praised the unity and stability manifested in the Great Assembly and contrasted 
this favourably with the strife tom months of 1650. The Hollander argued that this was 
because divine providence had removed the ‘twistmaker’.34 Far from being an essential 
reconciling element in the Union, the stadholder was now depicted  as a sower of 
discord. In a poem of 1651 entitled Op de Eenigheit der zeven vrye Nederlanden 
Geraerdt Brandt portrayed a unity recovered and restored in which provincial liberties 
and prosperity are the concomitant blessings.
Nu komt hier d’Eenigheit, die Neerlant hadt verlaten 
En leidt de welvaart aan voor ons gezegent lant,
En d’oude Vrijheit, die haar te zamen spant.3 5
A print of 1651 commemmorating the Great Assembly exemplified the rhetoric of 
a world without a stadholder. In the centre of the print stood an altar upon which lay the 
seven bound arrows of the Union of Utrecht, surrounded by the female representations 
of the seven provinces. An angelic host above exhaled the word ‘vrede’ and the motto 
emphasised ‘de grootste macht is de Eendrachf. In the accompanying poem by J. de 
Bondt, the language deployed was reminiscent of Orangist polemic with the difference
33 Loon,  ii, 364-365.
34 Knuttel,  no. 7040, pp. 3-4.
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that this time it was the representatives of the provincial states who were the focus of 
attention. They were the peace-makers, the reconcilers, the ‘trouwe Harders’ who ‘naest 
Godt, in liefd en Vree/ En Eendracht lieflick voede’. They were now the physicians who 
cauterised the wound of discord.
Dit zijn ons Stuer-luy, ja 
Ons Harders in den noot;
Ons Medecijns die selfs 
De oorsaeck van de doodt 
Wech nemen, en in plaets 
Liefd’, Vree en Eendracht bringen.3 6
Thus unity was achievable without the personal reconciling influence of a stadholder. 
The ideals espoused by Holland, rather than the figure of an individual, could form the 
focus of a bond of unity. For a writer of 1652, the unity achieved by the Great 
Assembly, without the person of the stadholder, ‘een nieuwen bont van Liefde wederom 
hebben verbonden, wesende dese verbintenisse niet geschiet door authoriteyt van een 
Hooft, maer niet veel min als uyt duysent ghemoederen van Menschen’.37
This view of the Union of Utrecht was tested in the events of 1654. The province 
of Holland had to justify to her fellow provinces her willingness to enter into a separate 
peace with Cromwell’s England and the policy of exclusion of the young prince of 
Orange from the offices of his forefathers. The reality was that the other provinces were 
in no position to mount any effective opposition to Holland’s policy. The power of 
Holland was such that the Union of Utrecht could be deemed to mean whatever the 
province’s representatives wished.  However, the war of rhetoric revealed  the positions 
adopted by the supporters of de Witt and their opponents, the Orangists. The Deductie 
of de Witt published in 1654 and the supporting pamphlets of the following year can be 
said to have tested the doctrine of provincial sovereignty to destruction. A degree of
36 Muller, no.  2013.
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semantic casuistry enabled these writers to argue that the difference between a contract 
and a treaty enabled Holland to deal with England separately from her confederates in 
the Union of Utrecht. The Union, for them, appears less to be based on the actual 
articles of the Union, however defined, than on the bonds of ‘confreryen, compaignen’ 
and ‘commercie’. Once again the stadholderate is deemed dispensable for, ‘de Unie vry 
vaster ende seeckeerder rust op de fondamenten van onsterfelijke Vergaderingen ende 
Collegien als op de uytterlijcke splendeur ende auctoriteyt van sterflijcke Menschen’.38
Holland and her principles again become the focal point of the Union but as the 
writers protest the importance of the province, there is a hint that the realities of the 
political world in the Netherlands and the critical position of Holland is now more 
openly stated. The sensibilities of her fellow provinces are somewhat roughly handled.
It is revealing that the anonymous author of Wederlegginge op de Bedenkinge der 
Deductie van de Edele Groot Mogende Staten van Holland, published in 1655 describes 
Holland without apology as ‘de Hert-Ader van de Republijck’. It is true to say, he 
argues that the provinces were bound together but it had also to be acknowledged that 
Holland furnished by far the greatests costs of the war against England and thus she can 
be said to have the greatest interest in its outcome. The author of another pamphlet of 
the same year echoed this. Holland’s contribution to the w ar, ‘by naer anderhalf mael 
soo veel als alle te samen’, is emphasised. Holland as the financial pivot of war and a 
seaward province has a particular interest in the war against England which is not 
shared by all her fellow provinces. The author paid lip service to the equality of the 
partners in the Union but then moved on to suggest that, in certain matters, weight of 
influence should take precedence over the number of votes. Thus in the case of Holland, 
‘als meesten tijt het meeste geinteressiert zijnde oock het meeste gewicht by brenght
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sonder dat daer mede de egaliteyt die onder de Provintien is ende moet blijven te kort 
gedaen wert’.
This openly Hollandocentric development is worth remembering when we come to 
consider the work of Pieter de la Court in the 1660’s.
In reaction Orangist rhetoric in the early years of the 1650’s reiterated many of the 
themes which were present before the death of the stadholder. Orangist writers 
continued to assert that the very nature of the new Republic and its citizens inclined it to 
faction and discord without the presence of a stadholder. For the anonymous writer of 
Grondigh Bericht nopende den Interest van diesen Staet published in 1651  ‘in diesen 
landen de humeuren der Menschen seer different sijn, ende verdeylt in veelderley secten 
en factien’.40 Thus the Union continues to be depicted as under threat and the stadholder 
as its defender. The author of a pamphlet of the same year argued that the actions of 
William II in  1650 were designed purely ‘tot maintien ende conservatie van d’Unie’. 
Those who opposed him were inevitably committed to not only the dissolution of the 
Union itself but also the concomitant changes in the political and religious framework 
of the nation.41  For the author of Grondigh Bericht it was axiomatic that Holland was 
attempting to dissolve the ‘body’ of the Republic. Body analogies continued with the 
States General described as the corpus of the Republic but the author here was 
considerably more cautious than his predecessor in Bickerse Beroerten of 1650. The 
role of the States General in regard to particular provinces was expressly described as 
having to be compatible with their provincial liberties and freedoms.
Thus Orangist rhetoric chimed with the spirit of the hour. The concept of the 
sovereignty of the States General would be brought into play when the other provinces 
were largely at one in opposition to Holland’s policy. In this year of the Great 
Assembly, this was not the case. By  1653 however, the situation had changed. The
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exigencies of  the war with England and heavy taxation led to disturbances in several 
Holland towns which were accompanied by calls for the restoration of the Prince of 
Orange to the offices of his forefathers.  The rhetoric of the Orangists now approximates 
much more closely to that of Bickerse Beroerten of 1650. In Ondeckinghe van den 
Nederlantschen cancker the author unmasks the intentions of de Witt and his supporters 
to make themselves total masters of the Republic. They will renounce the Union and 
thrust aside the States General, denounce the Synod of Dort, make changes in religion 
and drive out the Prince of Orange and all his dependents. In order to achieve this, they 
will declare that each province, yea even every town is sovereign and free to select any 
policy it chooses.42 In this way the jealousy of towns and provinces could be exploited 
by a policy of divide and rule.
The past was trawled to prove the point.  1653 saw the republication of a pamphlet 
of 1617, Spaenschen Raedt. Now entitled Dienstige Aenmerkingen  and with an 
additional forward and remarks, the pamphlet purported to be the counsel of Lipsius, 
Puteanus and Campanella to the King of Spain on the reduction of his Dutch foes. As 
before internal dissolution is the keynote, to be achieved on both occasions by those 
treacherous allies of Spain, the representatives of the State of Holland. Their weapon is 
one of those ‘Machiavellische gruwelen,’ to wit the principle of provincial sovereignty 
in which each province ‘soo seer op sijne particuliere gerechtigheden, pointilten en 
souverainiteyt staen’ that unity is no longer possible. For the writer this emphasis on 
provincial liberties may occasion the death of liberty itself for ‘libertas libertate perit’. 43 
Here, at least, it is clear that for Orangists the concept of liberty or freedom was 
identified with the struggle against Spain and was threatened by this very emphasis on 
provincial liberties.
42 Knuttel,  no.  7441, np.
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The publication of de Witt’s Deductie in 1654 and the policy of excluding the 
young Prince of Orange from office called for a response from the Orangist camp.
Many in the other provinces abhorred both the separate dealings of Holland with the 
England of Cromwell and  the action taken against the House of Orange which Holland 
continued to argue had been imposed upon it by Cromwell. However with Holland as 
the paymaster of the war unwilling to continue and a spirit of realism conceding that 
peace was desirable, there was a grudging inevitability in the agreement of the other’s 
provinces to Holland’s policy.  It was rumoured that the guardians of William ID were 
seeking urgently for a writer to refute the Deductie and the Orangist counterblast came 
in the form of the  Bedenckinge op de Deductie van de Ed. Mog. Staten van Holland of 
1654.44 In a letter to van Bevemingh and Nieuwpoort in England, John de Witt 
suggested that the author of the work was one unknown to them but suspected of being 
a minister of the Reformed Church.45 The author of a pro States Party work of the 
following year 1655 declared that the author of the Bedenckinge was also unknown to 
him, ‘hoewel uyt de stijl afgenommen kan werden hy uyt Zeelant te moeten zijn’. 46 
Certainly the author pays due regard to the sensibilities of the disgruntled within 
Zeeland and the States of Zeeland were to issue a resolution against Exclusion in  1654.
In language reminiscent of Bickerse Beroerten of 1650, the author argued that  the 
stadholderate had always acted as a ‘conterpoys’ against the pretensions of Holland and 
Amsterdam and hence was essential to the functioning of the Union.  It was for this 
reason that Holland had always attempted to curtail the powers of the stadholder under 
both Maurice and William II. In the same vein, the policy of Exclusion, the author 
alleged, had not been forced upon Holland by Cromwell but was the very creature of 
Holland itself. Availing himself of his opponents’ concept of freedom, he argued that 
the very policy of Exclusion took from the provinces their freedom to nominate the
44 Birch,  ii, 521.
45 Brieven  van Johan de  Witt,  I, 251.
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Prince of Orange and his descendants as captain general  The particularism of Holland 
and Amsterdam was emphasised when the author underlined, in the same way as the 
anonymous author of Bickerse Beroerten,  the alleged hostility of those in power in 
Amsterdam to the West India Company.
The West India Company had been founded in 1621, its stated mission being not 
only to trade but to colonise and bring the Reformed faith to the New World. Founded 
at a time of intense religious and political controversy, its policy had attracted 
considerable support among Counter-Remonstrant groups.Until the 1630’s and the 
control of large sections of the sugar exports of Brazil, the West India Company had 
few prospects of being a commercially viable organisation and had been far more 
dependent on subsidies from the States General than the East India Company. The 
failure of Holland and in particular the Amsterdam Chamber to rescue the West India 
Company from its disastrous position in Brazil in the late 1640’s may have been the 
result of the Chamber’s greater interests in the Guinea and Angola sections of the 
Company allied to the not unreasonable assumption that  Brazil was no more than a 
bottomless pit. Yet this policy was deeply resented in provinces such as Zeeland and 
Groningen where investment in the company had been proportionately higher than in 
Holland. Zeeland, unlike Holland had suffered a severe slump in trade and commerce 
following the Peace of Munster in  1648 and the reopening of the Schelde and the 
coastal ports in the south. The West India Company had provided work for shipwrights 
and associated suppliers and the Company, was as the author attested, a succour to 
many widows and orphans particularly in Zeeland.47 In this pamphlet of 1654 we see 
how the Orangist rhetoric of Union and the defence of a supra-provincial organisation, 
in this case the West India Company, could be deployed by individuals with a 
seemingly provincial bias.
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The language of the pamphlet is heavily reminiscent of the 1650 publication 
Bickerse Beroerten. It could be that the anonymous writer had the earlier work to hand 
or the concepts and language of the work of 1650 had become an intrinsic part of the 
treasury of Orangist rhetoric. Whatever the cause, the author of 1654 also urged that 
sovereignty was by its very nature limited when a free Republic, in this case a province, 
entered into a Union with other free Republics. Like the author of 1650, he likened the 
dependence which must flourish between partners in the Union to the union of man and 
wife, the married pair ‘hebben een dependence van malkanderen...dat oock hare private 
actien niet so vry zijn ofte zijn bepaelt ten besten van het huwelijck’. The writer pointed 
out that the Bible had often used the imagery of the body to illustrate the unity that must 
prevail in any state, each bodily part being different but all working together within a
d O
single framework.  He might have added that Orangist imagery had long followed the 
Biblical example. An Orangist pamphlet of 1618 exhorted that the provinces of the 
Union ‘behoort maer een lichaem te wesen’. In this body, one province would 
contribute its financial resources, another would defend the great river frontiers in the 
east, yet another would stand as a bulwark against Spanish invasion, its towns suffering 
depredations as a result. Each province, like a limb of the body, would provide in its 
own fashion ‘het ghene de Generaliteyt noodich is’.49 It is salutary to compare this 
language with that of John de Witt in which the whole is subordinated to the individual. 
In a letter of 1652, he assured his correspondent that while the English when writing of 
the Dutch Republic described it as a single state, the reality was that ‘yder provincie 
apart een souveraine respublica is’. It was therefore a ‘respublicae foederatae ofte 
unitae’.50 A States Party pamphlet of 1655 appeared to acknowledge the force of the 
Orangist language of the body and deployed it more subtly when the author
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acknowledged that ‘de seven Provintien en zijn een lichaem maer wel seven naeu aen 
de
anderen verbondene lichamen elcks op sijn selfs bestaende.51
It is difficult to estimate the readership of the Bedenckinge of 1654. It is not 
included in Knuttel’s list of banned publications. However, a correspondent of 
Thurloe’s wrote from the Hague in November 1654 of a book entitled Considerations 
upon the Deduction of Holland. He added that he had read it ‘but the States of Holland 
took such a good course and order to suppress it, that there is not one to be had of 
them’.52 It was impossible, however, to suppress the printed response of the States of 
Zeeland to the Exclusion. This publication, compiled by Adrian Veth, was a much more 
tempered document and its publication may have been intended to placate Orangist 
sentiment in the province rather than representing the authentic voice of the Zeeland 
regents.53 This supposition appears to be borne out by Thurloe’s unnamed 
correspondent who recorded in August 1654 that at a fair in Zeeland  the citizenry 
sported orange scarves and ribbons but added sagaciously ‘yet in Zeeland more than 
half of the magistracy do hold in their hearts with the maxims of Holland’.54 
Nonetheless the title page appeared to show oranges borne aloft on a sash and the 
publication opined that the Netherlands would never be at peace without the leadership 
of ‘Vooghden ende Heren van qualiteyt’. In concluding peace with England, Holland 
was acting against the spirit of Article 9 of the Union of Utrecht and her actions could 
only lead to ‘verzwackinghe en turbatie van de Unie’. Zeeland appealed to Holland on 
the grounds of their common history under the same Count and argued that by the 
agreements of 1575 and 1576 the two provinces became as one state ‘ende voor een
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lichaem werd ghereputeert’.55 It is possible that here we see an example of Orangist 
rhetoric including images of the body, being deployed by those who were less than fully 
committed to the cause.
Ultimately the test facing the States Party of de Witt was not to develop an 
intellectually coherent rhetoric but rather to demonstrate in practice that the Dutch 
Republic could maintain itself without a stadholder. In the latter task, during the course 
of the  1650’s it was successful. Orangist rhetoric could only await better times which in 
practice meant either the elevation of the young Prince of Orange to the offices of his 
forefathers by virtue of the intervention of an outside power or internal discord brought 
about perhaps by the exigencies of war occasioning a crisis of confidence and a division 
within the ranks of Holland itself. The Restoration of Charles II to the English throne 
and the ensuing hopes that he would further the cause of his nephew Willliam III led to 
a  resurgence of Orangist pamphlets in  1660. Their burden was once again Holland’s 
alleged attempt to break the bonds of Union in her own interest and the necessity of a 
stadholder to mediate between the provinces and maintain a balance between their 
conflicting interests. As one writer expressed it, the opponents of the stadholderate had 
taken advantage of the Peace of Munster of 1648 and the death of William II in 1650 to 
institute a novel form of government but he added darkly ‘de tijden loopen nu veele 
anders’.56  His hopes were to be dashed. Charles II was unwilling to take any practical 
steps to assist his nephew and the Orangist cause continued to be plagued by discord 
between Amalia von Solms and her daughter in law Mary Stuart until the death of the 
latter in  1661. Meanwhile the rhetoric of those opposed to the stadholderate gained 
momentum, encouraged no doubt by the faltering fortunes of the Orangist party. As we 
have noted, the States Party pamphlets of 1654 and  1655 had not hesitated to emphasise 
the pivotal role of the province of Holland in the new Republic and the debt which the
55 Knuttel,  no. 7554,  np.
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other provinces owed to her. This was as nothing compared to the salvo fired by Pieter 
de la Court in his Interest van Holland in 1662
In de la Court’s analysis, the stadholder had frequently invoked the support of the 
other provinces and the language of ‘Union’ to outvote Holland in the States General, 
an element of the constitution for which de la Court had little respect. He argued that far 
from being a reconciler the stadholderate had been a formenter of discord. Following 
the death of William II, internal problems had been perfectly satisfactorily resolved, the 
problems in Groningen and Overijssel in the mid 1650’s being a case in point. So far 
this rhetoric was very similar to other States Party publications. However de la Court 
then proceeded to emphasise the role of the province of Holland in a fashion which had 
only been mildly anticipated in the publications of 1654 and 1655. The provinces of 
Holland and Zeeland had formed the backbone of resistance to Spain. In the opinion of 
de la Court the other provinces, Utrecht excepted, had added nothing to strengthen and 
fortify the government of Holland or to free that province from any peril.  Holland on 
the contrary contributed financially not only to her own defence but also to that of the 
other provinces. Thus Holland ‘onder de schone dekmantel van protectie en vriendschap 
te genieten, warelik een onuitsprekelik grooten last heeft moeten fragen’. Holland was, 
for de la Court, like a man who brings water to his neighbour’s house when his own is 
on fire. He mused purposefully that with its manifold resources, Holland’s interests 
might best be served by becoming ‘een Staat op zich zelven’. The waterways around 
Holland could be used to make her invulnerable in times of hostile assault; the assault in 
this case coming from other member states of the Union. Holland would thus be free to 
live and flourish without a ‘qualik-gepractiseerde Unie’ and its ‘misleide
S7
bondgenootenV
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It is difficult to read Interest van Holland even now without feeling some of the 
outrage which contemporaries experienced. The attack on the stadholderate and the 
Union, allied to what amounted to a unilateral declaration of autonomy on the part of 
Holland, could only have quickened that festering resentment of sections of the other 
provinces faced with the power and resources of Holland. In past rhetoric it had usually 
been possible to depict Holland both as an individual geographical province and as the 
embodiment of ideals, the so-called ‘maxims of Holland’ which transcended physical 
boundaries and could be applied by well meaning individuals in the other six provinces. 
Thus, in the fictional ‘praatjes’ which occupy so much of pamphlet literature, the 
fictional Hollander is not just a citizen of that province but a spokesperson for the 
particular values associated with that province. There is a sense in which de la Court’s 
rhetoric profoundly threatens this duality. His Holland was clearly territorially located. 
The citizens of the other provinces were considered only in so far as they create a drain 
on Holland’s resources and may later attempt hostile action against the newly 
independent state, though, in that case, de la Court did not give much for their chances. 
The rhetoric of ‘Union’ which both sides had deployed, albeit in different ways, was 
now totally discarded.
De la Court, whatever his intentions, left the States Party’s flank hideously 
exposed on the matter of the Union. Interest van Holland appeared to justify all the 
Orangist allegations that Holland wished to dismantle the Union. It is not particularly 
surprising that though States Party literature often cited other books or pamphlets for 
their readers’ edification, I have found no pamphlet supporting de Witt and his policy 
which encouraged its readers to dip into Interest van Holland. The Orangists were now 
left free to command the moral high ground. Their response came in two forms. On the 
one hand, Orangist pamphleteers dissected de la Court’s work and provided detailed 
arguments to counter his thesis. On the other they demonised de la Court to the extent154
that still ten years later, pamphlet literature, poetry and print depicted him as the figure 
who epitomised all that was wrong with the government of John de Witt..
In analysing the events of 1662 and 1663 and the Orangist response, we have to 
bear in mind not only the rhetoric of de la Court in 1662 but also the events of 1663 and 
in particular the Public Prayer debate. If de la Court represented the theory, then the 
Public Prayer debate represented the practical implementation. In December 1662, a 
report to the States of Holland and West Friesland reminded members that by a 
resolution of 1657, they were committed to the devising of a new formula for Public 
Prayer. The present formula was described as containing ‘merckelijcke en essentiele 
incongruiteyten’ for since the States General was placed before the provincial States in 
the list of petitions, simple folk could be given the impression that the ‘Ridderschap, 
Edelen en Steden van Hollant ende West Frieslant ...niet en waren de ontwijffelbare 
Souveraine ende naest Godt de eenighe hooge Overigheyt deser Provincie’. The revised 
formula as proposed in  1663 was to place the States of Holland and West-Vriesland at 
the head of the petitions followed by the other provincial States. Then and only then 
were prayers to be said for deputies to the States General and the Council of State and 
lastly for local magistrates and councillors. The Prince of Orange being a private person 
had no place in public prayer.
The response from the other provinces was swift. In an answer to the letter of the 
States of Holland, the States of Friesland argued that the States General were, without 
doubt ‘de hooghste ende Souveraine Overigheyt van alles de Vereenighde Provincien’ 
with regard to those matters which had been placed in their hands. Since the States 
General had negotiated with Anjou on the subject of religious liberties in  1583, the 
States General had assumed a ‘de facto’ right in these matters which had been 
reinforced by the Synod of Dordrecht which had been summoned by the States General 
and the General Assembly of 1651, in which all the provinces had agreed to maintain155
the true Reformed Religion as defined at Dordrecht. Thus Holland had no powers to set 
up for herself a new formula of prayer and her action ominously ‘strijdt met de 
eeuwighduerende Unie van Utrecht’. For the States of Zeeland responding on 22 August 
1663, the States General represented ‘het ghemeen lichaem van de Republijcke’. This 
was not to deny  provincial sovereignty in matters not prescribed as within the remit of 
the States General but for Zeeland ‘de Staten Generael hebben eene qualiteyt en 
waredigheyt die praeemineert boven die van de respective Provincien’. Groningen 
damned the proposals as a novelty while Overijssel described them as ‘een saecke 
streckende tot de grootste kleynachtinge van het gemeene lichaem der Bontgenooten’. 58
The other provinces had not always been so eager to defend the position of the 
States General. In the peace negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Munster several of 
the provinces had been concerned that the States General’s role would lead to an 
extension of its authority dominated by the province of Holland. War and peace was 
indubitably the concern of the States General yet the Zeelanders, in particular, had 
perceived with concern a tendency on the part of the States General to increase its 
powers at the expense of the sovereignty of the provinces. It was the influence of 
stadholder William Frederick of Friesland rather than any innate principles which 
caused the provinces of Groningen and Friesland at the Great Assembly of 1651 to 
plead for more authority for the States General at the expense of the provinces. In spite 
of their fulminations against Holland in  1663, most of the provinces had not enacted the 
church order as defined at the Synod of Dordrecht and in reality continued on most 
occasions to consider religion as a matter of purely provincial concern.59 Political 
rhetoric reflected the issues of the day rather than any long term principles.
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A deputy in the States General complained that the citizenry were daily diverted 
by ‘diversche libellen ende schandeuse Boecken’ which sought to foment disunity.60 
On the part of the States Party, perhaps the most noteworthy work was a forthright 
defence of provincial sovereignty penned by John de Witt, the cousin of the Pensionary, 
entitled Public Gebedt. De Witt followed Bodin in his definition of sovereignty as that 
‘boven welcken met niemant en kent dan Godt almachtigh’. De Witt’s marks of 
sovereignty, again derived from Bodin, were noticeably ambitious including  absolute 
command of the military and the possession of an autonomous Mint. As an Orangist 
opponent pointed out neither of these marks of sovereignty were in the hands of the 
province of Holland. The reader might draw the conclusion that de Witt profoundly 
wished them to be so. His was a doctrine of virtually unrestricted provincial 
sovereignty. The Union of Utrecht had been concluded and couched in what he 
described as ‘negative termen’ in which the allies bound themselves no further than 
their implicit provincial sovereignty permits them to do, rather than in  notional 
‘positive termen’ in which matters believed to be deferred to the States General were 
automatically treated as such and resolved by majority vote. For de Witt, as for Bodin 
sovereignty was indivisible and hence could not be conveyed in part to a States General 
or delegate its executive function to a stadholder.61
States Party propaganda in  1662 and 1663 appeared to be casting aside the 
rhetoric of Union which it had deployed in 1651 in favour of a more forceful definition 
of provincial sovereignty. For the author of Herstelden Bamevelt of 1663, not only was 
religion clearly a matter for the individual province but the States General meeting only 
twice or three times a year could be deemed surplus to requirements since any matters 
needing attention could be dealt with by the Council of State. The States General was 
manifestly sovereign in States Brabant and States Flanders but nowhere else. The very
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title United Provinces illustrated quite clearly that the Republic was composed of 
‘verscheyde landen’ and the history of the region under Spain indicated the impossibilty 
of ever combining the provinces under one head whether personal or corporate.  Jacob 
Westerbaan in his poem Krancken Troost voor Israel published in 1663 commented of 
Holland that ‘ghy werdt benijdt van uw gemeene Bondgenoten’ but adds with an acute 
sense of political realities, ‘ghy hebt geen nood so langh ghy selfs eendrachtigh zijt’. 
There is little of the Union rhetoric of 1651 here. For the anonymous author of D,en 
Schotsche Duyvel the Union had only served to restrict and undermine the province of 
Holland in matters of religion. In reaction to Orangist rhetoric he declaimed ‘nu is ‘t al 
weeraen al Unie’ just as in the years 1618 and 1650, but then as now  what was intended 
was no more than ‘slaevemye’ or the subjugation of provincial rights. Here at least there 
is a return to the rallying call of 1651 as the author explains that ‘vryheidt is de waere 
bandt en ‘t oogmerck van de Unie’.  ‘Slavery’ and Union were incompatible.64
Thus Orangist propagandists were responding not only to the rhetoric of de la 
Court but to the perceived threat to the Union contained in Holland’s proposals for a 
provincial formula in matters of religion which they saw as integral to the integrity of 
the Union. There was no need to develop a new rhetorical formula.  For the author of a 
refutation of de la Court, Ware Interest van Holland of 1662, the policy of Holland 
since 1651 had been ‘divide and rule’ in contrast to the harmony achieved by means of 
the institution of the stadholderate.65 For the anonymous author of Den Ver-resenen 
Bamevelt of 1663, Holland was treating the six other provinces as if they were mere 
‘byloopers’ or six planets compelled to revolve around the sun of Holland.66 Den 
Herstelden Prins of the same year accused de la Court of seeking ‘den band van 
eendracht te brecken’ and emphasised the sacrifices made by the landward provinces in
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the cause of war.  The case for a mediating stadholder was re-emphasised for ‘de
Provintien en Steden onder den anderen egael sijn ...ende dat d’een d’ander niet wilt
£ 0
toegeven’.  Emphasis was again placed on the States General as the assembly which 
was the physical manifestation of Union. For one writer of 1664, the States General 
were ‘nos souverains Seigneurs’ and he created a fusion of images of unity when he 
lauds the Princes of Orange as ‘ayant ete, en leur vivant, du corps des Estats 
Generaux’.69
For the author of Bedunckelicken Brief of 1663, reflecting on de Witt’s analysis in 
Public Gebedt, sovereignty in a Republic composed of many bodies or limbs was 
different from that of a monarchy. When Hollanders spoke of their state they did not 
only mean Holland but also the seven united provinces who sent their deputies to the 
States General and imbued the institution with powers in certain crucial issues such as 
war and peace. When the States General concluded a treaty with foreign powers, he 
asked rhetorically, ‘doen sy al ‘t selvige niet met Souveraine macht’ and argued 
emphatically , ‘ontwijffelick ja’.  In the States General each deputy represented his 
province and brought attendant with him the sovereignty of that province which was 
then subsumed into that of the States General. Thus public petitions in prayer had to be 
directed first to them  The author was emphatic that this was not to argue that each 
province was not sovereign within its own boundaries but the States General clearly 
posessed ‘meer Majesteyts en lusters als een besondere Provintie’. Once again, when 
most of the other provinces were opposed to some action of Holland, Orangist writers 
emphasised the States General as containing elements of sovereignty over and above the 
provincial estates. The analogy with marriage recurs, for ‘door’t eeuwigh Verbont de 
Provintien onderlingh als man en vrouw getrouwt zijn’, with all the attendant giving up 
of personal freedoms in the interests of the union. The author reinforced past Orangist
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rhetoric when he warned his readers that the malignant Lipsius was indeed correct when 
he surmised that peace would destroy the internal unity of the Republic.70
In addition, the Orangists were gradually developing their own rhetoric of 
freedom, in relation to the Union. For the supporters of the States Party, as we have 
seen, freedom consisted in the sovereignty of the provincial estates and their constituent 
elements. Thus William ITs embassy to the Holland towns in 1650 was depicted as a 
violation of their sovereignty.71 For Orangist writers, on the other hand, this ‘freedom’ 
was little more than a cloak for the ambitions of men, who cast off the mutual 
dependency and seek to subjugate their fellow men and make themselves their master. 
For the writer of Den Herstelden Prins of 1663, there was no place for this ‘freedom’ 
for ‘so isser in geen staat van Regeringe vrijheid, en met sulcke vrijheyd soude oock 
geen Staat noch Regeringe konnen bestaan’.72 In a work intended as a riposte to the 
posthumous publication of Schelius’ Algemeene Vryheid, Pieter de Hubert’s Apologie 
of 1669 reiterated a view of freedom in which liberty must be in harmony with 
authority. For Hubert freedom within a state had perforce to be limited and this 
limitation was not so much inhibiting as positively directing. Applying these maxims to 
the Union he concluded
zoo veel souverainiteit als ‘er wegens ieder Provintie, aan het Collegie van de Staten Generaal is 
gedefereert, ook zoo veel van de onbepaalde vryheit is aff stand gedaan, tot de Algemeene 
Regeeringe van deze Vereenigde Nederlanden.
For as no society could be set up without some loss of freedom, ‘zoo kan ook deze Unie 
geen effect grypen, ten zy een leder van zyne vryheit zoo veel in’t gemeen conferere, als 
tot onderhoud van dezelve’. Within this equation, a stadholder provided not only 
security, without which freedom is worthless, but in traditional Orangist rhetoric, served
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to ensure that ‘alles onder deze oudste en getrouwste Bondgenooten in een equitable 
Balance gehouden te werden’.73 De Hubert’s analysis clearly found support among 
Orangist ranks for versions of this work were republished twice in 1672.
Ultimately, however Orangists could only wait upon events. As long as de Witt 
and his allies could hold together the Republic, the Orangist taunts of disunity fell short 
of their target. Whether by conviction or stealth, Holland or its maxims had become the 
nexus of the Republic. However, the increasing threat of French aggression and the 
accompanying pressure to accomodate the young Prince of Orange in some form, led to 
his admission in 1670 to the Council of State. A medal of 1671 commemorating the 
event showed on one side a profile of the young prince and on the other a burning altar 
besides which  a woman representing the United Provinces rests on the back of a lion 
who has a bundle of seven arrows in his paws. Near to her are two shields both bearing 
images of unity restored. One is the traditional bundle of seven arrows, the other two 
hands linked together in union, not unlike the hands of the couple made man and wife. 
The motto reads ‘salus populorum concordia’.74 Here we see the resurgence of ‘unity’ 
propaganda which will become so prevalent in 1672. The circumstances of war and 
dissolution recreated the conditions which had so animated Orangists in the past and  of 
which they had been deprived  following the Treaty of Munster in 1648.
The rhetoric of 1672 as William III was elevated to the role of captain general and 
then stadholder of Holland, inevitably drew its inspiration in part from the glorious past. 
A poet of 1672 exhorted his readers that
Wilhelm is ‘een nieuw verresen Son. Wiens Ouderen met banden 
Vast hebben ‘t saam-geknoopt den Pijl-bos.7 5
The idealised unity of the past reinforced the present.  For Jacob vander Does
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De Nederlandt wier siet gesloten met het flot
Van Eendracht, ‘t sterckst geweer, en Wapenen, naest God. 76
Vollenhove hymned his hope of the United Provinces once again
Pijl aen pijl verbonden, door geen zwaert 
Noch fors gewelt, maer zachte Oranje banden. 7 7
These hopes found visual expression in the prints of that year which celebrated the 
appointment of William Hlas captain general and stadholder. Images of the Prince of 
Orange, framed by a laurel wreath, or seated on a Roman triumphal chariot being 
crowned with the same wreath by the figure of Fame, combined hopes of victory with 
symbols of unity such as the  Holland lion bearing in his paw the seven arrows of the 
provinces or a Netherlands maid, her shift adorned with the arms of the seven 
provinces, holding the bundle of arrows in her right hand.78 The physical fragmentation 
of the Netherlands following the French invasion had come in the minds of many 
contemporaries to exemplify the disunity inherent in the state before the war and 
William was to cauterise the wounds of both.
The symbolism of marriage recurs. This time, however, the bridal union is 
between the Prince and the Provinces. The Prince’ advancement  was celebrated in  ‘t 
Lof van Orangien where the author, one Paulus Hellebuyck, proclaims his jubilation 
now that William ‘is getrouwt met d’langh gewenste Bruyf.79  In another pamphlet of 
1672, the image of the seven provincial brides was derided by one ‘Keesje’ who 
exclains robustly that if his wife ever suspected him of such polygamous nonsense ‘die 
sou my met een stok wel streelen op het lijf. His interlocutor corrects him gently saying 
that that was indeed true for the likes of Kees and himself but the wise King Solomon
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had a thousand wives. While William III had been young and excluded from authority, 
foreign princes had lusted after the provincial maids but now they were united with their 
true bridegroom.80  Images such as these imply the centrality of the stadholder in the 
writer’s concept of the Union. Implicit in this bridal imagery is the sense in which there 
can be no Union without the Prince of Orange, who fulfils the masculine active role of 
protector and defender. Also implicit in this image is the subordination of the 
individuality of the seven maidens to the common good of their corporate marriage.
Other symbols of unity were emphasised. A pamphlet entitled A Further 
Justification of the Present War against the United Netherlands by one Henry Stubbe, 
explained to his English countrymen that under de Witt, the Union was so infringed that 
Gelderland, Overijssel and Friesland were effectively subordinated to Holland. The 
authority of the States General under de Witt had become insignificant and precarious. 
This ‘polyarchical’ government would collapse without the presence of a stadholder and 
the Union would dissolve.8 1 In his remarks on the States General, Stubbe was echoing 
Orangist polemic. In Het Rechte Fondament van het nieuwe Herstelde Oudt Hollands 
Regt of 1672 Pieter Hubert argued that Holland’s polemic of 1663 in which the States 
General possessed ‘geen souvereynen in haer Natuere’, could not be sustained. If 
Holland argued that the States General possessed no sovereignty being merely deputies 
of the provincial states, then the same could be said for the provincial states which were 
composed of deputies from the towns. Taken to its logical conclusion the town council 
would end up lesser in stature than the individual citizen. On the contrary, for this 
author the States General as an institution was more important than the provincial states 
for it was a ‘Hooger Vergaderinge’ having regard to war, peace, the mint and religion 
and organising days of prayer and the translation of the States Bible.82
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Alongside this form of rhetoric, there appeared a wealth of material which 
demonised Pieter de la Court as the man who had attacked both the stadholderate and 
the Union. In so doing  Orangist writers did their best to link him irrefutably to the 
person of John de Witt. Several publications purported to reveal the secrets of de Witt’s 
library Contained within were maxims of state collected by ‘Mr Jan en de la Court’.83 In 
a fictional dialogue between two Amsterdammers, Jan pointed out to his companion 
Pieter that de la Court himself acknowledged that John de Witt had written two chapters 
of one of his pernicious works.84 For another writer de la Court was the ‘Duyvelschen 
Leermeester’ at whose feet could be laid the disasters of 1672.85  Yet another writer 
informed his readers that if they sought to find the origins of the downfall of the de Witt 
brothers ‘soo sijn ‘t de Hollants intresten’.  A fictional dialogue between two citizens 
of the occupied city of Nijmegen revealed to readers that the invasion by Louis XIV 
was part of a plot concocted by the province of Holland, in which the eastern provinces 
would be ceded to France in return for Holland’s sovereignty over the rump of the 
Republic. The source of this strategy lay in the writings of de la Court.87
The strategy of John de Witt had survived naval wars against England and 
skirmishes in the Baltic but a land war, particularly one which began with such a series 
of disasters, revealed the weaknesses inherent in States Party policy. War of this kind 
inevitably emphasised unity at the expense of provincial sovereignty and the figure of 
the young Prince of Orange fulfilled a strong symbolic function. As long as the Dutch 
Republic was involved in a land war, Orangist rhetoric had a certain persuasive force. 
Petrus Valkenier, writing in 1675, and surveying the events of the previous ten years, 
crystallised the arguments which had been inherent in pamphlets from 1648 onwards. 
For Valkenier the Union of Utrecht symbolised the highest point of the Republic’s
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interests. He wrote ‘dit land hout voor sijn eerste poinct van Interest, dat het sijne Unie 
en Verbond in alien deelen ongekreukt onderhoude’. The contrast with the Interest van 
Holland was deliberate. The shameful collapse in the face of French arms could be laid 
at the feet of a policy which emphasised provincial sovereignty at the expense of 
national unity. The role of the restored stadholderate was, in time-honoured fashion, ‘de 
Balance te houden, dat de eene Bondgenoot over de andere niet predomineere’. Holland 
had sought and achieved predominance over the other provinces, encouraged by the 
work of de la Court, which ‘meest uyt de koker quam van de Raad Pensionaris’. De 
Witt had sought to concentrate in his person and role the power previously conferred on 
the stadholder. Yet such a strategy could clearly not maintain the crucial balance 
between the provinces. To this end de Witt ‘dat Nootsaakelijcke en Illustre Collegie van 
haare Ho: Mog: als onnut annulleerde’. The States General was treated as a mere 
servant of Holland’s ambitions and its deliberations were circumvented by cabals and 
secret councils. The consequences of this policy were clear and disastrous. ‘In summa, 
men maakte in de Vereenigde Nederlandsche Republijk so veele bysondre Republijken 
en Vrye Staaten, alsser Provincien en Steeden in waren.88
Conclusion
How realistic was Orangist rhetoric? Here we must distinguish between the type of 
questions posed by academics dissecting the constitutional framework of the Republic, 
the pragmatic solutions favoured by practising politicians and the power of language 
designed to appeal as much to the emotions as the intellect. In his Memoire of 1607 
Busius, a professor at the University of Franeker, had argued that the United Provinces 
constituted not a single Republic but seven autonomous provinces, each with different 
forms of government, who came together only for their common defence. There could
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be no legislative power in the States General as the law of the majority had no force, 
deputies referring back to their provinces on all issues and each decision requiring a 
unanimous vote. This very unanimity was depicted as a defence of provincial liberties.
In his Verantwoording Grotius had echoed this analysis, arguing that, in the light of 
Bodin’s definition, the individual provinces were possessed of indivisible sovereignty, 
the States General being merely an assembly of confederates. This argument was 
buttressed by Dirck Graswinckel in his De jure magistratis dissertatio o f1642 in which 
the absolute and indivisible sovereignty of the individual provinces served as a bulwark 
against any princely or monarchical ambitions.89 These were the arguments deployed by 
supporters of the States Party in the period 1650-1672, when provincial sovereignty 
became effectively a maxim of state.
The Orangist argument had never enjoyed this type of academic lustre. Bodin may 
have been taught at Leiden from 1607 but it is clear that Orangists did not use his 
definition of sovereignty, indeed Orangist pamphlets are characterised by the noticeable 
absence of any definition of sovereignty per se. This was not entirely a mark of 
intellectual incoherence. Orangist rhetoric concentrated on the pragmatic workings of 
the Dutch Republic rather than on the theory. For even the seasoned observer, the locus 
of sovereignty in the Republic could be misleading, as States Party writers freely 
acknowledged. For William Temple, English ambassador at the Hague from 1668-1670, 
‘the Sovereign Power of this United-State lyes effectively in the Assembly of the States 
General’.90 Thus when Orangist writers sited the sovereignty of the Republic in the 
States General or the States General and stadholder combined, their argument might not 
have the academic force of a Grotius, yet still reflect one view of the reality that was the 
Dutch Republic. Once it is understood that for many Orangists sovereignty may have
Catherine Secretan,  Les Privileges, Berceau de la Liberte (Paris:Vrin,1990) pp. 126-130.
90 Clark, p. 61.166
meant no more than a nebulous ‘highest authority’, their rhetoric becomes more 
comprehensible.
In a discussion on sovereignty in the Republic, de Bruin argues that this Orangist 
siting of sovereignty in States General did not reflect political reality and may have 
been intended merely for external consumption.91 This may be going too far. The 
consistency with which the Orangists emphasised the role of the States General in co­
operation with the stadholder suggests that the concept had more resonance than mere 
window dressing. If we accept that Orangist writings were based on the politics of 
Aristotle rather than Bodin, we can understand that their emphasis lay not on 
sovereignty per se but on the parts of the constitutional  body into which the power of 
the political community was divided.  In addition, the notions of unity and ‘balance’, 
as found in Orangists writings, created an image of internal harmony and strength 
against the enemy without. As rhetoric, it clearly had influence in a situation where 
there was no counter force to the power of the province of Holland. It was no accident 
that much Orangist rhetoric emphasised that voting in the States General should be 
based on a majority vote rather than unanimity.93 Yet, neither was it entirely realistic.
As we have seen a province such as Zeeland, which embraced the Orangist position in 
1663 was equally capable of ignoring the claims of the States General when their 
particular interests were threatened. At times of crisis such as the emergency of 1618- 
lb 19 and 1650 the Dutch Republic emphasised central authority by rediscovering 
residual sovereignty in the States General but this view of sovereign authority in the 
Generality was discarded as soon as the immediate problem was dealt with.94 The 
question would always remain as to how far Orangist language concerning the Union
91  Guido de Bruin,  ‘De soevereiniteit in de republiek: een machtsprobleem’, BMGN, 94 (1979), 27-40 (p. 
40).
92 Klashorst, p.  131.
93 Secretan, p.  133.
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and the stadholder would carry weight at times when the Republic was at peace and 
enjoying prosperity. As their enemies taunted, the stadholder and his party were always 
in need of war.168
4
STADHOLDER AND CAPTAIN GENERAL
In the middle years of the 1640s when the stadholder Frederick Henry’s health was 
visibly in decline, the House of Orange determined to celebrate and commemorate his 
achievements. Whether the initial impulse came from Frederick Henry himself or his 
wife Amalia von Solms it was to be Amalia who, after the death of Frederick Henry in 
1647, carried out the project known to history as the Oranjezaal. The newly built Huis 
ten Bosch which had initially been intended as a pleasure palace became, in effect, a 
mausoleum dedicated to the dead stadholder and the House of Orange. The room known 
as the Oranjezaal was decorated with paintings, rich in allegory, which depicted 
Frederick Henry as nurtured by the Gods from the cradle onwards to become a great 
war leader.
On the west wall of the room, the infant in his cradle was flanked by Mars who
handed him a lance symbolising the arts of war.1  As a boy his studies are guided by a
helmeted Mercury whose hand on the boy’s shoulder directs his eye to a parchment
bearing the ditches and bastions of a military fortification. 2  As a young man he rides in
armour bareheaded beside his step-brother the stadholder Maurice in an allegorical
reference to the battle of Nieuwpoort.  The two men are accompanied by a winged
Victory who bears laurel wreaths poised above their heads. Amidst the laurel leaves can
be seen a glittering star emblematic of Castor and Pollux, figures who since classical
times have featured as patrons of warfare and brotherly love.'  On the north wall the
adult Frederick is ruler of both sea and land. Armoured, in a chariot of shell and bearing
1  Allegory on the birth of Prince Frederick H enry, Cesar Botius van Everdingen, 373 by 246 cm.
~ The upbringing of Prince Frederick Henry,  Theodoor van Thulden,  1649, 319 by 207 cm.
3 Princes Frederick Henry and Maurice as leaders in war,  Thomas W illeboirts Bosschaert, 317 by 
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a trident, he takes the reins from Neptune who relinquishes his kingdom to the Prince. 4 
In works by van Thulden, Pieter de Grebber, Jacob van Gampen and Pieter Soutman, 
triumphal processions bear the booty of war, the flags of the conquered, their wealth 
and trophies.5 On the south wall is the other face of war with crouching prisoners of 
war, hands tied behind their backs, stumbling forward. Behind them soldiers bear on 
poles the arms of the captured towns o f’s Hertogenbosch and Breda. 6
The military victories of Frederick Henry find their apotheosis in Jacob Jordaen’s 
work entitled The Triumph of Prince Frederick Henry. The Prince is depicted in 
breastplate and general’s cloak, seated on a chariot in front of a triumphal arch. Behind 
him is placed the figure of Victory who is about to crown him. Jordaen in his notes on 
the painting explained that the four white horses drawing the chariot symbolised the 
willingness of the Prince to put the interests of the Republic before his own. The figures 
of Hate and Discord are trampled beneath the horses’ hooves. On the right of the 
painting a mounted Prince William II emerges. A second crown bome by Victory is 
intended for his head. Behind him comes the figure of Hymen bearing a flaming torch 
and the sign of two joined hands symbolising the marriage of the prince to Mary Stuart, 
the daughter of King Charles 1  of England. To the right and left of Frederick Henry 
appear the figures of the former stadholder Princes of Orange, mounted on plinths as 
befits pillars of the state. Clustering around the bases and clinging to their feet, the 
common people embrace the figures who by their victories have secured for them their 
liberties.7  Above all else, the paintings of the Oranjezaal emphasise the centrality of 
the role of the Princes of Orange as leaders in war. Scanning the walls of Oranjezaal it 
is the spirits of Mars and Minerva in her role as fighter for just causes which
4 Fredrick Henry as M aster o f the Sea, Thomas Willeboirts Bosschaert, 314 by 208 cm.
5 Triumphal Procession with maidens strewing flow ers and an elephant,  Theodoor van Thulden,  1649,
375 by 242 cm  :  Triumphal Procession  with a statue ofJupite,  Pieter de Grebber,  1650, 380 by 246 cm: 
Triumphal Procession with the treasures from  Brazil,  Jacob van Campen, 380 by 205 cm;  Triumphal 
Procession with captured treasure,  Pieter Soutman,  1648, 380 by 210 cm.
6 Triumphal Procession  with Prisoners o f War,  Theodoor van Thulden,  1648, 383 by 205 cm.
7  1652. 730 by 750 cm; Peter-Raupp, pp.  148-152.170
predominate. The viewer could be forgiven for thinking that the sole ‘raison d’etre’ of 
the Princes of Orange was the conduct of war.
One of the most potent symbols of the Union of the United Provinces was their 
military forces. It was in no sense a national army. The army of the Republic included 
many foreign soldiers while the navy contained a greater proportion of Dutchmen in all 
ranks.8 However, the army in the field in the eighty years war of liberation against Spain 
symbolised the need of the individual provinces to lay aside their particular concerns in 
the interests of the common good. That the Princes of Orange were both stadholders and 
commanders of the army and navy reinforced their status as symbols of unity while 
bestowing on them both political and military authority. This was a heady combination, 
tolerated in times of war but increasingly resented by some factions. Following the 
Peace of Munster there were those who argued that there was no further need for a 
stadholder who was captain and admiral general. In times of peace, such as they hoped 
this would be, political and military power should return to the provinces where it 
rightly belonged. The death of William II in  1650 gave them the opportunity to put their 
ideas into practice.
Before the Revolt military authority had long been an important element of the 
power wielded by stadholders. As representatives of the royal authority they served as 
captains general in the provinces. As the Revolt gained ground this military role became 
crucial. In 1575 Holland and Zeeland formed a Union in which they agreed to work 
under the leadership of William of Orange as stadholder and captain general. He would 
be ‘sovereign and supreme head’ for the duration of the war. It might appear that all 
political and military authority was being concentrated in William’s hands but this 
would be to misunderstand the situation. The states themselves were the source of 
William’s authority which was quite deliberately limited to times of war. The States
8 Pieter J. A. N. Rietbergen,  “ Nederlandse  identiteit’  in politieke structuur en politieke cultuur tijdens de
Republiek\ BMGN,  107 (1992), 636-656 (p. 643)171
undoubtedly needed William as commander of the armed forces, able to take executive 
decisions at crucial times but he was always reliant on the States for money for his 
campaigns.9
The stadholderate of each province was coupled with the position of captain 
general of the troops of that province. Thus in January  1587 Maurice in his turn became 
captain general in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland. When in October 1589 Adolf 
van Nieuwenaar died, Maurice became stadholder and hence captain general of the 
provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht. However, Maurice’s authority was not 
undivided. In Friesland, William Lodewijk had been appointed as stadholder and 
captain general of the province of Friesland where he retained independent command of 
the northern forces. This dual command, however, created no problems and the two 
men worked well together.  10
After the death of Maurice the States General appointed Frederick Henry as 
captain general of the Union. Frederick Henry's command was more extensive than that 
of Maurice as it encompassed all the troops in the service of the States General 
including those in the Northern provinces. It is interesting that this appointment took 
place before Frederick Henry had been chosen as stadholder by the appropriate 
provinces, haste being urged on the States General by the province of Holland which 
was alarmed by the threatening military situation and an army restive without 
leadership.  In  1637, after some hesitancy, the ‘Survivance’ of the captain generalship of 
the Union was granted to Frederick Henry’s son William.  1 1
Fears began to crystallise. It appeared that political and military control was not 
only being centred in one individual but was in the process becoming hereditary. The 
States would cease to be the source of authority but would rather merely confirm it in 
the Orange dynasty. As long as hostilities continued it appeared, in the eyes of some
'J  Rowen.  The Princes o f O range.  pp.  2. 4.  17-19.
1 (1  Rowen.  The Princes o f Orange,  p.  38:  van  Deursen.  M aurits van Nassau,  p.37:  Kooijmans.  p.  11.
1 1   Rowen.  The Princes o f O range.  pp.  56. 72:  Poelhekke. Frederik Hendrik,  pp. 77-85.172
observers, that as the power of the stadholder and captain general grew, he was 
becoming the master rather than the servant of the provinces. In a pamphlet published in 
1646 the anonymous author urged the States of Holland to seek a permanent peace with 
Spain. Only then could the burgeoning power of the Orange dynasty be restrained. He 
reserved the main thrust of his criticism for Frederick Henry whose military successes 
he found deeply suspicious. He warned the States to beware of the stratagems of the 
Prince of Orange ‘qui n'a autre dessein que d’eslever sa fortune sur nos mines’. Holland 
had not cast off the yoke of the King of Spain only to ‘tomber soubs (sic) la tyrannie 
d’un petit prince'.1 2
Some in Holland feared that control of their troops was slipping from the 
provinces, whose masters they were, into the hands of the supra-provincial captain 
general. Provinces made appointments within the ranks of their soldiery when these 
troops were stationed at home but once in the field appointments became the 
responsibility of the captain general. This was a rational arrangement reflecting the 
exigencies of battle but as the war dragged on and each year saw a campaigning season 
there built up a corps of officers whose loyalty, it was suspected, was to their captain 
general as an individual rather than to the provinces. It was further observed that there 
had developed at court a distinct officer corps made up of those who owed their position 
to the stadholder and captain general, particularly among the foreign regiments whose 
officers were appointed directly by the captain general without reference to the 
States. At the funeral of Frederick Henry his body was accompanied by a guard of 
honour of eighteen colonels of which at least six were British. They formed a close-knit 
group at the stadholder's court and it has been argued that they increasingly ostracised 
the native burgher element.13  In the increasingly heated argument between the
Knuttel.  no. 5309. p.  6.
13 O laf Morke.  De hofcultuur van  het  huis Oranje-Nassau  in de zeventiende eeuw '.  in  Cultuur en 
m aatschappij in N ederland  1500-1800.  ed.  by  Peter te Boekhorst.  Peter Burke and W illem Frijhoff. 
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stadholder William II and the province of Holland over the decommissioning of troops, 
the States of Holland urged that the foreigners among the officers and troops should be 
the first to lose their posts.14 William II’s use of the military in his thwarted attempt to 
seize the city of Amsterdam only reinforced fears that the stadholder and captain 
general represented a threat to provincial and civic liberties.
Following the death of William II and the abolition of the post of captain general, 
supporters of the States Party emphasised two propositions. The first was that peace was 
the most desirable condition for a nation which made its fortune by trading. The second, 
was that a stadholder and captain general would inevitably favour a bellicose foreign 
policy for in times of w ar his position was strongest. We see these themes echoed in 
verse. On  13 September  1651  a day of Thanksgiving was appointed to commemorate 
the work of the Great Assembly. In his poem, entitled ‘Dankbaarheid’ penned to 
celebrate the occasion the poet Joachim Oudaan drew a clear distinction between a 
peace-loving Christ and the hot-blooded pugnacious youth who had been William II. 
Christ w as He w hose ‘eerst en laatste les was vrede en vreedzamheid’. Prince William, 
on the other hand
...niet verlet met steden af te steken,
Met legers op te staan. met drommen te breken,
.. .opgehitst van die niet anders zyn
Als bezig bobb'lend bloed ter herrszucht op te scherpen,
Een Staat van Oppermacht in ‘t brein scheen te bewerpen;1 5
An anonymous poet of the same year conceded that the House of Orange had 
contributed to the attainment of Freedom and Peace but argued that paradoxically it was 
only by the death of William II that these could ultimately be secured.
European  Republic",  in Princes.  Patronage and the Nobility.  The Court at the Beginning o f the Modern 
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Men mest dien Stam om Vreede en Vryheyd te verwerven.
Nu erft men eerst de Vrede en Vryheid door sijn sterven. 1 6
In their Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat of 1660, the brothers de la Court 
argued that the rule of a single head and bellicosity were inseparable. Kings and 
stadholders waged war overseas in order to empower themselves and the armed forces 
within their own countries. In order to do this they instituted heavy taxation which in 
the eyes of the de la Courts spared the meanest but placed a heavy burden on the 
commercial classes. Their perpetual demands for resources for war had ruined 
Holland's trade and bled her dry and defenceless.17 Pieter de la Court developed this 
theme in his Interest van Holland. Here we have a race of Hollanders who subsisting by 
manufactures, fishing, navigation and commerce are by nature peace loving if they are 
not incited and coerced to war by some single head or stadholder. It was de la Court’s 
contention that nearly all Republics, particularly those dependent on trade, were at risk 
of destruction when they embarked on offensive wars and conquests. This had certainly 
been the case with the Orange captain generals who had neglected the interests of the 
provinces and in particular Holland as they single mindedly pursued their own dynastic 
gain.1 8
De la Court's language and concepts were taken up by other writers. In a work of 
1662 the anonymous author contended that the hallmark of the best type of rule was that 
it brought peace. In the context of the Dutch Republic, this desirable state could only be 
achieved in a government without a stadholder and captain general where the policies of 
the States predominated.19 In the following year the author of Den Schotschen Duyvel 
reiterated de la Court's maxim that a trading province such as Holland must live by
16 Knuttel,  no.  7045.  np.
1   Consideratien  en Exempelen  van Staat.  om trent de Fundamenten  van allerley Regeringe (Amsterdam. 
1660).  pp. 63-64.  170.  174-175.231.
18  Knuttel,  no.  8652. pp. 9. 63-64.  90.
19 Knuttel.  no.  8655A .  pp. 100-101.175
peace and eschew war.20 Even during the second Anglo-Dutch war supporters of the 
States party were eager to emphasise that they sought peace. In the words of a fictional 
citizen of Delft now ‘men agte het niet zoo veel, door oorlog te overwinnen, als wel de 
Vrede in te voeren, en de overwinnings-loop te matigen’. It was conceded that it was 
right to resist English attacks at sea but this was a hard necessity for we Batavians, the 
author argued, are a peace loving race and if any fault could be laid against us, it was 
that ‘wy te zeer na de gemakkelijke rust getracht hebben’.21
Not so for the Orangists. For Pieter de Hubert writing in  1669 it was the martial 
qualities of the Batavians which had attracted the attention of Tacitus, who had 
commented on their ability to withstand the weight of the Roman military under 
Vitellius. When de Hubert describes the characteristics of the Batavians, it is their 
‘dapperheid* and kloekheid' which is emphasised."  This distinction marks a fault line 
which runs through the competing rhetoric of States Party and Orangists. On the one 
hand, the Dutch are by both nature and self-interest a peace-loving people whose 
strategy, once peace with Spain was concluded, was to stand apart from a belligerent 
Europe. On the other hand, in the rhetoric of the Orangists. war is constantly present, 
either in anticipation or in practice and with it the necessity of a single head to unite 
both military and political strategy.  It is interesting to observe that these dual strands of 
rhetoric are usually followed almost regardless of the external realities of the 
contemporary situation. During the period  1650-1672 there were two naval wars against 
the English, hostilities in the Baltic and incursions by the Bishop of Munster, yet the 
language deployed by the supporters of the States Party usually emphasised the 
desirability of peace, even during times of war. Similarly, when the Republic is at 
peace. Orangist writers continued to insist that the nation must be in a state of 
preparedness for war. The one exception to this pattern occurred during the second
20 Knuttel.  no.  8801. p.  39.
2'  Knuttel.  no.  9330. p. 18.
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Anglo-Dutch war when Orangists were in favour of a peaceful reconciliation with an 
England which they viewed as the natural protector of the interests of William III.
Many Orangists were dubious of the benefits of peace in  1648. They feared that 
the cessation of hostilities was spearheaded by a powerful group of regents bent on 
diminishing the authority of the Prince of Orange. These doubts surfaced before the 
death of William II in  1650. An anonymous writer of 1647 asserted that those whom he 
described as the Arminians were eager for peace as it would enable them to push 
forward their policies in church and state.23 A writer of 1648 alleged that the Prince of 
Orange was being excluded from the negotiations about peace although he had a crucial 
role to play.24 A pamphlet of the same year insinuated that peace with Spain was an 
integral part of a policy to reduce the power of the Prince of Orange. The writer spoke 
of
un tacite projet de rabbaisser Fauthorite du jeune Prince d’Orange au meme temps qu’on fait 
semblant de vouloir prier pour luy: puis qu’a Foccasion de son establissement en la charge de 
Capitaine general pour la conduit de vos guerres, on redouble si fort les voeux pour la paix, 
comme a dessein de luy rendre ceste dignite entierement inutile.25
For the author of Dienstige Aenmerkingen op den Spaensen Raedt, of 1653 the present 
rulers of the Republic shared with their Spanish friends a desire to cut down the House 
of Orange and peace combined with the death of William II had provided them with this 
opportunity. Just as the Spaniards and their advisers had identified the stadholder 
Maurice as ‘the dragon which guarded the land' and sought to bring him down with the 
aid of their Dutch friends, so the descendants both literal and metaphorical of these 
traitors had urged peace so that once more they could restrict or remove the only power
'3  Knuttel.  no.  5512. p. 16.
~4  Knuttel.  no.  5765.  np.
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which defended the people of the Republic against their enemies both within and 
without.26
The Orangist plaint was not limited to the conclusion of peace of 1648. They also 
expressed a view that war had made their nation rich and powerful and exerted a strong 
unifying influence on the seven provinces. This was more than just nostalgia. In the 
works of some Orangist writers it appeared as if war was the natural and normal 
condition of the Republic and peace an uneasy intermission during which preparations 
for war must always be underway. Their rhetoric was certainly in part a response to the 
works of the brothers de la Court and others in the early  1660s in which peace was held 
as the greatest good and the Princes of Orange caricatured as power hungry 
warmongers. Yet the theme was already present in the Orangist writings of the 1650s 
and reflected a consistent strand in the Dutch political rhetoric of the seventeenth 
century.
Throughout the seventeenth century there was within Dutch society a deep 
ambivalence about the wars they endured and the benefits which they had reaped. It was 
not that the Dutch were oblivious to the havoc, destruction and death which war, 
particularly on land, brought on its wake. In a pamphlet of 1621  a nameless peasant 
lamented the end of the Truce and the resumption of arms.
Ick wilde dat ick noyt was gheboore 
Dat ick nu Mars son trom weere hoore.
Mijn hert dat is in groot beswaren 
Dat die soldieren tieren en baren 
Ick worde ghestooten ende gheslaghen.
Wy arme boeren zijn te beklaghen.2 7
A writer of the same year lauded the ideal of peace though as an educated man  his 
language was more theoretical than the heartfelt cry of the peasant. For him ‘liefde ende
~6 Knuttel.  no.  7451.  pp.  23-25.
~  Knuttel.  no.  3198.  np.178
de Natuere selfs moet hy uytghetrocken hebben, die den Oorloch boven den Vrede 
soude willen verheffen'. Yet as the same author explained it, the paradox was that peace 
appeared to be of little service to the inhabitants of the Dutch Republic. No benefits had 
accrued to the state as a result of the Twelve Years Truce. Rather there had been a 
decline in trade particularly in Zeeland, Jesuits had flocked into the towns and 
countryside of the Republic and the Arminian faction had fomented a deadly discord. 
Whatever the theoretical superiority of peace, it had served the Republic ill. 28 Another 
writer of 1621  expressed his conclusions more brutally. Some might say, he wrote, that 
war is an evil above all other evils and the bountiful nurse of all miseries but, he 
insisted, war occurred in order to avoid worse evils and to defend and maintain freedom 
and religion. In his view,
de couragieuse Mensche hebben liever een strijdtbare Vryheyt dan een vreetsame 
dienstbaerheyt. De besittinghe der Vryheyt ende der tijdtlijcke goederen en is niet seecker, so sy 
niet ware gheconserveert door de Wapenen.
War here is inextricably bound up w ith the defence and preservation of freedom, a 
theme which will recur throughout the century. The author also recommended bracingly 
that war instils a discipline that is woefully absent in times of peace and quickens the 
bodies and spirits of men.29
The arguments expounded in this rhetoric of 1621  were to be echoed down the 
century every time the possibility of peace arose. In  1629 when peace with Spain was 
once more under discussion, an anonymous author argued that while peace was usually 
to be preferred to war, this maxim did not apply in the case of the United Provinces.
Like Rome, Thebes and Sparta, the new Republic had flourished in war. Like the 
Roman Empire, the Dutch Republic with no enemies to fight would turn her bellicosity 
inw ards with internal strife culminating in a dictatorship or monarchy. Those who
28  Knuttel.  no.  3204.  np.
~9  Knuttel.  no.  3216.  np.179
sought a truce with Spain were no patriots for the cessation of hostilities would leave 
the nation fatally weakened.30 ‘Patriots’ were also to be found opposed to a proposed 
truce in a pamphlet of 1632. This author praised those
Oprechte Vrome ende Ghetrouwe Patriotten  , daer van onsen Doorluchtigen Prince van
Orangien ‘t Hooft is, die nimmermeer zullen toelaten dat door de flau-herticheydt of 
eyghenbaet-zoekerye ‘t ghemeene Landt ende al watter inne is, verloren gaen ende met eenen 
schoonen schijn onder de Slavemye vande Spangiaerden ghebracht zoude werden.3 1
In this work the Prince of Orange, Frederick Henry is identified as the head of the 
‘Patriot’ party who resist the blandishments of slavery in the cause of freedom.
Opponents of peace with Spain had depicted the war as a profoundly positive and 
creative experience which had moulded the new state. It was to be preferred to the perils 
of a dubious peace. One writer of 1647 assured his fellow citizens that ‘de oorloge die u 
gequeeckt heeft, sal u wel maturineren beter dan een bedriegelijcke ruijeneuse Vrede’.32 
In the avowedly Orangist pamphlet Bickerse Beroerten published before the death of 
William II in  1650 the enemies of the Republic were said to be still armed and in 
waiting. The Republic bom and raised in war, could not survive without war and 
weapons. Finally, the anonymous author drew on Aristotle's contention that a Republic 
could only sustain success if, in times of peace, it maintained sufficient military forces 
to fight not only a defensive, but an offensive, war. If not, her fate rested not in her own 
hands but those of others.33
Given their bellicose stance, it is not surprising that during the first Anglo-Dutch 
hostilities. 1652-1654,  the Orangists favoured an enthusiastic prosecution of the war. 
Cromwell was an enemy of both the Houses of Stuart and Orange and the naval war 
resulted in demands for an admiral and captain general who could expedite matters.  A
30 Knuttel.  no.  3924.  np.
31  Knuttel.  no.  5015.  np.
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pamphlet of 1652 commended the English under the previous Stuart monarchy, 
excoriated Cromwell as the destroyer of Dutch commerce and urged an ardent 
prosecution of the war ‘t welck met de nature van onse Natie dapper over een komt’. 34 
Another pamphlet of the same year alleged that Dutch commerce had always flourished 
best in times of war. The Truce of 1609-1621 and the years of peace after the Treaty of 
Munster in  1648 had, the author asserted, been marked by a slowdown in trade. War 
was the great unifier of the seven provinces. Hard experience had taught the Dutch that 
‘vrede met een ander, Oorlogh met u selven’. This was because of the essentially 
fractious and bellicose nature of the people. ‘Sy sijn in ‘t ghemeen ghenegen tot twist en 
tweedracht, soeckende weer werck als sy geen en hebben, en een vyandt en vyantschap 
als sy in rust sitten.'35 To those who argued that the sister Republics of England and the 
United Provinces should not engage in war but seek their mutual interests in peace, the 
French Calvinist David Blondel argued that the mere fact that both were Republics did 
not promote peace between England and the Dutch. Rather like their fellow Republics 
of Venice and Genoa, they had strongly competing interests which might find their 
outlet in war. There was nothing in the intrinsic nature of a Republic which inclined it to 
peace. Instead in the case of the Dutch and the English, Tuniformite de leurs interests 
est plus propre a les mettre en jalousie’. 36
On  12 and  13 June  1653 a seabattle took place off the coast at Nieuwpoort, which 
ended in victory for the English. Tromp was forced to retreat with his ships and the 
English began a blockade of the Dutch coast. The Dutch government initiated peace 
negotiations but more bellicose spirits were abroad. The poet Jan Six van Chandelier 
anathematised the prospect of such a peace in his work of 1653 entitled ‘Afraadinge van 
Vrede, met de Tegenwoordige Regeeringe van England.’ Six van Chandelier mourned
34  Knuttel.  no.  7205. p. 4.
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the glorious past under the Princes of Orange which had been witness to so many 
victories.
O ouden tyd! O eedle zeeden!
Hoe werd uw bloem in stof vertreeden 
[...]
Waar zyn se die by Indiaanen,
In oost en west de Princevaanen, 
Hooghloflik plantten over zee,
Op Lisbons, en Kastijles ree?
The helpless and bewildered were calling for an end to the war but Six van Chandelier 
argued that de Witt’s motivation for peace lay not in the nation’s welfare but in his own 
interest and to further weaken the cause of the House of Orange.
Hy socht maar vrede, om eigenbaat,
Oorspronklik, uit een wrok en haat 
Voor hoon geleden van Nassouwen,
Om die uit’s Land gebied te houwen.
Such an approach w as tearing the country apart. If the war is to be successful and 
internal unity restored, then the answer lies with the promotion of the Prince of Orange.
En wilt men vreede binnen ‘t land?
Men ente den Oranjeplant,
Die tot een schoonen boom opgroeije, 
Langs welker schaduw Neerland bloeije.3 7
It was, however, in response to the barbs of de la Court that Orangist rhetoric 
emphasised the centrality of war both present and future in the forming of the Republic. 
An author of 1662, sobered by the experiences of the first Anglo-Dutch war, conceded 
that naval warfare could well be disadvantageous to the Republic but argued, that war 
by land had enriched the country. De la Court’s scorn for such wars was, he argued, no 
more than an attempt to deprive the Prince of Orange of the glory that was rightfully
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his. He contended spiritedly ‘echter is een rechtvaardige Oorlogh, op goede redenen 
gegront nimmer te verachten'. The very freedoms which the Republic now enjoyed had 
been won at the point of the sword.38 These sentiments were reasserted in a pamphlet of 
1663. The Treaty of Munster was depicted yet again as an insidious plot on the part of 
the Jesuits to reduce the Republic to impotence and internal discord. Drawing on the 
Public Prayer Debate of that year, the author argued that Lipsius in counselling Spain to 
peace during the Truce had been proved correct. Peace would destroy the Republic. The 
seven arrows would fall apart. 39 William IT s attempts to break off the peace 
negotiations of 1648 were commended ‘want ons Landt is door de bedriegelijcke vrede 
bedorven'.40 The author of Den Herstelden Prins scorned de la Court’s portrayal of 
bellicose and self-interested Princes of Orange. The supreme duty of  any prince was to 
defend the citizens and their territories against foreign aggression. The union of 
stadholder and captain general in the persons of the Princes of Orange, far from 
encouraging war. had served as a deterrent to neighbouring states jealous of the growing 
wealth of the Republic. The Dutch were now at peace but that could soon change and an 
army without the unifying figure of a captain general was ‘niet anders...  als een 
lighaam sonder ziele. 4 1
The war against France in  1672 presented a much more unequivocal target for 
Orangist rhetoric. Now the warlike qualities of the nation were uppermost and Orangist 
rhetoric predominated. One author asserted that the enemies of the Prince of Orange 
were saying that he would take advantage of his newly appointed role as captain general 
to enable the House of Orange to dominate the Republic once more. This writer would 
have none of it. Pausing to lay the blame for the year’s disasters on the traitors who 
opposed the promotion of William III, he called on the martial spirit of the Batavians in
38 Bedenkingen  Op het Boek  Interest van  H olland ’.(Leiden,  1662). pp. 41-42. 44. 92.
39 Knuttel.  no.  8786. pp. 4.  14.
40 Knuttel.  no.  8806. pp.  11-12.
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the nation's hour of need. 42 The warlike spirit of the Batavians was also called into play 
in a plea to the citizens of Amsterdam. An anonymous author urged them to consider 
‘de roem van de oude Batavieren onse Voor-ouders, wat voor Helden-daden sy tegen de 
Romeynen gedaen hebben’. The past is to be re-lived. William III has become their 
Claudius Civilis.43 The humiliating surrender of  Dutch fortresses in the face of the 
French army proved for one author only too clearly the need to have at the nation’s head 
a Prince of Orange who could inspire resistance amongst the demoralised troops,44 
Another, more philosophically inclined, mused on the paradox that war was commonly 
associated with a variety of ills and peace with prosperity, yet this was not true in the 
case of the Republic. Here war had been characterised ‘door gematight landts bestier, 
aflegginge van eygen Interest, en submissie alom,’ whereas the hallmarks of peace were 
‘grootsheydt, passie, en beooginge van eygen voordeel’.45 Valkenier writing in  1675 
completed this paean to war. He cited Polybius to prove that the ultimate preservation 
and welfare of the state consists in the martial deeds of its army and navy, ‘fortitudo in 
hostes'. Once again peace is depicted as essentially inimical to the internal well being of 
the state. When there is no war
men keerde de Wapenen om in sijne eygene ingewanden en besprengde sijn gebiet met eygen 
burger bloet. waar door Romen de Koninginne van de wereld weird overwonnen, dat te voren 
alle sijne Vyanden hadde overwonnen.
When peace reigned the inhabitants of the Republic had been lulled by tranquillity and 
prosperity, their old courage and steadfastness debased. War, led by a descendant of the 
nation's heroes, had enabled the Dutch to recover the martial spirit of their forefathers.46
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For the supporters of the House of Orange it was an axiom, not only that war was 
in the interests of the Republic, but that their opponents the States Party were incapable 
of adequately prosecuting any naval or military campaign. Failures at sea or in the field 
were inevitably used to highlight deficiencies real or imagined and urge the 
appointment of a captain and admiral general. The first Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-1654 
provided fertile ground for Orangist criticism. In a pamphlet of 1652 three fictional peat 
workers debated the current situation. One, Kees, bemoaned the news that the English 
had seized many merchant vessels, three wars ships and a quantity of shot. The Dutch 
government had been powerless or unwilling to prevent this outrage. Kees concluded 
‘dat onse Prins leefde ten souder soo niet gaen’. 47  These sentiments were echoed in a 
work of the same year in which one fictional character contemplating what he alleged to 
be Dutch pusillanimity in the face of Cromwell’s determination lamented ‘o hadden wy 
nu soo een krijgh’s helt als onse Prins heeft geweest, het soude anders gaen’. 48
Accusations of cowardice against certain sea captains were already surfacing. One 
Captain Boer-Jaep of Amsterdam was alleged during an engagement with the English to 
have quit his ship leaving the steersman and common sailors to bring the ship safely 
home. Accusations of dereliction of duty such as this were to occur frequently during 
the course of war. Orangists were certainly to make the best possible use of such 
charges but they may not always have originated with them. Rivalry among sea captains 
had previously led to such charges. An example will suffice. In October 1638 de With 
had failed to prevent a privateer from leaving the port of Dunkirk. After escorting a fleet 
of Bordeaux merchant ships safely home de With found on his arrival in the Hague that 
two of his own officers intended to accuse him of failing in his duty. In the case of the 
offending Amsterdam captain of 1652 the anonymous writer held his actions to be 
symptomatic of  a government which rewarded family members and clients with office
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and placed birth and connections before merit. These new sea captains were no more 
than placemen, the one promoted ‘om dat hy een schoon Vrou heeft, den anderen om 
dat sijn vrienden inde Regeringh syn\ 49 There was a clear implication that standards 
had fallen since the death of the stadholder and captain general and petty self interest 
reigned above the common good.
This cry redoubled during  1653 as the republic registered a series of naval 
disasters, merchant ships were unable to leave port and unemployment mounted.. 
Blondel writing in  1653 insisted that the war was not being prosecuted adequately and 
lamented that  ‘plusieurs mois se sont passes en pure perte’. He feared a shameful 
peace.50 Accusations of cowardice and treachery abounded. The death of Tromp in  1653 
occasioned allegations that a section of the fleet had not supported him in the battle off 
Portland, no less than twenty six Dutch vessels holding back from action. A fictional 
steersman in a pamphlet of 1653 served as a mouthpiece for the national mood of gloom 
and paranoia when he asserted that the defaulting captains had been bribed by the 
English to leave Tromp in the lurch and argued ‘wy hebben te veel schelmen in onsen 
Vloot gehad'. A fictional merchant commented pointedly on the failure of the States to 
punish the defaulting captains, asserting that the latter had too many friends at the heart 
of government. His citizen companion opined that if the captains were not apprehended 
and tried for cowardice the common folk would take matters into their own hands.51
In several pamphlets these failings were attributed to the absence of an Orange 
captain and admiral general. An alleged shortage of ships and experienced seamen, 
tardy decision making and the appointment of unsuitable captains with family links with 
the regent oligarchy were contrasted sharply with the way matters were conducted 
under the House of Orange. A fictional  ‘heavy-head’ in a pamphlet of 1653 commented
49 Knuttel.  no.  7258.  np:  Ronald Prudhomme  van  Reine.  Schittering en Schandaal (Amsterdam;
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astringently that the war against Spain had been conducted in a very different and 
praiseworthy fashion. Readers were reminded that the deficiencies of the consultative 
system of the States General in times of war had been pointed out by  William I as early 
as  1579. The appointment of the Prince of Orange as captain general had been intended 
to resolve this problem. By implication, the promotion of William HI would achieve 
similar happy results.52  In another pamphlet of the same year it was reported that even 
the English were shocked at the scandalous behaviour of the sea captains. In the distress 
and strife ridden atmosphere of 1653 there were fears that the union of the seven 
provinces was in the process of breaking up ‘ende het schijnd hier en is geen vast 
binden aan , of men sal het met een Orange sleuyer moeten doen’. The author of a 
pamphlet against the promotion of William III had to concede that a unholy coalition of 
writers of pamphlets and ministers of the Reformed Church had convinced the people 
that the Prince of Orange was the only physic for their pains.  ‘Het wordt dagelijks de 
gemeene luyden in gestampt dat dit(Orange) het eenige middel is om van de lager wal te 
Taken.' This even though a fictional character stoutly contended, with some justice, that 
‘die by zijn zinnen is, weet wel dat een Held van twee en dertig maenden noch alleen 
geen Bry-pot kan bestormen, ik laet staen iemand te helpen’.53
Even a fictional Englishman was permitted to offer his opinion on the cause of the 
Dutch defeats. His recipe for success was to get rid of all the captains who had been 
appointed as a result of nepotism. He roundly denounced the traitors of Veere, 
Rotterdam, Enkhuizen and Harlingen who were, he alleged, still exporting materials for 
ship building to England concealed in herring busses. He highlighted ‘de gierigheyt en 
‘t misbruyck der Regenten in hare Ampten die van langer soo groot en geweldich wort, 
datte misdoende geen misdaet siet’. In sum, he urged a fictional Hollander ‘de Quade 
Srs uyt-roeyen, om den Staet weder alsoo tot haer eerste beginselen te brengen’. This
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was a clarion call for the restoration of the authority of the House of Orange.
Challenged by the fictional Hollander, the Englishman asserted that if the result of the 
appointment of a captain general were swifter decision making and a more vigorous 
exercise of justice against defaulters, then it was a strategy which met with his approval. 
He took care, however, to make plain that such a captain general would be no 
Cromwell, whom he described as a veritable Machiavelli and a tyrant, but one who 
understood and maintained the liberties of Holland.54 In the light of all this it  comes as 
no surprise that the States of Zeeland, deploring the lack of secrecy and convoluted 
decision making, urged a ‘herstellinghe vande oude ordre, ende forme, daer aen den 
Staet by na een gansche Eeuwe, so wel, ende geluckeligh sich bevonden heeff. This 
entailed the appointment of a captain and admiral general in the person of the young 
William III with William Frederick of Nassau as his lieutenant. 55
The Orangists even alleged that the hatred of the government of the Republic was 
directed at the Prince of Orange and his supporters rather than at the English with 
deleterious consequences for the prosecution of the war. Allegations of this nature 
centred on the person of Admiral Tromp. Tromp was well known for his Orangist 
sympathies. In a poem commemorating the sea battle between Tromp and Blake off 
Dover in May  1652, the Dutchman refuses to be cowed by the usurper’s fleet.
Men ziet hem ryzen uit het nest 
Belauriert van zynen Prins.
Death is to be preferred to defeat, for when the greatest danger looms,
Zoo zal hy by d’Oranjevlag 
In dien verschrikkelyken slag 
Veel liever sneuvelen, dan zijn Kroon
54  Knuttel.  no.  7440.
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Tromp's habit of flying the Prince's flag was confirmed by other sources. In a 
description of the sea battle of August  1653 in which Tromp was to be killed, the 
narrator remarks almost casually that Tromp’s vessel was sporting the Prince’s flag. His 
sympathy for the cause of the Houses of Orange and Stuart was confirmed when after 
the capture of an English vessel, it was renamed the ‘King Charles’. 57
The Admiral’s death in battle in  1653 unleashed accusations that his fellow 
captains had deliberately abandoned him to his fate. The fact that they went unpunished 
by the States General did not go unremarked. 58  Jan Six van Chandelier implied that the 
grief of certain regents at the death of this Orangist naval hero was feigned. There were 
those who dissembled and donned mourning but others who disdained to pretend grief.
A1 is het aardryk nu verdeelt,
Zoo veel, als Louvesteyn verscheelt, 
Van ‘t eedel Prinsdom van Nassouwe, 
Om deesen Held, haar lid in rouwe, 
Waarom party inwendigh lacht,
En veinst of weigert swarten dragh,5 9
In other words, members of the States Party had connived at his death. In so doing they 
had placed their own factional interests above the national welfare.
Similar accusations were levelled at John de Witt and his supporters during the 
French invasion of 1672, when it was alleged that they would rather connive with the 
enemy than permit the promotion of the Prince of Orange to stadholder. In these 
circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the old accusations concerning the death 
of Tromp the Elder resurfaced at this point. One writer alleged, in verse, that John de
56  'Voor het aangaan  van’t Zeegevecht tusschen de Vlooten der Hollanders en Engelschen onder Oliver 
K rom wel’. Onze Mannen  ter Zee in dicht en beeld,  ed. by Daniel Scheurleer,  3  vols (The Hague.  1912), 
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Witt had deliberately connived that Tromp should be left unaided during the battle. 
Written after the death of the brothers de Witt, the soul of the mutilated John roams Hell 
admitting to his treachery.
... Wie is de oorsaeck van de doot
Van Tromp, ben ick het niet? Ick liet hem in de noot;
lek was die’t werck bestaeck door hemelijcke brieven,
En net Capiteins en Volck dat zy hem lieten blijven 
In ‘t heerste van ‘t gevecht. 60
One pamphlet alleged that both Tromp the younger and the elder were victims of the 
supporters of John de Witt because they were good naval men, good patriots and friends 
of the Prince of Orange. The author alleged that the younger Tromp ‘moest uyt de Vloot 
om dat hy al te wel vochf and his father had been deliberately sacrificed as part of the 
agreement of Holland and England to the Seclusion of the Prince of Orange. 61
Orangist rhetoric remained conspicuously muted during the course of the second 
Anglo-Dutch war. Charles II had naturally been seen as the protector of the interests of 
his nephew William III and  there was clearly uncertainty about how to play the 
patriotic card without damaging the Prince's cause. There is a notable absence of the 
type of bellicose language heard during the first Anglo-Dutch war The naval reforms 
introduced by John de Witt were bearing fruit and the English battered by plague and 
the Fire of London clearly had many problems of their own. De Ruyter’s triumphal 
progress up the Thames occasioned much patriotic rejoicing. John de Witt had 
introduced speed and co-ordination to Dutch naval decisions and had involved himself 
personally in the selection of suitable capitains. He had supervised the fitting out of the 
w arships at Texel and went to sea with the fleet in July 1665 and September 1666. In 
short, he was acting, in effect as a quasi admiral general and arguably a more effective
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one than any Prince of Orange.62 His brother Comelis had shared in Ruyter’s naval 
triumph.
In these circumstances,  the Orangists instead concentrated on the situation on 
land where things were much less rosy. In a pamphlet of 1665 a fictional merchant told 
of his recent visit to the frontiers where he was struck by the paucity of troops and 
artillery. If an assault were to come by land, it could not be repulsed. A fictional regent 
remarked ominously that the Bishop of Munster was taking advantage of the naval war 
with England to threaten the Republic. 63  The regents of the province of Zeeland took 
up the cudgels the following year. The unexpected and violent attack by the Bishop of 
Munster in the north of the Republic and the inability of the armed forces to deal 
adequately with him had revealed deficiencies in the military. Hence they argued, it was 
necessary to appoint a captain general as soon as possible. They proposed that William 
III be made general of the Cavalry under the guidance of John Maurice of Nassau and 
introduced into the Council of State as his father had been before the death of Frederick 
Henry. Once William attained his majority he would be appointed captain general, a 
post he would hold not for one campaign but for life. These sentiments were also 
expressed in verse. An unknown poet queried
Waerom soo lang gewacht met onsen Prins te hulden?
Heeft Hy niet langh genoeg dees spijt moeten gedulden?
The Prince's youth is no longer to be held against him.
En daer Hy is te jong is, niet te out om te leeren, 
Daer vindt Hy liefd' en gunst by militaire Heeren.
62 Jaap R.  Bruijn.  The Dutch Navy o f the Seventeenth and Eighteenth  Century (Columbia:  University of 
South Carolina.  1990), pp.  76-77.  81-82.
Knuttel.  no. 9125.  np.191
Once again, as during the first Anglo-Dutch war concerns surfaced about the quality of 
the military and naval appointments under the government of John de Witt. It was 
scandalous that such callow youths were advanced when the Prince of Orange, the fruit 
of heroes was left standing by.
Wat sietmen hedensdaegh al nieuwe Officieren 
En jonge Capiteyns, en jonge Vendrichs zwieren,
En sulcke gaen Hem voor, ‘t is schand’
Sy stappen aldereerst, en laten ‘t volck staen.64
There was a growing sense in the Dutch Republic that the France of Louis XIV 
represented the greatest threat. Louis’s designs on the Spanish Netherlands conjured up 
the spectre of a neighbour more powerful than an ailing Spain. Louis’s ambitions 
appeared boundless. In  1667 there was published in Paris a work entitled Des justes 
pretentions du Roy sur I’Empire.  The writer Aubery portrayed a monarch and state 
brought together in mystical union and determined to win back that patrimony which 
once had been French. The author argued that the territory of the Gauls had, at one time, 
embraced  ‘la plus grande partie de Europe'. Some pages later, he was more specific. 
Under Charlemagne the kingdom of the French had comprised ‘la plus grande partie de 
l'ltalie, toute la France comme elle est presentement bomee, tous les Pays-bas, et toute 
l'Allemagne'. 65  The States of Holland were alive to the danger France posed but also 
equally perturbed at the possibility that a Prince of Orange would, one day, combine 
both the stadholderate and the role of captain general. It was admitted that ‘sich omtrent 
de Grensen van desen Staet een donckere wolcke van discentie ende Oorloge bevonde 
op te doen' and that the army must be placed on a more advantageous footing but it was 
argued that vital freedoms would be threatened if the role of stadholder were to have
64  Knuttel.  no. 9420.  np.
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both political and military elements. The Perpetual Edict of 1667 stated that no 
stadholder of any province could be promoted to the role of captain general. The 
Province of Holland would henceforth have no stadholder and all provincial officials 
have to take an oath to uphold the Edict. However, there was a recognition that some 
form of role had to be envisaged for William. At the age of twenty he would enter the 
Council of State which had particular responsibilty for military administration and the 
governance of the Generality Lands. If William would forego the stadholderate of any 
of the provinces then he would be appointed captain general of the Union when he 
reached the age of twenty-two. 66
The certainty of a military role for the Prince of Orange and the hope that 
changing circumstances might also bring with it the stadholderate, may account for the 
relative paucity of factional rhetoric in the years  1669-1671. Yet there was an 
impending sense of urgency. In August  1670 the French army was marching towards 
the Spanish Netherlands. Alarmed, de Witt urged the States General to turn its thoughts 
seriously towards re-arming but several provinces were reluctant to countenance the 
necessary expenditure.67 In a pamphlet of 1671  a prescient fictional Hollander described 
Louis XIV as a waxing power whose aim was ‘kort om, in alle schijn met een 
openbaren Oorlog te Water en te Lande, om Monarch te worden over de geheele Werelt 
gelijk de Romainen’. If any doubted him they should read Justes Pretentions du 
Roy, which was now available in a Dutch translation.68  In October 1671 it was proposed 
to increase the army by 20,000 men. In November 1671  the province of Gelderland 
urged the States General that the Prince of Orange be appointed captain and admiral 
general forewith. 69 On 25 February  1672 the prince was appointed captain general for 
one campaign only. He was not to be stadholder of any province. He would remain
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firmly under the authority of the deputies of the States General who accompanied him 
in the field and he could not give orders for the movement of troops without the 
agreement of those provinces and towns whose responsibility they were. There was to 
be no possibility of another coup such as that against Amsterdam in  1650. 70
These limitations reflected the concerns of de Witt and his supporters. From 
1650 to  1672 States Party rhetoric emphasised that no Republic worthy of the name 
entrusted supreme military authority to any individual for life, regardless of the political 
authority or otherwise of the person concerned. Thus even if the House of Orange were 
denied the stadholderate, they were not to be trusted with any form of overall military 
control. Once in control of troops, a Prince of Orange would be able to enforce his will 
upon the United Provinces at the cost of provincial supremacy. De Witt in his Deductie 
of 1654 argued vehemently that republics which placed one man in charge of the army 
for the duration of his life were doomed to be ultimately reduced to the status of a 
monarchy or single headed rule. The Milan of the Visconti bore witness to this. The 
Republic had been threatened with the same outcome when Anjou, determined to make 
himself supreme master of the Netherlands, had attempted with his troops to seize 
Antwerp in  1583. The stout courage of the citizens had thwarted his worst designs and a 
beneficent providence had borne him to the grave shortly afterwards. Likewise, in the 
view of de Witt, the death of William I before he could be made count, the mist before 
Amsterdam in  1650 and the death of William II could all be imputed to God who had 
preserved the freedoms of the Republic from an all-powerful military leader. 71
Even more evocative was the example of Julius Caesar who used military success 
to seize political headship. In the work of Machiavelli and Boccalini whose reading of 
Roman history was influenced by Cicero and the epic poet Lucanus, Caesar was the
70 Japikse.  I. p.  178.
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prototype of a tyrant whose seizure of power was a warning to all lovers of freedom.72 
Likewise in States Party rhetoric the figure of Caesar stands for all who gain political 
supremacy by force of arms, among whom are included implicitly or explicitly the 
Princes of Orange. In his Deductie of 1654 de Witt drew on the alarming precedent of 
Julius Caesar who after commanding a mere fraction of the Roman army, used those 
same arms against his own Fatherland. In this way the Republic which had withstood 
the world was brought down, not by external defeat but by internal strife.73 A pamphlet 
of the following year reiterated that under an ‘aristocratic’ form of governance of 
Consuls and Senate Rome had flourished for centuries. However, the political power of 
Caesar, achieved through control of the military had brought the Republic to slavery.74 
In an analysis of kingship the brothers de la Court listed those who had risen to the 
status of a monarch by virtue of their military power among them Julius Caesar, 
Tiberius, Prince William I, Prince Maurice, Prince Frederick Henry and the Medicis.75 
Writing in  1663 the author of the De Guide Legenden compared William II’ s 
unwillingness to decommission troops and his attack on Amsterdam with the actions of 
Julius Caesar. Caesar, when the Council at Rome wrote to him to lay down his 
command and decommission his soldiers, argued that Pompey must do the same 
meanwhile marching on Rome to seize sovereignty.76 In a pamphlet of 1668 supporting 
the separation of the posts of stadholder and captain general, Caesar once more 
provided a salutary lesson with Leicester added for good measure.77
In an oration delivered to the burghers of Deventer in May  1664, Theophilus 
Hogers narrated the rise of Caesar the better to urge his fellow citizens to value and 
defend their freedom. For Hogers nature had bestowed on man such an inborn love of
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freedom that he would rather die or live in poverty than be rich and unfree. However, he 
warned that there are among all peoples ‘slaefachtighe geesten’ who willingly take upon 
themselves the yoke of slavery thinking that they will hence gain advancement. So there 
are those who bow to tyrants and among those tyrants was none other than the great 
Caesar for ‘de geen, die of door gewelt, of door list, de vestingh van de gemeene Staet 
aentast, wordt met seer groot recht met de naem van Dwingelant uyt-gesproken’. The 
figure of William II lurks unspoken in the background. Having won the support of 
Pompey and conquered the Gauls, Caesar ‘dacht niets anders dan openbare oorlogh 
tegen sijn Vaderlandt te voeren’. Hogers described Caesar’s legions of foreigners who 
owed loyalty to him alone. The presence of foreign soldiers and officers in the army of 
the Republic who had been appointed by the Princes of Orange and whom it was 
alleged they were unwilling to decommission was a recurrent theme in the rhetoric of 
the States Party and Hogers may well be implicitly referring to these. His power based 
on the military, Hogers* Caesar seeks new and evil occasions of war to buttress his 
power. Hogers refers to Caesar's persecution and imprisonment of Cato, ‘de beste man, 
en heylighste Burger die in romeynsche Heerschappy geweesf who found himself 
incarcerated ‘schoon hy by sich self van geen misdaet bewust was’. The hapless Roman 
takes on the traits of an Oldenbamevelt. Finally after gaining power and silencing his 
enemies Caesar openly strove for the position of king and would have been successful if 
fate, in the shape of his assassins, had not removed him. He had not learned the vital 
lesson that princely power gained by weapons can only be sustained by those same
78 weapons.
Hogers*s oration was published in  1666 in a volume which also contained 
Schelius* posthumous publication De Gemeene Vryheit. Praise of monarchical 
government among his contemporaries had moved Schelius to write in defence of the
78 Theophilus Hogers. Vertoog  van dat Julius  C esar een  Tyran lieeft geweest,  included in Rabo H.  Scheie. 
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freedoms which were native to man and which were inevitably diminished and stunted 
by slavish obedience to monarchical authority. Schelius was clearly writing in support 
of the regime which had followed the death of William II and he was a correspondent of 
de Witt. Hoger’s purpose in his oration and its publication is even more explicit. He 
wrote that he deployed the example of Caesar ‘als om de Burgers door een voorbeelt te 
vermanen, en hen op te wecken om de Vryheydt, met het bloet onser voorouders 
ghekocht, te verdedighen'. There is clearly a present day threat to freedoms for there are 
‘dusdanige menschen, die uyt begeerte van de Vorsten te believen, de Gemeente en 
Vryheid verraden’.79 These are the supporters of the House of Orange eager to restore 
the authority of a stadholder and captain general.
The role of Caesar was shunned by those who supported the policies of John de 
Witt. In  1666 the poet and dramatist Jan Vos, long known to be hostile to the cause of 
the House of Orange, wrote in praise of the Pensionary who had accompanied the 
victorious Dutch fleet to sea during the second Anglo-Dutch war. In his poem entitled 
Zeetocht van den Eed. Heer Joan de  Wit Vos lauded de Witt as both statesman and 
military leader. De Witt
strydt met zijn tong in ‘t Hof, en met zijn arm op zee.
Hy voert in d’eene handt, om vryheidt en om vree,
Het Wetboek van de Staat, in d’andre handt den deege 
Van d’algemeene leeuw.
However in spite of this potent combination of roles Vos makes a clear distinction 
between de Witt as servant of the state and a figure such as Caesar who strives to 
dominate his fellows. Vos urges his fellow citizen to guard against such types and take 
care that military authority remains firmly in the hands of the provincial States.
9 Hogers.  Vertoog  van dal Julius  C esar een  Tyran  heeft geweest. p.  158.197
Zoo lang als Roomen haar krighshelden heeft ontslaagen 
Van hun geleende macht, behiel ‘t haar vryigheidt:
Maer toen haar Raadt dit recht van Caesar wierdt ontzeidt, 
Verviel ‘t in slaavemy, ...
[...]
Wie wakker zorgen wil heeft voor geen ramp te vreezen. 
Zoo moet men eeuwig zijn in ‘t Staatsche Neederlandt. 
Wie voor zijn burgers zorgt behoudt een vrye staat.80
1670 saw the admission of the Prince of Orange to the Council of State, with the 
implication that this appointment would help to prepare him for a military role within 
the Republic  In the same year John van Someren published his drama Julius Caesar, 
ofte Wraeck van vennande Vryheydt. This may be no coincidence. Van Someren, a 
correspondent of de Witt, contrasted the interests of the all powerful single head and the 
concept of freedom, with the clear implication that the two were incompatible.81 For van 
Someren it was evident that ‘de konincklijke Opper-macht, is by alle Staetkundige, 
tegen de Vryheydt gestellt, ende de Vryheydt den breydel om deselve te betoomen’. In 
his introduction van Someren emphasised that power over the military was the key to 
authority in the state.
‘t Gesagh dat een Opper-hooft, door de Wapenen, die hem vertrouwt zijn, verkrijght is by die 
Machten, die ‘t hem aenbevolen hebben, seer bedenckelijck: alsoo de Krijghs-macht, de Sleutel 
van de Regeeringe in handen heeft’.
A sonnet reiterated the theme.
Siet wat de Krighs-macht doet, wanner sy heeft‘t bewint, 
Hoe sy de Vryheyd selfs, door haer geweld verslint;
Wie dat de Vryheyt mint, moet die noyt overgeven.
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Van Someren’s drama faithfully follows the account laid down in Plutarch’s Fall 
of the Roman Republic. In the speeches of the conspirators we discern themes which 
were familiar in contemporary debate in the Dutch Republic. They speak of the servant 
who, by power of arms, became the master and of a freedom which was incompatible 
with a sovereign head. For Marcus, freedom was imprinted in even the lowliest beast
Geen dier op Aerden leeft dat niet sijn Vryheyt minde,
However while nature has designed monarchs for the animal kingdom and the fickle 
mob cry for a king, Marcus, in freedom’s name, acknowledges no headship.
Laet dan ‘t wanschapen volck een’s konincks Scepter vieren,
Die Vrouw Natuer bykans, gestelt heeft naest de dieren,
Uyt een geringen stof, wy volgen ‘s Vryheyt’s Wet,
Die op geen dwing’landy, van hoogheyt immer let.
Cassius’s warning against those who rise to supremacy by power of arms has a 
particular resonance. It was the contention of supporters of the States Party that the 
Orange stadholders and captains general were the creation and servants of the provincial 
states whom they subsequently sought to dominate and subjugate.
Wie dat een Rijck be-erft, daer vindt men kracht en reden,
Om met die heerschappy sijn kind’ren te bekleden,
Maer die het werd gegunt, door hooger handt of macht,
Moet toesien dat hy niet sijn eygen Heer verkracht,
Dat hy geen banden past, aen haer door wiens bevelen,
Hy kreeg de Heerschappy, en kan de meester spielen.
The price of freedom is eternal vigilance. As the chorus after the death reminds the 
audience they must be alert to the dangers of other Caesars emerging.
Het Opperste Gebiet de Vryheyt moet begrimmen.199
Soo ghy u Vryheyt mint, leent noyt haer krachten uyt,
Het opperste Gesagh dat loert op sulcken buyt,
En ‘t wil door dese wegh, naer d’hooghste Troonen klimmen.82
Van Someren may have considered this a timely warning as the star of the young Prince 
of Orange appeared to be rising.
Orangists, on the contrary, glorified successive Princes of Orange by comparing 
them to the mighty Caesar. In  1597 a medal cast to celebrate Maurice’s victory at 
Tumhout echoed Caesar’s alleged words on his expedition to Britain but paid the 
ultimate tribute to the Almighty, ‘venit, vidit, Deus Vicit’.83 Maurice’s triumphs were as 
great as Caesar’s but the former was marked by true Christian humility. A work entitled 
De mutatione Reipublicae en initiis monarchiae Caesarum sive C. Julius Caesar by 
J.H.Carer and published in  1645 was dedicated to the stadholder Frederick Henry. The 
author asserted that Caesar’s greatness lay in his realisation that Rome needed a single 
head to prevent faction within the state.84 In a work of  1650 De Doodt van Julius 
Caezar, the dramatist Hendrik Verbiest tackled head on the traditional Republican view. 
His Caesar wields the sword for the benefit of his people and their freedom, bringing 
peace within the frontiers of the Empire and stability in Rome. He stands above the 
factional strife of the city, placing the welfare of the Republic before self interest. He 
stands in contrast to Brutus and his faction who do not shrink from the murder of a head 
of state.85 For some citizens the stadholder, famed for his military victories, fulfilled the 
same function in the Dutch Republic. In a poem of 1650 lamenting the death of the 
stadholder. William II became a second Caesar.
De tweede Caesar, die de palen 
Vant vrederijk in rust besat,
En blonk als in een Zonne-stat,
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Zie ‘k onversiens ten grave dalen.86
The appointment of William III as captain general in  1672 once more evoked 
images of Caesar. For one writer, van der Meer,  William’s birth following the death of 
his father led to comparisons with Caesar whose birth brought about the death of his 
mother William III was one
... die als een Caesar waart
Geboren, na de dood van die u dede leven.
However, there is here no hint of a military tyrant. The poetic Rhine God, 
contemplating the coming war, assures his listeners of eventual victory, for there is alive 
a Prince of Orange who ‘wist alle dwinghlandij uit mijn gebied te bannen’. 87 
Another writer viewed the appointment of the prince as the prelude to victory over the 
French. He urged his fellow citizens to deck themselves in orange in honour of the
O  Q
young prince who like a Caesar ‘al  ‘t Frans gewelt teniet magh doen’.  Johan van 
Eyck in his Den Nederlantsche Prins published in  1674 the choice of William III as 
stadholder and captain general in  1672 was ‘  ‘t Herstellen van de dootsieckte vryheyt’ 
of which his ancestors had laid the foundation. For this author the Dutch people in  1672 
were,  ‘t Vertoomde Volck, ‘t welck sich van straffende wetten en gebiedende 
Overheden wilde ontslaen, wiert door een Vaderlijck gesicht, als van een Caesar tot
O Q
haare gemeene-plicht aen-gemaent’.  For Orangists Caesar and freedom were entirely 
compatible in the form of William III.
The Orangists were clearly able to contemplate with equanimity a great war hero 
who combines military expertise with the exercise of political power. Far from seeing 
such a situation as a prelude to tyranny, the supporters of the House of Orange viewed it
86 Lyk-Clok over de D oot van zijn  H oogheyt  Willem Frederyck (1650)
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as an essential element in the defence of their freedoms. In a response to the Perpetual 
Edict the States of Zeeland argued in  1668 that an attempt to separate the functions of 
stadholder and captain general was ‘een reproche ende condemnatie van het geene by de 
voorouders is gedaen’. They dismissed the argument from history that nations suffered 
as a result of the combination of a political and military head. This was not relevant to 
the experience of the United Provinces for what caused the downfall of one nation ‘is
on
dickmaels een middel voor een andere natie tot haren opganck’.  This was cleady the 
case in the Dutch Republic. It was the military might of the Republic led by the 
redoubtable Princes of Orange which had held the Spanish tyrant at bay and enabled the 
emergence of an independent state. In all their actions both political and military, the 
Orange princes had acted not as tyrants but as agents of divine providence and servants 
of the people.
We can see this theme clearly in the collection of songs known as the 
Geuzenliederen. Sung to popular tunes, they were intended to teach both youth and 
women about the heroic struggle against Spain. Inevitably the role of successive Princes 
of Orange was an essential theme within these works. Largely written before  1648, this 
material continued to be supplemented and published during the years without a 
stadholder. An edition of the Geuzenliedboek was published in  1656 in Amsterdan and 
another in  1659 in Dordrecht. Two further editions followed in  1661  and 1668. The 
threat of war with France and the increasing chance of the Prince’s promotion to 
military office may be the reason why two editions saw the light of day in 1671, both 
published in Amsterdam. Not surprisingly, the onset of war and William Hi’s successes 
in recovering the country from French control led to new editions of this type of 
material.  1675 saw the publication of three separate volumes, Prince Liet-Boeck of
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Trompet des Oorlogs, the Trompet des Oorloghs of J. P. Tulp and Nassouse 
Trompetje.91
In the Geuzenliederen, the Princes of Orange were bound up with the defence of 
freedom. This was freedom not just from Spanish domination but from the type of 
governance which the compliers described as ‘tyranny’, in which liberties, privileges 
and the freedom to worship God in the manner of the Reformed are trodden underfoot. 
William I appeals to God,
Myn Schild ende vertrouwen / 
Zijt gy, o Godt myn Heer /
Op U zo wil ik bouwen / 
Verlaat mijn nimmermeer./
Dat ik dog vroom mag bly ven / 
U Dienaar t’aller-stond /
De Tyranny verdryven /
Die mijn Herte door-wond.
William's son Frederick Henry treads the same path.
Voor de Vryheyd en Godts Woord, 
Voor de rust der Vroomen,
Sta ik als een vaste Poort,
Niemand heeft te schroowen.
Not only were the Princes of Orange the protectors and defenders of all that was dear to 
many in the Republic but sailors and soldiers fought in their name. On one occasion 
Dutch mariners were exhorted with the words,
ontwaakt mijn Batavieren koen / 
Die strijden met Oranjen groen / 
Voor’t Vaderland getrouwe /
Die wagen ‘t lijf Avond en Noen 
Voor ‘t Huys al van Nassouwe.
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This model was applied even when there was no Prince of Orange as stadholder and 
captain general. A victory song commemorating the battle of Santvoort in 1653 hymned 
the valour of Tromp.
Voor ‘t Vaderland heeft hy gestreen /
Spanjen eertends doen beven;
Voor ‘t Huys Nassou / en voor ‘t Gemeen /
Oranjen deed’ hy streven.
This identification of the Princes of Orange with the fortunes of the state is carried 
forward into the future. In a song commemorating one of the innumerable conquests of 
the Orange princes, a chorus of grateful citizens sing
Wy zullen gaan uyt galmen /
Ontzaggelijke Vorst /
Met lof-zang en Psalmen /
En u verheven Borst /
Zijn Daden eeuwig prijzen / Dank bewijzen. 
En Godes gunst af smecken /
Dat ‘ t Vorstelijke Zaad /
Ons nimmer mag gebreken /
Tot voordeel van ons Staat / 92
Sentiments such as these, read and sung by those who might not resort to the 
conventional history book, could only inculcate the sense that not all would be well 
with the Republic in matters of war or politics unless there were a Prince of Orange at 
the helm. Fragmentary incidents bear witness to this. Sir George Downing writing from 
the Hague to Lord Chancellor Clarendon on 9 June  1665, at the time of the second 
Anglo-Dutch war, told of one Captain Terslong, the commander of the ship Gonda, who 
was approached by his seamen and soldiers who insisted that ‘unless he would putt out
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ye Princes flag they would not fight a stroke’. Terslong appears to have conceded their 
demand. This was not a lone incident. In the same letter Downing reported, ‘Wednesday 
last, ye drums beating in Leyden for more men in the name of ye States General, the 
women got about ye drums and cut them in pieces crying out ‘Ye Devill take ye States;
- beat some for ye Prince of Orange.’93 On  16th May 1666 William III appeared before 
the fleet in the  company of his uncle Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg. 
William came aboard the vessels Zeven Provincien, Eendracht and Hollandia to be 
greeted by shouts of ‘vive le Prince’ accompanied by a salvo of shots. 94 This incident 
demonstrating the seemingly indestructible bond which existed between the Princes of 
Orange and the nation’s fighting seamen and soldiers was selected by Romeyn de 
Hooghe for inclusion in his print of 1672 entitled Orangien Wonderspiegel which 
depicted iconic scenes from the youth and childhood of William III. 95
This sense that the Princes of Orange in their dual role as stadholders and captains 
general were essential to the freedom and well being of the state finds voice when 
William III was appointed as captain general in  1672. The poet Pieter Verhoek 
celebrated this long awaited occasion and the hopes which it engendered.
Die lang verwachte stont is eindelijk geboren,
De staf van’t krygsbewint, Oranjes Vorst beschoren,
Hem opgedragen door de maghten van den Staet:
[...]
‘s Lands wellust neemt begin. De Lantzaet door deez’ maeren 
In ‘t hart verheugt, grypt moet, laet drove zorgen varen.
Geen Zee gaet hem te hoog, nu de eendracht is herstellt.96
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In Orangist rhetoric the struggle against France in 1672 mirrored the war against Spain 
of the previous century. For the poet Vollenhove it was an occasion for his fellow 
citizens to reflect on the services of the former princes of Orange.
Nu heugt al ‘t lant, hoe WILLEM ons den hoet 
Der vryheit weer opzette,
The martial deeds of Maurice and Frederick Henry were recalled in their turn. Victory 
was assured with William HI at the head of the nation’s forces.
D’Oranje telgh, ter goeden uur gesproten 
Uit zulk een stam, dien he I dens  tarn, belooft 
Trompf en heil, als opperste oorloghshooft,
I--]
Geen trommel werft het krighsvolk zoo gezwint,
Gelijk de naem van’t heldenrijk Oranje,97
A pamphlet of the same year compared the state of the nation in  1672 with the 
sufferings under the depredations of Alba during the previous century. In a world of 
plundering, burning and summary execution it was the First William of Orange who 
rescued the ship of state.  ‘Hier komt dan den Hooghloffelijcke Prins Willem van 
Orangien, die dit...Schip vint drijven, ja hy heeft terstont een Pomp doen maken om het 
Schip boven te houden.'Now the ship is once more in distress, its mast down and its 
sails in shreds but the young prince William III is determined to restore its fortunes and 
sail it once again as his forefathers did.98  A pamphlet of 1673 published for ‘de 
liefhebbers vande Vryheydt’ urged the nation to reject peace and fight to the last man. 
The anonymous writer drew upon the history of the siege of Leiden during the Revolt 
and the burgomaster Pieter Adriaenszoon van der Werve who when the citizens wished
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to capitulate to the Spanish offered his own body to assauge their hunger.  Sacrifice was 
required for then as now it was a struggle of freedom against tyranny and William HI 
had taken up the mantle of  William I."
Yet Orangist rhetoric was not to carry all before it. On 20 April  1675 the States
General declared that the position of captain and admiral General was henceforth
100 hereditary.  With war continuing, we encounter once more those fears that whoever 
controlled the army, controlled the state. The Caesar of the States Party, the threat to the 
sovereignty of the provinces and their privileges once more raises his head. In a 
pamphlet of 1675 allegedly published in Antwerp, the author claimed that William in 
intended to use Tromp and the fleet against the States for he aimed to make himself 
sovereign and tyrant. To that end, he had placed his Governors, who were no more than 
his creatures, in all the frontier towns.101 Another writer of the same year warned the 
magistrates of the Republic that the Prince of Orange as stadholder and war leader was
1  (P intent on becoming a tyrant with the support of the nobility and the soldiery .  “ In 
another pamphlet of 1675 the rhetoric has strong echoes of the language of the 
supporters of John de Witt. The author alleged that William III intended to concentrate 
all authority within his hands.  To that end he would deploy the soldiery particularly the 
foreign troops who owed allegiance to him alone. The nation was ruinously taxed in 
order to support the English troops and this was a deliberate tactic intended to weaken 
the nation so that the stadholder, the servant of the Republic ‘could play the master’. 
Both Venice and the Swiss cantons, those time-honoured examples, managed their 
affairs without a single head who had control of the military. It was essential to curb the
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designs of the Prince of Orange and the first step in  this process must be a policy of 
peace with the neighbours and erstwhile enemies of the Republic.103
Conclusion
The Orangist message was one of bellicosity. Its source lay in the rhetoric which had 
marked the years of the Truce, subsequent negotiations for the cessation of hostilities 
and the negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Munster. The one exception to this rule 
occurs during the course of the second Anglo-Dutch war when Orangist rhetoric was 
strangely muted, though evidence from other sources suggests that Orangist sentiment 
was running high. War was inevitably linked to the restoration of William HI to the 
offices of his forefathers. Orangists saw nothing to fear in the combination of military 
and political roles.
Yet there were clearly flaws in the Orangist argument. The demands for the young 
William III to be appointed captain and admiral general in  1653 with William Frederick 
of Nassau as his lieutenant owed more to the ambitions of the Frisian stadholder and the 
desire to sow confusion among the populace than any well considered strategy. As 
Pieter Geyl has pointed out, during the first Anglo-Dutch war, the Orangists were 
unable to provide an alternative regime or even an alternative policy.104 As opponents 
did not hesitate to point out, the appointment of a infant of two years to the Republic’s 
highest military and naval offices could not of itself improve the conduct of the war. 
Neither the Princess Dowager Amalia von Solms or the Princess Royal Mary Stuart 
were inclined to tolerate the pretensions of William Frederick and saw his claim to the 
lieutenancy as a threat to the eventual restoration of William III to the stadholderate in 
the majority of the provinces. Success under the Princes of Orange was contrasted with 
the problems encountered by de Witt and his supporters. The imagery projected by the
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Orangists was that of disorder, confusion and disunity, a people divided amongst 
themselves and unable to unite against the foe. It is telling that this language which was 
deployed in  1653 when internal discord truly threatened, did not see the light of day in 
the years of the second Anglo-Dutch war.
Above all the language of war was the language of unity, of a time when 
provinces and stadholder as captain general strove together to defend the privileges and 
liberty of a free people. A people who were bound together in defence of a single 
religion, the True Reformed Faith. It is no accident that calls to bellicosity and the 
advantages of war were so often linked to the fortunes of the Calvinist faith in the 
Republic. In Orangist rhetoric, peace saw the triumph of Arminianism, the sects and the 
proliferation of Roman Catholics. In certain strands of Orangist rhetoric war and the 
public church united the Republic and were a bulwark against the autonomy of the 
provinces and the civic tolerance of the regent patriciate.209
5
A DEFENDER OF THE TRUE REFORMED RELIGION
On 7 February  1659 the poet and dramatist Jan Zoet was cited before the consistory in 
Amsterdam. It was alleged in the protocol that ‘hy niet en rust, maar zijn dwalingen 
ende verleydingen van het geestelyck koninckrijk overal soeckt te verspreyden’.1  Zoet 
certainly nursed an abiding contempt for the public church. He had castigated the 
ministers of the Reformed Church as ‘wolven op de roof.  This was not a lone sally.  In 
his poem ‘Het Groote Vischnet’ Zoet compared the various religious groups in the 
Republic to different types of fish. The Roman Catholics received the dubious accolade 
of ‘pike’. The Reformed Church as ‘perch’ was little better served.
De Baarzan, dapper hoog gepreezen,
Wiens scharpe Vinnen elk moet vreezen,
Is ‘t Edle nazaad van Kalvijn,
Die Goed, en Kwaad noodzaaklik noemen,
En Ezau, in den Buik, verdoemen,
Wijl God niet kan gebonden zijn.
Zy heerschen Vorst’lik in de Landen.
Zy hebben horde, en scharpe tanden:
En wreeken zig van overlast.
De stroemen moeten voor heur beeven.
Wie zou, aan haar, den prijs niet geeven,
Wijl in ‘er hand den Scepter past?3
Zoet’s antipathy for the public church was matched by his admiration for more 
radical voices such as Adam Boreel and Galenus Abrahamszoon. Both Boreel and 
Galenus belonged to the Collegiant movement. Eschewing sectarian intolerance they 
hoped to establish a religious movement based on biblical principles but making no
1   Rudolf B. Evenhuis. Ook dit was A m sterdam , 3 vols (Amsterdam:Ten Have,  1965),  hi, 202.
2 Koenraed O. M einsma. Spinoza en zijn kring (The Hague,  1896). p.  116.
'  “Het Groote Vischnet'.  in Zoet. p. 157.210
pretence of divine authority. The eyes of Galenus were fixed on the millenium when 
Christ would restore his churches from the decline into which they had fallen. In the 
interim men and women were to live lives of humility and service to others, 
acknowledging no binding confession but subject to the power of the Holy Spirit acted 
out in the individual soul.4 Yet, however, respectful of the personal qualities of Boreel 
and Galenus and however sympathetic to their objectives, Zoet depicted himself as a 
free spirit.
Wat my belangt, il wil my aan geen kap verhangen,
Nog Luiter, nog Kalvijn, nog Menno hoe geleerd,
Hoe hailig met de mond, hoe zeedig in ‘er gangen 
Na volgen in de daad.5
Landlord of his hostelry ‘De zoete Rust’ on the Harlemmerdijk in Amsterdam and 
consorting in bibulous camaderie with his fellow poets Karel Verlove, Hendrik Bruno 
and Pieter Rixtel, Zoet occupies at best a somewhat marginal position in the history of 
letters in the Dutch Republic. Yet in any analysis of Orangist writing Zoet deserves 
consideration, for this scourge of the public church was an ardent and committed 
supporter of the House of Orange.
The occasion of the sixth birthday of William III on  14 November 1656 saw Zoet 
reading a poem dedicated to the Prince in the presence of several nobility and, perhaps 
less welcome to Zoet,  a number of ministers of religion.6 In  1659 William entered the 
university of Leiden, an event commemorated by a poem by Zoet and a print to which 
Zoet provided the attached verse.7 The princely image was once more celebrated on the 
first day of 1660 with a poem entitled ‘Op ‘t overgeeven van het Prinsselik Zinnebeeld’ 
and on  14 November 1668 there was further laudatory verse on the occasion of
4 Andrew C. Fix. Prophecy and Reason (Princeton:  Princeton University Press,  1991), pp. 57, 92, 99-100.
5  “De krankke  Krankke-Troost', in  Zoet. p.  70.
6  ‘Geboorte-Feest van zijne Doorluchtige Hooghaid W ilhelm Henrik. Gebooren Prince van Orange.', in 
Zoet. pp. 95-108.
'  ‘Het Triomfeerende Laiden opgewekt ter blyder en Staatzy-rikke Intreede van Zyne Doorlughtige 
HOOGHAID WILHELM  HENRIK Gebooren Prinsse van Oranje':  ‘Prinsselik Zinnebeeld  toegeaigent 
aan zyn  Hooghaid WILHELM  HENRIK  Gebooren Prince van Oranje'.  in Zoet.  pp.  109-1  17,  121-123.211
William’s eighteenth birthday.8  In  1672, the hand of God was seen in the fate of the de 
Witts and the downfall of their cause.9  Only once had Zoet’s loyalty faltered. In 1650 
he had composed a poem celebrating the brothers Bicker, the notable Amsterdam 
regents who hotly opposed the ambitions of William II. Even in this work Zoet took 
care to lambast the Reformed divine Jacobus Stermont.10
Zoet poses for us a problem. How was it that this proud citizen of Amsterdam, a 
free thinker in  matters religious and a steadfast enemy of the Reformed Church felt able 
to give such devoted support to the House of Orange. Naked self interest would appear 
to suggest that he should have pledged his allegiance to the regent elites of Holland who 
looked the other way when Catholics and Sectaries worshipped freely. The case of Zoet 
serves to remind us that strong though the links were between the stadholder Princes of 
Orange and the Reformed Church, they were not all-encompassing. Many Orangist 
publications were to present the stadholder as the defender of the Reformed faith.. Yet 
Orangist support, particularly in the Holland towns, did not simply stop at the 
boundaries of the communities of the Reformed.
The religious situation in the Republic was complex. By the terms of the Union of 
Utrecht, each province was to take care of its own religious settlement without 
hindrance from any of the others. While in all provinces the Reformed Church had a 
monopoly of public worship, freedom of conscience was assured. In many of the 
provinces the majority was overwhelmingly of the Reformed faith as set out at the 
Synod of Dordrecht in  1619. From the South-West to the North-East of the Republic 
along the line traced by the military campaigns of 1600-1620, the Reformed Church 
was closely linked to the political establishment and the whole population was 
encouraged to take up the Calvinist faith. However, the conquests of the years after
8 pp.  123.124:  '  ‘t Jaar -Feest der Geboorte van zijne Doorlugtigste Hooghaid WILHELM HENRIK’, 
Zoet. pp.  117-121.
9  “ d Y dele Vlugt vertoont  in de schiclikke  Dood van  Kornelis en Jan de W itt’, in Zoet, pp. 262-263.
10 ‘Palm-Kroon  voor de Heeren Andries en  Kornelis Bikker aan de Brainlooze Vlegter van de vuile 
Lauwerier-Krans'.  in Zoet. pp.  81-83.212
1626 had brought under Dutch control areas to the south and east which had a strong 
Catholic identity reinforced by the teachings of the Counter-Reformation. Here Catholic 
worship was difficult to suppress although these newly conquered areas were not 
permitted to form a  sovereign province and Catholics had no part in government. In the 
cities of Holland and in the province of Utrecht the Reformed Church enjoyed the 
greatest freedom from political authority. However, it was also in these areas that 
Catholic reorganisation and missionary activity has taken place. In the Holland town of 
Gouda it was estimated that in  1612 there were approximately 500 Catholics. By 1622 
there were between 3,000 and 4,000 Catholics and by 1656 there were 6,000 Catholics 
who formed approximately a third of the town’s population. By the middle of the 
seventeen century it has been estimated that about a third of the population of Holland 
was Catholic. In effect, the size of the Catholic population was such that the practice of 
Catholic worship could not be crushed without resorting to the kind of draconian 
methods which no province or town council in the Republic could contemplate.There 
emerged in some Holland towns a broadly Christian civic culture in which Catholics 
and sectaries practised their religion with relative impunity. While office holders in the 
provincial government and towns were usually nominally members of the Reformed 
Church, the interests of civic harmony and the encouragement of commerce were 
placed before those of the proscription of public worship.1 1
Meanwhile, generations of Calvinists had attempted to buttress and extend the 
authority of the public church and they had turned to the stadholders as their natural 
supporters. They envisaged that both institutions, the church and the stadholderate, had 
an interest in reinforcing the supra-provincial unifying link provided by the Calvinist 
faith. The crisis of 1617-1619 when the stadholder Maurice had thrown his weight
1 1   Marlin Prak. Gouden Eeuw: Her raadsel van de Republiek.(Nijmegen.  SUN. 2002), pp. 228,  234; Ernst 
H.  Kossman.  ‘Het probleem  van de vrijheid  in de zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse Republik’,  in 
Vergankelijkheid en  Continuiteit:  O pstellen over geschiedenis (Amsterdam:  Bert Bakker,  1995), pp. 63- 
101  (p.  84): Peter van Rooden.  R eligieuze regimes:  O ver godsdienst en m aatschappij in N ederland 
(Amsterdam:  Bert Bakker.  1996). pp. 21-22.213
behind the Counter Remonstrants and against the Arminian model of a church based 
within provincial boundaries had served to emphasise the connection. Frederick Henry’s 
flirtation with more Remonstrant elements had not ultimately threatened the alliance of 
stadholder and public church. William n, in spite of personal licentiousness, had been a 
model supporter of the Reformed ministry.
The actions and policies of William I were interpreted by many writers in the light 
of his commitment to the Reformed faith. A pamphlet writer of 1632 assured his .readers 
that William’s policy throughout had not been prompted by self interest ‘maer alleen 
uyt Godtsdienstigheydt ende vierighen yver tot de ware Gereformeerde Religie.’12 The 
poet Samuel Coster commissioned to laud the Princes of Orange in the celebrations to 
mark the treaty of Munster depicted Prince Maurice as a latter day Numa Pompilius in 
his high minded defence of the interest of the national church.13 In the same year the 
poet Jan Six van Chandelier praised the recently deceased Frederick Henry as the 
symbol of a state in which
De hengselen, van Godtsdienst, eendracht, recht 
En vryicheit, zyn breekelos gehecht.1 4
In a drama of 1649 commissioned to celebrate the visit of the stadholder William II to 
the Zeeland town of Flushing, the author in a flood of hyperbole argued that the Princes 
of Orange, were more worthy of commendation than the heroes of classical Rome for 
while the latter were motivated by the desire to extend the boundaries of the Empire, the 
heroes of the House of Nassau fought for ‘het lieve Vaderlandt... Loffelicke Wetten, en 
insonderheyt voor den waerachtigen, zuyveren, en gereformeerden Godsdienst.’15
12 Knuttel.  no. 4265, np.
13 Jacob Bax, Prins M aurits in de volksmening der 16e en  17e eeuw (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris,  1940), p.
64.
14  ‘H ooghloffelijke Gedachtnisse van Frederik Henrik. Prince van Oranje’,  in Jacobs, I, 363-365, lines 61, 
62.
^ Triumphe ofte  Vlissinge  Vreught; over het Ontfangen  vanden Hoogh-geboren Prins Wilhelmus 
(Flushing.  1649).  ‘Introduction’,  np.214
The events of the period  1640-1650 brought together the interests of the public 
church and the stadholder. Historians have emphasised the connection in the eyes of 
contemporaries between the conclusion of hostilities and the weakening of the position 
of the public church.16 Not only was the Peace of Munster a recognition that the 
Calvinists in the North would not be able to free their brothers in the South from the 
Spanish yoke but also the movement for peace had originated in those regent circles 
which viewed the relations of church and state in erastian terms. From 1640 we 
encounter an increasing emphasis on the dangers facing the national church. Among the 
circles of the Reformed, there was mounting concern at the threat allegedly posed by the 
Roman Catholic minority. This anxiety had several foci. On the one hand, there was an 
attitude akin to desperation at the missionary activities of Roman Catholic priests in the 
very heart of the Republic. Images of collapse and ruin marked the beginnings of a 
pamphlet of 1644; foundations were undermined, pillars subsided, wealth was turned to 
poverty, freedom to slavery, while foxes ravaged the vineyard. All this was the result of 
the missionary efforts of priests, Jesuits and Kloppen who marauded throughout the 
towns and villages of the Republic. The author calculated that the numbers of ministers, 
deacons and elders of the Reformed Church in total amounted to less than half the 
numbers of Roman priests and their female assistants. In some towns, there were as
1  7
many as sixteen priests to one Reformed minister.
The author of 1644 blamed  this desperate state of affairs on a hierarchy of 
magistrates and officials who did not hold the interests of the true Reformed faith to 
their hearts but whose conduct was governed only by the needs of commerce and 
prosperity. He warned that God would not tolerate idolatry and neither should the
1  ft
stadholder whose role was to defend and maintain the true faith.  A writer of 1648 
reaffirmed this predicament and urged that a new Union should be concluded in which
16 Jan J. Poelhekke. Geeti B lyder M aer in  Tachtigh Jaer (Zutphen: Walburg,  1973), p. 42.
17 Knuttel. no. 5136.  np.
18 Knuttel. no. 5136.  np.215
the dominant position of the Calvinist church should be reaffirmed and the placards 
against the papists implemented with alacrity and severity.19 Neither writer expressed 
any hope of winning over the dilatory town magistrates and local officials to this cause. 
The stadholderate was the only institution capable of counter-balancing this dangerous 
license, if necessary by replacing the present incumbents with those more enthusiastic 
for the Reformed Church.
Dutch Calvinists also emphasised the international context. The after shocks of the 
massacre of protestants in Ireland and the prosecution of Puritan ministers in England 
highlighted fears of a Catholic rebellion in the United Provinces. In a fictional dialogue 
of 1642 between an Englishman and a Dutchman, the former warned that the civil 
discord and strife might also disfigure the Republic ‘want met sulcken vryheydt aen de 
Papisten te geven, stelt ghy de zielen van u Ingesetenen, ja de heele kerck en het lant in 
een waechschale’. The Dutchman acknowledged that when the Spanish had invaded the 
Veluwe in  1629,  the local Catholics had come out of the woodwork and welcomed the 
incomers. He laid the blame at the door of the local regents. In his view
so lange vele burgers zijn, zijn zij Liefhebbers van de Religie en van de Vryheydt; Maer alsse 
op het Stadt-huys raecken dan siense stracx hoe de wind Wapt, en laten haer van eenighe Groote 
die de Meester maken in alle Collegien verleyden, beginnen vyanden vande Kercke te 
worden...20
Another source of concern were the large numbers of Catholics resident in the 
Generality lands, particularly as they were resistant to  the missionary efforts of the 
Calvinist ministry. Indeed it was asserted that Catholic priests were working to convert 
the small communities of the Reformed, including those in public office, in these 
areas.21 This situation was aggravated by the Republic’s acquisition of the area known 
as the Meierij as a result of the peace with Spain. Sited in the region around ’s
19 Knuttel. no. 5720. np.
20 Knuttel. no. 4869. np.
21  Knuttel.  no. 5140. np.216
Hertogenbosch, the locality was firmly Catholic. Spain had tried to surrender only 
‘temporal sovereignity’ over the Meierij in order to safeguard the religious institutions, 
their lands and revenues. The Holland regents appeared minded to acquiesce in this 
arrangement but were dissuaded by the outcry from certain of the other provinces and 
the national church. Thus once peace had been ratified, there followed a rapid process 
of confiscation of Catholic churches and religious houses and a battalion of Reformed 
ministers was dispatched to win over souls. Not all went well. The ending of the 
fighting enabled many Catholic priests to return to their flocks and stiffen their resolve. 
They proved obdurate in spite of a battery of measures designed to break down their 
resistance.While the States of Holland worried about the negative effects of religious 
coercion on relations with Spain, the stadholder William II led the  ‘reformation’ of 
those parts of the area controlled by the House of Orange, drawing accolades from 
many members of the Reformed ministry.22 There was a clear alliance of interest 
between the stadholderate and the public church.
The issue of religion in the Meierij became a focal point in political polemic both 
during the stadholderate of William II and after his death. Ministers of the Reformed 
faith and their supporters alleged that the interests of religion and hence the bonds that 
held together the Union were being put at risk by a regent class which sought only to 
secure peace and placate Spain. In a pamphlet of 1647 a fictional Lourens mocked  the 
delegates at Munster who were so desirous of peace that they would permit all manner 
of religious liberties in the Meierij and the Barony of Breda."  Another writer of the 
same year lamented the disregard shown for the interests of the Reformed. Religion 
was, he emphasised, ‘den bant van alles’. Not only did the Calvinist faith provide an 
essential bond between the seven sovereign provinces, it was also, he asserted, the very
22 Israel.  The Dutch Republic. pp.  598-601
"3 Knuttel. no. 5510.  np.217
source of the Republic’s prosperity.24 In  1650 the detention on account of their 
protestant faith of a number of the retainers of the Prince of  Orange in the catholic 
Duchy of Luxembourg was contrasted with the flagrant papist practices countenanced in 
the Meierij.25 In a pamphlet of the same year, attributed to the Reformed minister 
Wittewrongel, the regents were lambasted for their failure to support the Calvinist 
ministers in the region."  In the following year the consistory of Utrecht published a 
Remonstrance to the States of Utrecht in which they asserted that the King of Spain was 
using the papists in the Meierij to undermine the very fabric of the Republic. The 
regents were urged to ensure that all those appointed to any position of authority were 
members of the national church. Furthermore, they should follow the example of their 
forefathers.
Onse eerste Regenten hebben de gereformeerde religie wel weten te achten en te mainteneren, 
ooc om datse sagen, dat het geluck en overvloet val alles van wegen dese arcke Godes haer qua 
toe vloeye; en dat God almachtich dese landen tot eenen so hooge top van Vryheyt, mogentheyd 
en onsaghelijcheyt tot een verwonder vande gantsche werelt hadde verheven; om datse zijn 
woort en kercke geheberght,ghevoedt en beschermt hadde.2 7
There was a crisis of confidence between voluble sections of the national church 
and the regents of Holland and their supporters. The regents of Amsterdam, particularly 
the powerful Bicker family, were accused of neglecting the interests of the West India 
Company. The promotion of the West India Company was seen as a national expression 
of the Reformed faith and those in Zeeland most dependent on the employment 
provided by the Company were among the mostly strongly Calvinist in the United 
Provinces. Ministers of the Reformed Church had been amongst those who had urged 
investment in the Company and the Company was seen as a vehicle for their interests.
24 Knuttel. no. 5519, np.
25 Knuttel, no. 6920, np
26 Knuttel, no. 9756, p.5v
27 Knuttel. no. 7075. pp. 4-6.218
In a satire of 1649 a burgomaster of Amsterdam described the defenders of the West 
India Company as ‘ een hoop kerckuylen’.28 Yet for others the West India Company 
was a national institution which emphasised the key position of the Reformed faith in 
the determination of the nation’s strategy both at home and overseas. For one writer of 
1647, urging resistance to the sirens of peace, the Company was ‘un des second bras de 
l’Etat’.29 Another writer in the same year went further and asserted that the Company 
was ‘den principale stutte van desen Staet’.30 Yet a third alleged that the Company’s 
very existence was under threat from those friends of Spain who favoured the Jews and 
Portuguese in Brazil.31 To accusations of self interest and disregard of a national 
institution was added more than a hint of treachery. In all of these works the peace 
settlement was seen as part of a demonic strategy in which ‘Arminians’ and Papists 
would join forces to destroy the national church and with it the Republic’s very 
existence.
In the light of these fears, it was inevitable that many leading lights of the 
Reformed Church would draw closer to a stadholder who sought to exercise his 
authority at the expense of the regents of the province of Holland and the city of 
Amsterdam. During  1650 when relations between the stadholder and the leaders of the 
province of Holland reached their nadir, ministers of the national church went into print 
to deplore the Peace of Munster, defend the Union  and lambast those ‘Arminian’ 
regents who placed their own interests above the country’s good. Although these 
pamphlets, like most others, were issued anonymously, hostile pamphleteers, in one 
case an Arminian minister, made certain that the public was informed of their 
authorship. The prominent Reformed minister Goethals of Delft  who had presided at 
the death beds of both Frederick Henry and William II, was revealed as the author of the
28 Knuttel. no. 6469, np.
29 Knuttel, no. 5512. p.20
30 Knuttel, no. 5522, np.
31  Knuttel.  no. 5519.  np.219
tract entitled Den Amsterdamschen Ommeganck, ofte Onderrechtinge over het 
verzekeren der Hollandsche Heeren. Jacobus Stermont, ever to be a thorn in the side of 
the regent oligarchy, was alleged to have penned a deeply Orangist eulogy on the death 
of the Prince of Orange in 1650 published as Lauweren-Krans Gevlochten voor Syn 
Hoocheyt Wilhelm de Heer Prince van Oranjen. The evocatively titled Na-Ween van de 
Vrede was ascribed to the the Calvinist minister Wittewrongel. The Zeeland minister 
Maximillian Teellinck was known to be the author of Vrymoedige Aenspraefc, a .work 
which was no less than a paean to the Prince of Orange. He was an example, it was said, 
of those who governed not by the maxims of Machiavelli but by the rules of Christ. 32 
The unexpected death of William II left these sections of the Reformed Church 
bereft. Now there was no-one to act as a counter-weight to the erastian and tolerant 
regency which predominated in many of the Holland towns. Ministers like Teellinck 
and Wittewrongel who campaigned for a ‘Further Reformation’ of morals and manners 
were heavily dependent on the support of local magistrates to enforce sabbath 
observance as well as laws against drunkenness and the institution of the theatre. With 
the death of the stadholder who had a role in the selection of magistrates, the national 
church was left at the mercy of its enemies. It is therefore no surprise that many 
ministers of the Reformed Church were fervent Orangists and contributed to the 
publication of works which urged the restoration of the stadholderate. The opponents of 
the stadholderate were quick to assign the ministers a key role in Orangist propaganda.
A supporter of de Witt alleged that the preachers were ardent supporters of the late 
Prince of Orange and ‘zijn werk prezen en hem bij monde en geschriften verdedigen en 
alle zijne mishandelingen en quade feiten goed keuren.’33 Certainly some key works 
were imputed to them. The Orangist response to de Witt’s Deductie of 1654, a work 
entitled Bedencking op de Deductie was described pejoratively in a hostile pamphlet as
32 For the  identity o f the authors see  Knuttel.  no. 7301. pp. 5,10  and Knuttel,  no. 7039, pp.  8-9.
33 Knuttel  no.8919, p.35220
a book which ‘niemand als een Predikant uyt de herssenen gedroopen is’.34A 
particularly vituperative attack on de Witt and his supporters along with their alleged 
forefather Oldenbamevelt launched in  1663 under the title de Verresenen Bamevelt was 
said by the author of a counter-blast to be the work of none other than the Utrecht divine 
Gisbertus Voetius.35 However a pamphlet of the same year dedicated to the ‘lovers of 
truth’ argued forcefully that Voetius was not the author and moreover the Utrecht 
professor had no idea of the identity of the writer.36 The matter remains unresolved but 
it is significant that the enemies of the House of Orange saw fit to impute these 
publications to ministers of the national church. Two other works which contributed to 
the rhetorical battle of 1663, Bedunckelicken Brief and its successor ‘r Vervolgh were 
deemed by a hostile writer to be the work of a ‘Domine Pastor na de Friesche Rhetorica 
van desem tijd’.37 The contribution of the Reformed ministry to the murderous rhetoric 
of 1672 is discussed elsewhere but here again contemporaries were eager to emphasise 
the role played by the preachers in inciting the people against the de Witts and their 
supporters.
However, it is worth remembering that political pamphlets written by ministers of 
the national church formed only the tip of a very large iceberg. It was reported of the 
Reformed minister and ardent Orangist Jacobus Stermont that he declared a sermon in 
favour of the Prince to be worth more than a hundred ‘blue books’.38 Seditious 
preaching was a frequent cause of comment and complaint throughout the years  1650- 
1672. In a letter of 1652 John de Witt noted that a nobleman had been sent to Dordrecht 
to stir up the preachers on behalf of the Prince of Orange and his inclusion in Public
34 Knuttel no 7596.p.21
35 Knuttel  no.  8801. Den Schotschen Duyvel,  Betabbert in den  Verresenen B am evelt... Uyt de gemeene 
Lessen en Legenden van Gisbertus  Voetius. This attribution  was reinforced by a work of the following 
year in which the offending text was described as emanating from the pen of the eminent professor of 
theology, Voetius. (Knuttel, no.  8927,  np.) However, the biographer o f Voetius has queried this 
attribution. ArnoldusC. Duker, G isbertus  Voetius,  4 vols, (Leiden:  Brill,  1897-1915).  in. cx; iv.  169.
36 Knuttel, no. 8925, p. 6
37 Knuttel, no. 8801, p. 4
38 Knuttel. no.  8799. pp. 5-6.221
Prayer.39  Scurrilous verse of 1653 attacked the rabble- rousing activities of some 
ministers in Zeeland of whom the author alleged
Oproer stooken toom’en haet,
Bassen tegen staf en staet.40
In August  1654 with Seclusion being hotly debated, a correspondent of de Witt from 
Alkmaar reported that the Frisian stadholder William Frederick of Nassau was meeting 
surreptiously  in the Noorderkwartier with ministers of the Reformed Church including 
Eleazor Lotius of the Hague and Goethals.41 It was suggested that they were plotting 
against Seclusion and the government of the day.
These activities drew attention beyond the frontiers of the Republic.In July 1653 it 
was related to Secretary Thurloe in England that magistrates in Amsterdam had banned 
four ministers for publicly praying for the Prince of Orange. Clearly the ministers were 
not permanently discouraged for a letter from the Hague in January 1655 informed 
Thurloe that preachers were still working on the people on behalf of the Prince of 
Orange.  “ Correspondence between the French Ambassador and his government in Paris 
supports the observations of Thurloe's correspondent. The ambassador assured the 
government in Paris in January 1655 that he intended to work with great application to 
win over the Reformed ministry to the cause of William III and, coincidentally, of 
France. However, he soon realised that his efforts were needless for ‘on m’assure que 
de euxmesmes ils y sont assez portez, et que nostre sollicitation n’a jousteroit rien a leur 
zele'.43
However, the interests of certain of the ministers of the Reformed Church and the 
House of Orange did not always coincide. In the first Anglo-Dutch war, Orangist
39 Brieven  van Johan de  Witt, i  ,  36.  20/4/52
40 Knuttel, no.  7466, p.  11.
41  Brieven  van Johan de  Witt.\.  133-134.  31/8/54
42 Birch.  i,3 2 4 :m ,5 1 .
43 Groen  van Prinsterer,  v.  158. 23/1/55222
interests favoured a speedy and effective prosecution of the war against the regicides, 
for with the restoration of Charles II the prospects for William HI would improve. 
However, as political pamphlets of the time make clear, many ministers of the 
Reformed church felt considerable sympathy for the Republican government in England 
which was made up in part by their co-religionists. A pamphlet of 1652 played on the 
existence of these sympathies when its unnamed author declared that hostilities between 
the two countries would shame the honour of God and offend so many consciences who 
would be forced to leave the country rather than fight in such an unnatural war.44 A 
writer of the same year urged the Dutch to forgive and forget former English incursions 
on their commerce for ‘ ‘t ware beter... dat wy onse Machten conjungeerden en de 
Religie sochten te maintaineren, waerse is, tegen alle hare Vijanden’. 45 A fictional 
merchant in a pamphlet of 1652 exclaimed that the eyes of many in the Republic were 
blinded by the arguments of a common faith in favour of an understanding with 
England and warned his readers that the Parliament of England explained away many of 
its atrocities in the name of religion.46 Neeltje, a fictional housewife, related that she had 
heard some ministers pray for ‘our brothers in Parliament’. Her husband had left the 
church in a fury and there had been angry words between them afterwards. Trijnte her 
neighbour related a similar experience when she has been present in the Nieuwe Kerk in 
Amsterdam when minister Wittewrongel had appealed for alms for the poor brethren in 
England.47 A pamphlet in support of the government drew attention to the links between 
Voetius and the English and Scots Presbyterians describing them as ‘zyn broeders in de
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Heere, zyn geloofs-genoten’.  Even so, ministers of religion did not adopt a uniform 
approach to the issue. In a pamphet widely attributed to the minister Jacobus Stermont,
44 Knuttel. no. 7204, np.
45 Knuttel, no. 7206, np.
46 Knuttel, no. 7209. p. 7.
47 Knuttel. no. 7233. np.
48 Knuttel. no. 7256. p.  34223
it was argued that there must be a speedy prosecution of the war against the English 
whose government persecuted Presbyterians and tolerated schismatics. 49
In general however we can say that there was an alliance of interest between the 
Prince of Orange and certain elements of the Reformed ministry. The Orangists needed 
the support which a preaching ministry could provide but it could not be in their 
interests to be too closely aligned with the public church and its ministers. As one 
historian has remarked the stadholders were always willing to deploy the sacral  . 
component of their role as defenders of the Reformed faith but they used their link with 
the public church as a tactical instrument.50 It is difficult to go quite as far as one 
authority who has argued that the Orangists conducted their battle on a purely political 
terrain and handled church questions without a great deal of enthusiasm.51 Yet it is 
undeniable that the bulk of the defence of the stadholderate was conducted in political 
terms. The ministers on the other hand usually supported the interests of the Prince of 
Orange for there was nowhere else where they could find support for their programme 
of a national church buttressed by a magistracy which was prepared to be guided by 
their principles without interference in their practice.
Set against this is the view of religion in the Republic set out by John de Witt and 
his supporters and this must be considered for it is against this view that the Orangists 
would seek to define the role of the would-be stadholder. In  1651  a print was issued to 
celebrate the Great Assembly of the seven provinces. Its theme not unnaturally was 
unity. At the centre of the image was an altar on which was sculpted the figure of 
‘caritas’ or ‘liefde’ representing the affection which bound together the sovereign 
provinces as well as the sacrifices which had been undergone in the struggle for the 
freedom of the Republic.On the altar lay the seven arrows bound together and before the
49 Knuttel.  no.  7257. p.  3-4.
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altar were placed the shields of the provinces bearing again the image of self sacrificing 
love. In the foreground of the image a lion with a sword lay down with the lamb who 
bore the cap of freedom on a spear. Below them was crushed the figures of Discord and 
Strife. These figures stood not only for the recently concluded peace with Spain but also 
for the spirit of unity upheld by the Assembly against the forces of strife represented by 
the stadholder William n. Behind the altar two identical male figures in breastplates and 
plumed helmets embraced accompanied by eight female figures representing the seven 
provinces and Zutphen. The whole thrust of the image is that which binds and unites in 
love. Yet in spite of the fact that the Assembly had reiterated its support for the national 
church and its doctrines as promulgated at the Synod of Dordrecht, the print contains no 
image representing religion as a force for unity within the Republic.
Supporters of the party of Holland and its policies accused the former stadholders 
of exploiting religious issues for political motives. The death of William II was 
commemorated by a medal commissioned by those hostile to the stadholder in which, in 
the foreground there was a leaping riderless horse, representing the dead stadholder and 
in the background the sun of hope rising from the sea. Beneath the horse’s saddle cloth 
could be seen a seen a sealed book bearing the words ‘ Unio Religionis’ and below 
‘SIMULANT’.52 Verses from Vondel on the occasion of the medal made clear the 
theme of the imagery.
Wie Enigheid en Godsdienst mint,
Zie dat geen dekkleed hem verblind’
Door schonen schijn en veinzerijen;5 3
Stadholders both past and present had claimed that unity of religion was essential to the 
maintenance of the Union of Utrecht but, Vondel implied, in deploying such language 
they had merely been serving their own interests.
52 Bizot, p. 201
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In contrast the bulk of the polemic literature in support of the States Party placed a 
firm emphasis on religious toleration.  In a pamphlet published in 1650 after the death 
of the stadholder William II, the author defined a free country as one in which ‘wy elck 
een in vryheyd stil en gerust laten leven’. That this principle applied to religion is clear 
for the writer argued that where religious worship was forbidden or persecuted ‘daer en 
maeckt geen vry landt noch oock geen Christenheyf. 54 In a pamphlet of 1653 the 
Remonstrant Joannes Naeranus emphasised that the government was not forcing, 
consciences but rather leaving individuals free to worship in their own fashion. He gave 
a hearty thanks to God for this latitude.55 A fictional Amsterdammer, in a pamphlet of 
1667 argued vehemently that it was tyrannical to force a man’s conscience and cited the 
recent placards against Catholics issued in Friesland. His Frisian interlocutor attempted 
to defend his province’s government. He alleged that they had been forced to it by the 
ministers of the national church.56 All wise princes and regents knew that differences in 
religion ‘niet om ‘t essentiele of gheloove self en is, ‘t welck alleen bestaet in God den 
Vader en Jesus Christum te belijden', asserted a writer of 1668 for whom even Papists 
‘niet en souden durven excluderen ofte verdoemen’. More pragmatically he insisted that 
the welfare of the seafaring provinces lay in the ‘niet te naeuw inquireren van de 
Religie' particularly as there were so many merchants there who were not members of 
the Reformed faith.57 The most comprehensive affirmation of religious freedom came in 
work of the same year. In answer to the taunts of a Zeelander that his province tolerated 
the public worship of both Socinians and Papists, a fictional Hollander answered,
Holland wil den naem wel hebben en niet eenen Hollander behoeft zich to schamen dat men 
zeid dat het een Vrije Provincie is, en daar niet alleen alle Christenen Vrijheid geeft, maer 
zelver de Joden, Persianen en Turken zoo ze hier quamen: Dat is een tak aan onze Kroon. Het is 
Papen en zulken Volks werk, die haar Religie niet vertrouwen te verdedigen en volgens de
54 Knuttel,  no. 6842. pp.  28-29.
55 Knuttel,  no. 7469. p. 30
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Schriftuure te verantwoorden andere Gezintheden daar om Verketteren te haten, te veijagen, ja 
te verbranden of andere wreede doel aen te doen. Maar dat wil men in Holland niet doen.5 8
The Orangists were able to exploit the arguments of their opponents and appear 
the natural defenders of the public church and the reformed faith.  Much of the polemic 
which demanded stronger action against public worship of those who were not of the 
Reformed Church also contained explicitly or implicitly the suggestion that things had 
been better under a stadholder and could be so again. In a pamphlet of 1653 the author 
blamed setbacks in the war against England on a government which connived at 
‘verachtinghe van den Godsdienst’ and the withdrawal of divine support following the 
ingratitude shown to the House of Orange.59  A publication of the same year noted that 
after five years of peace with Spain the country was swarming with  Jesuits, Kloppen 
and other undesirables. The author urged rhetorically ‘waar wil (weerde en lieve 
Patriotten) dese ongebondene Vryheit heenen’. This time of discord and defeat was 
contrasted with the time of stadholder Maurice who properly understood the wiles of 
Spain and had defended the national church. 60
The diversity celebrated by some sections of the States Party  was viewed with 
more jaundiced eyes by other contemporaries. Writing in  1665 at the onset of the 
second Anglo-Dutch war, the poet Arnold Moonen prophesied that the wrath of God 
would chastise the Republic for its latitude in tolerating all manner of heresies. He 
mourned that the golden age was gone and now one saw
de Godsdienst, in den slaep der zonden 
Gewiegt, belaegt, beloert, geschonden 
Van Ketteryen.
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He reserved particular venom for what he described as ‘de helse kroonsucht van Socyn’. 
Moonen’s ‘golden age’ lay in the not too distant past,
toen predikstoel en rechtertroon
Elkanderen in ere geleidden
Als breeders, door geen twist gechieden,
En ‘t lantgezagh aen d’aerdsche Goon,
Godts stedehouders, bleef bevolen.6 1
For Moonen the presence of the Princes of Orange had been a key element in the 
maintaining a unity of purpose between the secular authorities and the national  church. 
With the absence of a stadholder, there had been a descent into discord and a latitude 
which bordered on anarchy.
In much of this literature there is a sense of a threatened people for whom little 
stands between them and papist domination. Events abroad could trigger these 
sentiments. The persecution of the north Italian Waldensians in the dukedom of Savoy 
caused the poet Jan Six van Chandelier to reflect on the dangers closer to home. 
Contemplating their sufferings he warned
dit zy een spiegel, voor ons land,
Waar soo veel paapensoons verkeeren;
Die krygen sy maard’ooverhand,
Op zullen kam weer zullen scheeren.62
The Orangists were able to exploit this.The fate of Henry of Navarre who became a 
Catholic in order to ascend the French throne haunted one writer of 1663. If Papists in 
the Netherlands were permitted freedom of worship they might become so numerous 
that they too would force any future leader in the Republic to embrace the church of 
Rome. Freedom in matters of religion could only be interpreted in the sense of freedom 
to practise the true Reformed religion. A prince of Orange as stadholder and captain
61  ‘Verbastert Nederlant. of Klaghte over de Bedorve Zeden des Vaderlants\  in Arnold M oonen, Poezy 
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general would ensure that the Reformed faith in the Republic was maintained and 
defended.63 Pamphlets of the same year pressed for  the enforcement of placards against 
Catholic worship whilst urging the promotion of William III to the offices of his 
forefathers.64
This fear of the papist menace and hatred of the regents who permitted Catholics 
and sectaries to worship erupted in violent polemic with the invasion of the French in 
1672. The government is seen as having betrayed the Republic and its national church.
In a vituperative satire of 1672 a fictional Socinian hymns the freedom which he and his 
fellows enjoy to worship and publish as they please. He proclaims that the Perpetual 
Edict of 1667 which abolished the stadholderate in perpetuity in Holland was intended 
to institute both political and religious freedom ‘dewyl men altijd gesien heeft dat de 
Princen van Orangen haer over beyde Meester ghemaeckt hebben’.65 A print of 1674 
designed to celebrate the announcement of a hereditary stadholderate in Holland and 
hence the ‘death’ of the Perpetual Edict reiterated this theme. Watching disconsolately 
are a flock of masked beasts, sheep without but wolves within. These are the 
‘vrygeesten,’ the Socinians and Cartesians whose objective is the confusion of all 
religions and the downfall of the national church.66  A sentence pronounced on the 
murdered brothers de Witt by an anonymous author of 1672 accused them of attempting 
‘de standt van de Religie te perturberen; de Kercke Gods grootelijcks te beswaren en te 
bedroeven’. They had also tried to prevent ministers of the church from praying for the 
Prince of Orange.  An anonymous author satirised a government which put aside the 
claims of religion.
Men sette den Papist oock alle poorten open,
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En weer geen Atheist, om ‘t geen hy mochte hoopen.
Gelooven, leeren,  als hy maar ons voordeel geeft,
En in een goet beroep naer onse wetten leeft.68
Inevitably this was contrasted with the treatment meted out to the Prince of Orange who 
is now the great patriot and defender of the national church.
In addition de Witt was accused of trying to destroy the Reformed Church by 
subjecting it to intrusive and harmful political interference and exploiting doctrinal 
differences. It was alleged that he had forced political commisioners onto consistories 
and secured the pulpits for theologians and teachers who were his supporters.69 The 
national church was being trampled under foot by the secular authorities claimed one 
writer of 1672. In Zeeland the churches could not hold a consistory meeting without the 
permission of the magistrates and political deputies had been appointed to attend all 
meetings of the church council. The classis of Zeeland had been forbidden from 
presenting requests directly to the provincial states as had been their wont. Now all 
matters had to be transmitted through the agency of the Raad Pensionaris. The author 
was clear in his own mind that the Prince of Orange would put an end to all this and 
restore harmony between church and state.70 In another inflammatory work of the same 
year, de Witt was accused of following in the steps  of Cromwell and seeking to 
establish a new religion with a new bible, psalm book and confession of faith in which 
all appointments at every level were made by the State. De Witt would equally follow 
the example of Cromwell in murdering his opponents and William HI would be forced 
to flee the country.71
De Witt, it was claimed after his death, had prevented any ministers of the 
Voetsian tendency from preaching in the major towns to the extent that some of the 
excluded were now turning their coats and drawing more sustenance from Descartes
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than from the Holy Scriptures. To add fuel to the flames de Witt was alleged to own a 
copy of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, a work which was currently 
banned.72 Yet another author lamented that de Witt would not countenance ministers 
who were the disciples of ‘den noyt volpresene en door de gantse werelt vermaerde 
Professor G Voetius’ preferring to appoint those
die Carthesius meer lasen als den Bibel om soo van een nieuwe Theologie te maken en dan 
Joden, Mahumetanen, Atheisten, Papisten, Anabaptisten, Mennisten, Labadisten, Socinianen, 
Arminianen, Lutheranen, Photinianen, Herdrianen en Onderen te Kerke laten gaen.73
In the light of this inflammatory rhetoric it is a considerable anti-climax to encounter 
the murdered de Witt  described merely as ‘een seer subtyl Philosoph meest toeghedaen
74 de secte der Cartesianen’.
The events of 1672 enabled the Prince to be depicted as the defender of fatherland 
and faith. An address from the churches of Zeeland in  1672 urged upon the new 
stadholder the maintenance and defence of the true Reformed faith just as his father 
before him had done. In the eyes of this group, God had brought low the Republic in 
order that William might show himself to be the saviour of the nation and the protestant 
religion.75 Some sections of the community certainly saw him in this light. In a print of 
1672 a church was located within a fortification surrounded by hostile forces. Within 
the churchyard was an orange tree on whose stout branches were posed the five Orange 
stadholders. Thus the link between the Reformed faith and its defenders the princes of 
Orange is emphasised. The papist whore of Babylon and her supporters the ‘witte 
rasemy’ both sited beneath the emblem of the fleur de lys have attached a rope to the 
tower of the church and are attempting to pull it down.76
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William becomes the defender of both the freedom of the Union and the protestant 
faith. A print of 1673 demonstrates the nature of the enemy. The occasion is a 
celebration of the feast of the Blessed Sacrament in the captured city of Utrecht. Priests, 
monks and klopjes process in the company of the bishop bearing the sacrament in an 
elaborate monstrance beneath a richly ornate canopy. Governor Stoupa, representing the 
French Tyranny, accompanies the parade and French soldiers line the route to control 
the crowds and prevent hostile demonstrations. The protestant religion and the liberties 
of the Netherlanders are being suppressed by an alien military force. The French have 
their collaborators. The houses of Roman Catholics along the route are decorated with 
images of angels, crosses and saints accompanied by the arms of the king of France and 
the motto ‘Vive le Roy’. 77 In contrast to this representation of popery, foreign 
domination and internal treachery, William is depicted as the symbol of the protestant 
religion and the Union. In a print of the same year he rides in the chariot of victory. In 
his hand he carries a shield bearing an image of the seven arrows clasped together. His 
chariot is driven by ‘Fides’ while by the side of the vehicle walk ‘Pietas’ reading a bible 
and ‘Libertas’ holding aloft the hat of freedom. Tyranny and idolatry are trampled 
below the wheels of the chariot and the hooves of the horses. At the bottom of the print 
are sited the faces of the four former stadholders whose God-given task is continued by
78 their descendant.
In the  words of one writer, William Hi’s rise to authority had defied all 
expectations.
Hy schijnt als van Godt gegeven te sijn tot een Verlosser over dit sijn Volck en Landt, 
gebooren, opgevoet, bewaert en bequaem ghemaeckt tot het Lant’s bestier op een wonderlycke 
wyse boven, ja tegen alle menschelycke hope en verachtinge.
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The language is very similar to that used to describe his great-grandfather William I and 
this is surely no accident. Just as a ‘black legend’ developed based on Spanish atrocities 
so now the French are accused of ‘brandende, blakende, moordende sonder 
onderscheydt van sexe; selfs onnooossele Wieg-kinderen’. They are worse than any 
heathen or Turk.79 At such a time all attention is on those forces which bind the nation 
together and arguably the stadholder fulfils this role to a greater extent than the national 
church. As contemporary rhetoric depicts William as the defender of liberty against 
French tyranny and domination, he cannot be seen to be any the less defender of 
freedom of conscience than his predecessors. There was clearly a need to retain the 
hearts and minds of the Catholic minority in provinces such as Holland. That there was 
an anti-Catholic reaction in the Republic during the French invasion is evident. In 
November 1673 the Calvinists demanded stricter penalties against Catholics and in the 
summer of the same year an anti-Catholic movement threatened to envelop Rotterdam. 
William himself appeared ready to oppose this until dissuaded by his advisors.80 In the 
prints of the period it is evident that the Reformed faith serves as a rallying point for 
much of the community but is it any more so than the stadholder himself? In most of the 
prints of the time, it is William who is the central focus, whether surveying his 
victorious army or recovering the lost provinces for the Union. Images of the reformed 
faith do not appear without William but he appears without them.
In much of the polemic described so far the emphasis has been on attacking the 
States Party rather than defining the role of the Prince of Orange in relation to a 
Republic  which while it had a public church was multi-confessional. Taken purely on 
the evidence so far it is difficult to imagine how any Arminian, Lutheran, Cartesian or
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Catholic, let alone a free thinker like Jan Zoet, could lend their support to the cause of 
the Prince of Orange. Yet the would-be stadholder could never remain simply the tool 
of a faction, however powerful, of the national church. That is not to say that the Prince 
of Orange was ungrateful for their support. However, it was vital for Orangists  to steer 
a way between supporting the Reformed faith as an a vital element in the creation of 
national, as opposed to provincial, sentiment and drawing upon loyalties to the House of 
Orange which went beyond confessional boundaries. The result of this was that those 
authors who wrote in support of the Prince of Orange came to consider the issue of 
religion from different standpoints and did not always share the same conclusions.
A suitable place to examine this development is the view of the religious position 
expounded in Pieter de la Court’s Interest van Holland of 1662 and the varying 
Orangist responses to it. In a book containing forty-seven chapters, de la Court chose to 
devote only two chapters to the matter of religion. De la Court was clear that among the 
many blessings of God, freedom of all religions was the first. It was, he asserted, the 
mark of true religion that it did not seek to impose itself on others. He was not speaking 
of mere freedom of conscience. De la Court’s Holland would permit the worship of 
Catholics and sectaries for such would promote harmony and friendship among 
neighbours and, he added disingenuously increase ‘de ware Religie’ amongst the 
people. De la Court’s reasoning behind these propositions was openly pragmatic.
People would not stay where they were not free to practise their religion and valuable 
skills and finance would be lost to the economy of Holland. Moreover, the Dutch had to 
find their way in a Europe in which those of the Calvinist faith made up less than one in 
a hundred of the population. Rubbing salt in the wound, he asserted that in Holland 
scarely half of the population were of the Reformed faith. Hence, any attempts to234
suppress freedom of worship would involve the harassment of sizeable sections of the
c 1
community.
The responses to this and other writings of the same year from supporters of the 
House of Orange show that there was no uniformity of approach. For the author of 
Bedenckingen Op het Boek Interest van Holland Spain had sought peace the better to 
undermine the Republic and the only means of defence against such a strategy were a 
strong army, the elevation of William HI to the offices of his forefathers and the 
maintenance of the true Reformed faith as set out at the Synod of Dordrecht in 1618 and 
1619. Any minister, and the writer may well have been one, who did not urge such a 
course on the government would  be failing in his duty to God and his neighbour. He 
took as his theme the maxim of Socrates that  ‘de bewaaringe van de Religie is het 
welvaren van de Staat\ A common religion was the bond which held society together. 
The longevity of the Roman Empire was attributed to its refusal to tolerate novelties in 
religion. Plato had warned against changes in the religion of the state for ‘veranderinge 
van Religie, veranderinge van Regeeringe bragt’. Religion was ‘de ziel, het harte, en ‘t 
eedelste deel van de Staat\
Hence the force of the accusation that the Remonstrants were seeking to introduce 
novelties ‘en gelijk sommige hebben willen bewijsen , Kerk en Staat poogden t’ 
ondermijnen’. Here ‘Remonstrants’ refers not only to a particular religious persuasion 
but to all those who would place the public church under the control of the local 
magistrate. The writer cites one work by an  Remonstrant Jacobus Taurinus entitled 
Onderlinge Verdraagsamheit in which the author is alleged to have written that ‘de 
Gereformeerde Leere erger is dan de Turkse, en der Saracense Leere, en datse over een 
komt met Mahhomet in sijnen Alcoran’.This provided testimony that the hatred 
expressed by Arminians for the Reformed Church would provoke fraction and discord
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within the Republic. Yet the Orangist writer pointed out that Oldenbamevelt himself had 
argued that only one public church should be authorised. The Remonstrants demanded 
freedom of worship for themselves while seeking to clip the wings of the national 
church.
As for the Papists, where they were in control, there was no freedom of 
conscience. ‘Haare Tollerantie aan de Gereformeerden is yder bekent.’ In contrast in 
some Holland towns thirty, forty, even fifty various places of Catholic worship could be 
found. To all intents and purposes there was freedom of worship in some parts of the 
province. The author drew on Lipsius to explain his concerns about this development. It 
was essential that the authorities both local and provincial upheld the supremacy of the 
national church for to quote Lipsius,
die geene die in de Goddelijke zaken iets nieuws in bringen, haatse en bedwingste, niet alleen 
om Gods wille, maar om dat dese alzuke nieuwe Goden inbringende, veel menschen dryven tot 
veranderingen van zaaken. Waar uyt dat komen ‘t samensprekingen, oproeren en heymelijke 
vergaderingen, zaaken voor waat die een Staat geensins nut zijn.82
The pamphlet Haeghs Hof Praetje was suspected to be the work of Henricus Bomius,83 
an academic who had been charged with the education of the young William HI. Like 
his friend the poet Arnold Moonen, he saw the re-establishment of the stadholderate as 
essential to the maintenance of the national church. This pamphlet launched a much 
more direct attack on the rhetoric of de la Court but in essence, it replicated the 
arguments of the previous publication. Fulminating at de la Court’s proposal of freedom 
of worship for all, the author enquired rhetorically ‘hebben sy noch niet vryheid 
genoeg’. Such tolerance would enable the Papists to increase their numbers beyond 
those of the Reformed and this would precede the return of tyranny and the forcing of 
tender Calvinist consciences. To permit other protestant groups to worship in public
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would serve to create a state in which there was no national church but a diversity of 
faiths which would shatter the unity of the Republic and the province of Holland. Far 
from supporting commerce as de la Court alleged, freedom of worship would draw 
down the vengeance of God. De la Court was no more than a ‘verfoeylijcke Atheist’ 
and if he were to venture into the province of Zeeland, the common people would make 
sure that he ended up in the town ditch.84
The approach of the author of De Herstelden Prins of 1663 is more measured and 
there is a clear difference of emphasis from the previous two publications. The writer 
asserts that not all would agree that the war against Spain had as its aim freedom of 
worship. However, he clearly sees some freedom of worship as integral to the ethos of 
the new state for
niet-te-min is waar, dat onzen Staat van Regeringe niet en zoude konnen lyden, zonder ruine 
van’t welvaren van dien, dat men dwang van conscientie in dat stuk zoude willen invoeren of 
doen gebruiken, en de andere haare vrye oeffeninge om God te dienen, benemen.
Clearly, this author is alive to the economic benefits of permitting a diversity of 
religions and he had no stomach for a Reformed Church in which people find 
themselves compelled to engage in worship in order to prove themselves loyal citizens 
of the Republic. If the worship of minorities is prohibited, the result would be
de God-vreezenste en de best hier niet  en zouden konnen woonen, en de Kerke vol van een 
hoop geveinsde huichelaars gepropt worden, die in alle Gelegentheid, haare genegentheid 
zouden toonen.
It was desirable, he wrote, that within the boundaries of a state there should be 
uniformity of religion since religion promotes unity and harmony among the citizens. 
However, where diversity exists, groups should be permitted to worship in designated 
places, for such a policy would prevent persecution and the oppression of a minority.
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The author appears to  envisage the development of a form of religious syncretism in 
which religious groups whose convictions are not so very different from those of their 
peers find themselves moving towards unity. This development, the writer asserts, is 
unlikely under an aristocratic regime of many heads but can be encouraged and 
supported under the leadership of a single stadholder. He rebukes de la Court for not 
considering that
men door bequame middelen tragte eenige Religien, die zeer wenig verschil hebben, met den 
anderen te vereenigen, .. .daar ‘t zelve nochtans de Regeringe niet wenig vaster en geruster 
zoude stellen; maar alzo dit onder een Regeringe van veele ende verscheiden Hoofden niet wel 
zoude konnen te wege gebragt worden; maar vry beter en gemakkelyker door hulpe ende 
authoriteit van een bemint aangenaam en ansienlyk Stadhouder ende 
Capiteyn Generaal.85
This rhetoric is very different from the standard presentation of the stadholder as the 
defender of the Reformed faith alone. Instead the stadholder, acting as a focus for unity 
presides over relative latitude of religious worship in which previously hostile and 
competing groups experience the affinity which proceeds from their shared convictions.
Den Herstelden Prins is ascribed in the Knuttel catalogue to Constantijn Huygens. 
This attribution dates back no earlier than  1749 when in a work of that year H. W. van 
Welbergen described the pamphlet as a work of Huygens, though he omitted the 
forename. Huygen’s most recent biographer in reviewing the evidence has pointed out 
that Huygens had no previous record as a pamphlet writer and stylistically the prose 
bears no relation to any of his written works. At the time of publication, Huygens was
o z
deeply involved in matters concerning the principality of Orange.  Thus he is unlikely 
to be the author. However the religious position outlined in the pamphlet has long 
attracted attention with one authority commenting that it appeared more in agreement
85 Knuttel. no.  8806A,  pp.  15-17
86 Hendrik A.Hofman.  Constantijn H uygens(1506-1687), (Utrecht:  HES.  1983), pp.246-249, 312 note 13.238
with the ideals of Grotius than the doctrine of the Synod of Dordrecht.87 Certainly 
Grotius in his treatise Meletius(}6\\) had argued for a public church which should be 
sufficiently comprehensive to include most mainstream Christians. He had refused to 
institutionalise any form of dissent. This stance was characteristic of Grotius’sjuridicial 
approach. For him the purpose of the state was to enable the citizen to live a pious, 
industrious and tranquil life and in its function the state transcended the church.88
The issue had surfaced again in the early 1660’s.  1662 saw the publication of Het 
Licht op de Kandelaar presumed to be the work of the Collegist Pieter Balling. The 
author sought for a philosophically based minimal creed which could replace the 
numerous Christian factions. Balling belonged to Spinoza’s circle and it was another 
member of this group Franciscus van den Enden who in  1665 published Vrije Politijke 
Stellingen. Van den Enden was concerned at the proliferation of sects and argued that it 
should be possible to create an inclusive Chrisitianity reduced to its basic principles. 
This development, he argued, would reduce and ultimately destroy the various sects
Q Q
which flourished in the Republic.  It is tempting to link the anonymous author of Den 
Herstelden Prins to this particular circle. Tantalisingly he does not develop his 
argument. However, we are probably justified in saying that he did not belong to the 
same religious strand as Voetius and Wittewrongel.
A different perspective was highlighted by the author of Ware Interest van 
Holland published in  1662. The author entirely refuted de la Court’s criticism of the 
stadtholderate. A body needed a head to promote harmony and unity and history bore 
witness to the freedom and  prosperity achieved under both the counts and the Princes 
of Orange. For this writer there were two pillars of state, peace and commerce. In
87 Geyl,  “Het stadhouderschap in de partij-literatuur onder De W itt’, p.45.
88 Jonathan Israel,  ‘The Intellectual Debate about toleration in the Dutch Republic’, The Emergence o f 
Tolerance in the Dutch Republic ed.  by C.  Berkvens-Stevelinck, J.Israel, G. H. M. Posthumous M eyjes 
(Brill: E.J..  1997), pp.3-47 (p.12); G.  H.  M. Posthumous M eyjes,  ‘Hugo Grotius as an irenicist’,  The 
W orld o f Hugo G rotiusf1583-1645) (Amsterdam, Maarssen:  APA-Holland University Press,1984), pp. 
43-64 (p .51)
89 W illem Frijhoff. Marijke Spies.  1650 Bevochten Eendracht (The Hague:  SDU,  1999),p. 335-336.consequence, he would have no truck with those ministers of the Reformed faith who 
had condemned the peace of 1648. They must submit to the wiser counsels of those in 
government. Our author clearly had little time for those who abused the cause of 
religion to advance other less worthy objectives. He drew on the example of Cromwell 
in England as an illustration of one who promulgated savage and unwelcome change in 
the name of religion. In a glancing blow at the ministry in both England and, 
presumably their co-religionists in the  Netherlands, he mocked the way in which the 
Lord Protector was described as ‘een Moyses, die de kinderen van Israel uit het land 
van Egipte leyde’. The reality was, he argued, that the greatest threat to any state lay in 
what he described as ‘partyschap’ and he continued that ‘de gevaerlijkste partyschappen 
onstaen uit verblinden yver van Godsdienst’. It was his contention that such forms of 
faction were much more likely to occur in an ‘aristocratic’ regime than one with a single 
head for the latter was more easily able to swiftly ‘damp down’ any threats to the unity 
of the state.
Our author was quite clear that, contrary to much polemic emanating from the 
ministers of the national church and their supporters, the war against Spain had not been 
waged in the interests of the Reformed church. Calvinists had composed a small 
minority of the people at the outset of the revolt and, hence, it was inconceivable that 
their interests alone had dictated the programme of the rebels. William I, on the 
contrary, had favoured religious freedom for both Calvinists and Roman Catholics and 
he ‘klaeghde meermalen over de onbehoorlijckheyt van eenige dienaers die de 
Roomsche Godtsdienst niet konden lijden’. Frederick Henry was also depicted as a 
model of moderation and tolerance in religious matters. Had others in positions of 
authority followed his policy, the author contended, there was a considerable likelihood 
‘dat de Catholijke Godsdienst vry soude gebleven hebben in de Nederlanden, en datse 
de Spanjaerts weder na Spanje soude gesonden hebben’. However, the intentions of the240
two Princes of Orange had been thwarted. The rebels had required the wealth released 
by the acquisition of church properties and goods to bankroll their struggle and Spain 
herself had provided no equivalent model of toleration for protestants. In consequence, 
religious freedoms granted to citizens began to be curtailed and Roman Catholics were 
increasingly suspected of collusion with the enemy. Neither of these developments 
however could be laid at the door of the two stadholders.
De la Court was right, argued this defender of the Orangist cause. It was essential 
to the economic well being of the Republic that free exercise of their religion was 
permitted to those of minority faiths. He had heard it said, he alleged, by many 
merchants from the Southern Netherlands and France that if Spain were to permit 
protestants to worship freely in its dominions, trade and industry would follow and the 
grass would soon grow in the streets of the Holland towns. Mindful of this the town 
regents should permit freedom of worship without any consultation with the ministers 
of the national church. Hence, he was at one with de la Court in condemning the 
practice by which Roman Catholics had to bribe local officials to turn a blind eye to 
their gatherings for worship. He wrote, ik verwonder my ten hoogsten dat de 
Regeerders, die alien zonder Kapitein Generael moeten regeeren, hier niet op letten, 
gemerkt na zijn zeggen, dit een schadelijk werk voor den Staet en by gevolgh voor dien 
koophandel is.90
The frontispiece of this last pamphlet, which was published in both Dutch and 
French, gave the name of the author as one I.N.D.P. The initials stand for Jean Nicolas 
de Parival. Parival, bom in Verdun in  1605, had moved to Leiden in  1624. Resident in 
the Republic for most of the remainder of his life, Parival was also to study at the 
University of Louvain in the Southern Netherlands in the  1660’s. It was there, it is 
believed that this Roman Catholic came under Jansenist influence but he had already
90 Knuttel. no. 8635B, pp. 13-29241
acquired a somewhat maverick reputation. His work Abrege de ce Siecle de Fer had 
been placed on the papal, index in 1660 as the author had insisted that the massacre of St 
Bartholomews Eve had been a monstrous event, Jan Hus had been injudicially 
sentenced and that violence against so-called heretics was contrary to the word of God. 
Parival had already aired his conviction that commercial prosperity in the Republic was 
dependent on religious toleration in his Les Delices de Hollande of 1651.91  He had not 
ceased to be a worshipping member of the Roman Catholic Church. When he wrote of 
the perils and ambiguities of Catholic worship in the Republic in his work of 1662, he 
was reflecting on direct personal experience. In 1659 Parival was alleged to be hosting 
Roman Catholic meetings in his house in Leiden.92
The cases of both Parival and Jan Zoet bear witness to the fact that support for the 
House of Orange came from many and varied sections of the religious community. As 
the Orangist response to de la Court illustrates there was no single Orangist view of the 
religious settlement in the Republic but a variety of opinions which reflected the 
diversity of support enjoyed by the former stadholders. It was certainly the case that 
faced with a States Party which emphasised the non-religious elements of the Union, 
certain of the supporters of the House of Orange were able and willing to play the 
religious card. Compare the print of 1651 celebrating the Great Assembly which 
eschewed all images of religion with one of 1663 in which William III rode in an open 
chariot drawn by two winged horses with the figure of ‘Religio’ guiding the reins.93 
Issued at the height of the debate on Public Prayer, the would be stadholder poses as the 
defender of both the Reformed faith and national unity in the face of Holland’s 
determination to unilaterally alter elements of worship in her province. Yet this image 
of William III and much of the accompanying rhetoric from ministers of religion and
91 W illem Frijhoff,  ‘Religious toleration  in the United Provinces from  ‘case’  to  ‘m odel’, Calvinism and 
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their supporters does not seem to have deterred the likes of Zoet and Parival from 
placing their pens at the service of the stadholderate. Orangism, clearly, was not the 
prisoner of any one religious group.
Even following the traumatic events of 1672, many Orangists deployed a rhetoric 
which would have disappointed sections of the public church. Petrus Valkenier, writing 
in 1675, dedicated his work to William IQ and asserted the desirability of a 
stadholderate. Yet this Orangist rhetoric shows no signs of the brooding fear and 
intolerance which marked the writings of many supporters of the House of Orange in 
the national church. Instead his writings have been viewed by later historians as 
influenced by secular considerations rather than confessional loyalties.94Valkenier, like 
the author of den Herstelden Prins, was convinced that each state should have only one 
public religion. This he argued was the conclusion of all political commentators of 
repute other than Machiavellis. Valkenier cited with approval the words of the English 
ambassador Winwood in  1621 that ‘de Religie is het PALLADIUM van dese 
Republijke’ and he was quite clear that it was the Reformed religion which was the 
‘ziele van desen Staat’. It alone among the faiths provided the cement which bound 
together the seven provinces and it was the foundation stone of the success and 
prosperity of the Republic. This is standard fare but Valkenier then moved on to more 
contentious terrritory. He pointed out to his readers that in Poland all religious groups 
apart from the Socinians were permitted to worship freely. In France the Edict of Nantes 
gave the Huguenots considerable privileges in certain areas. These examples were not 
objects of contempt. On the contrary, there was much there to be admired for ‘een Staat 
meer kan verryken met het getal der menschen en door deselve met overvloet van 
schatten als wanneer elk word vergunt Vryheit van Conscientie en Religie’. If Holland 
had in giving one religion the status of national church, excluded the practice of all
94 Friedrich M einecke.  ‘Petrus Valkeniers Lehre  von den Interessen der Staaten’, in Aus Politik und 
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others ‘so soude het niet het derde deel van sijnen florisanten Staat konnen bereyken’. 
To add insult to injury in the eyes of the national church, Valkenier scrutinised the 
example of the Turkish Empire and found it good. By permitting other religions, the 
Turks had attracted wealthy Christians of different nations to say nothing of the Jews 
driven out of Spain and Portugal. Finally Valkenier warned his readers to be suspicious 
of any action undertaken ‘op ‘t mom-aansigt van Superstitie en Religie’ of which the 
execution of Charles I of England served as a salutory example.95
Conclusion
Traditionally authorities have stressed the link between the House of Orange and the 
public church. There is much to support this approach. The Princes of Orange had been 
perceived as the defenders of the Reformed Faith. Stadholder and public church saw 
themselves as representing national rather than provincial institutions. Both perceived 
themselves the losers as the result of the Treaty of Munster. Ministers of the Reformed 
Church wrote pamphlets and preached sermons in favour of the restoration of William 
III to the stadholderate. Orangist rhetoric attacked the supporters of John de Witt for 
their perceived laxity in regard to the worship of sects such as the Socinians and the 
Roman Catholics and castigated them for their hostile approach to the interests of the 
public church.
Yet Orangism was in no sense the captive of sections of the public church and its 
ministers. As we have seen, disagreement over policy could and did occur as happened 
during the first Anglo-Dutch war. Orangist regents as well as those who supported John 
de Witt had in common a concern to keep the Reformed ministers under control.The 
Reformed Church provided a platform for, and a prominent articulation of, popular
95 Valkenier, pp.6-9244
Orangism rather than creating it.96 Free thinkers such as Zoet and Catholics such as 
Parival clearly found in the Prince of Orange a focus which transcended religion. The 
Reformed faith has been seen as a unifying factor in an otherwise centrifugal Republic 
and Orangists were willing to pay tribute to its worth. However the person of the Prince 
of Orange, descendant of stadholders and captain generals, attracted a devotion which 
eluded even the public church. He alone of all persons and institutions could represent a 
stance which was above party and faction and truly in the interests of all of the citizens 
of the Republic.
96 J. Lesley Price, H olland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth  Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 
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THE ENGLISH CONNECTION
During the course of the seventeenth century almanacs were available not only for the 
educated elite but increasingly for the literate citizen of moderate means. For the most 
part factual and descriptive, almanacs also featured predictions for the year ahead. 
Bouman’s Almanac was no exception. Its edition of 1659 advised its readers to expect 
significant changes both at home and abroad. ‘Holland vemieuwt de vriendschap met 
een herstelden Prins waer door het Landt vol vreughden is. Het Huys van Oranjen 
triumpheert.’1
Other signs pointed to an anticipated change in the fortunes of William HI. The 
Prince's enrolment at the University of Leiden was celebrated by the issuing of a print. 
The youth was depicted poised before the ‘horse of state’ whose bridle was held by an 
archetypal figure described significantly as ‘de vlugge Tijd’. Time was clearly on the 
Prince's side and the designer of the print was brave enough to hazard when his 
advancement might be expected to take place. Towards one edge of the print could be 
seen the traditional Orange motif of a trunk hewn off with a fresh shoot emerging. The 
image was coupled with the inscription ‘Florescat  1659’. It was a bold guess but events 
did not run their course entirely as hoped. An unknown hand altered the date to 1660.
The Prince who was to be restored was the English Charles II. It would be the 
summer of 1660 before he finally came into his own but his elevation had clearly been 
anticipated by well wishers across the North Sea. As the print of 1659 bears witness, the 
cause of the Stuart prince was inextricably bound up with the fate of his nephew
1  Jeroen  Salman. Populair Drukwerk in de Gouden Eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg,  1999), p. 74.
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William HI. As brother of the Prince’s mother Mary Stuart, Charles II might be 
expected to intervene with the rulers of the Republic on behalf of the Prince of Orange. 
The editor of Bouman’s Almanac of 1659 had expressed the hope, in carefully studied 
prose, that de Witt would find a solution to the problem of the Prince’s Exclusion from 
the offices of his forefathers.3 De Witt and his fellows, faced by the restoration of the 
Stuart monarchy in 1660, were forced to oblige and the Exclusion was annulled. The 
States of Zeeland found it timely to request of the States of Holland that William HI be 
designated stadholder and captain general of the two provinces, taking up the role in 
person on his eighteenth birthday.4  So the restoration of Charles II as monarch would 
lead to William ID’s designation  as stadholder and captain general.
It was in  the month of May 1641, in the Palace of Whitehall in London that the 
fortunes of the House of Orange-Nassau and the House of Stuart were formally linked.
A marriage was concluded between Mary, the daughter of Charles I of England and 
William, the son of the stadholder Frederick Henry. For Charles I this dynastic union 
could be seen as a mesalliance; hard times in the form of the struggle with parliament 
led him to seek succour from wheresoever he could. The House of Orange, however 
highly rated by Dutch patriots, did not in the eyes of the Stuarts rank among the 
foremost royal families of Europe but it was hoped that Frederick would be able to 
supply much needed financial assistance to the beleaguered monarch. The House of 
Orange, for their part, could argue that the marriage was a strategic coup designed to 
prevent closer relations between Charles I and their enemy Spain. However, whatever 
the diplomatic consequences for the Republic, there was no doubt that the prestige of 
the House of Orange had been elevated by this dynastic alliance.
Back in the Republic, there were observers who were uneasy at this development. 
Events in England were closely followed and English political polemic of the time was
3 Salman, p. 74.
4 Knuttel.  no.  8365A. p. 5.247
speedily translated into Dutch and issued in pamphlet form. Dutchmen reflected on the 
similarities and differences between their own struggle for their liberties and privileges 
against the King of Spain and the contest between King and Parliament in England. Not 
all were sympathetic to the Stuart monarch. This contest between a single head and a 
representative assembly caused them to reflect on the balance of authority within the 
Republic and how such discord could best be avoided. There were also concerns that by 
means of this marriage the House of Orange was seeking to extend its authority at the 
expense of the provincial States.5 The stadholderate was not hereditary but it was feared 
that Frederick Henry had  reassured Charles I that any offspring of this youthful union 
would in their turn succeed to the offices of their forefathers. Characteristically, these 
fears were vented in a fictional dialogue between an Englishman and a Dutchman in a 
pamphlet of 1642. The Englishman observed that he had heard that Dutch citizens 
muttered against the marriage, ‘om dat sy meynden dat het een aenleydinge soude zijn 
om de jonge Prince (William II) te doen staen naer de Souvereyniteit vande Provincien 
waer toe hem sijn Schoon-vader en Oom de Coninck van Vrankrijck souden helpen’.6
The close connections between the Houses of Orange and Stuart need not of 
themselves have been harmful. It could be argued that dynastic links with one of the 
major royal houses of Europe could only raise the prestige of the stadholder and with 
him the entire Republic. However some observers hostile to the Prince of Orange could 
argue that such a marital alliance served only the interests of a particular faction, that is 
the stadholder and his supporters and did little or nothing for the common good  of the 
Republic. At stake here was a question of legitimacy. The pamphlet writer of 1642 had 
defined two categories of person in relation to the governance of the Republic. The first 
was the ‘politique’ who manoeuvred his way into local or provincial government, the 
better to gain support for his faction and himself. The second, in contrast, was the
5 Pieter Geyl, Orange and Stuart ( London:  Phoenix Press, 2001), p. 13
6.  Knuttel,  no. 4869, np.248
‘patriot’ who placed the interest of the Republic over and above that of faction or 
person.7 The years before the Treaty of Munster had seen competing political and 
religious groups whether they be Arminians or Counter-Remonstrants, the peace party 
of Holland or those opposed to the ending of hostilities with Spain, all claiming that 
their stance alone was that of the ‘patriot’ and lover of the ‘Vaderland’. Such claims and 
counter claims were heard most frequently not at times when the Spanish enemy 
threatened to prevail, for then the nation was united, but at those junctures when the 
nation was divided as to whether to continue the war or seek a lasting peace.8 Such a 
time was the period leading up to and immediately after the Treaty of Munster when 
both groups were seeking to occupy the moral high ground. The English marriage gave 
the stadholder’s opponents the opportunity to accuse the House of Orange of acting 
within their own narrow dynastic interests rather than for the welfare of the Republic.
Thus sources hostile to the House of Orange asserted that the stadholder William 
II was committed to assisting his English relations and that such a strategy was not in 
the best interests of the nation. As affairs in England were observed and commented on 
in the light of the Dutch Republic there were some who alleged that the stadholder’s 
support for his royal brother-in-law Charles II was a manifestation of his own designs 
for sovereignty in the Republic. An anonymous pamphlet alleged that the Prince of 
Orange’s aborted attack on Amsterdam was intended not only as a bid for sovereignty 
in the Republic but also to damage those unfriendly to the cause of Charles II.9 
Supporters of the stadholder in their turn were to present their opponents as ‘politiques’ 
who placed faction above the common interest. There was circulated a fictitious printed 
document in which Parliament was alleged to promise the city of Amsterdam a fleet of 
25 ships and a force of 10,000 men to support it in its struggle against the stadholder
7  Knuttel,  no. 4869, np.
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and other hostile provinces.10 An anonymous poem from a similar source alleged that 
the Bickers family sought sovereign power in Holland with the assistance of the English 
Parliament.11   The death of William II in November 1650 did nothing to put an end to 
these alignments within the Republic. The House of Orange found itself like the House 
of Stuart excluded from those things which they believed to be rightfully theirs. Far 
from fracturing the link between the two dynasties, the supporters of the House of 
Orange believed that the restoration of Charles II could only aid their cause while the 
English Royalists, amongst whom of course was Mary Stuart in the Hague, urged 
Orangist supporters to champion the Stuart cause in the Republic. Supporters of the 
States Party on the other hand were to argue in 1650 against the elevation of the young 
prince William III to the offices of his forefathers on the grounds, amongst others, that 
his English connections might cause him and his supporters to act against the interests 
of the Dutch Republic.12 Throughout the twenty-two years of government without a 
stadholder they would attempt to hang the English connection like an albatross round 
the neck of William III and his supporters.
The enemies of the House of Orange were assisted by sources from within 
England. John Milton’s A Defence of the People of England had been published in Latin 
in February  1651. The work was intended as a response to the lengthy attack on the 
regicides contained in Salmasius’ Defensio Regia of 1649. The initial publication of 
Milton’s work was in Latin and this makes it likely that the author was seeking in part a 
continental audience and he was not unwilling to draw upon recent events in Europe to 
buttress his theme. For Milton, Salmasius and the stadholder William II had shared 
similar objectives. He inquired rhetorically of the States of Holland
10 Knuttel, no. 6713, np.
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who it was that incited this partisan of royal authority to write. Who was it that lately began to 
act the King among you. Consider what plots, attacks and disturbances followed throughout 
Holland, and what the case would now be, how slavery was prepared for you and a new ruler, 
and how that liberty which had been won by so many years of toil and battle would now have 
perished from your midst had not the most providential death of that headstrong youth  allowed 
it to breathe again.1 3
Milton’s work was rapidly translated into Dutch. It appeared in 1651 in a companion 
work with a defence of the king and people of England by the Royalist John Rowland.
In the Dutch version of Milton’s work, the paragraph relating to the former stadholder 
was removed from its context in the body of the print and placed in the preface where it 
was more accessible for the reader.14 As one supporter of the Houses of Orange and 
Stuart observed this ‘stinckende bouk’  was only too easily availability in contrast to the 
work of Salmasius which was banned.15
Not only were the aspirations of the House of Orange linked to those of the 
deposed Stuarts but the connection was held to be injurious to the welfare of the 
Republic.lt became an article of faith among supporters of the States party that the 
responsibility for the first Anglo-Dutch war should be laid at the feet of the House of 
Orange.  The author of a pamphlet of 1651  written before the outbreak of war claimed 
that William II had intended, before his death, to replace Holland regents with his 
creatures with the intention of waging war in favour of the Stuart dynasty. It was 
alleged that privateers acting in the name of the King of Scotland (Charles II) were 
preying upon the commerce of Holland with the knowledge and connivance of the 
stadholder.16 One of Secretary Thurloe’s correspondents wrote from the Republic in an 
undated letter of 1653 that there were two main parties in the Republic. One would have 
the Prince of Orange for stadholder, believing that his unifying presence would have 
averted the defeats at sea and the discontent at home. The other faction argued that the
13 Com plete Prose  Works o f John Milton,  ed. by Don M .W olfe, 8 vols (New Haven; London:  Yale 
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supporters of William ID had caused this breach with England, the better to further the
17
Prince’s cause.  Certainly this was a view which de Witt and his circle were eager to 
propagate. In a letter of October 1654 addressed to the diplomats Hieronymus van 
Bevemingh and Willem Nieuwpoort, the Pensionary expressed his satisfaction with a 
work of Aitzema’s on the  peace negotiations as it laid the blame for the war on the 
King’s friends and the supporters of the House of Orange.18 The contention was that the 
House of Orange bound by marriage to the English monarchy was not capable of acting 
in the interests of the Republic, either during the lifetime of William II or the infancy of 
his son. While peace with England was deemed desirable the House of Orange sought to 
prolong the war not only to aid the Stuarts but with the hope that defeats at sea and 
dislocation of trade would lead to a popular outcry for the restoration of the 
stadholderate
Orangist responsibility for the breach with England surfaced once more in the 
polemic of the early 1660’s. Peter de la Court in his Interest van Holland of 1662 
clearly believed that the Dutch government should have welcomed English overtures for 
a closer political and commercial relationship in  1651 but that they had been thwarted 
by the actions of the Orangists who had incited the rabble against the English delegation 
and their proposals. This then, he asserted, was the true reason of that lamentable war.19 
The French invasion and the prospect of a naval war with Louis’ ally Charles II led 
pamphlet writers once more to review the history of Anglo-Dutch relations. One author 
who clearly had favoured the policies of de Witt described the first Anglo-Dutch war of 
as ‘die bittere kerlen van die Brittanische Bruyloff. Cromwell had accused the United 
Provinces of assisting Charles II with arms and ammunition but the author argued such 
actions were not the policy of the States General but privately undertaken by the House
17 Birch,  l, 253.
18 Brieven aan de  Witt,  I, (Werken Uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap, Gevestigd te Utrecht) 3rd  
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of Orange. The pamphlet pointedly contrasted the seventy years of peace and good 
neighbourship which had existed between England and the Dutch Republic before
Frederick Henry’s dynastic policy had hitched the fortunes of the nation to the cause of
20 the Stuarts.  Another pamphleteer writing at the same time also thought that the war of 
1652-1654 had been against the interests of the Republic. This had indeed partly been 
provoked by those who wanted to use Dutch force to weaken her new fellow republic in 
the hopes of restoring the Stuart dynasty.21
This view of events was of course countered by writers favourable to the Prince of 
Orange. It was essential to their cause that the Prince, standing above self interest and 
faction represented the true interests of the Republic. From 1650 onwards authors from 
both sides of the political divide described themselves as ‘lovers of the fatherland’ but it 
has been observed that this claim was advanced more frequently by Orangist writers. In 
effect, they were boldly declaring that ‘love of the fatherland’ and loyalty to the current 
government were not necessarily synonymous.22 When Orangists spoke of the first 
Anglo-Dutch war, they insisted that the English under Cromwell, not the Prince of 
Orange and his supporters, had instigated the war. In an pamphlet of 1662 entitled 
Haeghs Hof-Praetje the author decried de la Court’s version of the cause of the first 
Anglo-Dutch war. It was, argued a fictional citizen of Leiden, the result of the new 
English government’s desire to deprive the United Provinces of their ships and trade.23 
The author of a pamphlet of the same year argued that the cause of the war was not the 
late stadholder but the the ‘hoegmoedigheit der Engelsche’ who having executed their 
own King were trying to dictate Dutch policy towards the House of Stuart. Meanwhile 
the English had been harrying Dutch shipping and robbing vessels.24 As early as  1652 
supporters of the House of Orange had argued that if Charles I had remained alive, there
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would have been no hostilities with England. The English monarchy had never wreaked 
such havoc on the Dutch as Cromwell, indeed succesive English Queens and Kings had 
been stout friends of the Republic. 25 The theme was to be repeated. Writing with one 
eye on Charles II and the possibility of an English naval war against the Dutch, an 
Orangist writer of 1672 had Jan, a fictional Amsterdammer, assert firmly that if the 
Republic had aided Charles I as Frederick Henry and William II had wished, then 
Cromwell would not have acceded to power and there would have been no Anglo-Dutch 
war. 26 In 1675, with William III firmly in the saddle and a peace with England deemed 
desirable, the first Anglo-Dutch war was said to have resulted from the execution of 
Charles I and the rise of Cromwell. Had the Stuarts remained in power there would have 
been no need for hostilities between ‘dese twee ouden vrienden en geloofs verwanten’.27
Accused of factional self interest by their opponents, Orangist writers were 
prepared to return the charge. In Ware Interest van Holland of 1662, Jean Nicolas de 
Parival argued that it was the merchants of Amsterdam who had been seduced by 
Cromwell’s gold to root out the Prince of Orange. In his view Cromwell was a more 
terrible enemy at sea than Spain but in spite of this there were those who were prepared 
to be  bribed by him to secure the Exclusion of the Prince of Orange.  If as Orangists 
were to allege, there was an unbreakable link between Fatherland and Prince, then by 
scheming the downfall of William III his opponents were not only seeking to damage 
the House of Orange but also the very Republic itself. This rhetoric was to bear a deadly 
fruit in  1672.29
What was not disputed was that the House of Orange had bound its interests to 
those of the exiled Stuarts during the course of the first Anglo-Dutch war. There was, of
25 Knuttel, no. 7205, p. 4; Knuttel, no. 7208, p. 9.
26 Knuttel, no.  10412, np.
27 Lambert  van den Bos, Leven en B edrijf van sijn Hoogheyt Willem Hendrik.  D e D erde Prince van 
Orangien (Amsterdam,  1675), p. 9.
28 Knuttel, no.  8653B, pp. 87-89.
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course, a substantial Royalist contingent keeping company with the Court at the Hague. 
William III ‘s mother Mary Stuart was, not surprisingly an ardent defender of her 
dynasty and her exiled brother. It had been her wish to christen her infant son Charles 
after her murdered father, a design which had only been thwarted by the threat by the 
boy’s grandmother Amalia von Solms that she would boycott the ceremony.30  The 
‘Winter Queen’ Elizabeth of Bohemia, the sister of Charles I, had found shelter at the 
Hague along with her hotly Royalist sons. In 1651 James Duke of York was at the 
Orangist court and in 1653 his brother the Duke of Gloucester received a fond welcome 
from his sister. The Orange Court at the Hague could not afford munificence. There was 
now no income from offices of state and Spanish payments to the House of Orange, 
promised in  1648, had not been paid in their entirety.31 However, funds could still be 
disbursed to celebrate the Orange and Stuart dynasties. The Dutch artist Hanneman who 
had worked in London before the Civil War and whose van Dyckian style was to prove 
popular with the exiled Stuarts and the House of Orange fulfilled a commission to paint 
Henry, Duke of Gloucester dated provisionally to 1653. In the following year he 
produced a portrait of William III in which the young prince posed full length, holding 
an orange in his right hand and pointing with the forefinger of his left at a small dog, 
symbolic of the virtues of loyalty. In the version which ended up in the former East 
Germany and which was presumably a gift to the Prince’s uncle and godfather the 
Elector of Brandenburg, William III wears the blue insignia of the Order of the Garter 
over his left shoulder.32 William had received the Order from his uncle Charles II on 4 
May 1653 33 and its presence in the portrait makes plain that far from being wary of his
30 Aitzema, H istorie o f \ erhael,\\\. 333.
31  Japikse.  I. 42.
32  ‘Henry. Duke of Gloucester’.  Adriaen Hanneman. National Gallery of Art. Washington. Canvas  105  by 
87 cm. c.  1653:  ‘Portrait of W illiam III aged 4 years’ canvas  135 by 95 cm.  signed Adriaen Hanneman. 
1654. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam,  (for Dutch  version).
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English connections, the House of Orange consciously emphasised and flaunted the 
dynastic ties which linked the two families.
In their turn, the English under Cromwell had emphasised the link between the 
Stuarts and the House of Orange. In 1652 English emissaries had presented the Dutch 
with a series of articles which included a clause stating that the enemies of one power 
would not be given succour in the other. It was proposed that the States General should 
not suffer any family or supporters of Charles II to live in in the towns or residences 
belonging to the House of Orange. If contravened, the prince or princess would be 
deprived of their possessions for the duration of their life. Supporters of William HI 
were to make much of this. An angry merchant in a pamphlet of 1652 fulminated at the 
idea that the property of the innocent young prince might be confiscated simply because 
he helped his own family. This was to show gross ingratitude to William HI and his 
forefathers. If Charles II wished to buy arms from the Republic, why should he not? As 
for exiled Royalists, the Republic had long furnished a haven for the persecuted. Like 
Stermont, this author was determined to emphasise that the civil war in England bore no 
resemblance to the Dutch struggle for independence. He issued a firm rebuke to 
Pensionary Cats who, in a visit to England had assured his hosts that the two nations 
shared a common interest since both had cast off monarchy. Advising Cats to stick to 
poetry, the author reminded his readers that Philip II had been but Count in Holland and 
the Dutch had only cast off allegiance to him with the consent of the States General 
after twenty years of foreign governors and the execution of the flower of the nobility. 
Charles I had been no tyrant. Rather his only fault was ‘dat hy al te goed-aardig en sijn 
Onderdanen al te gunstig was’. The author recommended a reading of Salmasius’ 
defence of the royal martyr. 34
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In a fictional discussion of the same year between three women, the tactics of the 
English were deplored. One woman, Grietje, was outraged at the proposed action 
against the Prince if he should aid his English family. She could not believe that Dutch 
regents would follow such a course ‘en souwen wy nu dat eenichste kindt dat zijn Vader 
noyt gesien heeft om het begeeren van sulcke Moordenaers met de voet stooten’. 35 
Certainly the demands of the English coupled with their aggression at sea made the 
cause of Charles II a popular one. Syme, a fictional peat cutter, opined in 1652 that if 
the Republic fell under the dominance of the English, their lot would be worse than 
under Alba. God was using the Dutch as an instrument for the restoration of Charles 
II.36 Samuel Brown the English bookseller and publisher resident in the Hague was 
clearly of the same mind. He was the stockist of a pamphlet of 1653 published by one 
Harman Comelisz in which the anonymous author argued that it was unlawful to assist 
those who had seized supreme authority by force. It was the duty of the Dutch to fight 
the English rebels with the aim of restoring the Stuart monarchy. 37
Orangist polemic attempted to exploit the affinities in the policies of Cromwell 
and de Witt, even as the Exclusion of William III was proceeding. In a fictional 
discourse set in an alehouse a Hollander and an Englishman argued comfortably which 
of the two nations was the greater villain. The Hollander, a supporter of the House of 
Orange,  asserted that the crown must fall to the English since they had killed their 
King, cast aside their lawful Prince and cut off the rights and privileges of Dukes,
Count, Barons and Knights. The Englishman admitted that these excesses lay at the feet 
of his government but countered by inquiring if the government of de Witt was so 
different since they had maligned their Prince and taken away from him not only the 
titles of his forefathers but also the profits thereof. The governors of the Republic, the 
Englishman affirmed were ‘in their hearts more English than Dutch’. Secret channels of
35 Knuttel, no.  7233, np.
36 Knuttel, no.  7235, np.
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communication fuelled by pensions from Cromwell ensured that the English were 
forewarned when a good prize ship was afloat and pliant Dutch sea-captains were 
encouraged not to press their attack against the English vessels. The Englishman 
identified these traitors as the ‘Louvesteyn faction’ who wanted no stadholder Prince of 
Orange and were determined, as far as they were able, that there should be no king in 
England. However, he contended not all is lost for the discontented English are now 
turning back to the House of Stuart. The pair concluded by drinking a toast dairming 
Cromwell and the ‘Louvestein devils’ and crying ‘long live the King: Long live the 
Prince of Orange’. 38
Loyal toasts notwithstanding the years after 1654 and Exclusion were uneventful 
for the supporters of the House of Orange. It was the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 
which raised the hopes of Orangists. The poetry and prose of that year make clear how 
far contemporaries assumed that the fortunes of the Houses of Stuart and Orange were 
linked. In a fictional dialogue of 1660 James Duke of York in conversation with his 
brother the King affirmed that Exclusion must be annulled and once William reached 
his majority he must be confirmed in the offices of his forefathers.39 Another author 
proposed that the appointment of William III as stadholder would restore to the 
Republic a constitution similar to that of Venice and would please the new King of 
England.40 A publication of 1660, Nassous Bedryf an account of the heroic deeds of the 
House of Orange between the years  1567 and  1646, paid tribute to the spirit of the times 
by including in the volume a paen of joy on the miraculous restoration of Charles II.41
In verse we see the link between Orange and Stuart  frequently celebrated. An 
anthology of poetry entitled Herstelde Zeeg-Triompf van Karel de Tweede published in 
1660 laid joyful emphasis on the connection and the implication that the successes of
38 Duytch Zee-m ans Praetjen.  (Amsterdam,  1654), pp. 5, 7-10,  14-18, 23-24.
39 Knuttel,  no.  8224, p. 24
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one would favour the fortunes of the other. In a poem entitled ‘Op d’ Uytroepinge van 
Karel de Tweede’ which celebrated the restoration of Charles II the poet C.C.D. Bevere 
declaimed
het Oudt Batavien, met blyschap overladen,
Schijnt nu in vreught te baden,
Vol hoop, dat Nassau ws Stam, die door een hagel-slagh 
By na ter neder lagh,
Sal door dees Somer-lugt weet moediglijk uytspruyten, 
Spijt buyen die het stuiten.42
Similar sentiments were expressed by his contemporary Havius who recorded
een yders mont spreekt Konings tael;
Men drinkt sijn voorspoet onder ‘t dond’ren der Cartouwen, 
En blaest terwijl luyd op Wilhelmus van Nassou;43
Meanwhile the poet Bara urged
lang leef de Vorst van ‘t machtigh groot Brittanje, 
Lang leef de stam van ‘t Vreden-rijck Oranje
and declaimed
Wie zoude niet naa d’Opperblijtschap dorsten 
By d’Edelheyt van hergestelde Vorsten.44
The family ties between Stuart and Orange were reinforced in contemporary print. 
As Charles II travelled through the Republic in  1660 on his journey to England, prints 
were published celebrating his reception by local notables and in these the House of 
Orange was conspicuously present. At a reception for Charles in the Hague, the King
42 Herstelde Zeeg-Triom pf van Karel de  Tweede.(Dordrecht,  1660) p.  15.
43  ‘Gemeene Blytschap, op  ‘t Herroepen in ENG ELAND’, in Herstelde Zeeg-Triomphe van Karel de 
Tweede,  p. 41.
44  ‘Herstelling  van sijn Doorluchtigste M ajesteyt Karel de Tweede’, in Herstelde Zeeg-Triomphe van 
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sits in splendour at the top table accompanied by his sister Mary Stuart with the frail 
figure of the Prince of Orange seated under the canopy with his kingly family.45 At his 
embarkation at Scheveningen on 2 June, Charles was depicted standing on the beach 
with the young William III to his right.46 Afterwards Charles and his sister Mary would 
be conveyed aboard ship in a ‘pinck’ decorated with palms and oranges.
The dynastic theme was reinforced in a print of 1660 entitled ‘De Croon van 
Coninck Carel de II.’ The centrepiece of the print was a genealogy of the family .of 
Charles II descended from both James I of England and Henry IV of France through his 
mother Henrietta Marie. However, the focus of the print becomes clear as the various 
lines of descent unite at the bottom of the print in the persons of stadholder William n, 
his wife Mary Stuart and their son William III. To allay questions the caption read
Dat syn Hoogheit staet hier onder,
Heeft man al soo moeten doen,
In de Tacken, Recht te houwen,
Dat syn Hoogheyt, dus ten Toon,
The circumstances of the birth of William III and his royal connections were held to be 
of providential significance.
Van oudts men  Groot Geluck, altijt heeft toe geschreven,
Die naer des Vaders Doodt, quam als dien Prins in ‘t leven.
Van de eerste Carel is hy d’ Eerste Dochters Zoon,
En d’Eerst, uyt Carel’s stam, en Conincklijcke Croon.4 7
The restoration of Charles II required the government of de Witt to reappraise its 
policy towards William III. In the interests of good relations with England, the 
Exclusion of the Prince of Orange was annulled.Pamphlet writers mocked this apparent 
volte face. In a work of 1660 two fictional characters, a soldier and a tailor discussed
45 Muller, no.  2276.(4)
46 Muller, no. 2156.(6a)
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with relish the discomfort of leading government figures. The tailor confided to his 
companion that he was heavily engaged in the task of ‘turning coats’ and pointed to a 
garment of de Witt’s awaiting his attention. In the recent past all symbols and signs of 
the House of Orange had been removed but now ‘weet men geen snijders genoegh te 
krijgen om de Rocken om te keeren’. For the soldier there was one moral to be drawn. 
‘Desen staat kan sonder de vrientschap van Engeland, ende den dienst van Orangien 
niet bestaan.’ 48  The poet Jan Zoet described the royal welcome given to William HI 
and his mother Mary Stuart during their visit to Amsterdam in 1660 in his poem De 
Herstellinge van Britanje en Oranje and concluded cynically  ‘de minste is nu een 
Prinseman’.49
Events did not proceed as Orangists had hoped. Policy makers in England were 
divided as to how far to emphasise the Prince’s cause. Clarendon was alive to Dutch 
sensibilities and de Witt’s strategies. He expostulated,
1  pray upon what grounds, in reason or policy, can the Kinge, in the renewing of a league with 
the States Generali, demande that they should choose a Generali of his recommendacon? and 
what harangues would de Witt make upon that subject, that the Kinge of England will not make 
a peace with them excepte he may give them a Generali, Admirall, and Stateholder who 
mustalwayes remember to whome he owes the benefitt?
Clarendon had prophesied wisely. In a letter of May 1664 Sir George Downing related 
that Holland was a hot bed of rumours. It was alleged that the English would force the 
Dutch to take the Prince of Orange and ‘give him all his Father’s charges, whether we 
will or not’.50 In a pamphlet of the same year the anonymous author announced that 
with the absence of a stadholder freedom once more reigned in the land. The sun of 
truth had dispelled the mists and the mask of deceit had been tom off to reveal the 
power hungry machinations of William III and Charles II.51 Such polemic may not
48 Knuttel, no.  8372, np.
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accurately reflect the mood of all sections of society. Downing reported an interview 
with a naval captain who told the Englishman that his seamen and soldiers would not 
fight unless the flag of the States, ‘the bloody flag’ was replaced by that of the Prince. 
Clearly anticipation of war was troubling many. Downing reported from the Hague in 
June 1665 that, ‘mens minds beginning to be strangely discontented; and they talk at a 
very strange rate, and very many begin to say that they shall never be quiett unless 
ye Prince of Orange be restablished’.52 There was undoubtedly a fear that this war 
against England might lead to the naval losses, recession and hunger which had marked 
the first Anglo- Dutch war. Meanwhile States Party rhetoric hammered home the 
message that the link between Orange and Stuart posed a threat to the liberties and self 
determination of the Dutch Republic.
A writer of 1665 set out the challenge facing the Republic. The United Provinces 
had either to permit themselves to be subject to the will of the King of England or take 
up arms. England wanted to see the Dutch divided amongst themselves and there was 
no greater friend to the enemy, he asserted,  than those in the fleet and in the country 
who called for a ‘Prince en Nieuwe Landtsheer’. All citizens should rally to support the 
present government who, he alleged, were giving body and soul for the freedom of the 
seas and the welfare of the nation.  In the following year Admiral Tromp the Younger 
was accused by sections of public opinion of disobeying de Ruyter’s orders and missing 
the chance of destroying the English fleet. He was dismissed his post in September 
1666.  A fictional seaman in a pamphlet of 1666 commentedly acidly of Tromp that it 
appeared that the Tromp had been hired by the King of England to bring confusion to 
the Dutch fleet. A citizen of Delft linked Tromp’s deficiencies to the Prince’s cause 
when he remarked that the Admiral was the friend of those who believed that the
52 Lister,  hi,  38 L  385-386.
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greatest shame in the world was that William III had not succeeded to the offices of his 
father. 54 Potential treachery was allied to the Orangist cause.
The case of Buat was a veritable godsend to the writers of States Party polemic. 
Buat, a close confidant of the Prince, had been corresponding with the court in England 
concerning the possibilities of peace between the two countries. At least some of this 
correspondence had been with the knowledge and connivance of de Witt who saw Buat 
as a suitable go-between in these delicate secret deliberations. However, Buat had 
exceeded his brief by engaging in further correspondence, unknown to de Witt, in which 
he sought to promote the cause of the Prince of Orange. To this end he gathered 
information about Dutch losses at sea. In a fatal gesture Buat succeeded in delivering 
this correspondence into the very hands of John de Witt. He was imprisoned, 
condemned to death and executed on  11 October 1666. His co-conspirators Kievit and 
van der Horst fled abroad and were condemned to death in their absence. 55
Supporters of the States Party seized  upon the opportunity to depict the Prince’s 
party as capable of outright treachery in their design to elevate William HI.56 Yet, their 
own conduct was not beyond reproach. Observers in Zeeland compared Buat’s secret 
diplomacy on behalf of the province of Holland with the negotiations between England 
and Holland in  1654 over Exclusion in which the other provinces were kept in 
ignorance.57 Hence supporters of the States Party were eager to assert that the House of 
Orange had placed its own interests before the nation and the life blood of its seamen. 
After accusing Buat of scandalous intimacy with the late stadholder William II, an 
anonymous author speaking in the person of an Amsterdammer drew the net wider. It 
was plain to all, this stout patriot asserted, that Buat had not acted alone. There were 
other ‘Bons Amis’ who were named in Buat’s correspondence with England, who were
54 Knuttel,  no. 9330, pp. 5,  11-12.
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all known supporters of the Prince. It was alleged that an accord had been made with 
Charles II that he should be sovereign of the United Provinces and William III was to be 
his stadholder. The Duke of York was to act for William until he came of age. Dutch 
interests were to be trampled underfoot. The English were to have free access to the 
East Indies commerce and the herring fisheries. Pliable ministers of religion were to be 
deployed to convince the people of the justice of the action and twelve or fourteen of de 
Witt’s party were to be brought before special judges and condemned to death. Qur 
Amsterdammer concluded by firmly linking the House of Orange with treachery and 
overweening self interest. Just as the Republic of Venice had expelled the Jesuits and 
any who argued their cause were indicted for high treason, so should the Dutch 
Republic treat those who argued for the return of the stadholderate. 58
His voice was not alone. In a pamphlet of the same year a fictional citizen of Delft 
accused Buat and his fellow conspirators of seeking to weaken the navy leading to the 
shedding of much Dutch blood and leaving the King of England as master of the seas. 
All this was to be done in the interests of the Prince of Orange. 59 In the following year 
1667 a fictional Rotterdammer, exhilarated by news of Dutch naval victories, 
proclaimed that the Republic had no need now of a stadholder and captain general and 
excoriated Buat and his sort who sought to make Charles II the greatest monarch in 
Christendom and the Prince of Orange his satrap. 60 The comments were timely. In  1667 
the States of Holland were to introduce the Perpetual Edict in which the roles of captain 
general and stadholder could no longer be combined in the same person and the 
stadholderate was abolished in Holland in perpetuity. Faced with opposition from 
Zeeland to Holland’s policy, the spectre of Buat was produced. A writer of 1668 argued 
that the Edict was designed to prevent threats to the national interest such as that posed 
by Buat in the service of the Prince. With Holland now formally committed to having
58 Knuttel, no.9330, pp. 24-25, 30, 32.
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no further stadholders such acts of treachery would be redundant. For the edification of 
readers and to heap further coals on the heads of the Prince’s party, a copy of Buat’s 
correspondence to England was included in the pamphlet.61
It is clear that in attempting to win over the other provinces to the policy of 
Holland, de Witt and his supporter were to make much of the Prince’s connections with 
the King of England and the allegation that in furtherance of his own interests the Prince 
and his party were prepared to damage the interests of the Republic. The year 1668 saw 
the publication of a volume of verse entitled ‘t Verheerlijckt Nederlandt. In the 
introduction the unknown editor declared that the purpose of the work was to laud the 
victory of the Dutch at Chatham in  1667 and the work therein of Cornelius de Witt. 
However, several of the poems made plain that treachery had been afoot in the 
Republic. In a poem which the publisher attributed to Vondel but which does not appear 
in the authoritative volume of his works the courage of those who fought for the States 
is lauded. However, their heroism was
Ondermynt en ondergraven 
Van ‘t onthoofde lantverraet 
En Leicesterlijke treken 
Door de blaeuwe vlagh gebroet,
Om den burgerkrygh te queeken,
In een zee van Heldenbloet.62
The traitor in question was Buat. Leicester had combined political and military 
governorship in his person during his ill-fated stay in the Netherlands during the  1580’s 
and to the States Party his name symbolised all that they loathed and feared in the 
military and political authority of the former stadholders. Although endowed with his 
authority by the States, Leicester had clearly acted in the interests of his master the
61  Knuttel,  no. 9662, pp. 7-8.
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Queen of England. There were those who would argue that William IQ was in a 
potentially similar situation with respect to his uncle Charles Q.
There was no immediate response from the Orangists. The times were not 
propitious. However with the French invasion of 1672 the question of loyalties became 
imperative and Orangists were eager to establish their bona fides as stout defenders of 
the Fatherland, unswayed by any other consideration than the nation’s welfare. A 
revised interpretation of  Buat’s endeavours was essential to reassure potential critics 
that William HI was no pawn of the King of England. Pamphlet writers who supported 
the House of Orange were eager to oblige. Again and again it was asserted that Buat’s 
purpose had been to promote peace with England without bending to French interests. 
His actions were in no manner treacherous but intended to leave the Dutch Republic at 
peace and not reliant on a France whose ambitions in the Southern Netherlands were 
already causing disquiet.  ‘French interests’ had not featured in the original polemic 
surrounding Buat but with leading members of the government accused of being in the 
pay of the French invaders, this was a timely interpretation on the part of the Orangists.
In truth in  1672 the Orangists found themselves in potential difficulties. Since 
England was the ally of the French aggressor, the link between the House of Orange and 
Charles H could become a liability. It was clearly in the interests of the Republic that 
the English should be neutralised and peace concluded with them but the conditions 
imposed might well be onerous. A pamphlet of 1672 set out the demands of Charles II 
as relayed to the States General. The towns of Flushing, Sluis and den Briel were to 
transferred permanently to the ownership of the King of England. In recognition of the 
domination of the King of England, the States General were to pay an annual tribute to 
the King of 100,000 pounds sterling for the privilege of fishing for herring in his waters. 
As if these proposals were not inflammatory enough, the pamphlet recorded that the
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titles of stadholder and captain general were to be bestowed upon the Prince of Orange 
and his heirs in perpetuity with an additional proviso that in the case of a minor a 
lieutenant would be chosen by the States with the consent and approval of the King of 
England.64 William made plain his rejection of these proposals.65 Another pamphlet 
published in both Dutch and French, and clearly hostile to the House of Orange, 
revealed the alleged contents of  a letter from Charles II to William HI setting out the 
terms he considered acceptable for the conclusion of peace between the France, England 
and the Dutch. In every town or village where there was more than one church,
Catholics were to be given one of these as a place of worship. Where there was only one 
church, an additional place of worship was to be constructed and stipends for priests 
were to be paid by the States. The Prince of Orange and his descendants were to have 
sovereignty over the Republic.66 In this type of polemic the elevation of William III was 
linked to demands which were clearly unacceptable to the majority of citizens of the 
Republic.
A poem by Joachim Oudaan which was published in pamphlet form in 1672 
displays this rhetoric in its most virulent form. In view of the frequent accusations that 
senior regents had been bribed by the French, Oudaan’s purpose was to convince his 
readers that it was the Prince’s camp who were betraying the Republic. Those who laid 
the charge of treachery at the Prince’s door,
...zeid dat dit onheil smeulde,
Ten tijde van Buat, die schelms met Karel heulde,
Om ‘t Vrye Nederlandt te lev’ren aan den Brit,
Op dat men Willems zoon te leen kreeg in ‘t besit.
Having revisited the site of Buat’s treachery, the author has James Duke of York 
propose to his brother,
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65 Geyl,  The Netherlands in the Seventeenth  Century,p.  132.
66 Knuttel.  no.  10070, pp. 2. 6 ; Knuttel.  no.  10071, np.267
... Dit’s de tijd om door het Frans geweld.
Het Puriteins gebroet, dat Vader heeft geveld,
Met list geweldelijck eens op het hert te trappen.
Om als een vrye Vorst weer op den Throon te stappen 
Dan voeren wy met macht de Roomse oudheid in.
The promotion of Roman Catholicism in the United Provinces was to be associated 
with the future sovereignty of William HI bestowed upon him by England.
James urged,
Men zou het wettig recht ontwringen uit de handen 
Der Staten van het Land, en dragen Willem op.
Met dit beding nochtans, dat hy de hoogsten top
Van Holland’s Heerschappy ontleend’ uit Karels handen.67
In the same vein, following the murder of the brothers de Witt, an outraged character in 
a pamphlet damned the traitors who had pawned the country to both the French and the 
English ‘om de Prins Graf van Hollandt te maken’. The hearts of the de Witts had been 
tom from their bodies in order to please the monarchs of France and England.68
To rebut these charges, Orangist polemic developed two strands of argument. 
Firstly, it was emphasised that in spite of his foreign connections, William steered an 
independent course whose only lodestar was the welfare of the United Provinces. 
Secondly, and more commonly, William’s English connections were alleged to be of 
benefit to the Republic since they might lead to an independent peace with Charles II 
and the English king might intervene with Louis XIV to broker some kind of settlement 
which almost inevitably would involve the Prince being appointed to the offices of his 
forefathers.69
67 Knuttel, no.  10606, np.
68 Knuttel, no.  10603, pp. 6-7, 20.
69 Robert Fruin.  ‘Prince W illem 111  in zijn verhouding tot Engeland\ in  Verspreide Geschriften, V, (The 
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William’s appointment as captain general resulted in a flood of pamphlet 
literature. Readers were encouraged to recollect the role of divine providence in the 
founding of the Dutch Republic and relief at the elevation of the great grandson and 
namesake of William I was tempered by calls for unity and repentance. One writer 
expressed the hope that William would give the lie to his enemies who asserted that his 
family links with England and France would influence his actions to the detriment of 
the State. 70 Another writer posed the question and provided an answer in the allegorical 
setting of a ship at sea. In his pamphlet, the fictional steersman of the good ship 
Hollandia, one Willem Willemsz. assured his nervous crew that he will not seek the 
shorea of England or France. Newly bid to the helm, Willem told his crew, ‘wy moeten 
noch Engelsch noch Fransch syn, maer beyde vermyden als trouwe Hollanders’. 71
More common was the assumption that the promotion of the Prince would assist 
the Dutch cause because of his relationship with the English king. In contrast Charles II 
was depicted as actively hostile to the government and its supporters. This was a line 
actively encouraged by the English. A pamphlet in English by one Henry Stubbs 
attempted to clarify the postion. The writer drew on the recent history of the Republic to 
buttress his assertion that both Oldenbamevelt and John de Witt had sought to damage 
both the interests of England and the House of Orange. He alleged that de Witt had been 
seeking to stir up sectaries in England against the authority of their lawful monarch. 
Aware of Dutch hopes, he commented obliquely that ‘his Majesty did express as much 
concern for the interest of the Prince of Orange as the nature of his Treaties would 
permit’.72
Dutch writers and publishers took up the theme. Following the appointment of 
William III as stadholder of a Holland a pamphlet was published containing an alleged 
letter from Charles II to his nephew. The King of England reassured the Prince that the
70 Knuttel, no.  10008, pp. 33-34.
71  Knuttel,  no.  10300, np.
72 Knuttel,  no.  10017A, np.269
latter’s interests remained close to his heart but he could not overlook the insolence and 
ingratitude which de Witt and his faction had meted out to both himself and Louis XIV. 
Now that William was stadholder and that affairs were no longer in the hands of that 
‘violent factie’, Charles would attempt to intervene with his French ally on behalf of the 
Prince.73 This letter became a mainstay of Orangist rhetoric and appears to have been 
the work of William HI and the new councillor pensionary Caspar Fagel. It was 
formally received by both the States General and the States of Holland.74 In a pamphlet 
issued in the hectic days before the death of the de Witt brothers, a fictional character 
Jan returned to the theme when he assured his companions that Charles II had no 
quarrel with the Dutch people but only with the ‘Louvesteynse Factie’.75 It is clear that 
such rhetoric was not seen as in any way ‘unpatriotic’ and the Prince was not seen as 
betraying the interests of the Republic. Rather, his connections were viewed in this 
instance quite pragmatically as a means to achieving a rapprochement with England. In 
a fictional conversation set on a barge a Rotterdammer assured his companion that the 
change in regime which had recently taken place in his city had been prompted in part 
by the contents of the letter of Charles II to his nephew which had led to a movement 
towards the Prince’s party.76
Attempts to buttress the authority of William still further were presented in terms 
of pleasing the King of England. This may have been a reaction to the decision of the 
States of Holland on 27th August to empower the Prince of Orange to change the 
composition of the town councils, a decision motivated, in the eyes of one hostile 
writer, with the intention ‘dat de goede Gemeente dan verder van sijn verhooging tot 
Grave niet souden spreken’.77 In a pamphlet of 1672 the anonymous author considered 
that the hatred of the prince by some sections of the regent oligarchy would make it
73 Knuttel, no.  10172, np.
74 de Bruin, Geheimhouding en verraad,  p.  372.
73 Knuttel,  no.  10341, p.7.
76 Knuttel, no.  10472, np.
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difficult to restore the country to its former glory. The proposed solution was William 
ID should be declared Count of Holland and the this position should be made hereditary 
in William’s line. This would, the author suggested, satisfy the King of England and the 
Elector of Brandenburg and predispose them to peace with the Republic.78 A call to all 
patriotic citizens of Holland emphasised that internal unity and external peace with 
England could be secured if the Prince were declared count of Holland 79 and this theme 
was reiterated and developed in very similar terms in a work, possibly by the same 
author, in September of that year.80 It was argued that the promotion of William HI to 
the position of stadholder was not enough to satisfy the English King and that an 
extension of his authority would be necessary to obtain peace.
The link between the elevation of the Prince and a settlement with England is 
evident from a print celebrating the conclusion of peace with England in 1674. The 
centrepiece shows William taking the oath as stadholder while outside the windows can 
be seen the feast given in his honour by the deputies of the States General after he had 
accepted the post of captain and admiral general in February 1672. William is posed 
behind a table upon which rests a splendid carpet. On the carpet is superimposed an 
image showing the conclusion of the peace with England in February 1674, exactly two 
years after William’s promotion to the captaincy general. The connection is re-inforced 
as the motto beneath the image reminds the viewer that peace with England was 
concluded in the same month  19 February 1674 as the Prince was appointed hereditary 
stadholder of Holland, 2 February 1674. The implication is that the two events are 
clearly linked and that the Stuart connection has proved beneficial to the wellbeing of 
the Republic. Doubts apparently were still being expressed about the Prince’s concern 
for his own interests as opposed to his duty to the Republic. A pamphlet of 1673 
reported that some muttered that William was a traitor who had conspired with England
78 Knuttel,  no.  10310, np.
79 Knuttel, no.  10316, np.
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and France to obtain his present postions and dark rumours were circulating that, after 
the receipt of a letter from the Prince of Orange, the garrison of Nijmegen had 
precipately surrendered to the enemy. The printmaker issued a riposte to these 
suggestions when he placed in a window behind the figure of William the spectacle of 
justice being meted out, in the form of a military firing squad, to those true traitors who 
had failed in their duty of resistance to the  French enemy.81
Moreover some writers were already seeing long term benefits for the Prince and 
the Republic as a result of the English connection. Suggestions were already being 
mooted concerning  a possible marriage between William III and Mary, the elder 
daughter of James, Duke of York. One writer of 1672 commended the possibilty to his 
readers, discounting concerns about  the extreme youth of the princess, for her aunt 
Mary Stuart had been but a child at the time of her marriage to William n. 82 The writer 
discounted any possibilty that such a marital alliance might encourage monarchical 
tendencies in the young stadholder. Rather it rebounded to his glory and that of the 
Republic. A pamphlet which linked Oldenbamevelt and de Witt in a trail of infamy 
concluded with a poem entitled ‘Nederlandt tot de Nederlanders’. The writer clearly 
relished the possibilities inherent in the Prince’s dynastic relationship with England. He 
urged his readers to rejoice in their good fortune.
Gy hebt een Prins, een Erfvorst van Oranje,
De darde Heer van ‘t Koninkrijk Brittanje.8 3
With Charles II without any legitimate heir and his brother James, Duke of York having 
only female offspring, enticing prospects loomed for the son of Mary Stuart and the 
grandson of Charles I.84
81  Muller,  no.  2530:  Knuttel, no. 10951, np.
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Orangists were to emphasise that the Prince’s English connections and his 
expoitation of them were in the interests of the Republic. The case of Buat had enabled 
supporters of the States Party to depict the House of Orange as guided only by self 
interest and hostile to the vital interests of the Republic. When in 1672 Orangist writers 
insisted that de Witt and his cohorts deliberately preferred French domination to the 
elevation of William HI, this was, amongst other things, a response to the accusations 
which Buat had brought down on their head. Now it was the Pensionary who had placed 
the interests of faction before nation. Characteristic of this type of rhetoric was a 
vituperative  pamphlet of 1672, the work of the Rotterdam Reformed minister Borstius, 
in which it was alleged that the Dutch were responsible for the English reneging on the 
Triple Alliance of 1668. Mombas at the French court was said to have suggested to 
Louis XIV an alliance betweeen the two countries with the objective of ruining England 
and preventing the Prince of Orange from being appointed to the offices of his 
forefathers. To further this end, inspectors sent on behalf of the States General to review 
the Republic’s landward defences were alleged to have been plied with drink so that 
defiencies, of which there were many, passed unnoticed and the French invasion could 
proceed unhindered.85 This was but one example of the genre. The theme appeared in 
verse where the unknown author charged that de Witt and his faction
Vrankryck uyt naam van staat 
Aanboden Engelant te vemielen,
Door boos gewelt of listen quaat,
Waarom dien Koninck reden vont,
Om wreecken ‘t breuck van d’Egt-verbont.86
It was similarly alleged that Admiral de Ruyter had been well placed to destroy the 
French fleet but had been ordered instead by Cornelius de Witt to attack the English
87 navy.
85 Knuttel,  no. 10224, pp. 7-10.
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Much of this rhetoric mirrored the propaganda emanating from the English court 
in which Charles II declared that he had only the interests of the Republic at heart and it 
had been the hostile intentions of de Witt which had obliged the English to take up 
arms. On both sides of the North Sea it was  alleged that emissaries of de Witt had been 
stirring up Parliament and the dissenting interest against the King. An English pamphlet 
available in the Netherlands condemned de Witt’s connections with dissenters, (‘an 
honest party in this Nation though differing in some minute ceremonies from the. 
Church’) and sorrowfully viewed the plight in which the Dutch found themselves.
A mournful Tragedy. Methinks like wise Patriots, they should seize upon their States (whom 
they may thank for all their calamities and miseries) and yield themselves up to Justice; set up 
their Prince, whose Ancestors have spent so much Blood and Treasure to Vindicate their Rights 
and Liberties, and not to serve their ends of him (as all wise men think the States do at this 
juncture of affairs).8 8
However the refrain was reinforced in Orangist writings. One pamphlet among 
many alleged that after the Treaty of Breda in  1667 John de Witt had attempted to bribe 
opponents of Charles II in England and it was his failure in this quarter which led him 
to seek a clandestine agreement with France.89  The conclusion of peace with England 
in  1674 led to the reinforcement of this theme. Valkenier, writing in 1675, accused de 
Witt of seeking to isolate England and render her impotent while preventing the Prince
on
of Orange from being appointed to any position of the authority.  Montanus’s account 
of the life of William III, published in  1675, again recounted de Witt’s attempt to 
foment internal disunity in England and linked them to the Pensionary’s alleged design 
to acquire greater authority in the Republic than that possessed by any  Prince of 
Orange.91
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Conclusion
As one of the great princely families of Europe, marital alliances inevitably have the 
House of Orange to other dynasties. To his enemies, William Hi’s foreign connections 
influenced him in courses injurious to the Republic; to his supporters they were often a 
source of pride. Both the Orangists and their opponents sought to present themselves as 
the true ‘patriots’, the party which placed national self interest before faction. In effect 
the writers of Orangist rhetoric were saying that they and not the legitimate government 
of the Republic were the true guardians of the nation. This was potentially a profoundly 
dangerous situation as events in 1672 were to prove.
During the first Anglo-Dutch war, Orangist writings made much of the link 
between the Houses of Orange and Stuart and depicted the governments of de Witt and 
Cromwell as cut from the same cloth. In 1660 the restoration of the Stuart dynasty and 
the hopes for William III were celebrated in word and image. In 1672 the Orangists 
adroitly emphasised both the Prince’s independence of any undue English influence and 
the benefits to be gained from the connection. The case of Buat during the second 
Anglo-Dutch war undoubtedly damaged the Prince’s party and may have helped the 
acceptance of the Perpetual Edict of 1667 amongst the waverers. The accusations levied 
at the brothers de Witt and their confederates, iiever frans als prins’, were a fitting 
revenge. The House of Orange, past and present, were the true defenders of the nation; 
rather than putative sovereigns, they were the Republic’s greatest and most loyal 
servants.275
7
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PAST
In the early months of 1672 a pamphlet entitled Viva Hollandia celebrated the 
appointment of William HI as captain and admiral general of the Dutch Republic. The 
author, not only saluted the Prince’s promotion but also deplored the criticism and 
condemnation heaped on the Prince’s forefathers. He complained that since the death of 
William n, hardly anyone had dared refer to the praiseworthy deeds of the House of 
Orange. This, he argued, was the result of a pernicious freedom abroad since 1648; a 
freedom to say and write what you will, particularly if it involved attacking and 
demeaning the reputation of the House of Orange. Orangists, he alleged, could not 
respond to these slanders without fear of censorship and punishment.1
As we have already seen in earlier chapters, this last allegation fell far short of the 
truth. Orangists could and did write in defence of the stadholders. Yet virtually all of the 
author’s contemporaries would have appreciated the connection he was establishing 
between twenty-two years of exclusion of William III from an official role and the 
attacks levelled at the previous stadholders by supporters of the States Party. For 
supporters of the House of Orange, the history of past stadholders formed a narrative 
which interpreted the past in terms of the services and sacrifices of a particular princely 
house and the contribution of that house to the strength and prosperity of the Dutch 
Republic. Orangists saw that a favourable interpretation of the past presaged a hopeful 
future for the Prince of Orange.2 We call this a political ‘myth’ but this is not to 
disparage its importance. Selected images of the past create solidarity and cohesion and
1   Viva H ollandia o f Nederlands Vreugde-Basuyn over het verkiesen van  Wilhelm III (Amsterdam,  1672),
PP’2* 4’
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can serve to legitimise a social and political order.3  The anonymous writer of a 
pamphlet of 1653 subscribed unknowingly to this view when he wrote of ‘vergetenheyt, 
die wel te recht een Suster vande Doot wort genaemt’. History, he argued, not only 
taught you to value your present but also to know your enemy.4
Seventeenth century Orangists perceived the crucial importance of a reading of the 
past. Once the rule of the King of Spain had been abjured in 1581, the position of his 
representative or stadholder depended on a principle of utility; that is the stadholderate 
fulfilled an essential role in the government of the Dutch Republic. The argument could 
be made in theory for single headship but its effectiveness could only satisfactorily be 
supported by evidence of the unique contribution that the House of Orange had made to 
the founding and development of the new Republic. Claims for the promotion of 
William HI rested upon the achievements and sacrifice of his forefathers. Images of the 
past would serve to buttress the hopes of a new Orangist order.
History writing has, of course never been value free. Historical thinking during the 
sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century had been based on the assumption that 
human nature remained constant and that lessons drawn from the past were directly 
relevant to the present. During the sixteenth century it was classical Antiquity which 
provided a model while during the course of the seventeenth century  there was 
increasing attention paid to more recent history.5 Sometimes the intentions of the 
authors were ambitious indeed. The Reformed minister Abraham van de Velde declared 
in the introduction to his De Wonderen des Alder-Hoogsten vertoond inde Opkomst van 
‘t Vereenigd Nederland of 1668 that he would demonstrate the stupendous work of God 
in relation to salvation from Spain and the establishment of the new Republic. He had, 
he declared, gathered together material from many different histories, the better to work
3 Paul Connerton, How Societies Rem em ber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1989), pp. 2-3; 
Coenraad A.Tamse, Het Huis van  Oranje en andere politieken mxthen (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002),
p. 26.
4 Knuttel, no.  7451, pp. 3-4.
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upon the conscience of the reader. He urged upon each head of household the duty of 
handing down these things to their family and servants. ‘Forgetfulness’, he wrote, was 
one of the principal origins of the Republic’s current misery.6 Other writers were 
somewhat more modest in their intent. Many followed the Plutarchean model whereby 
history writing served as a mode of instructing and inculcating the young in the classical 
virtues. The soldierly deeds of William II and Maurice could and did fulfil this role. In 
most of these works, there was no sense of historical development as we understand it. 
The sequence of events was worked out through great men and their actions, a form of 
history writing which naturally lent itself to a concentration on the virtues and deeds of 
the Princes of Orange.7 This tendency was of course emphasised by the practical reality 
that the immediate descendants of these heroes held prominent office in the Dutch 
Republic.
With the death of William II in  1650, the Republic underwent a partial change in 
its mode of governance. One of the tasks of this ‘new order’ was to pass judgment on 
the practices of the old regime that had gone before, in this case the conduct of the 
former stadholders. The ‘canon’ of accepted truths about the national past was changed 
in order to reflect and emphasise new political realities.8 Accordingly Pieter de la Court 
poured scorn on the partiality of former history writing and launched his own attack on 
the Orange stadholders. Moreover, de la Court’s rhetoric was directed not simply at the 
acts and omissions of individual stadholders. Rather, it was an indictment of a whole 
quasi-monarchical system in which no man could write freely. History writing as de la
6 Abraham van de Velde,  D e  Wonderen des Alder-Hoogsten  vertoond inde Opkomst van  ‘t Vereenigd 
N ederland (Amsterdam,  1717),  ‘Tot den leser’
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Court envisaged, in which the individual examined the facts in independence and 
impartiality, could not be achieved under the rule of a stadholder.9
William I
Historians of the Dutch Revolt had differed in their appraisal of William I. Emmanuel 
van Meteren in his Commentarien ofte Memorien van den Nederlandtschen Staet, first 
published in the late sixteenth century and re-issued in nearly every decade after, had 
valued a neutral stance though his analysis of most of William’s actions was positive. 
Pieter Bor, however, in his Nederlantsche oorloghe, beroerten ende borgerlijcke 
oneenicheyden, had depicted William as the nurturing ‘vader’ of the new republic, a 
man of manifest good qualities who deplored all excesses carried out in the name of 
religion. Everhard van Reyd, a fervent member of the Calvinist Reformed church, not 
unnaturally emphasised William’s far-seeing and principled opposition to Philip II in 
his Oorspronck etide Voortganck vande Nederlantsche Oorloghen of 1626. Other 
writers such as Orlers in his Nassauschen Laurencrans of 1610 and his Genealogie des 
illustres comtes de Nassau of 1615 and Baudartius in Nassausche Oorlogen of 1615 had 
contributed to an Orangist history in which William was the Judas Maccabaeus of his 
age, leading a principled struggle against an alien oppression. On the other hand, the 
dramatist and historian P.C. Hooft in his Historien praised William for his skills as a 
‘politique’, used here in a non pejorative sense, reconciling opposing factions and 
emphasising the value of religious toleration against intolerance from any quarter. All of 
these works provided a fund of material on which future Orangists could draw: those 
opposed to the restoration of the stadholderate were not ashamed to draw selectively 
from them.
9 Historie der Gravelike Regeering in H olland (beschreven door V.H) (1662)/Voor-reeden tot den leser’, 
p. 3v, 4v.5; H.  Kampinga, D e Opvatting over onze Oudere  Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis (The Hague, 
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There were, of course, other more scathing interpretations of William’s actions. 
Franciscus Haraeus who came from Utrecht but went abroad to train as a Roman 
Catholic priest presented a very different William I in his Annales of 1623. His William 
was a fractious heretic whose actions and those of his fellow nobility had been 
determined by no more than self- interest and envy. Adriaen van Meerbeeck in his 
Chroniicke of 1620 saw Orange as determined not to make peace with Philip II at any 
cost. For both the Italian Jesuit Famiano Strada in De Bello Belgico of 1632 and . 
Cardinal Bentivoglio in his Della guerra di Flandre published in the same decade 
William had no true religious feeling. Rather he used religion as a pretext to conceal his 
own ambitions while manipulating the religious principles of others.10
The role and character of William I was under continual reassessment. In 1642 
there was published in Munster a work entitled Opkomste der Neder-landtsche 
Beroerten. The author simply styled himself  ‘eenen Lief-hebber der waerheydt ende 
der zielen saligheyt’ but a later edition of the work ascribes it to Augustijn van 
Teylingen. In the preface the author expressed his hope that the northern provinces 
would return to unity in the Roman Catholic faith and he provided for the reader a 
martyrology of those priests and religious who suffered at the hands of the Sea Beggars 
and, he emphasised, those who supported them. For this writer also William places 
ambition before religious principle and he quoted the radical Ghent minister Petrus 
Dathenus who preached scathingly
dat den Prins de Religie achtede ende soo licht veranderde als een omhangsel van een kledt; 
ende noch om Godt, noch om Religie en gaff maer van Staet ende nut sijnen Aff-godt 
maeckte."
10 A comprehensive account of contemporary historians’  handling of W illiam I, from which the above is 
drawn, can be found in Haitsma Mulier and Janssen,  Willem van Oranje in de Historie 1584-1984,  pp.
18-46. For Hooft see Johannes D. M. Cornelissen,  ‘Hooft en Tacitus’, in D e Eendracht van het land 
(Amsterdam:  Bataafsche Leeuw,1987), pp. 53-103 (p. 84).
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This book was re-issued in 1649,1666 and  1673, having on each occasion a place of 
publication outwith the United Provinces.
These works which were critical of William originated from outside of the United 
Provinces and their writers’ stance was influenced by their Roman Catholic faith and 
their loyalty to their political masters. The material which began to flow in  1650 
differed in that it originated within the Republic (though a false foreign place of 
publication could be given) and was overtly concerned with issues concerning the 
internal governance of the United Provinces. Also much of this material appeared in 
pamphlet form, dealing as they did with contemporary issues.
We see signs of this even before the death of William n. An anti-Orangist tract of 
1650 entitled d ’Onstelde Amsterdammer met Sijn trouwe waerschouwinge Raed en 
Antwoort Op Bickers Beroerten, allegedly printed in Brussels, appeared in the aftermath 
of the stadholder’s failure to seize the city of Amsterdam. In the opinion of ‘Jan’ one of 
the leading protagonists in this fictional debate, William II’s actions were just part of 
the long standing ambition of the House of Orange to seize sovereignty  first in Holland 
and then in the other provinces. William I, he alleged, had also deceitfully sought to 
become sovereign in the United Provinces.12 This clearly referred to the proposed 
countship of Holland offered to William I in the early 1580s. This theme recurs in 
polemic of the time. In a pamphlet of 1651 a fictional ‘Hollander’ spoke of how events 
which appeared to be disasters had resulted in favourable outcomes. The expulsion of 
the Sea Beggars from English harbours had led to the seizure of den Briel in  1572 and 
the murder of William I in 1584
was een groote zegen voor’t land, alsoo het na by was dat men hem Graef van Holland soude 
gemaakt hebben, daer door wy wel van Heer souden verandert hebben maer niet van Conditie, 
alsoo wy geen beter souden gehad hebben aen Oraignen, als een Spaignen.1 3
12  Knuttel, no. 6848, pp. 4r, 5r.
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The Deductie of 1654 penned by John de Witt also emphasised the fortuitous nature of 
the death of William I and this theme was reiterated the following year when an 
anonymous writer emphasised God’s providential role in preventing William I 
becoming Count of Holland.14
These sentiments were not new. A leading Holland regent and contemporary of 
William I, Comelis Pieterzoon Hooft had been of the few in the early 1580’s to oppose 
the elevation of Orange to the position of Count of Holland and he had persuaded 
Amsterdam to adopt this point of view in 1584. He wrote subsequently that William I 
had shown signs of wanting to impose himself as Prince of the new state, a position 
which would be passed on to his heirs. Only his assasination had prevented this 
potentially disastrous development.15 The sudden and unexpected death of William II in 
1650 enabling as it did the Republic to be governed without a stadholder inevitably led 
to comparisons with earlier ‘providential’ deaths. Hence it is not surprising that the 
issue of William I and the countship of Holland resurfaced in this form. However, anti- 
Orangist writers took matters further.
The writer of Noodig Bericht aan alle oprechte Patriotten published in 1654 
argued that previous history writing had emphasised the role of William of Orange at 
the expense of other heroes such as the leader of the Sea Beggars Lumey de la Marck 
and the leading Calvinist Brederode. He contended that historians such as van Meteren 
and Bor had accorded full honours to these latter protagonists but that pro-Orangist 
writers had deliberately inflated the contribution of William I in order that his 
descendants should be appointed to the position of stadholder and captain general. 
Drawing on the Jesuit writer Strada, he argued that William’s actions were determined
14 Knuttel, no. 7543, Pt.  II,  Cap.  1  (20), p. 50; Knuttel, no. 7660, p. 45.
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New Series no.  15 (Utrecht,  1871,) p.  156.282
by his jealousy of the Habsburg Archduke Matthias. In addition, he maintained that 
William was an incompetent military leader for his army had been unable to liberate the 
provinces from the curse of Alba’s depredations. A critical and until now 
unacknowledged role had been played by the strategy and resolve of the States of 
Holland and Zeeland and it was at the cost of their deprivation and suffering that the 
House of Orange had ridden high.  They, next to God, were the source of Dutch 
freedom.
In all of this, the role of the Almighty was paramount.  The author recounted that 
no lesser power than the Sultan of Turkey had, in a conversation with the Venetian 
ambassador concerning Dutch success against Spain, excluded all causes of success 
other than the hand of God.16  The Deductie of 1657 echoed the Sultan’s view. Written 
to argue against the necessity of an individual leader for the armed and naval forces, the 
author fulminated against any talk of a single head or monarch as he preferred to call it. 
There was no need of such for God alone had miraculously saved the United Provinces 
from the wrath of their foes. Indeed it was as if God himself had been head of state and 
the republic a ‘theocratische regieringe’.1 7
There are elements here which will recur in the rhetoric of the 1660’s, particularly 
the reliance on hostile ‘catholic’ historical sources and the emphasis on the role of God 
as opposed to the Princes of Orange. In the Deductie of 1654, John de Witt also argued 
that whatever sacrifices the House of Orange had made in the struggle against Spain, 
they had been more than compensated by the gains they accrued. Towns and areas 
belonging to the House of Orange which lay beyond the boundaries of the United 
Provinces had been garrisoned at the expense of the States. In time of truce and treaty 
the Princes had received substantial gifts from other nations and their gains from booty 
garnered by the East India Company or the West India Company added to the profits of
16 Knuttel,  no.  7567, np
17 Knuttel, no. 7880, p. 38.283
war totalled no less than 20 million gulders.18 Those who believed that an Orange 
stadholderate was a necessary mark of gratitude for the sacrifices of family must now 
consider that the debt had long been paid.
The year 1660 sees the beginning of a much more closely argued attack on the 
past Orange stadholders. In 1660 Consideratien en Exempelen van Stoat omtrentde 
Fundamenten van allerley Regeeringe of the brothers de la Court, a monarch is 
identified by unbridled ambition which serves his interests alone. He encourages .and 
relishes internal discord for then his opponents are divided and his authority 
undiminished. From their perspective, William I was an archetypal monarchical figure. 
His ambition drove him to seek to usurp the authority of Philip II whose stadholder he 
was. He exploited  dissension in matters political and religious to preach sedition and to 
further his own cause. Echoing Dathenus, de la Court alleged that William changed his 
religion like he changed his coat, all with the aim of his own aggrandisement. 19
Pieter de la Court also introduced his Dutch readers to other writers critical of the 
House of Orange. In an appendix contained within his 1662 publication Historie der 
Gravelike Regeering in Holland he published for the first time in Dutch a contemporary 
account of the early years of the Revolt by Viglius, a former president of the Privy 
Council, member of the Council of State and Chancellor of the Order of the Golden 
Fleece. Translated by de la Court under the title Grondig Beright van  (t Nederlands 
Oproer zo onder de Hertogin van Parma, als den Hertog van Alba, it had previously 
only been available in French. De la Court acknowledged that historians inevitably 
emphasised the achievements and diminished the faults of the group they favoured. 
Viglius owed all his fortune to the King of Spain, but, de la Court argued, he wrote with 
‘meer kennisse and opreghtheid’ than other Spanish writers. He thought it good to bring 
it to the attention of readers, accompanying it with an ‘impartial’ introduction.
18 Knuttel, no. 7543, Pt II. Cap. V ](5), p. 73.
19 Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat om trent de Fundamenten van allerley Regeringe 
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De la Court likeViglius considered that the ambitions of the Netherlands nobility 
was matched only by their relative poverty . Spain had contributed to their 
embarrassment by sending them on costly embassies and not reimbursing them but the 
leaders such as Orange were also naturally inclined to conspicuous consumption. Hence 
they were eager to change the political structure and replace the rule of Philip II in their 
own provinces. Orange’s stance was based partly on personal animosity to Granvelle, 
following the latter’s successful opposition to William’s proposed marriage with a 
daughter of the House of Lorraine.20
De la Court’s position on William I was taken up and reinforced by Uyttenhage de 
Mist. There are three books which can be attributed to this writer; De Stadthouderlijcke 
Regeeringe in Holland ende West-Friesland of 1662 and De Guide Legenden van de 
Stadthouders in Hollandt ende West-Frieslandt  and Apologie ofte Verantwoordiginge 
van den Ondienst der Stadthouderlijke Regeeringe both of 1663. In De Stadthouderlijke 
Regeeringe Uyttenhage de Mist praised De Historie der Gravelikke Regeering and 
spoke of his own work as a completion of de la Court’s work. He knew, he alleged, that 
he would face abuse from those who were  enslaved by the wiles and attractions of the 
Orangist court but it was his duty to remind his fellow countrymen that the former 
stadholders had not acted as lowly servants of the state but had ruled in their own right 
as mighty princes. 21
The picture of William I that emerges from these works is scarely flattering. 
Uyttenhage De Mist acknowledged that it was the policy of Philip I to rule the 
Netherlands as a monarch rather than as a count. However, his ambitions were assisted, 
rather than thwarted, by an impecunious and fractious nobility. The opposition of 
William of Orange and Egmond to the machinations of Cardinal Granvelle were 
founded on their own designs to wield the ultimate power on behalf of the king and they
20 Historie der Gravelike Regeering in H olland beschreven door V.H.{ 1662), pp. 209-210, 216-222.
21  Knuttel. no.  8655A,  ‘Aen den  leser’,  np;  ‘Voor-reden’, np.285
used their authority in the Council of State to achieve their personal ends. The Jesuit 
historian Strada was cited to prove that once Philip II had departed for Spain, William 
of Orange’s strategy was to exploit the disunity of his fellow nobility in order to have 
himself appointed as the king’s representative and highest authority in the 
Netherlands.22
William’s departure from the Netherlands in 1568 was depicted as a great betrayal 
of the country and in particular those of his fellow nobility. The way was left open for 
Alba to enter Brussels and some of Orange’s noble contemporaries such as Egmond and 
Hoorn suffered death at the hands of the government. The exiled William, it is alleged, 
was determined to place himself at the head of all opposition to Alba and was hence 
angry and jealous when the Sea Beggars captured den Briel and began forcing their way 
into the Holland towns in  1572. Even after the Pacification of Ghent in 1576, the chance 
of peace in the Netherlands is lost because the leading nobility, of which William is one, 
cannot work together in the common cause. William is portrayed as the epicentre of a 
maelstrom of destructive envy; his appointment as Ruwaard of Brabant serves only to 
alienate many of his contemporaries.
William placed his own interests above those of the suffering citizens of the Low 
Countries. At Cologne in  1579 the Archduke Matthias had attempted to negotiate a 
compromise peace with Spain with the help of the good offices of the Emperor and 
William was severely criticised for his refused to support this venture. His attempt to 
seek foreign support from Alen^on was portrayed as deeply suspect. The Jesuit historian 
Strada was cited to support the contention that William favoured this course purely in 
order that Alen^on would make William Count of Holland and Zealand. Van Meteren 
and van Reyd were quoted to adduce that William actively desired the Countship. It was 
alleged that money found in William’s house after his death had been intended to be
22 Knuttel,  no.  8655A , pp. 12-13; Knuttel,  no.  8806C, pp.  15,47.
23 Knuttel, no.  8655A, pp.  15-16,  19, 23-25;  Knuttel, no. 8806C, pp.  18, 21-22, 28-29; Knuttel, no.  8794,
p.  166.286
spent on his inauguration. As the writer expressed it William’s untimely death put an 
end to ‘dit onrechtmatigh vervolgen van de Opper-heerschappye, ende van de 
Regeersuchtigen Prince leven’.24
This type of history contained elements with which we are already familiar. Anti- 
Orangist writers drew unashamedly from Catholic historians such as Strada. Orangists 
did not let this pass unnoticed. The Orangist polemicist Pieter de Hubert in 1669 
excoriated those anti- Orangist writers whose ideas, he alleged, were ‘niet anders als 
Concepten, die gezoogt zijn uit die fenynige Apotheke van dien infame Famianus 
Strada’.  Equally significant is the emphasis placed on the providential work of God as 
opposed to the actions and strategies of William I. We have already encountered the 
motif of divine intervention in the deaths of William I and William II and this theme 
was to be reiterated throughout the twenty-two years of stadholderless rule. Here the 
theme was developed to encompass virtually every Dutch victory including the 
foundation and defence of the nascent Dutch state. The relief of the siege of Leiden in 
1574 was imputed to the Almighty alone. William’s actions, the author contended had 
served only to hinder the relief of the town. For the author of De Guide Legenden it was 
self evident that ‘ Godt wel den eersten ende oock den voomamen verlosser der Stadt 
Leyden geweest is’. Indeed, he went further arguing that all the successes of the Dutch 
against Spain had wrongly been attributed to the Prince of Orange and his army. Rather 
they were entirely the work of God.  This was a commonly espoused view . A fictional 
citizen of Delft in a pamphlet of 1666 quoted the writer Schelius when he asserted that 
God alone was the origin and cause of their freedom. Monarchs such as Elizabeth I of
24 Knuttel, no.  8655A, pp. 26, 28, 31;  Knuttel,  no.  8794, pp.  168-169,  179;  Knuttel, no.  8806C, pp. 39, 
42-43, 52.
25 Knuttel, no. 9762, p.  141.
26 Knuttel, no.  8655A, pp. 32-33;  Knuttel.  no.  8806C, pp. 27, 57-58.287
England and the Duke of Anjou rejected or were rejected for the headship of the 
republic due not to the wisdom of the world but as a result of the providence of God.27
This stress on God’s providential action is important as it shifted the emphasis 
away from the work of prominent individuals such as William and his descendants. 
Single heads, however capable, could not claim to be the saviours of the Dutch. The 
sense that God had been a prime mover in their victory against Spain was common to 
many Dutch men and women. There was always a danger that by emphasising the 
contribution of any man one detracted from the honour due to God. Many who were 
friends of the Orange stadholders appreciated that danger. The Reformed Minister 
Abraham van de Velde who was no friend to the government of John de Witt assailed 
those who ascribed the virtues of the deity to the persons and actions of the former 
Orange stadholders. He fulminated ‘wech met sulke Pluymstrijkers en afgoden dienaers, 
rechte Princen slaven’. It was God alone who protected us so that like the burning bush 
we were consumed with fire yet remained inviolate. However, van de Velde continued 
it was not wise to deprive the Princes of Orange of the honour due to them. In one of his 
more thoughtful comments he exposed the flaw inherent in the States Party rhetoric. He 
asked, if you cannot show appreciation and gratitude to Princes living or deceased, how
can you express gratitude to God who is not visible and in his Majesty uses Princes, like
28 others, as his instruments.
The Orangist Response
The  1650’s saw the beginning of an Orangist response. Opposition to the Act of 
Seclusion concentrated on repudiating claims that there was no debt owed to the former 
stadholders. A pamphlet published in  1655 and intended to refute the arguments of the 
Deductie deployed evidence from the historian Bor to argue that William I had incurred
27 Knuttel. no. 9330. p.  16
28 van de Velde,  pp.  15-17, 24.288
heavy costs by bringing two armies into the field in 1568 against Alba. The sum 
involved had never been repaid. A pamphlet of 1654 argued that William I’s costs in 
war had been incurred, not to further his own interests but at the behest of the provinces 
and in particular of Holland whose stadholder he was. The anonymous writer tabulated 
the costs of William’s armies in  1568 and 1572 and reckoned that at simple interest the 
stadholder and his descendants had built up debts of nearly 40 million guilders of which 
only 20 million had, at their own calculation, been reimbursed by the States of Holland. 
These calculations took no account of the damages and confiscation of properties 
belonging to William I.29 Clearly a debt of gratitude was still owed and this could best 
be assuaged by restoring the stadholderate in the person of the young prince William IQ.
Drama and spectacle are less vulnerable to refutation than a printed work of 
political rhetoric. Perhaps this explains why the early 1660’s saw the publication, if not 
production, of plays which showed the character of William of Orange in a favourable 
light. One such work written by the Zeelander Joos Claerbout and published in  1661 
was entitled Droef-Bly-eyndig Vertoog op  7 Belegh en Over-gaen van Middelburgh 
onder 7 Beleyt van Wilhelmus den Eersten Prince van Oranje. Henk Duits has observed 
that the dialogue reflected contemporary debate about the character and motivation of 
William of Orange though we must of course to acknowledge that an author may have 
had more than one objective in writing a work.30 As this drama was published in 
Middelburg, the author no doubt intended to appeal to local sentiments. When in the 
course of the drama the Dutch Vice Admiral de Moor speaks of the Zeeland heroes who 
will show that their lives are at the service of their nation,3 1 the audience or readers 
would, have enjoyed the reflected glory. Yet there is evidence that the author was 
sensitive to the wider debate taking place at the time of publication.
29 Knuttel, no. 7659, np;  Knuttel,  no. 7553,  np.
30 Henk Duits,  Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse opstand (Hilversum:  Verloren,  1990), pp.  119-120.
31  Joos Claerbout, Droef-Bly-eyndig  Vertoog o p ’t Belegh en Over-gaen  van M iddelburgh onder  7 Beleyt 
van  Wilhelmus den Eersten Prince van  Orange (Middelburg,  1661), p. 23289
The work is dedicated to the young Prince of Orange, William HI. The author 
explained that he found nothing more pleasurable and instructive, apart of course from 
the Holy Scriptures, than the contemplation of the history of the Netherlands. In such a 
history a man could see how miraculously God had brought the United Provinces to 
their present stature by means of the leadership of  William I. He had, he affirmed, 
written the play for the youth of his time to awaken in them a due gratitude to God and 
his instruments, in particular Prince William I whom he compared to the Swiss William 
Tell.
In Claerbout’s drama the Spaniards are themselves divided on the character of 
William I. Don Louis de Requesens commanding the Spanish forces on behalf of Philip 
II has a view of William which though expressed in less temperate language would 
chime with that of many Catholic historians. For Requesens, William is an
Armen Aerdt-worm die naer staetsucht en baet-sucht dorst,
Wat onder schijn van recht, hy sal seer haest bevinde 
Hoe dat hy heeft soo stout sijn selfs gaen onderwinde 
Te steecken naer de kroon van dien vermaerden Prins.
Requesens vows that this heretic with his pernicious counsel having soared like Phaeton 
will plummet downwards and he, Requesens, will be the agent of his fall. Yet the 
Spanish Vice-Admiral Romero fears and respects William for
.. .soo lange als hy is by Nederlandtsche Staten,
Soo rechten wy niet uyt ons doen en sal niet baten,
Want hy voorsichtigh is en wys in sijn.
Oock is de eerste steen soo hy beleyt noemt Vryigheyt 
Ten gronde vast beleyt.
Romero is not so certain that Requesens can bring about William’s downfall and he 
warns him290
.. .Maer siet sijn groote gemoet
Dat staet gelijck een rots om al de tegenspoet
Te dragen.
The Spaniards appear to acknowledge that William’s leadership of the Revolt has left 
him in debt, though, of course, they do not see this as a virtue. One Sancio Davila asks 
rhetorically
... Wat zijn sijn vroome daden
Als gelt-verquistingh tot sijn te groots schaden?
En heeft hy niet sijn schat, sijn silver, en sijn goudt 
Te pand geset om hem te redden.
William, he contends, will retreat in ignominy back to Germany.
William’s personal testimony is a response to his Spanish contemporaries and his 
critics of the  1660’s.
... Ick hebbe noyt getracht
Om mijn vergrooting, noch mijn Princelijcke macht 
Met Rijckdom te versien: O neen, dees Ooreloogen 
En heb ick niet begost om mijn selfs te verhoogen;
Maer om het Nederlandt te rucken uyt de handt 
Van den gewissen dwangh van eenen Dwingenlandt
William addressing his subordinates emphasises the critical role of the Almighty and 
implicitly his role as an instrument of the Divine Providence when he says
Geen Prins noch volckeren ten hoogen toppe raeckt 
O f‘s Hemels Opper-Vooght gestaegh daer voren waeckt.32
William’s cause was also presented sympathetically in a work of 1662 entitled 
Wilhelm of Gequetste Vryheit. As the title suggests the drama concerned both the 
character of William I and the wider issue of how far his authority and, by implication, 
that of his successors was consonant with the concept of freedom.  The author Lambert 
den Bos denied in his introduction to the play that his work was a pure ‘apologia’ for
32 Claerbout.  pp.  ‘opdracht’, 9-10,  12-13,  18, 23, 36.291
William I but the drama certainly had overtones of the current political rhetoric.33 The 
play begins with Louise de Coligny, the wife of William I and the daughter of Admiral 
Coligny who had been murdered during the massacre of St Bartholomews Eve in 1572. 
Louise tells her lady in waiting that she has suffered a terrible dream in which her 
murdered father with his gaping wounds appears at her bedside.He warns her that her 
troubles are not over but urges her to have patience and fortitude and trust in God for as 
Coligny assures her
Die heyl komt eyndelijck neer so langh van u verwacht,
Is ‘t niet op u het is ten minste op u geslacht.
Coligny’s words concerning the future providential role of the children of Louise 
and William not unnaturally fails to reassure his daughter and she rehearses her fears to 
her husband. William, demonstrating an archetypal masculine approach, urges her to 
rein in her trepidation. His concerns are the earthly and pragmatic. He ennumerates the 
tasks with which he is burdened. He must ensure unity amongst citizens and soldiers in 
the face of discord and division. He must forge a closer link between the forces of the 
secular (Moses) and the religious (Aaron). He must ensure that towns and fortresses are 
defended. His is clearly a self sacrificial role and he has no brief for personal ambition 
for his task is also to
roey alle staetsucht uyt, en schadelijcke pracht.
Hou Steden in haer eer, in toom geswollen macht.
‘k Besorgh voor alle dingh de staetsucht voor te komen,
Met eerlijck loon de drift van ongenoeght te toomen,
Dat onse schatkist rijst en nimmer op en staet,
Voor die knaphandigheyt  van dieft en eygen baet.
Amidst all these concerns
33 Duits.  Van Bartholomeusnacht tot Bataafse Opstand, pp.  94-151.292
... ‘t minst van mijn gedacht, is maer mijn eynd sal wese,
This is far removed from theWilliam summoned up in the writings of Pieter de la 
Court and Uyttenhage de Mist. The dramatist also presents a traditional view of the 
causes of the Revolt of the type which had been reaffirmed by Orangist history writing. 
At the end of the second act a chorus of women hymn an account of the past struggles 
in which the tyrant of the West, Philip n, seeks to trample underfoot the liberties and 
privileges of all groups of Netherlands society. Far from exploiting discontent for their 
own selfish ends, the nobility, exiled or condemned to death, are amongst his foremost 
targets.
Following the death of William a conversation occurs in which themes recurrent 
in political polemic emerge. The fictional Burgerhart tells his companion Heereman that 
the death of the Prince, tragic though it was, may have been ultimately providential.
He foretells
Ick sie een klaren dagh door desen nevel heenen.
He explains that they were in danger of exchanging one autocratic domination for 
another for as he expresses it,
wy poogen , dacht ick vaeck, ons selfs van ‘t juck te vryen,
En voeden in ons schoot weer nieuwe heerschappyen.
This is clearly a reference to the proposal that William I should become count of 
Holland. He refers to the bellicosity and self interest which he alleges characterised the 
counts and, by implication, was in danger of occurring again. Heereman will have none 
of this. Then we were slaves, now we are free citizens. Burgerhart insists
wy wisselden van naem en nimmer van gesagh293
but Heereman counters sharply
wy wisselden van staet, en wierden vry geboren;
Een naem voor menige eeuw van onder ons verlooren,
In his view the stadholderate is not a mirror image of the worst excesses of the counts. 
Rather it is a office which derives its authority from the people, which authority can be 
revoked by them. It can be no accident that William before his death warns his son 
Maurice
geen slappe traegheyt, laet u Eed’le borst verov’ren,
Noch vrouwen sucht te seer u dapperheyt betoov’ren,
Noch drift tot meer gesagh, in dit gevryde landt 
Van ware eendracht oyt ontstrengelen de bant.
In the eyes of many critics of the Orange stadholderate the libidinous Maurice had 
attempted to exercise sovereignty at the expense of the provincial states, thereby 
threatening the whole basis of the Union of Utrecht. The author here is, perhaps, 
drawing a distinction between William whose self sacrifice is not in doubt and the more 
questionable behaviour of his son.
The conclusion of the play takes on a more traditional Orangist flavour. The 
gratitude owed to William by the nascent Republic is shown in the construction of his 
magnificent tomb long after his death.
Hy sal, eer langh, hy sal daer hy ter aerdt sal sincken,
In duersaem koper of in eeuwigh manner blincken,
En aen den reysiger doen uyt metael verstaen,
War wonder hy al heeft voor onse staet gedaen.
Yet not all show the requisite gratitude. At the end of the fourth act the chorus of 
courtiers utter irreproachable Orangist sentiments when they speak of William as 
‘gemartelt voor ‘t ondanckbaer Vaderlandf. The spectre of William which appears to294
his wife in the final act echoes this sentiment when he utters a mournful rebuke against 
‘een volck, dat wenig danck misschien mijn yver weef. Yet the play ends with hope for 
the future. The ghost of Coligny had spoken of the providential work of God in the 
family of William and Louisa. The spectre of the first William refers with approval to 
the marriage of his grandson William II to a daughter of the English royal family. Their 
union results in a son the third of his name who, in the words of his defunct great­
grandfather, is now
in d’armen van de staet, de hoop van groote dingen.34
Orangists eager to refute the arguments of de la Court and Uyttenhage de Mist 
also resorted to the more conventional weapon of political polemic. The nature of 
polemic required not merely that the writers restated the traditional view of William I 
but that they expressly refuted, by force of argument, the opposition interpretation of his 
character and actions. Pursuing this strategy it was essential to emphasise the integrity 
of former history writers who had been impugned as ‘flatterers.’ The author of Hollands 
Op-komst, published in  1662, asked whether it was really the case that eminent writers 
such as Bor, van Meteren and Hooft were no more than self seeking flatterers. He 
conceded that it was no virtue in a history writer to remain silent on the failings of the 
nation’s leaders but insisted it was equally wrong to emphasise all the material to their 
detriment while remaining wilfully silent on their achievements. The States Party 
writers were intent on vilifying William I while remaining silent on the violence 
unleashed on the people by Philip II. It was they who were guilty of subverting history 
for partisan purposes.35
34 L.v.B  (Lambert den Bos),  Wilhelm o f de Gequetste  Vryheyt ( Dordrecht,  1662) pp.  ‘Aen den Leser’, 3,
6-7, 21, 23, 38-39, 41, 45, 49, 52-53.
35 Hollands Op-komst oft Bedenckingen op de schaadelijke  Schriften genammt  Graafelijke  Regeeringe en
Interest van Holland ( Leyden,  1662). pp.  3, 9.295
Thus it was asserted that the States Party view of history in which William, 
Egmond and other nobles were the source of the revolt was in fundamental conflict with 
the writings of the eminent jurist and historian Grotius. This was indeed the case. 
Grotius had written that Philip II was of a nature which would settle for nothing less 
than absolute power and hated all nations where his authority was constrained by 
representative assemblies. At the end of the war with France in 1559, he had refused to 
remove Spanish garrisons from the Netherlands and had retreated to Spain leaving the 
Low Countries in the hands of his satraps. It was they had instituted a regime of 
intolerance and it was the nobility and towns together who had recognised that all trade 
and civil order would not flourish until the Placards against heresy were removed.  The 
Orangist citing of Grotius was a sensitive point since he could hardly be held to be a 
partisan witness in favour of the stadholders. Some Orangist writers did acknowledge 
that some of the nobility were guilty of factious behaviour and some were jealous of 
William I. As one writer expressed it
de Nederlandsche Heeren waren vol jalouzyen tegens malkander, zonderling tegen den Heere 
Prince van Orange, om zyne Princelyke deugden, lieftaligheit onder de Gemeente, en 
diergelyke.
nn
However, they countered, the Prince struggled always to be the focus of unity.
Eminent historians were used to counter other allegations. Bor and P.C. Hooft 
were cited to prove that William’s reaction to the Sea Beggars capture of Den Briel was 
indeed one of concern but that concern stemmed not from his own vanity, as States 
Party writers alleged. Rather, caught unawares by the capture of den Briel, William 
feared that Lumey de la Marck and the Beggars would cause the enemy to move once 
more on to the offensive and so thwart the campaign which the Prince had intended to 
carry out. To counter the view that the Prince actively sought the countship of Holland,
36 Jan W aszink, Antiquity of the Bavarian Republic (Assen: van Gorcum, 2000), p. 99.
37 Knuttel, no.  8655C, p. 32  ;  Knuttel, no. 9762, p.  110.296
evidence was adduced from van Meteren that the matter was spoken of but discarded as 
soon as certain towns expressed their dissent. One writer went further, perhaps spoiling 
the force of his argument, when he ascribed Amsterdam’s resistance to the plan to the 
fact that the town had only recently come over from the side of the King of Spain and 
was still too easily inclined to consult that monarch’s interests.38
Orangist writers were also prepared to include such primary sources as they 
considered supported their argument. In two works the evidence of the letters of Philip 
n’s ambassador in France, Frances de Alava, to the Duchess of Parma were cited to 
demonstrate that the King was determined to destroy all the privileges of the 
Netherlands. William of Orange’s own letters of 1563, 1564 and 1565 were quoted to 
show that not only was William the first to recognise Philip’s full intentions but also 
that William’s opposition to the introduction of the Inquisition had been based on 
genuine principles of religious tolerance rather than ambition. William was permitted to 
voice his own defence against the charge of ingratitude and disloyalty to his sovereign 
when sizeable section of his Apologie or Verantwoordinghe were quoted verbatim in 
one pamphlet. This tendency reached its apogee in  1662 with the publication of a book 
entitled Hollant ’s voordeel op-gekomen door hare Hoogheden door Godts Genaede 
Princen van Orangien en Nassau. This work published in Middelburg and compiled by 
one N.P. was a collection of letters and documents taken from the Histories of 
P.C.Hooft and included the Apologie as well as the offer of the countship of Holland 
from the States of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland. The author, as the title suggests, 
selected thoses sources which he felt vindicated William I against the charge that he had 
gratituitously rebelled against his sovereign Lord in order to usurp that sovereignty for
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himself. He clearly felt that the evidence spoke for itself without the need for extensive
39 commentary.
As we have seen Orangist writers took note of the fact that their opponents were 
deploying material from sources hostile to the House of Orange. One writer referred to 
de la Court’s use in Gravelike Regeering of material from the chronicle of Viglius, 
pointing out that this latter was not an impartial witness but a notorious flatterer of 
Spain whose account had long been mistrusted by other reputable Dutch historians.40 
The author of Apologie pour la maison de Nassau alleged that those who depicted 
William as the man who plunged the Low Countries into civil disorder were merely 
repeating the calumnies of Alba and the catholic historians. Present day writers, in 
vilifying William’s name, were carrying out the work of their Spanish masters. The 
author of Stadhouderlijke Regeeringe was described as ‘ce pensionnaire d’Espagne’ and 
‘un membre du corps Jesuitique’ 41
However Orangist writers were not averse to citing the works of catholic 
historians when it suited them. The author of Hollands Op-komst argued that even 
Spanish historians had conceded that the tyranny enforced by Alba and the Spanish 
soldiery ‘zijn oorzaak geweest van dese verdeffelijke en doodelijke Nederlandsche 
Oorloch’. According to the Orangist author both Bentivoglio and Strada had also 
admitted that the King of Spain was the original source of the violence which engulfed 
the provinces. To the charge that William fomented discord in the name of his own 
selfish ambitions, he countered that Strada himself had acknowledged in Book 9 of his 
work that the Spaniards had been driven out by the forces of the rebel provinces united 
together in a common objective.42 In the same way that certain Spaniards in Claerbout’s
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drama had spoken with respect of the Prince of Orange, so Orangists pamphlet writers 
plundered the works of catholic historians for favourable references to their hero. The 
writer of a work of 1669 pointed out to his readers that even Bentivoglio in the second 
book of his histories had commended William’s ‘wakkerheit, nyverheit, mildheit, 
welspreckenheit en doorzienigheit in allerlye handel’.43 The author of Hollands Op- 
komst cited the words of a catholic historian who had described William as gifted  with 
‘voorsichtigheidt, standvastigheidt, groot-moedigheyde, billikheydt, gedult en  ,
matigheidt: deugden der naulijks in een persoon teffens werden gevonden’. He alleged 
that even Strada had conceded that William was the defender of the freedoms of the 
Low Countries.44 The author of another pamphlet of 1662 deployed Strada to emphasize 
William’s critical role in unifying the discontented. In Strada’s account Granvelle had 
counted the seizure of Egmond and Hoorn for little, believing that only with the 
apprehension of William would the rebels concede. 45
States Party writers had as we have seen consistently emphasised the all 
determining role of God in the success of the Revolt at the expense of the actions of 
William II. Orangist writers clearly felt that this strategy had to be forcefully rebutted. 
One author used the case of the siege of Leiden to illustrate that God and Orange could 
work together. He argued that William had sent English troops at his own cost to protect 
the town though he did acknowledge that they subsequently surrendered to the enemy. 
He had gathered foodstuffs from the surrounding countryside to feed the besieged and 
he had subsequently taken the decision to cut the dikes and flood the terrain. Admiral 
Boisot had been summoned from Zeeland to relieve the town and the Prince had, by 
letter, encouraged the town’s resistance even though he was then gravely ill. This was 
not to deny the role of divine providence, for as the writer expressed it, ‘Godt de eerste, 
en voomaemste oorzake zy, niet alleen van ‘t Verlossen der Stad Leyden, maar ock van ‘t
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geheele Spaansch Jok’. However the Almighty had deployed the prince of Orange as his 
instrument.46  The irascible writer of Apologie pour la maison de Nassau  scorned those 
who insisted that God alone saved the Dutch. They were, he wrote, like little children 
who when they sat at table were directed to give thanks to God for the food on their 
plates, ‘sans leur faire scavoir les peines que peres et meres ont, pour parvenir aux 
moyens de leur foumir Fentretien qui leur est necessaire.’47
Finally, the writer of Hollands Op-komst introduced a novel element in the 
assessment of William I. Faced with the attacks on William’s integrity by States Party 
writers, he countered that their analysis was clearly flawed since the Prince of Orange 
had enjoyed the universal approval of the people. If he had served the provinces so 
badly why then had they delegated to him so much status and authority. In this analysis 
the provincial States were clearly seen as in some sense representing the will of the 
citizens. As the author expressed it,
het volk heeft hem gewilliglijk verkooren, om hare Vryheit voor te staan en te beschermen.
.. .als Spanje hem meende meest te straffen en te schelden, is hy allermeest van ‘t volk verheven
48 en gepresen.
Maurice and Oldenbamevelt
William Temple, English Ambassador in the Hague, had published his Observations 
upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands in  1673. In Temple’s opinion the long 
struggle for independence should have made of the new Republic a strong and healthy 
body. This, he added, was in part true for only one ‘disease’ had afflicted the body 
politic in the space of the ninety-three years since the Union of Utrecht in 1579. Yet like 
a virus it lingered in the blood stream for as Temple expressed it,
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this Disease, like those of the Seed or Conception in a natural body, Though it first appear’d in 
Bamevelf s time, breaking out upon the Negotiations with Spain and seeming to end with his 
death .. .yet has it ever since continued lurking in the veins of this State and appearing upon all 
Revolutions, that seem to favour the predominancy of the one or other Humour in the Body;
And under the Names of the Prince of Orange’s and the Arminian Party has ever made the weak 
side of this State; and whenever their period comes, will prove the occasion of their Fall.49
Another ‘revolution’ in the body occurred in 1650 with the stadholder’s thwarted attack 
on Amsterdam and his death later that year. Inevitably men reflected on previous 
struggles between the stadholder and the States of Holland, in particular the earlier 
struggle between Maurice and Oldenbamevelt and so the political polemic emphasised 
parallels. This was not simply a dispassionate reappraisal of the past. It was felt by both 
groups that the significance of the policies of the States Party in the years 1650 to 1672 
was only apparent when assessed in the light of crucial events in the past.
Firstly, the actions of Maurice, like those of his father William were subjected to a 
searching and hostile analysis by the opponents of the House of Orange. They argued 
that Maurice had built up within the military an independent power base for himself.
The foundations for this were the ‘patents’ which enabled him to call up troops swiftly 
and the bestowing of military offices. Normally such offices were at the disposal of the 
provincial states but Maurice was empowered to act at his own behest when the Dutch 
forces were on campaign. Thus he built up a corps of individuals whose loyalties were 
to him rather than their provincial masters. This was a dangerous development for 
whosoever controlled the army, controlled the state.  In addition Maurice had appointed 
foreign soldiers to key positions in the army. This was depicted as a sinister strategy. 
Not only was it ‘unnatural’ to prefer these outsiders to native bom Dutchmen but these 
foreigners were often from countries where there was a monarch or single head and thus 
were natural supporters of the stadholder with no commensurate loyalty to the States
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General or provincial States. This cohort of ‘flatterers’ and foreigners could enable the 
stadholder to develop tyrannical powers.50
Buttressed by his supporters in times of war, Maurice had little desire for peace. 
States Party polemic emphasised his opposition to the Truce of 1609 which they 
depicted as essential for the republic’s economic welfare for the costs of war were 
greater than the nation could bear. Similarly at the end of the Truce in 1621, rather than 
seek an advantageous permanent peace, Maurice went back to war, driven it was said by 
his own desire to interfere in German affairs as well as the urgings of the Zeelanders 
and Counter-remonstrants who had always opposed the Truce. In addition Maurice’s 
personal dynastic interests ensured that the armies of the United Provinces were 
deployed to occupy areas such as Moers and Lingen which had once been baronies and 
domains of the Orange-Nassau family.51
Most European observers had counted Maurice as perhaps the greatest military 
leader of his age but the States Party writers would have none of this. The author of the 
Guide Legenden purported to cite both the van Reyd and van Meteren when he alleged 
that Maurice’s unsuccessful attack on the town of Bruges in 1592 had been carried out in 
direct contravention of the wiser counsels of the magistrates of Zeeland. He had been 
dilatory if not negligent when he refused to besiege the town of Grol in 1591 in spite of 
the fact that the States General were firmly in favour of the move and the Spanish 
troops were mutinous for lack of pay. Driven by dynastic self interest, he had taken the 
armies of the States General off to Germany in 1621 to support the Elector Frederick,
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leaving the country vulnerable and denuded of troops.
Orangists were swift to refute these claims. The use of patents, they argued was 
essential when the Republic was under threat and the States, with their lengthy 
deliberations, were too slow to respond. There were occasions when it was important
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that military posts were swiftly filled, particularly during the course of gruelling 
campaigns. As for the employment of foreigners in the army, there were many of them, 
English, French and Scots and they had given great and honourable service in the name 
of the Republic.53 Underlying all these arguments was the assumption that military 
matters could not be left to the deliberations of the States alone and that the example of 
Maurice showed that a captain general was essential if victory were to be assured.
Orangists were quite prepared to defend Maurice’s opposition to the Truce of 
1609. Not only did they cite the adage of Tacitus that an honourable war was better than 
a shameful peace but they argued, more pertinently, that by 1608 Spain’s resources 
were severely depleted. If Spain and the Habsburg Archduke had truly been willing to 
accept the United Provinces as an independent state, then there was no reason why they 
should not have concluded a lasting peace. The Truce had simply provided a breathing 
space for Spain to recover, while internal discord racked the United Provinces.
Similarly Maurice had no real choice but to renew the war in  1621 as there was no offer 
coming from the Archduke which would have guaranteed Dutch independence. Maurice 
had not encouraged the Elector Palatine in his Bohemian ambitions but Dutch interests 
could not permit matters in Germany to proceed without intervention. And as for Moers 
and Lingen, these had been fortified not because they were former Orangist domains but 
because of their strategic position on the frontier.
In the face of accusations of military ineptitude, Orangists drew upon historians 
such as Johan van de Sande who had pointed out that in the case of Grol  rain had 
turned the terrain into a quagmire. Consequently, the besieging soldiers were drenched 
and cold and beset with sickness and hunger. In desisting from the siege Maurice had 
shown not only great foresight but also considerable humanity in the face of the 
sufferings of his troops. Nor was this high view of Maurice’s qualities limited to
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supporters of the House of Orange. The Jesuit Famianus Strada had written of his 
‘dapperheit and ‘voorzichtigheit’ and Cardinal Bentivoglio had said of his military 
skills that the States General were as well served by Maurice as by any prince in the 
world.54 The publication in  1663 of Nassouser Heldens Pronk-Tooneel drove home the 
point. It narrated the inimitable deeds of the heroes of the House of Orange-Nassau and 
their central role in the restoration of liberties and privileges and defence of freedom. 
The flavour of the work can be gauged from the illustration on the frontispiece which 
depicted the Holland maid kneeling in submission and gratitude beside a seated Prince 
of Orange. At his feet lay a prone and defeated Spaniard. The first part of the book 
consisted almost entirely of accounts of Maurice’s military campaigns and victories. 
The significance of these for contemporary political debate was signalled at the end of 
the book where the author concluded, ‘we hebben nog een afzetsel van die rechte Stam, 
daar wy ons mee moogen troosten’.55
This polemic concerning the person of Maurice, his military and strategic abilities 
and his relations with the States General and Oldenbamevelt found a particular focus in 
the matter of the battle of Nieuwpoort in  1600. The bare bones of the history concerned 
were not in dispute. In  1600 the Spanish army in the Southern Netherlands was 
quartered in several different locations and plagued with mutiny. Meanwhile, the 
provinces of Holland and Zeeland were both suffering from the depredations of 
privateers based in the port of Dunkirk. It was decided that Maurice should take an 
army of approximately fifteen thousand men to Flanders to capture both Nieuwpoort 
and Dunkirk, thus making the seas safer and facilitating the continuing defence of 
Ostende, the only town of note in Flanders which was still held by the Republic. The 
States General believed that the campaign would not be costly for the troops would live 
off the land and it was hoped that the Flemish towns would contribute to the upkeep of
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the army, an expectation which was not realised.There is no doubt that Maurice himself 
would have preferred an attack on the coast of Brabant or on the tow n of Sluis. He was 
concerned that the siege of Dunkirk could only begin after the capture of Nieuwpoort 
and both towns would have to be garrisoned and maintained. H ow ever the States 
General were insistent that Dunkirk must be the target. At the resulting battle of 
Nieuwpoort on 2 July, the Republic  triumphed but at the cost of approximately 1,000 
dead and 700 severely wounded. The Spanish commander M endoza lost 3,000 njen and 
personally surrendered to Maurice.
The States General and Oldenbamevelt now insisted that M aurice should proceed 
and attack Dunkirk but Maurice was concerned that the Spanish w ere defeated but not 
destroyed. Meanwhile his army had been severely weakened and demoralised by the 
contest and he argued that they were in no condition to lay siege to Nieuwpoort or 
Dunkirk. Maurice returned with his army to the United Provinces only to hear on his 
arrival that the Dunkirk privateers had once again caused considerable damage to Dutch 
fishing vessels. It was said that relations between Maurice and Oldenbam evelt were 
never the same following that summer’s campaign. In  1601 the Spanish laid siege to 
Ostende and Oldenbamevelt urged that the army return to Flanders but Maurice and 
William Louis of Friesland were flatly opposed and their counsel w on the day. 56
It is difficult to exaggerate the iconic significance of the battle of Nieuwpoort in 
the eyes of many supporters of the House of Orange. Orangist w riters continually 
emphasised that the battle on 2 July 1600 occurred three hundred and two years to the 
day after the battle in which an ancestor of the Archduke Albert had slain Adophus van 
Nassau, a renowned ancestor of Maurice. A poem by Johannes Schuler, a minister of 
the Reformed Church in Breda, delivered to William III on the occasion of his birthday 
on  14 November 1664 enumerated the achievements of the House o f Orange and their
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bearing on his future prospects with specific mention of the coincidence of the two 
battles.57 Nieuwpoort also became not only a victory for a particular dynasty but, for 
many, an integral and critical element in the stuggle for freedom against Spain. Peter 
Verhoek’s poem ‘De Parnassus aen ‘t Y’ placed Nieuwpoort within this framework of 
an iconic struggle in which the cause of the Republic and Orange are one.58 Most 
authors of this type avoided any mention of the dispute between Maurice and 
Oldenbamevelt. Lambert den Bos in his Poetische Betrachtingen of 1646 devoted 
nearly all of his poem of sixteen hundred lines entitled ‘Mauritias’ to the battle of 
Nieuwpoort without conceding any hint of discord between the stadholder and the 
Advocate of Holland. 59
However, the States Party history writers of the early 1660’s were bent on 
destroying Maurice’s reputation for military competence. In their view, wise regents 
acting in concert were better able to devise a coherent military strategy than a single 
commander. They claimed that Maurice had singularly failed to adhere to the policy 
advocated by Oldenbamevelt and had not followed up the victory at Nieuwpoort. In a 
blinding demonstration of armchair generalship, they insisted that if Maurice’s troops 
had been fit enough to fight and win a battle, they were fit and well enough to pursue 
the enemy. Countering assertions that the troops had been short of food, the author, 
almost certainly a Leiden lawyer, argued bracingly that troops were used to going 
without food. Concern for the large numbers of wounded was similarly dismissed. 
Failure to follow up the victory had enabled Albert to regroup his army and move back 
out of Flanders. One author cited Oldenbamevelt’s Remonstrance of 1618 in which the 
author had passionately defended his strategy of action in Flanders and by implication 
Maurice’s dereliction. In case any honour remained to Maurice, one work quoted van
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Reyd to the effect that the honour of victory was due to God alone as both sides had 
made critical errors during the battle. 60
As political polemic continued to debate the future of the youthful William HI, 
Orangist writers leaped to defend the reputation of his forefather. Not only did they 
emphasise the desperate condition of the Dutch army following the battle but argued 
that, if failings there were, they were firmly the responsibility of Oldenbamevelt. It was 
he who had urged the Flanders campaign but when battle was joined he remained in 
Ostende allegedly preventing cavalry reinforcements from reaching Maurice. One 
author argued that the whole strategy designed to relieve Ostende was flawed as the 
town was of little value to the Dutch. This writer also emphasised Maurice’s concern for 
his own troops as well as the magnanimous treatment afforded to the Spanish 
commander Mendoza. Another conjectured that Oldenbamevelt’s dispatch of Maurice 
to Flanders on such a dangerous campaign could be compared to the biblical King 
David’s dispatch of Uriah the Hittite to the forefront of the battle.61
When in June  1670 William III became a member of the Council of State, it was 
clear that he was destined for some form of military service in the name of the Republic. 
Since the end of 1669 the Council of State, alarmed by Louis XIV’s action against 
Alsace-Lorraine, was hastily attempting to recruit and equip cavalry and infantry 
regiments.  Inevitably these concerns raised the issue of military command and the 
possibility of the Prince of Orange acting as captain general.  Such considerations 
prompted reflection on the conduct of previous captains general and their relationship to 
the States General. The struggle between Maurice and Oldenbamevelt now became 
highly relevant to the unfolding of contemporary events.
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This may account, for the publication in 1670 of a drama by Comelis van 
Everdingen concerning the battle of Nieuwpoort entitled Slagh in Vlaenderen,
Spaenjens Treurspel. Recent historical events were now becoming acceptable subjects 
for dramatic production and Nieuwpoort had already been the theme of a play by Elias 
Herckmans, also entitled Slack van Vlanderen, which was published in 1624.63 In the 
introduction to this play the author described himself as one who had been in the service 
of the House of Orange and he dedicated the work to William HI. The past was 
emphatically to be recalled in the service of the present. In a poem by Humbert in the 
introductory section of the drama Everdingen was praised as one who ‘die d’oud 
vergeetenheydt / Doet knarsen op haer tandt’. This call to active memory was followed 
by an urgent appeal. ‘ONTWAECK UYT D’ YS’RE SLAEP, ONTWAECK 
NASSOUSCHEN HELST.’
Throughout the drama, Maurice is characterised as the loyal servant of the States 
General. Greeting their deputies and those of the provincial states, in Act I, Scene in, he 
declares emphatically, ‘den wel-stand van haer all’ sijn my van herten lief. It is clear 
that Maurice is unconvinced by Oldenbamevelt’s strategy. This is significant for 
Herckman’s earlier play did not refer to any disagreement between the two men.64 
Maurice argues that the Spanish army outnumbers the Dutch three to one and that 
Hollands coffers will be exhausted by the campaign but adds
... ik weet mijn plichten,
Die zijn met ziel, en lijf, verbonden uyt te richten,
Het geen den Staet gebied : ick houd’ my aenden Eed,
Die ‘k eens geswooren heb.
Here Maurice’s soldierly skills are directed not for selfish dynastic purposes as States 
Party writers alleged but at the behest of the States General and for the good of the
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Republic. While critics alleged that the captains general of the House of Orange had 
built up an independent power base within the army to challenge the authority of the 
provincial States, van Everdingen’s Maurice follows the strategy laid down by the 
Oldenbamevelt and the States General although he nurses well founded concerns about 
its efficacy. In Act n, Scene m, Maurice relays to his senior officers the orders given to 
him to engage the Spanish in battle. It is clear that they too harbour doubts but they 
comfort themselves that in taking action at the behest of the States General Maufice is 
acting in concert with and on behalf of the people of the United Provinces and express it 
thus.
A1 wat Pompilius of Romulus ooyt deed,
Stemt met‘t gemeen, ‘t om-helst den innnerlijcke vreede 
Het hooft bestiert de leen, de leen blieft ‘t hooft gemeen:
Zy bonden haer persoon, selfs in haer eygen rechten,
‘t Gemeen stemt in haer wil, ten aensien dat zy hechten 
De hand selfs aen het Jock, tot voor-deel van den Staet.
In rhetoric and spectacle, Maurice had been compared previously to the Roman Numa 
Pompilius both on account of his alleged defence of religion and his military exploits in 
the cause of freedom.65 Here, in an analogy of the body, Maurice the head acts out the 
aspirations and desires of the people, in this case expressed by the deputies of the States 
General.
However, Maurice is conscious that not all interests are as selfless as his own. At 
the very beginning of the drama in in Act I, Scene I he warns  his younger step-brother 
Frederick Henry and the readers that there are others who look only to their self interest 
and not to the national good.
...veel helden van Nassouw,
‘t Ontbrack haar noyt aen deucht, den lof bleef by haar trouw.
Dat bleek wel eer, aen hem, die met de Cepter Zwayde 
Een Kroon van’t Roomsche Rijk; hoe wel veel hoofden drayde 
‘t Onteydigh van hem af, vargeters van haer plicht,
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Die veel om eygen baet, een anders onheyl sticht.
It was Adolph of Nassau who wore the crown of the Holy Roman Empire and 
Maurice’s words emphasise the link between the battle which led to Adolph’s death and 
Nieuwpoort. However those ‘veel hoofden’ who sought to undermine Adolph carry 
overtones of the ‘veel hoofden’ whom Orangists accused of seeking to dominate the 
present day Republic.
Compared to Herckmans’ Maurice, van Everdingen’s hero is a profoundly 
religious man.66 Having agreed to carry out a strategy in which he has little faith, 
Maurice urges Oldenbamevelt in Act I, Scene m to institute a day of prayer for the 
enterprise. He entrusts himself to God as Isaac entrusted himself to his father Abraham. 
Confronted in Act I, Scene IV, by Count Ernest Casimir bearing the news that most of 
the men under his command were dead, Maurice admonished him to cast away his 
doubts for before dawn salvation will be upon  them.
Vertwijfelt maer niet, hy sal ons oock noch redde,
[...]
Stelt uwe hoop op hem, ‘t is noch de selde handt 
Die haer, na hare quael, betracht in ‘t beloofde land.
Vertrouw u op den Heer:
In his final soliloquoy in Act v, Scene m Maurice rejoices in victory over ‘Roomens 
wulpische Kerck’ before giving thanks to God who has saved him from the hands of his 
enemies and vowing lifelong gratitude and service. His opponents had often derided 
Maurice’s religious ideals, insisting that for him religion merely served as a pretext for 
intervention in affairs of state but here he is portrayed as devoted to the Reformed faith, 
not just in office but in person.
Supporters of the States Party might impugn Maurice’s military competence but 
van Everdingen’s fictional Spaniards are under no such illusion. As in Claerbout’s
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drama, some of the enemy initially deride Maurice and his army but others 
acknowledge that he is a worthy opponent.  A Spanish officer Labberloth boasts in Act 
n, Scene I that the destruction of Maurice’s army will be mere child’s play but wiser 
heads remind him of events at Tumhout where their unsuspecting army was attacked 
from the rear. In Act v, Scene I the defeated Archduke Albert answers States Party 
critics of both the House of Orange and the role of a Captain General when he opines
soo lang als Hollandt heeft sulck’ Veld-Heer in haer Staedt,
Sie ‘k voor mij wynich kans.
It may be significant that youth is also emphasised. Opponents of the House of 
Orange had consistently insisted that William HI was too young and immature to 
contemplate any role in the service of the Republic. William would be twenty years of 
age in November 1670 and arguments of this kind were becoming difficult to sustain. 
Van Everdingen emphasises the presence of Frederick Henry at the site of battle and 
lauds the youthful courage of the man who would be the future captain general of the 
Republic. In Act IV, Scene I, Maurice urges his young step-brother of sixteen years to 
leave with the departing fleet so that at least one of them would survive. Frederick, 
however, insists on remaining to play his part in ‘Neer-lands schut en scherm’. The 
Archduchess Isabella is fearful of the outcome of the battle but her husband Albert 
advises her that Maurice and Frederick Henry will soon concede for the clash of arms 
will be
voor eerst, in ‘t open veld, een schrick voor’t jonge-bloed 
Van Willems teere Soons, die nauw noch zijn vol-voed 
In Mannelijcke leen.67
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The outcome of the battle is an object lesson not just for Albert but for all detractors of 
the House of Orange.
In political polemic of the period 1650 to 1672 the struggle between Maurice and 
Oldenbamevelt was relived anew in the animosity between the House of Orange and de 
Witt and his party. The events of those years were compared to the events during the 
years of Truce and particularly the critical period of 1617-1619. In this dialogue, in 
which both parties were engaged, the policies of John de Witt were likened to those of 
Oldenbamevelt and in an ultimately disturbing development the person of de Witt was 
seen to be Oldenbamevelt reborn with all the prophetic implications for his final end. In 
a pamphlet of 1651 Haagsch Winkel-Praatje fictional citizens of the provinces of 
Holland, Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen debated contemporary issues. The Frisian 
inquired rhetorically
was niet het rumoer in ‘t Politijk Anno 1618, by-na gelijk als dat van ‘t voorleden jaar ende 
wilde Bamevelt niet de Regeeringe op de voet hebben als onse heeren die nu practiseeren: ende 
is niet Bamevelt gestorven om soo een saeck voor te staan als de Heeren van Holland die nu 
verstaan.
A lively argument followed in which the speakers weighed the relative merits of the six 
members of the States of Holland imprisoned by William II in 1650 against those of 
Oldenbamevelt.  Orangists, however, were putting the name of Oldenbamevelt to other 
uses. In  1652 the elderly Pauw, the Pensionary of Holland, went on an embassy to 
England designed to resolve pressing issues between the two nations. His embassy was 
heavily criticised for amongst other things seeking only to represent the interests of the 
States of Holland rather than the United Provinces as a whole. For some this was the 
past repeating itself. In a pamphlet of September 1652 entitled Den Zeeusen Beesem the
68 Knuttel. no. 7039, p.  17.312
writer urged his fellow countrymen to wake up to the reality of what was happening for 
in his words
tis alles Bamevelts en recht Machiavel.
Soo is ons heele Landt verbastert en vermompt
Sal Bameveldus Geest by ons nu komen Spoocken.
For this author, the present government were no more than ‘Bameveldus Broers”. 69  For 
another writer of the same year Pauw was a traitor who sought to imitate the policy 
which Oldenbamevelt had adopted. 70
In an Orangist pamphlet of 1653 matters were spelled out even more clearly. The 
supporters of the present government were evil regents and ‘groote voor-standers van 
Bamevelt en de geheele Arminiaensche factie’. Together, these had attempted to 
proscribe the True Reformed Religion in the years 1618 and 1618 while permitting the 
free exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion, had tried to murder Prince Maurice in the 
interests of their Spanish pay masters and had sought to deprive the citizens of their 
privileges. Moreover they now intended to reverse the condemnations pronounced on 
Grotius and Oldenbamevelt.71 Certainly it could not be denied that there was a revival 
of interest in the matter of Oldenbamevelt. Vondel’s drama Palamedes in which the 
innocent Greek hero was condemned to death by Agamemnon and his satraps had been 
widely recognised as an allegory on the trial and execution of Oldenbamevelt. The first 
edition, published in  1625, sold out in days in spite of attempts to confiscate copies. 
Further editions had followed in the same year. Palamedes was republished once in
69 Martinus van Alle, Den Zeeusen Beesem (Leiden,  1652),  np.
70 Knuttel, no. 7237, np.
71  Knuttel, no. 7438. np.313
1630 and again in 1634 but in  1652 the publisher, Abraham de Wees issued no fewer 
than six editions.72
For some, the very name ‘Palamedes’ was coming to stand for the defence of 
native freedoms against overwheening authority.  In a pamphlet of 1650 a fictitious 
Hollander stoutly maintained the integrity of provincial sovereignty against the forces of 
the States General and the stadholder. Referring to the attack on Amsterdam and the 
city’s powerful Bickers family, he alleged  ‘doch het gaet nu als het eertijds gingh, 
Palamedes wiert van Ulysses, om sijn deughden gehaet, en aen’t ongedierte
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overgelevert’.  The reference was clearly not just to a Greek hero but to the executed
Oldenbamevelt whose principles were being upheld by Amsterdam and the States of 
Holland. In 1657 Johnan  van Someren, a correspondent of John de Witts, published 
Herstelde Oudheyt ofte Beschryvinge van Batavia. Here he analysed the ‘freedoms’ 
enjoyed by the Batavians and the threats to those ‘freedoms’. The work was a judgment 
on recent events. The author depicted Arminius and Civilis, both of whom aspired to be 
kings, were represented as ‘disturbers’ of the Netherlands, just as Maurice and William 
II appeared to the States Party. The frontispiece showed a woman mounted in a chariot 
of state, on her head a laurel wreath and in her left hand a lance upon which a cap of 
freedom rested. Behind her on the chariot armed with trumpet stood the archetypal 
figure of Fame. Beneath was written ‘Beschrivingh van Batavia’ and at the very bottom 
of the illustration was inscribed ‘Palamedes inv (ictus)’. 74
The spectre of Oldenbamevelt still haunted contemporaries.  1658 saw the second 
publication of a work entitled Historie van het Leven en Sterven van Heer Johan van 
Oldenbamevelt. The anonymous author described himself as ‘een Liefhebber der 
Waarheyt’ and in a reference to the castle where the six members of the States of
72 A. C.  Schuytvlot, Catalogus van  Werken  van en over Vondel ( Nieuwkoop:  De Graaf,  1987), pp.  130- 
133.
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Holland had been confined by William II in 1650, the publication of 1658 was 
published ‘op Loevesteyn.’ This work had been first published in 1648 in the city of 
Rotterdam where copies had been confiscated on the orders of the magistrates. In May 
1648 the States General had described the book as a ‘notorious defamatory libel’ and 
urged all provinces to act against it. The editor, Joannes Naeranus, likened his travails to 
those of Vondel whose Palamedes had been banned in 1625.  In the introduction to the 
edition of 1658 the printer bluntly asserted that the sentence against Oldenbameyelt was 
unjust and prompted by base motives. However, he hastened to assure his readers that 
he did not say this to foment disorder or tarnish the name of his fatherland,
maar alleen om te betoonen, hoe ellendig een Staat gebengelt en geringelaart wert, wanneer 
eenige van de Regenten haar plichten niet quijtende, hare Voor-rechten en Priviligien om de 
gunst van de eene en de haat van andere, haar uyt de hand laten nemen; oft gewillige overgeven.
Such an outrage could not happen in present times and readers were urged to recognise 
how fortunate they were to be governed now by such wise and prudent regents.
Inevitably the picture of Maurice which emerged from this work was not a 
flattering one. As the writer expressed it, his aim like that of all history writers was to 
emphasise the merits of his subject but inevitably, he coyly conceded, this involved  the 
bringing to light of all the failings of those who opposed him. Vondel, in a poem 
seemingly written for this edition of the book, described the Advocate of Holland as 
‘Hollands Vader’ and defender of her freedoms who was  ‘veroordeeld als een Seneka / 
door Nero’s haat en ongena’. This would not be the last time that Maurice was 
compared to Nero. Another poem by an anonymous author entitled Praalbeeld voor den 
Vader der Vaderlands urged that a statue of Oldenbameveld, bearing the hat of freedom 
in his hand, should be erected at the door of the chamber in which he had been so
75 Ingrid W eekhout,  ‘Een Rotterdams voorbeeld  van zeventiende-eeuwse boekencensuur’  , Literatuur, 4 
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unjustly condemned.  Such a statue would serve to remind what the present 
government stood for and as well as emphasising that they were honour bound to 
struggle against the forces of malice and tyranny from whichsoever source they came.
This debate, however, was to take on a different and more disturbing tone. In the 
controversy surrounding the Public Prayer Debate in 1663, past and present converged. 
Battle commenced with a pamphlet tellingly entitled Den Ver-resenen Bamevelt, 
Betabbert met alle sijne Politycke Maximen. The author set the tone for the debate 
which would follow when he affirmed that ‘geene saecke moet een soo nieuw niet 
schijnen of men sy verseeckert dat in de voorgaende eeuwen deselve sy gepassert’.
What was occurring with respect to the formula of prayer was the struggle of 
Remonstrant and Counter-Remonstrant all over again only now, the author pointedly 
added, there was no stadholder Prince of Orange to resolve the issue and sustain the 
Union. He commented tersely, ‘BARNEVELT’S  geest is verresenen als eenen 
vermomde Samuel’ and mused purposefully whether the outcome might not end in 
tragedy as before.
De oude Rocken der Remonstranten, die eensdeels vermuft waren, anderdeels door de motten 
verteert, werden het voor gebracht, men verlucht deselve laptse,verschoontse om die selve 
Comedie, indien niet een Tragedie, noch eens te speelen.7 7
Another writer of the same year similarly linked Oldenbamevelt to the present 
government of the Republic. In a fictional dialogue between a Rotterdammer and a 
native of Gelderland, the former insisted that the Advocate of Holland was an ‘Agrippa’ 
that is one bom against nature feet first and such persons ‘naer de getuygenis der 
Naturalisten, hebben gemeynelick een ongeluckich evnde’.  Both Nero and Cromwell 
had been such. The Geldersman saw parallels in the present when he added darkly, ‘ick
76 Historie van  het Leven en St  erven  van  H eer Johan  van O ldenbam evelt (1658),  ‘opdracht’. For Vondel
see also  ‘Het  Stokse van Joan van Oldenbarenevelt. Vader des Vaderlands’, in Verwey, p. 982.
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soude nu wel gelooven datter ter dieser tijdt noch wel sommighe in ‘t landt zijn door de 
wonderen diemen vemeemt, welcke oock met de voeten eerst geboren zijn’.78
1663 also saw the republication of an Orangist pamphlet, first issued in 1618, 
entitled Gulden legende van den Nieuwen St Jan. It was a virulent attack on the person 
and policies of Oldenbamevelt but the publisher clearly intended it to be of more than 
historical relevance. On the frontispiece he declared that the pamphlet was ‘tot klaer 
bericht bestelt voor den nieuwen geresene Bamevelt’.79 The events of 1617-1619 had 
become topical. The conversation between the Rotterdammer and the Geldersman 
continued in another pamphlet of 1663 in which the protagonists argued that 
Oldenbamevelt had been justly condemned to death.80 For those who thirsted for more 
of the same, in the following year a third tranche of this fictional discourse provided a
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continuation of those ‘schrickelicke geschiedenissen vande Arminiaensche beroerten’.
There was a speedy response from the States Party writers. Just as the Orangists, 
they were ready to resurrect the quarrels of the past. A poem by the Remonstrant writer 
Jacob Westerbaan entitled Krancken Troost voor Israel in Holland began not with the 
events of the early 1660’s but the pillaging in February 1617 of the home of Rem 
Bisschop in Amsterdam by a mob urged on by Gomarist preachers. For Westerbaan, 
this served as an object lesson of what happens when religion escapes from the control 
of the secular provincial power.  “ For the author of Herstelden Bamevelt the problems 
of those years were entirely the result of Maurice’s attempt to seize sovereignty from 
his masters, the States of Holland.83  These writers effectively demonised Maurice. In a 
fictional discourse an inhabitant of the Hague mused on the arrest and trial of the 
Advocate Jacob van den Ende by the Duke of Alba in the previous century. Van den
78 Knuttel, no.  8804, pp.  12-13.
79 Knuttel, no.  8795  :  Knuttel, nos. 2757, 2758, 2759
80  Knuttel, no.  8805
81  Knuttel, no.  8917
82  Knuttel, no.  8807, p. 3.
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Ende had been lured by an allegedly friendly invitation and then seized and brought 
before the Council of Blood. He died in prison before sentence was pronounced. The 
citizen argued that in this matter the Duke of Alba had been less culpable than the 
stadholder Maurice. Alba could at least be excused because he was acting on behalf of 
his master Philip II but Maurice had been acting against the leading servants of those, 
the States of Holland, who were the masters of Maurice. He concluded ‘de Hollanders 
behooren meer te schrikken voor den naam van een Stadhouder als voor Due D alf.84 
Westerbaan reinforced this idea in his poem when he insisted that the persecution of the 
Remonstrant ministers and congregations marked a return to the values of Alba and the 
Council of Blood.85 This comparison became an idee fixe in States Party rhetoric 
whenever the issue of Maurice and Oldenbamevelt were discussed.86
Supporters of the States Party were well aware of the dangers which lurked in 
Orangist polemic. Westerbaan was only too willing to agree that the issues arising in the 
troubles of 1617-1619 appeared to have recurred in  1663 but it was only principles and 
not individuals who were involved. Oldenbamevelt had not risen from his grave: he 
would rest there until the Day of Judgment when God would take revenge for his 
innocent blood. 87 For the writer of Den Schotschen Duyvel of 1663, Oldenbamevelt 
was indeed a martyr and ‘de tragedie van Palamedes, Coningh Stuart, de 
Louvestainsche Heeren, is eene en de selve’. However, readers must beware of Orangist 
rhetoric for they ‘hares verresenen Bamevelts WITTE hooft willen laeten van de 
Schouderen nemen en Holland overgeven aen de discretie van vremde knechten’.88 A 
poem of 1664 reinforced the identification between the fates of Charles I and 
Oldenbamevelt before shedding light on what the author believed to be the true 
objective of Orangist polemic. They sought to make Oldembarnevelt despised,
84 Knuttel,  no.  8803, pp. 48-49.
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ghelijck sy de tegenwoordige regeeringe wederom soecken verhaet te maecken door haer vuyle 
pasquillen: De Guide Legenden van St Ian, Den Verresenen Bamevelt, t’ Samenspraeck 
tusschen een Rotterdammer En Geldersman, Kaets-bal... om noch eens een bloedige Traghedy 
te Spelen op Hollants Toneel.89
The risen Oldenbamevelt lived in the person of John de Witt and there were those who 
hoped that the present Pensionary would undergo the fate of his famous predecessor.
Oldenbamevelt also reappears as the martyred Palamedes. In his life of Vondel, 
Brandt explains that the first ever performance of Palamedes, since its publication in 
1625, took place in Rotterdam in  1663. There were also three open air productions in 
1665 when the Amsterdam Schouwburg was being rebuilt.90  In Rotterdam a deputation 
of Reformed ministers complained to the Burgomasters that the production of 
Palamedes was an insult to God’s Church and the House of Orange which strove to 
uphold it.91  Writers hostile to the House of Orange made it plain that these productions 
of Palamedes were linked to the memory of Oldenbamevelt. An author of 1664, said of 
the production in Rotterdam that it depicted the unjust death of ‘onsen Hollandsen 
Palamedes’ and set this within the framework of the freedom which had been 
established in a government without a stadholder. 92
The fiftieth anniversary of the death of Oldenbamevelt was not surprisingly 
marked by a publication. In this case, the author of the work concerned declared that he 
did not intend to take sides on the matter but simply to provide a narrative .93 However, 
a work bearing the same title and published by Joannes Naeranus, which appeared in 
1670, eschewed any attempt at impartiality. He informed his readers that his account, 
containing material not previously published would move their hearts with its recitation
89 Knuttel, no.  8928,  np.
90 G eeraardt Brandt: Het Leven van Joost van den  Vondel.  ed. by Mariecke van Oostrom and Maria A. 
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93  W aerachtige Historie van  7 G eslachte,  G eboorte...van wijlen Heer Juan  O ldenbam evelt (Amsterdam, 
1669).‘Voor-Hooft'.of the unjust and malignant slanders which Oldenbamevelt had endured during his 
lifetime and with which his memory was still assailed. His sufferings were the work of 
the stadholder for it was in the very nature of the men who held that office that they 
would trample upon the rights, laws and privileges of the country. Men must be 
reminded of these matters for there were some citizens who
zoo verbasterd zijn van zinnen datze de Stadhouderlijke straffe Regeeringe voor een vrije 
Staatse derven prijzen: zoo die zoo onwaarde Hollanders dit boek komen te lezen, en met een 
goed oordeel te onderscheiden, zoo heb ik mijn wens en begeren voltrokken.94
The sudden collapse of Dutch resistance in the face of the French incursions in 
1672 created a mood of national soul searching. For many, the roots of this disaster 
were to be found, at least in part, in the past. In the light of the previous polemic, it was 
inevitable that the spectre of Oldenbamevelt would be raised by Orangist writers. An 
anonymous poem of 1672, published in pamphlet form, decried the loss of so many 
towns and fortresses on the eastern frontiers of the Republic and the conduct of the 
officers charged with their defence. For this author, the origins of this defeat were 
expressed in the following sentiment.
De sack van Bamevelt en was noch niet vergeten,
Het werk van Loevestein was noch in ‘t hert gesleten.9 5
Another writer alleged that the disasters of 1672 were the result of naked self interest on 
the part of the nation’s rulers and a failure to maintain good relations with nations such 
as England. These failings could be ascribed to the fact that the Republic’s rulers were 
none other than ‘het saet van Bamevelt op t’ Hoogerhuys geseten’.96 Borstius, a 
Reformed minister from Rotterdam, raised the spectre of treachery when he argued that
94  W aerachtige Historie (1670),  ‘Voor-H ooft’.
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foreign powers could not have wrought such havoc if they had not been assisted by 
sympathisers from within. He traced the origins of this internal discord and want of 
patriotism back to the time of the stadholder Maurice ‘in wiens tijdt het eerste Zaedt 
Vruchten heeft gedragen van dat welck nu noch tegenwoordigh oorsaeck is van ons 
bederf. The supporters of de Witt were ‘vuyle gepassioneerde menschen, het rechte
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Zaad en nakomelingen van Bamevelt’.  A pamphlet containing a fictional catalogue  of 
books allegedly found in the library of John de Witt linked adherence to the prinpiples 
of Oldenbamevelt with present day treachery. One of the works contained within was 
described as ‘De gront-regel van de Politie’ in which were clearly stated ‘de middelen 
om Bamevelt’s doodt te wreken, door ‘t vermoorden der Slickgeuzen met haer 
Opperhooft en veel liever Frans als Prins’. 98
Many of these pamphlets were diminutive ephemeral productions and generally 
speaking they have not been considered worthy of study. Yet they were not lacking in 
significance. It had always been the contention of the Orangist Party that only the 
exercise of the authority of the stadholder Maurice had saved the Republic from 
dissolution. Faced by a French invasion and an apparent pusillanimity among many in 
government, their readers could draw the obvious conclusion that only the restoration of 
the stadtholderate could save them from the government of John de Witt and the French.
After the deaths of the brothers de Witt, Orangist propaganda linked them 
conclusively with Oldenbamevelt. A pamphlet printed after the lynchings in the Hague, 
stated  laconically of the de Witts that,
hare Namen mede moghten ghedacht werden als Martelaars in het Boek van dien vromen 
Patriot, Johan van Oldenbamevelt, die om deselve reden, door Beuls handen, mede na de andere 
Wereld is gesonden. 99
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A pamphlet issued at about the same time likened the life and work of Oldenbamevelt 
to that of John de Witt both being pensionaries of Holland. The writer made explicit to 
his readers that ‘de geest van Bamevelt, iandsvyant, aarts verrader’ was ‘herlevende in 
de Witt’. Both had, he alleged, oppressed the Church of God and the House of 
Orange.100
This theme was reinforced visually. A satirical print of 1674, based on a pamphlet 
of 1672, was headed by the query whether the de Witts were devils or not, the wording 
being flanked by the image of the bodies of the two brothers hanging on the gallows. 
John de Witt was also depicted flying with wings, cloven hooves and devil’s horns. His 
brother Comelis was similarly equipped and bearing a mask of deception. In the centre 
the Holland Maid sat in her garden overlooked by a tower with the sun on it 
representing Louis XIV of France. In a building by the tower a brace of devils were 
supporting the headless body of Oldenbamevelt while they attempted to re-attach his 
head and bring him back to life. Their attempts were in vain, however, for from the left 
William HI approached and with him men bearing the coats of arms of the towns he had 
reconquered from the French. 101 Another print of 1672 emphasised the common fate of 
Oldenbamevelt and John de Witt. The figure of Death is depicted bearing his scythe and 
seated  with one elbow resting on books on a table in a melancholy pose. Above him 
and to his left is the face of Oldenbamevelt. Two prints of the brothers de Witt are 
attached to the table hanging down towards  the floor at the  foot of which a snake is
curled. On the table are seen two books Op  en ondergang der Grooten (Plutarch’s
Lives) and Vondel’s Palamedes.102
Of course not all the print makers need be described as Orangist. They and others 
like them simply reflected the prevailing rhetoric. The Orangist strategy of the  1660’s 
had bound together Oldenbamevelt and John de Witt with the implication that the
100 Knuttel,  no.  10432. np.
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second would suffer the fate of the first. With the death of the de Witts this type of 
rhetoric seemed little short of prophetic. Prints and pamphlets published after the 
murders in the Hague gave the impression that no other outcome had been possible. In 
prose, poetry and print the death of  John de Witt and his brother, as well as the 
execution of Oldenbamevelt were depicted as the inevitable consequence of an attempt 
to thwart the government of a stadholder. By implication, such policies, were doomed to 
failure and their authors to death.
Conclusion
In a print of 1674 entitled Anticurus van Loevesteyn John de Witt sits on the 
stadholder’s chair as the embodiment of the now defunct Perpetual Edict. His hair is 
composed of adders spitting forth the names of anti-Orangist pamphlets. On a nearby 
table rests a copy of the ‘Guide Boeck’, that is de Guide Legenden of 1663 in which the 
reputations of the former stadholders were systematically debunked. Behind him are the 
images of chaos wrought in state, church and military. Above them the embodiment of 
Freedom descends on a cloud bearing the arms of William III.103 In the mind of many 
Orangists, the attack on the former stadholders was a major factor in the dissolution of 
the Republic which had threatened in  1672. An anonymous author of 1672 alleged that 
works such as the Stadthouderlijcke Regeeringe of 1662 had inflicted more harm on the 
Republic than Balthazar Gerard the assassin of William II.104
Certainly Orangists saw a defence of the persons and actions of the former 
stadholders as crucial to the future of William III. To that end, they deployed not only 
political rhetoric but also, in the  1660’s, drama. The two genres were closely connected. 
Characters in the plays posed and answered many of the questions which were being
103 M uller,  no. 2523;  Stolk,  no.  2573.
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debated in contemporary political pamphlets. In this way, the criticisms of Catholic 
historians, now deployed by supporters of the States Party, were confounded.
Sometimes this struggle for the past degenerated into tedium. Many commentators 
have seen the ‘history writing’ of the supporters of the States Party in the 1660s as 
marking a new phase of independent critical analysis. Both Kampinga in his De 
Opvattingen over onze Oudere Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis and Haitsma Mulier and 
Janssen in their Willem van Oranje in de Historie1584-1984 support this thesis.105 To 
contemporaries it may have appeared differently. De la Court may have mocked the 
‘pluymstrijckers’ who had previously eulogised the Princes of Orange but he was surely 
no less partisan and supportive of the existing regime as they had been of the Orange 
stadholders. De la Court might have taken a cynical view of human nature as epitomised 
in the drive for sovereignty on the part of the stadholders but he did not apply these 
dictums to his own motivation. There is a repetitive quality in the manner in which de la 
Court and others place the worst possible construction on the policies and actions of the 
Princes of Orange.This did not escape contemporaries. The author of Apologie pour la 
maison de Nassau, himself no stranger to hyperbole, may be permitted to speak.
Le  Prince  Guillaume  et  ses  descendants  n’ayant  pas  contente  les  partis  d’Espagne  dans  les 
progres qu’ils ont faits... s’ils prenent des villes ils ruinent le Pais, s’ils gaignent des batailles ils 
ne poursuivent pas leurs victoires,  s’ils employent leurs armis pour secourir la patrie affligee, 
ces armateurs-la servent plutot a oppresser la liberte, qu’a la delivrer; si la commodite ne permet 
d’emporter une  ville par siege,  ils sont blames de lachete,  si  1’enemi  fort au triple prend nos 
gens au depourvu, et aux-quels on ne pouvoit donner secours, il leur atribiie la faute avec ironie; 
si 1’Espagnol cauteleux fait semblant de trait de paix pour amuser les Etats, lesquels decouvrans 
les fourbes n’y veulent point entendre, on blame le Prince d’etre l’obstacle qui empeche le repos 
de la patrie; bref des actions de cette maison il en fait une selle a tous chevaux 106.
Pervasive also is the polemic of hatred. Orangist identification of the person of 
John de Witt with that of Oldenbamevelt served two functions. Firstly it presented the 
party of Holland in the years  1650-1672 as pursuing an identical policy to its
105 H.Kampinga. D e Opvatting over onze Oudere  Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis (The Hague,1917), pp. 51- 
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predecessors during the critical years  1617-1619. In this latter instance Orangists would 
argue that it was only the person of the stadholder Maurice who saved the Republic 
from internal dissolution. Only the restoration of William HI could save the seven 
provinces from a similar fate. Secondly, and more disturbing, there was an implication, 
identified by supporters of the States Party, that John de Witt would suffer the fate of 
Oldenbamevelt. Traditional analysis of the content of political pamphlets has tended to 
ignore or disregard these disagreeable sentiments, concentrating rather on wider, 
constitutional issues such as sovereignty and authority. Yet, at times of crisis, such 
polemic could have appalling repercussions.325
8
THE RHETORIC OF POPULAR ORANGISM 1650-1672.
An unknown correspondent of secretary Thurloe reported back to England on Dutch 
affairs following the Treaty of Westminster in 1654. Describing the celebrations which 
marked the end of the first Anglo-Dutch war, he recorded that the trumpeter’s first salvo 
was the Orangist Wilhelmus ‘wherewith I heard the commonalty were well pleased’. A 
letter from the Hague to London in the same month of May drew a distinction between 
John de Witt and his cohorts who governed and ie  peuple, qui ne gouveme point’ but 
who ‘enrage pour le prins’.1  This impression was not confined to reports across the 
North Sea. A letter to Mazarin in Paris in August 1660 confirmed  that ‘le commun 
peuple, generalement parlant, paroit bien intentionne pour le Prince’.2  Dutch sources 
reinforce this impression. A pamphlet of 1661, bewailing the death of Mary Stuart the 
mother of the young prince of Orange William III, offered consolation to the latter in 
his hour of grief. William might now be the sole remnant of the House of Orange but he 
must remember that ‘de ghemeent is goed Prins’.3 The writer one ‘PJT.’ appears to have 
been of an Orangist persuasion but his opinion was to be confirmed from other sources. 
Schelius’ posthumous work Algemeene Vrijheid published in  1666 demonstrated clearly 
the author’s support for the policy of  John de Witt. In Schelius’ view the Orangists 
posed a greater threat to the security of the Republic than any English aggression 
because ‘zy het geringste grauw tegen haare gerichtige overheden opstokken’.4 The use 
of the term ‘grauw’ is clearly pejorative yet the outcome is the same. They are for the 
Prince.
1   Birch,  H, 292, 297.
2 Groen  van Prinsterer, v,  199.
3 Knuttel,  no.  8537A , np.
4 Geyl.  ‘Het  Stadhouderschap in de  Partij-Literatur onder de Witt',  p.  35.326
The challenge facing the Orangists after the death of the stadholder William II in 
1650 was to formulate a rhetoric of opposition. This would take several forms. Political 
polemic would combine an attack on the policies and writings of the States Party of 
John de Witt while reasserting the arguments for a stadholder and captain general. 
Traditionally, commentators have seen this type of propaganda as intended to persuade 
and convince. It is equally likely that this rhetoric was designed to sustain Orangist 
spirits in inopportune times demonstrating, if nothing else, that the supporters of,the 
Prince were still in business. Provided the government of the Republic enjoyed the 
support, or at least the acquiescence, of the populace and in particular the political 
classes such Orangist propaganda would continue to uphold the cause while awaiting 
more propitious times. However, whenever events conspired to cause grumbling 
discontent, Orangist rhetoric assumed a more active and seditious role urging upheaval 
in local and national politics.
Such an occasion was  1653. From the start of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1652 it had 
been apparent that the Dutch navy was unable to gain the upper hand over an English 
navy which had been substantially expanded to combat the royalist threat at sea. In  1653 
the Dutch fleet was mauled off Portland Bill, Harwich and Scheveningen, in which last 
engagement the Dutch lost Admiral Tromp, eleven warships and four thousand men.5 
The arrival home of cohorts of maimed and battered seamen served as a physical image 
of the misery of the Republic, beset by the suspension of much long distance trade and 
humiliated by the loss of Netherlands Brazil to the Portuguese. In the summer of 1653 
riots erupted throughout the province of Holland, in Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Alkmaar, 
Hoorn, the Hague and Medemblik. The rioters pointedly displayed their allegiance to 
the House of Orange. In Haarlem the trained bands marched through the town waving 
orange flags and sporting orange favours on their clothing and hats. In Amsterdam men
5 Israel. The Dutch Republic.  pp. 715-716.327
beating drums to call for volunteers for the navy were ordered by the crowd to frame 
their call in the name of the Prince of Orange and when the drummers staunchly 
refused, their drums were forcibly confiscated. Aitzema in his contemporary account 
recorded that as the misery and straits of poverty grew greater, so the common people 
were moved to cry ‘vive le Prince’.6 In Enkhuizen a mob fuelled by antipathy to the 
town regents and the local Catholics ran amok and took over the town for several days. 
A correspondent of Thurloe recorded that Enkhuizen had declared for the Prince and 
placed his colours on the walls  .
In these circumstances it is to be expected that Orangist polemic urged political 
activism on its supporters. In  1653 were published two pamphlets entitled Ondeckinghe 
van den Nederlantschen Cancker and Ontdeckinghe van den tegenwoordigen stande 
onses Vader-Landts.8  The first named was described as printed in ‘heyl- stadt’ by ‘Eel- 
hart Goed-raedt,’ the second, named more prosaically, issued from Middelburg and was 
printed by Zacharias Roman. In spite of the different titles and sources, the pamphlets 
were virtually one and the same. Although neither title appears in Knuttel’s lists of 
banned books and pamphlets,9  the existence of a pamphlet under two different titles 
suggests a strategy designed to circumvent a local ban. The pamphlet was undeniably 
subversive. The anonymous author declared his theme to be ‘restoration’; restoration of 
the freedoms won for the Republic by their God-fearing forefathers under the leadership 
of the Prince of Orange. The disasters suffered by the Republic were manifestations of 
the wrath of God against a conspiracy of ‘de Grooten’ who were characterised by their 
whoredom, adultery and conspicious consumption. Their strategy was to make 
themselves ‘absoluyt Meesters van de Regeeringe’ by casting aside the authority of the 
States General, renouncing the Union of Utrecht which bound the seven provinces
6 Aitzema. H istorie o f verhael, VII,  p .900.
7 Birch, l, pp.  253-254, 295, 324.
8 Knuttel.  nos. 7441, 7462.
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together and forcing through fundamental changes in religion. Crucial to the writer’s 
analysis was the depiction of the States Party of John de Witt as powerful oligarchs who 
stifled all dissent and in so doing deprived the citizens of the Republic of their 
fundamental liberties. The role of the Prince of Orange, on the contrary, was ‘de 
Burgers aldaer te verlossen van de groote slavemye de Regenten’. The ‘gemeene volck’ 
were already everywhere calling for the Prince to be promoted as Captain General of 
the Army and as the author tellingly observed ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei’. Ominously, he 
continued that the Prince must swiftly be promoted to his new authority, ‘eer het volck 
na de wijse van de Romeynen selver yemant sonder bepalinge op-werpen’.
Having conjured up the spectre of the populace taking up arms on behalf of some 
nameless dictator, the author hastened to reassure his readers that this was not a call to 
rebellion. At such a time of national crisis it was essential that  the regents securely held 
the reins of government. Rather the magistrates in their elections must ensure that no- 
one entered the town council who adhered to the malignant maxims of the current 
government and sitting members of that persuasion must be purged. The author called 
specifically on the captains of the local militia, deacons of the guild and substantial 
merchants and tradesmen. They must persuade recalcitrant magistrates to purge their 
ranks and replace the malignant with the good. However the author conceded that the 
local magistrates might not listen to reason. In that case the intervention  must be sought 
from the ‘populus’ (ghemeynte) just as had occurred before successfully in the struggle 
against Spain when such popular intervention had been supported by the leaders of the 
rebellion, including William of Orange.
The rhetoric of this pamphlet reflects in part contemporary circumstances. An 
appeal to specific groups within the community to take upon themselves the role of the 
peoples’ tribune in urging the magistrates to purge their ranks of their opponents and the329
ultimate ressort to the community as a whole would have had considerable resonance in 
the Republic of 1653 where trained bands sported orange favours and the crowd at 
Enkhuizen forcibly purged their town council. However, the mark of this type of 
polemic is that it will both explicitly and implicitly evoke past events and past rhetoric. 
Present circumstances may be different but they will be presented in a context which 
evokes the past. This can be seen by examining the language of the pamphlet.
The primary purpose of this call to political action is the theme of restoration.
That which is to be restored is described in the all embracing term ‘d’oude maximen’ 
and this is, as we will see, a recurrent theme in Orangist polemic. The author of this 
pamphlet dated the demise of the ‘d’oude maximen’ from the Great Assembly of 1651, 
when the Prince of Orange as stadholder was cast aside and with him, he alleged, the 
Union of Utrecht. For an anonymous Orangist writer of 1660 the restoration of the 
stadholderate will restore the ‘d’oude maximen en grondt-vesten’.10 No further 
qualification is needed. This language, with its emphasis on restoration is reminiscent of 
the earlier polemic of the Dutch Revolt. An analysis of the Revolt in an Orangist 
pamphlet of 1618 depicted the Netherlands as a freedom loving people, crushed by the 
might of a centralising and absolutist Spain, whose liberties were ‘restored’ by William 
of Orange and, nota bene, the ‘gemeente’.1 1  Significantly, in later Orangist rhetoric the 
image of Spain was transposed onto that of an overweening Dutch  regent oligarchy 
which, by denying the Prince of Orange a role in the nation’s future, threatens to 
deprive the people again of their freedoms and privileges. Once more, these associations 
had their roots in history. During the great political and religious contentions of the 
years  1617-1619, Orangist rhetoric repeatedly accused the supporters of 
Oldenbamevelt of seeking to change what was essentially a ‘vrye ende loffelijcke 
Aristocratique Regieringhe’ tempered by monarchical and popular elements into an
10 Knuttel.  no.  8224, p.  17
"K nuttel.  no.  2610, p.  11.330
oligarchy, that is a government dominated by a few self selected individuals.12 It was an
essential  element in the Orangist world view that the stadholder prince maintained a
‘balance’ in which the burgeoning regent classes were not permitted to ride roughshod
over the liberties of the people. In an Orangist pamphlet of 1663 the writer attacked the
notion of freedom peddled by the States Party. He saw it as merely a device to wrest all
political power into their own hands. A single head, in this case the Prince of Orange,
1 ^
would defend the people from the depredations of this self-seeking group.
Throughout the pages of  Orangist polemic the stadholder restores and defends the 
privileges and liberties of the people against those who seek to concentrate power in 
their own hands, whether they be the servants of the King of Spain or the brothers de 
Witt. In the work of some writers there is an attempt to evoke a mystical bond between 
the Princes of Orange and the people of the Republic. Drama proved a fruitful medium 
for this form of imagery. In a play by one ‘NVM’ entitled Tragoedie van den Bloedigen 
Haeg ofte Broeder-Moort van Jan en Comelis de Wit published in 1672, William III 
hotly denies any hint of collusion between himself and the invading  armies of Louis 
XIV. Unlike the supporters of the brothers de Witt, he will fight to the death for the 
defence of his people for they and he are one. William tells one of his courtiers,
Ick weet, als dat dit bloet, ‘t geen dese rif besluyt,
Hoort aan het Vaderlant, en stort ick het uyt
Ten dienste ven ‘t Gemeen, soo keert het sich tot het selven.1 4
In the light of this rhetoric it is not surprising that the appointment in 1672 of 
William III, first as captain general and later as stadholder of Holland is the occasion of 
language which, as in our pamphlet  1653, speaks of the restoration of citizens’ liberties 
and privileges. The poet Jan Zoet hymned William’s elevation to the offices of his
12 Knuttel, no.  2634, p.  12;  Knuttel,  no. 2508, pp.  11-12; Knuttel,  no. 2610, pp.  11-12
13 Knuttel, no.  8806A. p. 46.
14  Knuttel.  no.  10452. p.  11.331
forefathers and the opportunity not only to drive out the French but restore the ancient 
privileges of the citizens. He wrote
Hy [God] sterkt u, dat gy moogt een Jozua verstrekken 
Voor ‘t oude Burgerrecht, en ‘t lieve Vaderland,
Om ‘t Onkruid in den tuin, voorzightig uit te trekken 
Om dat hier d’Eendragt weer de Gouwe Vryheid plant.1 5
The issue of freedom and privileges was expressed in more prosaic form in 1672. 
On  23 August a single printed sheet, allegedly from the citizens of Amsterdam 
demanded of their burgomasters and regents that they restore the former privileges the 
citizens had enjoyed under William I. A similar missive demanded that captains and 
lieutenants of the trained bands should not be drawn from the ranks of the city’s 
magistrates and the guilds should be restored to their former privileges and maintained 
in their former glory. For good measure, all money from local taxation was to go to 
forward the efforts of the Prince of Orange.16 It is probably no accident that the date 
given on one of these publications was three days after the murder of the brothers de 
Witt on 20 August  1672. On 8 July the town council of Amsterdam had felt constrained 
to invite William III to visit the town, the reason given being ‘tot contentement van ‘t 
graeuw’. The death of the de Witts appeared to have opened the floodgates to further 
demands from sections of the citzens  at a time when the Prince was skilfully distancing 
himself from the threatened town council.17 On  1   September the first of three sequential 
Amsterdam pamphlets based on a conversation between a sergeant, a citizen named 
Adelborst and a member of the trained band was published. This last speaker was the 
main proponent of the view that the one time liberties of the citzens had been whittled 
away and denied. He argued that recent inventories of the citizens’ privileges had
15  ‘Zeegenwenschen op de blyde inkomemst gezondhaids dronk. en  ‘t vertrek  van zijn Doorlugtigste 
Hooghaid den Heere Prince van Oranje'  in Zoet, p.  128.
16 Knuttel, no.  10214. np.;  Knuttel,  no.  10215, np.
17 A. F.  Salomans,  ‘De rol de Amsterdamse burgerbeweging in de wetsverzetting van  1672’, B M G N ,  106 
(1991),  198-219 (pp. 208-210).332
deliberately omitted much and he urged each citizen to place a copy of the original 
document alongside the family bible. In the opinion of Adelborst, 1650 was a turning 
point, for with the absence of the stadholderate, each town selected its own governors 
and became, in effect, a sovereign institution. From that point onwards, the magistrates 
looked not to the maintenance of the citizens’ privileges but to their own interests. The 
member of the trained band slyly inserted the remark that some towns were already 
receiving back their own privileges from the Prince.18 In the light of these opinions, it 
was possible to understand, if not support, individuals such as the anonymous writer of 
1672 who advocated that William HI be named count of Holland, for the authority and 
dignity of the office would enable him to restore the old privileges of the citizens and 
ensure that promotion to office was based on merit alone.19
Dialogues such as these deploy the language used by Orangist writers. This does 
not mean that the anonymous authors were themselves paid-up supporters of the Prince, 
though it is clearly his horse they are backing at present. Those who felt themselves 
deprived of influence within their city might well deplore, the so called oligarchy which 
kept them from what was rightfully theirs. Equally there is no doubt that in the years 
1650-1672 Orangist writers were using language which was open to popular and 
subversive nuances. In a pamphlet of 1653 entitled Nederlandtschen Cancker, the 
anonymous writer had urged that the regime be restored to its old footing with the 
appointment of the young Prince of Orange as Captain General. He insisted that the 
common people were urging such a step, adding ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei’. This phrase 
recurs in Orangist polemic and it is worthwhile spending some time examining its use.
Taken literally the phrase implies a people who possess a God-given faculty of 
knowing what is right from what is wrong. Is our Orangist writer of 1653 implying that 
the people have such a  faculty enabling them to distinguish the right from the wrong in
18 Knuttel, no.  10564, pp.5, 7-8;  Knuttel,  no.  10565. pp. 3-4. 8.  10;  Knuttel.  no.  10566, p.7.
19 Knuttel. no.  10597. p.  8.333
political conduct and should this faculty be the touchstone of government policy? It is 
helpful to look briefly at the use of this image in pamphlet literature immediately before 
the death of the stadholder in  1650. In  1647 there was published in Dutch, allegedly at 
Frankfurt, a pamphlet entitled Zeedich Ondersoeck van de Macht der Princen ende des 
Volcks. The writer postulated an original Golden Age of equality in which governments 
of various hues arise to settle civic disorder. Princes serve this purpose but they are not 
by nature different from their fellow men. Lawful authority has been delivered to them 
from the people for a purpose, but all the power which the people have not bestowed on 
their prince remains with them. If the prince by his conduct shatters the oath established 
between them , they are free to use this power to bring him to order. Those who are 
bound can unbind themselves in the same fashion and put in place any new order they 
choose. This power, both executive and judicial, is theirs by nature, from God. ‘Vox 
Populi, Vox Dei.’ This power is not to be abused. Some miseries must be patiently 
borne. Factional self interest must be constrained. Ultimately, however, the power of the 
people is from God and ‘de Ghemeente is het fundament ende steunsel vande 
waerheyt’.20
The date of publication suggests that the pamphlet may have been intended to 
refer to events in England rather than the United Provinces. It is nonetheless a fairly 
classic resume of a theory of popular resistance not uncommon in the sixteenth century. 
A somewhat similar use of the phrase occurs in a pamphlet of the same year. The 
author, arguing that peace with Spain should be concluded against the wishes of France, 
displayed his rhetorical skills in the form of a dialogue between some Dutch citizens 
and a visiting Frenchman. The Frenchman declared that among the common people in 
the United Provinces there were many who believed  that the French were the cause of 
the failure to conclude peace. Those of education and understanding were more
20Knuttel. no. 5408.  Tot den Leser'. pp.  12-13.  18-19.334
conscious of the complexities of the situation but he told a Dutch citizen ‘alsso het 
gemeyn peupel onder u oock part en deel heeft in de aller Importanteste Deliberatien, 
soo moetmen dese hoevel valsche Impressien niet kleyn achten’. The Dutchman was 
indignant.  ‘Het ghemeenne Peupel heeft onder ons geen deel in de Importantste 
Deliberatien.’ In his view, sovereignty in the Dutch Republic was now firmly fixed in 
the provincial States. However, there was no greater danger than having France as a 
powerful neighbour and such was evident to all citizens of the Republic, provinces, 
towns, nobility and non noble, young, old, great and small. ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei.’21 
The rhetoric in this pamphlet can appear contradictory but it is part of a significant 
strand in Dutch constitutional thought. The people are bound in government with the 
States but they take no part in important deliberations. However, if the perceived 
opinion of the people supports that of the writer then so much the better, ‘Vox Populi, 
Vox Dei’. Another pamphlet which also argued for peace and against the French 
expressed it more succinctly. Peace is ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei’.22
It is important to note that it is unlikely any of these pamphlets was written by the 
supporters of the House of Orange. If the first of them was intended to give succour to 
the party of Parliament in England, then the writer was no friend of the stadholder 
whose sympathies were firmly for his father-in-law Charles 1.  The following two 
pamphlets advocated peace with Spain without reference to the French. Both can 
therefore be said to belong to the party of the province of Holland rather than the 
supporters of the stadholder. However, after 1650 and the death of William II this 
rhetoric is appropriated by the House of Orange. An pamphlet of 1652 urged the 
appointment of the Orangist John Maurice of Nassau as admiral general in the naval 
war against England. The English in the view of the anonymous writer were worse than 
the King of Spain for even he had not threatened their trade and prosperity as England
21  Knuttel. no. 5506. pp.  3-4?  6.
22  Knuttel. no.  5514.  np.335
intended to do. The people, moreover, were in favour of a war against England and ‘alle 
wijse Overheden sijn schuldigh de stemme des ganschen Volcx te volgen’.23 In an 
Orangist response to the work of Pieter de la Court, the author of the Ware Interest van 
Holland of 1662 argued strongly for a stadholder governor. He described a people 
groaning under the burden of taxation and calling for a governor and,  as he added, ‘de 
stemme des volcks is de stemme van den Almogende’.24.
These might appear to be no more than timely cliches but there was no doubt that 
such ideas irritated the States Party. A pamphlet of that persuasion of 1667 opened with 
an Amsterdammer on a canal barge reading a poem tellingly entitled ‘Vrede en 
Vrijheid’. In conversation with a Frisian, traditionally seen as in favour of a stadholder, 
the Amsterdammer referred back to the time of Leicester eighty years before.  He 
argued that Leicester, inimicably opposed to those principles of freedom which 
Hollanders hold dear, had won over the Reformed ministers by a show of religion and 
had flattered the common people. Here he said contemptuously was your ‘Vox Populi, 
Vox Dei’. For the Amsterdammer popular choice was no guide for political strategy.
The former stadholder Frederick Henry, he remarked, had been loved by the common 
people who ‘niet verder ziet als haar Neus lang is’.25 Not unnaturally this contempt did 
not deter the Orangists. A pamphlet of 1672 described the Netherlands maid wooed by 
perfidious France and England. These two suitors sought only to despoil her but she 
was saved by the arrival of the young Prince of Orange who had written upon his sleeve 
‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei’. As the narrator described it ‘wel ligt sal dien Heere door de drift 
en toegenegentheit des volks tot aensienlijcke waerdigheit verheven werden’.26 
Following the murder of the brothers de Witt, one writer who described himself as a 
Hollander not by birth but in spirit, argued that the brothers had been condemned to
23 Knuttel, no. 7221,  np.
24 Knuttel, no.  8653B, p.  123.
2 :>  Knuttel,  no. 9587, pp.  3.  14.  19.
26 Knuttel.  no.  10337. p. 5.336
death not by the law of the land but by ‘de stemme van den hoogsten rechter’ for ‘de 
stemme van des volcks, is de stemme Gods’.27
Certainly, the disasters following the French invasion of 1672 brought the role of 
the populace very much to the fore. There was much popular resistance to any policy of 
accommodation with France and any town regent who defended negotiations faced a 
charge of defeatism, if not treachery, in the eyes of the townspeople. Rioters in 
Dordrecht, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Schiedam and Delft demanded that the Perpetual 
Edict of 1667 be annulled and the Prince of Orange appointed as stadholder which duly 
occurred in July 1672. The events of 1672 presented the writers of Orangist polemic 
with a particular challenge. On the one hand, they had to keep on the boil the 
disturbances in the Holland and Zeeland towns which, allied to the disasters of the war 
with France, would clearly lead to the restoration of the stadholderate and the fall of the 
de Witts. On the other, they had to justify the actions of the citizens in a world where 
fear of the mob and its disturbing effects on the political  system was deeply grounded. 
In order to legitimise what was happening Orangist writers had to convince their readers 
that such popular action was not novel, had a basis in history and, in the past, had led to 
beneficial consequences.
One writer laid the ground for historical analogy when he reminded his readers 
that the year 1672 was exactly one hundred years after the rise of the new United 
Provinces, which he dated to  1572 and the capture of Den Briel by the Sea Beggars. The 
capture of Den Briel and Flushing in  1572 had traditionally been depicted as the work 
of the citizenry who defied the magistrates to take the towns for the Prince of Orange 
and prevented Alba from reinforcing the garrisons. Thus the author was unapologetic 
about the role of the common people in the events of 1672. He wrote that the restoration 
of the stadholderate in the person of William III was entirely the work of the common
27 Knuttel. no.  10450. np.337
people, who began the task and followed it through to the end. The regent classes, by 
consenting and binding themselves to the separation of captain general and stadholder 
and agreeing to the  Perpetual Edict of 1667 which sought to abolish the stadholderate 
in perpetuity, had ruled themselves out of any action. The ‘common people’, however, 
had not so bound themselves and were free to act, having never consented to those 
decisions either in heart or spirit. Central to their action was a defence of their own 
freedoms which they believed, justifiably he argued, to be best maintained under the 
‘headship’ of the House of Orange, just as the people had long enjoyed their freedoms 
and privileges under the aegis of the counts of Holland. The author argued, in a manner 
which we will recognise, that those seeking redress against local oligarchs could always 
turn to the governor general, as he terms it, whose authority acted as an effective 
balance against the the over-powerful citizen or citizens. Thus the intervention of the 
people was justifiable for their actions were purposefully designed, ‘om de Regeringhe 
te brengen op den ouden voet’. Restoration not revolution was their design 28.
A more fundamental analysis, essentially in the same vein, comes from a 
pamphlet entitled a Kort Verhael van den Oorspronck en onderganck der 
Louvesteynsche Factie which its contents make clear was published after the murder of 
the de Witts in the Hague on 20 August. The inflammatory nature of the pamphlet and 
the writer’s hatred for the regent patriciate was amply demonstrated. He demanded 
rhetorically whether it was possible to believe that God would have created all men in 
order to serve a mere handful. Warming to his theme pulpit style, he thundered against a 
society in which the lives and goods of men, women and children were sacrificed in the 
interests of the lust for honours and money of some few regents who had less virtue in 
their persons than the least among the common people. The writer deplored the 
contempt with which those in governance treated the community as a whole. In a free
28 Knuttel. no.  10262. np.338
state, as the Republic purported to be, the common people should not be held so low as 
to have no say in the governance of town and state. This was particularly the case when 
the evil humours of internal corruption and external aggression rendered all other 
medicines to no avail and a fundamental change in the state and its government 
threatened. For this writer, the choice of government rested firmly in the hands of the 
people for
Godt wel het ampt der Overheyt heeft geordineert, maer ordinaerlijck aen 
elck volck gelaten de vryheit om te kiesen soodanigen forme van Regeeringe 
als ‘t begeert en dan noch te designeren alsucke persoonen daer’t dat ampt aen 
wil vertrouwen.
The author makes plain that the people’s choice would be the Prince of Orange.
It is significant that the writer buttressed his arguments from scriptural as well as 
classical sources. His reading of Deuteronomy XVII:  14-15 implied clearly that God 
had given the Israelites the option of choosing to be ruled by a monarch. Continuing to 
the well trodden field of I Samuel VIII, the writer emphasised that the elders, acting as 
spokesmen for the children of Israel, requested a king. God reinforced the constitutional 
justice of this approach by urging the reluctant Samuel to ‘hoort na de Stemme des 
Volcks’. The author judiciously omitted God’s further stricture to Samuel in which He 
told the prophet that the choice of a monarch was a rejection of Himself and urged 
Samuel to warn the people exactly what kind of king they were likely to get. The author 
stated that the people in Athens had participated in the election of magistrates while 
Rome was the outstanding example of a free state in which nothing was done in the way 
of government appointments without the knowledge and voice of the people. When the 
time came for monarchical rule in Rome to end, it was the people who engineered the 
change. The writer was quite clear that power derives from the people and is entrusted 
to those in authority so long as they repect the freedoms and privileges of the people, 
secure the state from external aggression and prevent faction and intrigue in internal339
affairs. Should authority fail in these essential matters, it is entirely natural that the 
people will intervene for
de algemeyne en bovendrijvende intentie van de Gemeente en is niet anders dan haer eygen 
behoudenisse en wel wesen, ‘t welck een yegelyck van nature magh en moet behertigen en 
soecken.
His basis for this natural right to protect and defend one’s intrinsic liberties is 
drawn in this instance not from any doctrine of natural law but from Ephesians V: 29 
where the writer instructs his listeners that ‘no-one ever hated his own body; on the 
contrary he keeps it nourished and warm’. Thus there is a righteous defence of that 
which is innate and the consequence is that scandalous abuse meets scandalous ends at 
the hands of the people. Caligula, who declared himself the equal of Jupiter, and Nero, 
rose only to fall as do all tyrants including the ‘twee groote Potentaten’ who met their 
end on the 20 August 1672 in the Hague. We may presume here that the intention of the 
writer was to encourage a thorough purge of all supporters of the late de Witts in the 
States and towns of the Republic.
Essential to such an argument was a justification from history. The writer drew on 
the Abjuration of 1581  with its attendant argument that the Prince who conducts himself 
as a tyrant can be set aside by the deliberations of the States as representative of the 
whole community.  Here the author had to tread carefully for the provincial States, or 
certain members of them, were now deemed a legitimate target  of popular fury. He 
continued that this emphasis on the provincial States did not derogate from the rights of 
the common people to resist a tyrant. This author also pointed to the action of the 
common people in Flushing in  1572  and the towns people and fishermen of Veere in 
the same year who against the wishes of their elders and betters ejected the Spanish and 
in so doing founded the basis of the new State. These events are crucial to the author’s 
argument for, echoing Sallust, he maintained that ‘een Staet werdt op sijn gemack340
staende gehouden door de selve middelen, daer hy in den beginne door opgebouwt is’. 
Simply expressed, the common people had played a pivotal role in the founding of the 
Republic, coincidentally one hundred years before, and that role was thus intrinsic to the 
governance of the state.29
The style and content of these two pamphlets suggest that they may have had the 
same author. In the second of the two works the author described himself as a lover of 
the Fatherland and of God’s Church and in sections of the work he paid flattering 
attention to the activities of the pro-Orange Reformed ministry and, by implication, 
himself. It is therefore quite likely that he was a member of that ministry and the 
contents of the two pamphlets may give us some impression of the political content as 
well as the vitriol which issued from certain pulpits unpublished. Another pamphlet 
which appeared to come from the hand of a Reformed minister laid similar emphasis on 
the beneficial role of the people both in the Revolt and in  1672, laying particular 
emphasis on their praiseworthy activity purging the churches of images in the 
iconoclastic outbreaks of 1566. This writer also conceived of the Republic as a 
‘populaire Regeeringe’ in which the body of the people is represented by the town 
councils, whose authority pertained only as long as they exercised it moderately and in 
line with traditional maxims. Should they fail to do so, the people possessed the power 
to replace them by means of their ‘verkooren Gouverneur’ that is the stadholder. For 
this author such action in  1672 is amply justified for, in his eyes, the current regents
30 imagined that they  ‘souverain waren en het Volck haere Slaven’.
Similar sentiments were expressed by writers who, on the evidence of their 
writing, appear to have no direct connection with the Reformed ministry. A pamphlet 
dated from early September 1672 from Amsterdam and addressed to the Prince of 
Orange defined the different natures of aristocratic and democratic governance.
29 Knuttel. no.  10264,  pp. 4-11.
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Aristocracy in the eyes of this writer was ‘perpetual’, a term he deployed pejoratively, 
whereas democracy was a government of the people by means of individuals elected by 
them who were changed annually. On this theoretical basis, the writer argued that since 
in 1585 the civic guard of Amsterdam had nominated a body of thirty six individuals 
who in their turn had nominated members to the town council, the constitution of the 
town at that point had been democratic in nature. Then, the writer added pointedly, the 
regents did not hold the people in contempt. He then widened the scope of his argument 
in a manner reminiscent of the earlier pamphlets by citing William I and the struggle 
against Spain, adding that ‘de Ghemeynte heeft het begonnen ende de Gemuynte sal‘t 
wel uytvoeren’. It is plain that the author intended this comment to apply not only to the 
course of the Revolt but also the events of 1672 for in both the people exercise, in his 
view beneficially, the authority invested in them.31 A pamphlet published in 
Amsterdam, seemingly about the same time, emphasised equally that authority rested 
not with the magistrates but with the people and they tended it to the Prince of Orange. 
The people would suggest the names of individuals for a new purged town council but 
they bestowed on the stadholder the absolute right to select magistrates in the future, in 
order to prevent the domination of the town council by a handful of individuals. This 
document was signed by one who styled himself the president of ‘the meeting of the 
common people’.32
Another image deployed to justify the role of the people in the events of 1672 was 
that of the ship at sea. One pamphlet writer assumed the voice of a fictitious crewsman 
charged with mutiny. He responded to his accusers by telling of a sea voyage in which 
the crew of the ship ‘Hollandia’, returning richly laden from a voyage to Spain, 
discovered that their steersman (alias John de Witt) was clandestinely piloting them 
towards the coast of France. If he were to succeed, the ‘reders ‘or shareholders would
31  Knuttel, no.  10549, np.
32 Knuttel, no.  10594, np.342
lose their investment and the crew would be imprisoned. When they objected, the 
steersman accused them of mutiny but they replied ‘hy was om haer, en sy niet om hem; 
hy kon sonder ‘t Bootsvolck alleen niet varen’. They elected to replace him as 
steersman with a young man William Williamson of the Hague (alias the Prince of 
Orange) who came from a family of steersman. To the deposed individual they 
recounted emphatically ‘wy aen u, noch gy aen ons niet langer verbonden zijn’. They 
defended their actions on the grounds that ‘de natuer leert de menschen, en selfs oock 
de beesten, haer leven en haer vryheit, die werder is als het leven, te beschermen’.33
Another writer similarly linked the restoration of the stadholderate with the plight of a 
ship at sea. If, he wrote, the government of the  Republic could be likened to the 
command of a ship, then the actions of the citizens in 1672 could be excused for while 
good order aboard ship required that the captain was in command, he in his turn was 
bound by the orders of those who had elevated him to that position, however lowly their 
state. Were the captain to act in a way which threatened the safety and wellbeing of the 
vessel the lieutenant, indeed even the common crewsman, could remove him from 
command.34
The force of these analogies is considerable. We may perhaps consider that to 
depict the workings of the Republic as a ship at sea is not an entirely appropriate 
analogy, but the reader accepts the notion, he or she must accept the argument that the 
vessel can only fare well if all ranks of the crew work together, even the lowliest having 
an essential role. All sailors have a duty of vigilance in all that concerns their vessel. 
This emphasis on popular vigilance finds an echo in other briefer publications. As one 
writer urged, drawing on the history of Rome, the ‘geese’ have to remain alert and
33 Knuttel. no.  10300.  np.
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watchful while the city sleeps.35 Yet in all these examples there is the note of the 
exceptional. Vigilance is required but popular intervention would rarely occur provided 
that those who exercise authority in the peoples’ name do so justly and with due 
consideration for their liberties and privileges. In the view of all these writers, this 
situation was best achieved by the presence within the Republic of a stadholder Prince 
of Orange.
When treating of the people as a whole, we can discern various strands within 
Orangist polemic. Sometimes we have works in which elements within the people, 
specifically women, are idealised. In 1672 Orangist propaganda was emphasising and 
commending the active role played by women in the defence of country and Prince. An 
unknown Orangist author contrasted the alleged treachery of the de Witts and their 
supporters with the stout resistance of the common people to the French incursion. He 
particularly cited the defence of Aardenburg in Zeeland where, in his words, ‘ ‘t swacke 
Vrouwe-volck als Amsoonen kloeck / Gaen trotsen menigh man te ere van de 
doeck’.  Another author pointedly contrasted the speedy surrender of garrisons in the 
eastern provinces where those in charge were the sons and nephews of de Witt’s 
placemen and the heroic defence of Aardenburg, where women and children fought 
alongside their men folk.37 A third offered thanks to God for the Amazon women of
-jo
Aardenburg whose qualities would be praised for eternity.
There are hints here of the heroic women of the Dutch Revolt, which is surely 
intentional. Historians of the Revolt such as van Meteren had elected to record the 
heroic actions of Dutch women against the Spanish enemy and later writers such as the 
fervent Reformed minister Abraham van de Velde, in a work first published in  1668, 
emphasised the righteousness of the Dutch cause when God used frail women folk to
35 Knuttel,  no.  10279, np.
36 Knuttel,  no.  10337,  p.  14
37 Knuttel,  no.  10479, p.  20.
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such glorious ends.39  Orangists adroitly appropriated this polemic to emphasise the 
links between the Revolt and the disasters of 1672 and  asserted the necessity for an 
Orangist stadholder who would fulfil the role of his predecessor William I. Moreover, 
women in Orangist polemic were not afraid to correct their menfolk when the latter 
were ill-advised. In one pamphlet a woman on a barge heard a peasant man appear to 
cast a slight on the Prince of Orange. The author recounted approvingly that she roundly 
declared him a ‘schelm’ and declaimed in exasperation ‘was ick een man, ick sloege 
voor je kop’.40 Traditionally such an outburst might be seen as indicative of womans’ 
inability to control her passions and argue in a rational fashion. However, in this 
pamphlet the author is emphasising the duty of each and every citizen to be ever 
watchful of their liberties which the Prince of Orange will defend against treachery and 
deceit. Hence the figure of the woman combines both humour and a praiseworthy 
forthrightness in her role as the politically committed citizen. A pamphlet of the same 
year written in favour of the States Party took a different view. This author lamented 
bitterly the state of the Republic when ‘de wijven onse landen regeeren, ende over al 
muyterye aenrichten’.41 For supporters of the States Party such as this writer, the 
involvement of women in political action was the stuff of nightmares.
Other Orangist writers were equally eager to distance the Prince and his cause 
from despised sections of the community. One author of 1672 asserted that the actions 
leading to the restoration of the stadholderate were carried out not by the common 
people and the riff-raff but by the foremost and most respectable citizens, ‘non a plebe 
sed a Populo’. It is this latter, the ‘populus’ who in the words of the author ‘die 
gesamentlijck het lichaem van de souverainiteyt in dese Regeringe zijnde’.42  The 
distinction is an ancient one. Cicero, reflecting on his fellow Romans, had drawn a
39 van de Velde, pp. 77-78.
40 Knuttel  no.  10300.  np.
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judicious distinction between ‘plebs’ and ‘populus’. The populus was by nature 
cohesive, being made up of men living together under the same law and sharing the 
same civic duties, for example military service . The plebs, or Greek ‘hoi polloi’, on the 
other hand, had no inherited property, no individual political power or influence and 
existed outside or beyond civic, moral and political bonds, being able to function 
politically only in the amorphous form of the mob.43 The distinction was recognised in 
seventeenth century Dutch political theory. Althusius in his Politica methodica  digesta 
of 1603  defined the ‘gemeente’ or ‘populus’  as the ‘corpus consociatum’ bound by the 
bonds of common living and association of which the Prince himself was a member. Set 
against the ‘gemeente’ was the ‘volk’ or ‘grauw’ who were characterised by envy, 
recklessness and irrational outbreaks of violence.44
While supporters of the Prince might be content to see the ‘grauw’ in action to 
further Orangist ends, in  1672 they did attempt to steer clear of the odium attached to 
the mob in the streets. Another Orangist author in an alleged letter from Rotterdam in 
July 1672 advised his unnamed correspondent
gy moet niet denken dat de Graeuw hier de meester speelt, want dit werk is uytgevoert door 
aensienlijcke Heeren, Capiteynen van de Burgery, de machtigste kooplieden, en de deftigste 
Borgeren, waer by sich voorts de andere Burgeren, Poortem, met de Gemeente haden 
vervolght.45
Yet another author, reviewing the events of 1672, distinguished sharply between the 
burghers and the ‘canaille’ or as he robustly described them, the uttermost dregs of the 
people. These latter had no right to choose a stadholder or make any alterations in 
government for the activities native to them were  plundering, robbing, murder and 
arson and any changes they instigate could only result in disruption and violation of
43 George Boas.  Vox Populi: Essays in the History' o f an Idea.  (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,  1969), pp. 
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good order. By God’s grace no such alteration had occurred in the Republic. Rather, it 
was the burghers who had taken action. They had fulfilled their part of the contract by 
paying their taxes and taking up arms against the French invader only to find 
themselves deceived by those who would not defend their privileges and who failed to 
maintain the security of the nation against foreign aggression.46
Certainly some Orangist publications emphasised that the Prince of Orange 
deplored riotous behaviour and had no part in fomenting it. In one pamphlet William HI 
reassured the allegorical figure of ‘de gestoorde Vryheit’ that he had no intention of 
permitting a mob to dictate policy. He empathised with the fear that reigns when ‘groot 
en klein soo door de straten swieren/ En d’onderdaan zich zelfs te buiten gaet’ and 
insisted that he had admonished the people to obey their lawful rulers 47 Yet as always 
there are ambiguities. Much as certain Orangist writers seek to distance the Prince from 
unruly elements of the underclass, other Orangist writings are clearly intent on 
inflaming all sections of the populace against the de Witts and their supporters. Certain 
publications seem intended to incite the people to demand the death of the de Witts, if 
not to murderous acts. Consider a poem known to be by Jan Zoet and published in 
pamphlet form in  1672 under the sobriquet ‘waermont’ in which he writes of three St 
Jans, two of whom, John the Baptist and Oldenbarnevelt, have already lost their heads.
‘t Is sestien hondert Jaer en viftigh nu geleeden,
Dat de eerste Heer Sint Jan het hooft wiert afgesneeden,
En drie en viftigh zijn verloopen van dien dagh,
Dat hier de tweede mee ‘t hooft voor de voeten lagh.
Komt nu de derde eens op sulcken wijs te sterven 
Soo sal ons Vaderlandt d’aloude vryheydt Erven.48
46 Knuttel.  no.  10309, pp. 2, 4-5,15.
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Here the poet anticipates that John de Witt will succumb to the fate of the second Jan, 
that is John van Oldenbamevelt, who was executed in 1619.
An inflammatory pamphlet emanating from Rotterdam and the pen of a Reformed 
minister similarly urged that the citizen had the right to demand that the brothers de 
Witt be indicted for treason against the nation. To those who would argue that it was not 
the role of the common citizen to take such action, the author responded that 
extraordinary times merited extraordinary measures.49 Another pamphlet admonished its 
readers that, with reference to the de Witts, ‘sy mouten haer rechtmatige aversie houden 
tegens de landverkoopers ofte bedervers’. The de Witts and their allies were described 
as ‘niet meritende compassie, dat men verschoonen wilde een slangh die steckt in onsen 
eygen boesem’. In case there should be any doubt in his readers’ minds, he urged 
‘hebbende dese Heeren met haer exempel geleert, dat men in materie van Staet de 
verhate Vyanden of slaen, of van haer geslagen moet werden’. The author vaunted the 
role of the people with particular reference to the iconoclastic fury of 1566, when, he 
recounted with relish, ‘veele der verdruckte in de furie door korte en prompte executie 
geraecken tot eene sachte wel verdiende doot’. For those who might quail at what could, 
at worse, be read as incitement to murder, the author reminded his readers that theirs 
was a historic and decisive role for during the long struggle against Spain, ‘Godt de 
Heere alsnu door de Mondt des Volcks heeft gewerckt’.50
Orangist propaganda also now specialised in a particular type of hagiography in 
which alleged ‘victims’ of the de Witts were ascribed a catalogue of virtues and the 
alleged injustice of their deaths was linked to the implication that the brothers de Witt 
deserved no better. One case in question was that of Jacob van der Graef. This twenty- 
two year son of a prominent family was arrested in June  1672 following a thoroughly 
botched attempt to assassinate John de Witt and much to his own surprise and that of
49 Knuttel. no.  10142, np.
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many of his contemporaries, condemned to death. A notorious pamphlet usually 
attributed to Simonides a Reformed minister at the Hague and published before the 
death of the de Witts, described the last days of the young man’s life for the edification 
of his readers.  An alleged miraculous epiphany in his prison cell  resulted in a well 
attested religious conversion. Van der Graef was declared by Reformed ministers in the 
Hague to be a ‘wonderwork’ of God and God’s Holy Church. As he reached the place 
of death, some observers swore that they saw a halo of light around the head of van der 
Graef and after his execution the splashes of blood could not be washed from the 
block.51 Such polemic clearly attracted the attention of contemporaries. A pamphlet 
published after the death of the de Witt’s alleged that the shock of the execution of van 
der Graef on the 29 June had been the catalyst which led all voting towns of the States 
of Holland to vote out the Perpetual Edict on 2 July. The author also attested that in the 
opinion of many, Simonides’ pamphlet had been been mainly responsible for bringing 
about the murder of the de Witts.'  In another pamphlet, a fictitious Amsterdammer 
argued vehemently that the death of the de Witts could in part be ascribed to a pamphlet 
published by a minister of the Reformed Church in which van der Graef had been 
treated as if he were a saint.53
The prospective fate of the de Witts was also often linked to that of Buat in the 
polemic of 1672. Buat, a companion to the young prince of Orange, had been executed 
following the discovery of treasonable dealings with England in  1666. His death had 
occasioned some  reference in the pamphlet literature of that time but he emerges in the 
polemic of 1672 not just as an Orangist, but as a national martyr. In a poem of that year, 
the anonymous author reminded his readers that William I gave his life for his country 
and not only he but other ‘doorluchte Helden’ of whom Buat was one.54 One writer
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contrasted the lenient sentence recently issued against Comelis de Witt by an allegedly 
browbeaten court with that of Buat.55  It is recorded that on 20th August, when 
Hendrick Verhoeff, the Hague silversmith burst into the room in which the brothers de 
Witt were sheltering, John de Witt declared himself prepared for death then and there 
but an incensed Verhoeff cried that they must both face their death in public as they 
made the worthy Buat and the innocent van der Graef.56
The death of Buat is also combined with other events to produce a strand of 
polemic which is truly chilling. One writer of 1672 recorded tellingly the destruction by 
the townspeople of Dordrecht of the painting commemorating the role of Comelis de 
Witt in the victory over the English at Chatham in 1667. The crowd removed the 
painting from the Town Hall and tore it apart paying particular attention to the 
mutilation of the image of Cornelius. The author, who was clearly writing before the 
murder of the de Witts, then immediately continued with a reference to the alleged 
statement of Buat some hours before his execution in  which the condemned man hoped 
that John de Witt and his supporters would justifiably suffer the punishment which he, 
the innocent, endured.57 This connection between the judgment and death of Buat, the 
destruction of the painting of Comelis de Witt and the future fate of the de Witts may be 
judged coincidental but it is troubling that it occurs in another publication. An 
anonymous pamphlet, allegedly recording a conversation between two citizens of 
Rotterdam, can be dated with some accuracy as the content makes plain that Cornelius 
de Witt was at that time incarcerated in prison in the Hague. It is observed that he 
occupies the same cell as did Buat and the author asks rhetorically whether Cornelius 
would share his fate. There follows a description of the destruction of the painting in 
Dordrecht and with uncanny prescience the writer describes how
55 Knuttel, no.  10194, np.
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dese lijst (frame) wierdt eerst geschomden, daer een pieck door het counterfeitsel gestoocken, 
hooft, armen en beenen afgeschonden. ‘t Elkens met soo een wens dat sulcx aen die Persoonen 
mocht gechieden wiens Beeltenis dit was, eenige stucken wierden steneenen 
aengebonde en in het water gesmeeten, sommige voor de Poort en op een muur gepijkeert, sodat 
die gebeelde lichaem jammerlijk is mishandelt.
This image which uncannily prefigures the mutilated and eviscerated bodies of the
ro
brothers de Witt was followed by the exclamation, ‘Buat’s bloet roept om wraeck’.  . A 
few days before the murder a publication was circulating whose contents were based on 
a skit of a poem by Brandt. Brandt’s work which was intended to adom a print of the 
Pensionary de Witt had ended with the laudatory comment that an image or statue of 
marble would honour de Witt. In the amended version the conclusion read ‘men ruck 
hem ‘t hert uyt ‘t lijf, en stamp het hooft in Mermer’.59 Brandt, corresponding with 
Johannes Vollenhoven on 4th September 1672, after the murder of the brothers de Witt, 
considered that the skit on his poem had been designed to teach the people how they 
should mutilate the bodies of the pair. Indeed, the silversmith Hendrick Verhoeff cut the 
hearts out of the bodies of the de Witts and retained them, showing them off for some 
years to dignitaries who visited him.60
In these pamphlets not only are the readers and those who hear them read asked to 
reflect on the failings of the de Witts, they are also being encouraged to envisage their 
deaths. Ronald Prud’homme van Reine in his recent biography of Maerten and Comelis 
van Tromp argues convincingly that the murder of the de Witts was not impromptu but 
a carefully planned action by supporters of the Prince of Orange and the Prince himself. 
Some contemporaries were likewise convinced. The poet Joachim Oudaan, long an 
admirer of John de Witt, made clear in his play entitled Haagsche Broeder-Moord that 
the lynching was the work of the Prince’s supporters including the Reformed ministers
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Simonides and Landsman and of the Prince himself who ‘slaat de hand met yver aan 
dien handel’.61
It may be that muttered suspicions of the involvement of William HI in the 
murder of the de Witts account, in part, for the wealth of pro-Orangist propaganda 
which emphasised that the brothers were ‘sentenced’ and ‘executed’ by the people. One 
pamphlet claimed that their deaths was the will of God carried out by means of the ‘ ‘t 
heilige Burgerrecht’ and contrasted this divinely inspired action with the silence of the 
‘lasse Rechters’ who cannot be trusted to carry out their duty.62 Another  pamphlet 
appeared entitled Sententie van den generalen Hove van Nederlandt, Tegens Mr 
Comelis de Wit ...en Mr Jan de Wit...Gepronunciert voor langh en ge-executeert den 
20Augusti 1672. There followed a list of charges which this ‘general Hof had laid 
against the de Witts, concluding with a sentence of death ‘ter ordinantie van de 
Gemeente’ and signed by the citizenry of the seven provinces and all promoters and 
lovers of God’s Church and the beloved Fatherland.  This view was propagated beyond 
the frontiers of the Republic. In a pamphlet in English attributed to one Henry Stubbe, 
the reader was instructed that with reference to the deaths of the brothers de Witt, ‘the 
real majesty of the burghers did sentence them’.64 This argument also found visual form 
in a print of 1672 depicting the eviscerated corpses of the brothers de Witt and entiltled 
Spieghel van Staet en Recht der Burgers. The image was accompanied by verse in 
which the readers were assured that
‘t Verraet moet gestraft, en is ‘t niet door Besorgers,
Soo is het door ‘t Gemeen, en door het Recht der Borgers.6 5
61  Joachim Oudaan, Haagsche Broeder-M oord ofD olle Blyschap.  (Utrecht, 1981), pp. 33, 43, 45.
62 Knuttel, no.  10371,  np.
63 Knuttel, no.  10408. p 7.
64 Knuttel,  no.  10017A, np.
65 Knuttel. no.  10199, np.Conclusion
In surveying all this material we must, in conclusion, bear in mind that political polemic 
is by its nature opportunist. Yet, we can distinguish certain consistent trends within the 
body of popular Orangist polemic. One such is clearly the assertion that the stadholder 
Prince of Orange would defend the people against an all-powerful oligarchy and restore 
to the people privileges which the government of de Witt was seeking to deny them. 
Popular perception of these privileges may have been unrealistic yet they played a vital 
role in Orangist rhetoric. In addition, in times of political volatility, Orangist writers 
drew on the role of the people as guardians of the principles of the State. The language 
and imagery which they used was not new and deliberately so. The image of the ship of 
state in which the ruler was steersman but the crew, that is the people, were the ultimate 
masters of the vessel had been deployed by Aggaeus van Albada in the polemic of the 
Dutch Revolt a hundred years before. Indeed the rhetoric of the Revolt which had 
emphasised that the authority of the magistrate rested on the common authority of the 
people was to be taken out and aired again in  1672. The events of 1572 were to 
legitimise those of one hundred years later. Yet to place too much emphasis on the past 
is to miss the radical tone of some of what was written. The people are to be actively 
involved in the service of the House of Orange even becoming co-conspirators in the 
murder of the de Witts.  As one commentator has observed, one of the peculiarities of 
early modem Dutch politics was that demands for a strong stadholderate and for popular 
sovereignty tended to go hand in hand with a republican regent oligarchy as the 
enemy.66 It was a commentary on the governance of the United Provinces from 1650- 
1672 that a stadholder and captain general was perceived by many citizens to be 
essential not only to rid their country of a foreign aggressor but also to defend their 
interests against an overweening urban patriciate.
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CONCLUSION
The coming of peace in 1648 posed challenges for certain sections of the Republic. For 
the stadholder, it marked the end of one of his traditional roles as captain general of the 
Republic’s forces. The advocates of peace were the Holland regents who had long 
championed the cause of trade, commerce and toleration and eschewed a policy of 
extending the boundaries of the Republic. Fearing that the Princes of Orange aspired to 
become a sovereign dynasty, they saw the end of the war as a chance to reassert the 
sovereignty and autonomy of the provincial States. Many ministers of the Reformed 
Church had opposed the Peace. They saw the termination of hostilities as a victory for 
the ‘Arminian’, Erastian town magistrates who sought to bring the public church under 
their political control. The Calvinist faith had provided a supra-provincial bond during 
times of war when ‘patriots’ joined together to defend the fatherland and the True 
Reformed Religion. Peace left them threatened and uncertain. The two elements which 
commanded loyalty across provincial boundaries, the public church and the stadholder, 
had both been weakened by the Treaty of Munster. The fears for the unity of the seven 
provinces were not mere rhetoric but a response to a perceived shifting of power in the 
direction of richest and most populous province. The death of William II in 1650 
marked a decisive victory for the province of Holland.
It has been  argued that the seventeenth century saw a dichotomy between the 
States of Holland and the stadholder. If one failed in government or alienated sections 
of the nation, then there was recourse to the other. In this view the restoration of 
William III in  1672 may best be interpreted as a way of making the political system 
work better and ensuring that the regents ruled as they ought.1  Within the context of this 
pragmatic reading of Dutch political life, it could be argued that Orangism did not need
1   Price. Holland and the Dutch Republic,  p.  102-103,  119.355
to develop arguments of any significant intellectual weight. Hence, Geyl’s criticism of 
the superficiality of Orangist political argument has validity. Rather for the Orangists  it 
was essential to highlight the ties of dependency which bound together the Republic and 
the stadholder princes. They would emphasise that it was only with the presence of a 
stadholder Prince of Orange that internal harmony and prosperity and external security 
and prestige were assured. The governance of the Republic from 1650 would appear to 
suggest otherwise. Internal faction in the provinces of Groningen and Overijssel was 
solved by the intervention of Holland acting as reconciler in the manner of previous 
stadholders. Dutch interests in the Baltic were assured and after the difficulties and 
defeats of the first Anglo-Dutch war, the second war with England ended with the 
glorious triumph of the Dutch navy in the Thames estuary. Yet the lesson of past history 
interpreted by the Orangists was that sooner or later the Republic would find itself 
dependent once more on the Princes of Orange.
The model of the mixed constitution fulfilled several functions. It was a 
constitutional model which was acceptable to the world of educated seventeenth 
political discourse. It emphasised the interdependency of the three different elements of 
the constitution with the implication that should one, the monarchical, be absent there 
would follow a degeneration, in this case from the aristocratic to the oligarchical model. 
The threat of oligarchy was one which Orangist political pamphleteers did not hesitate 
to lay before their readers. Interwoven with Grotius’ reading of the Batavian Republic, 
the Orangists were able to put forward a narrative in which this mixture of 
constitutional elements became characteristic of the Dutch experience. Their use of 
Grotius characterised the nature of Orangist argument. Orangist pamphlet writers had 
little use for Grotius theories of natural law. Rather, like jackdaws they plundered the 
work of the great jurist, retaining that which suited their purposes and discarding that 
for which they had no use.356
Experience not reason is the lodestone of Orangism and that may be one of its 
strengths. It does not require rigorous logic or intellectual coherence. It is tolerant of 
apparent contradiction. If a particular system has served the state well, then it should be 
continued for longevity is the hallmark of a successful form of government. While their 
opponents came to draw on Bodin to define a single sovereign authority, that is the 
province, Orangists refused to be drawn. They avoided any discussion as to the meaning 
and content of sovereignty. They belonged rather to that school of thought epitomised in 
a later century by Edmund Burke who assured his opponent Dr Richard Price
You see Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we are 
generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all our old 
prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more 
shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer 
they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish 
them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of 
reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the 
individual would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of 
nations and ages.“
The image of the body was deployed. The stadholder as ‘head’ was an essential 
component of the constitution without whom the remainder of the body could not 
function. One head was good but many heads were not, ‘te veel hoofden, te veel 
sinnen’. Within this language there was no place for an exposition of a dynamic and 
changing role for the stadholders. Their opponents were to argue that the Princes of 
Orange had sought to transform their role, striving to be monarchs in all but name. It 
was certainly the case that the political role of the stadholders had undergone change. 
Maurice’s intervention in the crisis of 1617-1619 and the marriage of Frederick Henry’s 
son William to the daughter of the King of England indicated that the relationship 
between the stadholder and the sovereign provinces was undergoing change. Yet this is 
not reflected in Orangist writing. The stadholderate as an institution appears immutable,
“ Edmund Burke, Reflections on  the Revolution  in France (London:  Dent,  1967), p. 84.357
an essential element in an exquisite balance of forces. Rather it is John de Witt who is 
seeking to subvert the framework of a model of government.
The Orangists during the years  1650-1675 were not monarchists and this was not 
the source of their attraction for the citizens of the Republic. Some would defend 
monarchy as an institution but always with the proviso that it was neither appropriate 
nor necessary in the Dutch Republic. The only possible exception to this rule occurs in a 
pamphlet in the febrile atmosphere of 1672 and it had no successor. William Hi’s 
unsuccessful bid to be made Duke of Gelderland in 1675 indicated that even the 
supporters of the Prince were unwilling to upset the constitutional balance. Yet it can be 
argued that Orangism’s use of imagery such as that of the Prince as the sun is strongly 
redolent of monarchy. Throughout the language of Orangism, there are ambiguities. The 
stadholder is the servant of the provinces yet he is also the beneficent orange tree under 
whose shadow the Republic grows and flourishs. Images of dependency are coupled 
with those of princely authority. The young prince William HI is both the ‘son’ of the 
United Provinces, living and growing under their parental authority and the ‘sun’ whose 
rays will beam down on the earth and drive away all shadows of discord and strife. It 
could be argued that this is the language and symbolism of princes appropriated for the 
peculiar needs of the Dutch Republic. What appears apparent is that  Orangism is able 
to accommodate this paradox without alienating substantial sections of its support.
Orangism could also provide loyalty to an individual and his family. Whatever the 
attractions of the ‘true freedom’ of the States Party in classical republican mode, it 
could not supply, nor did it seek to, one man upon whom hopes and expectations could 
rest. Its very ethos was contrary to the aggrandisement of the individual. Even the best 
of men could fall into temptation, taking advantage of their gifts to flatter and bribe 
their fellow citizens. The advent of such men could sound the death knell of a Republic. 
Orangists understood this well when they mocked the brothers de Witt as the ‘prince on358
land and the prince on sea’. Unlike the de Witts and their supporters for whom they 
alleged power was an intoxication, Orangists asserted that the very breeding and history 
of the illustrious ancestors of William III fitted him for the role of both servant and 
beneficent authority.
In Orangist political writing it was maintained  with few insignificant exceptions 
that the stadholderate was not hereditary but elective. It was vital so to do for their 
opponents equated hereditary succession with monarchy and whatever their private 
feelings Orangist writers were not prepared to fall into that trap. Yet an examination of 
the words and symbols deployed by the Orangist suggest a more nuanced reading. The 
image of the phoenix rising from the ashes had traditionally been attached to dynastic 
succession and continued to be deployed by the French monarchy and the English at the 
restoration of Charles II. Those who celebrated the image in verse or immortalised it in 
print or on the face of medals could not have been unaware of the significance of their 
choice. Perhaps the use of the image concealed ambiguities at the very heart of Orangist 
thinking. The stadholderate was not to be hereditary but there was an inherent 
assumption that the son of the previous stadholder or his nearest heir would succeed to 
the offices of his forefathers. The emphasis which proponents of Orangism on the word 
and the concept of gratitude enabled them to argue the case for the young prince without 
committing themselves to any explicit approbation of a hereditary succession. The 
frequency with which the concept was deployed in poetry, visual imagery and 
ceremonial display suggests that it fulfilled an important function in the Orangist 
arsenal.
For both the Orangists and their opponents the call to preservation of the Union 
formed part of their normative language. De Witt in his Deductie of 1654 saw the Union 
as a coming together of the seven provinces in pursuit of a limited range of objectives 
which could not appropriately be dealt with by the single sovereign province. The359
provinces were no longer bound together perforce to achieve their common survival but 
were linked rather by silken ties of affection and common interest. For Orangist writers 
the Union was in danger of dissolution following the end of the war with Spain or of 
being totally dominated by the province of Holland without the countervailing weight of 
the stadholder. Their rhetoric drew on the traditional role of the stadholder as reconciler 
and conciliator, as envisaged in the Union of Utrecht of 1579. As we have seen this did 
not for the most part reflect political reality. It would be dangerous to read too much 
into the periodic Orangist assertion that sovereignty lay with the States General. Such 
arguments tended to surface at times when tension ran high beween Holland and the 
other provinces, such as the Public Prayer debate of 1663. Within the Dutch Republic, 
there was and continued to be an unresolved debate about the relationship between the 
States General and the individual provinces in which self interest played as great a role 
as constitutional proprieties. It could be argued that the Orangist position was no more 
opportunist than the defence of provincial sovereignty mounted by John de Witt. What 
is plain is that at critical times such as the French invasion of 1672 Orangist words and 
images concerning the Union enjoyed wide circulation and manifestly answered a need 
which went far beyond the parameters of a measured constitutional debate.
In the absence of the stadholderate in the majority of provinces after 1650, the 
public church might have been expected to promote itself as the sole unifying element 
in an otherwise centrifugal Republic. The Great Assembly of 1651 had ratified the 
position of the Reformed faith as set out at the Synod of Dordrecht as the sole public 
church. In reality the position of the public church had been weakened. The institutions 
of the public church were dependent upon the political support of the local and 
provincial magistracy without the countervailing force of a sympathetic stadholder. 
Sections of the Calvinist faith were increasingly involved in a ‘further reformation’ of 
morals and manners which required the acquiescence, if not the support of town regents.360
For as long as the war continued with Spain, it can be argued that a sense of identity and 
national purpose had been in considerable measure linked to the Reformed faith. After 
1650, in the writings of the supporters of the House of Orange, the stadholderate 
appears to take on that role.3
While ministers of the Reformed Church fulminated against de Witt and his 
supporters, Orangists were only too happy to make use of their rhetoric and condemn a 
government which appeared to be lax in enforcing the placards against Catholics and 
sectaries. Orangists also deployed the bellicose language which had characterised those, 
many of whom were Reformed ministers, who had opposed attempts to end the war 
with Spain. However, as we have seen, those who wrote in support of the Prince of 
Orange came from a much wider constituency and they entertained very different 
notions of an ideal religious settlement. For certain of these writers, the attraction of a 
stadholder Prince of Orange far outweighed partisan religious positions. Studying the 
Orangists of the mid 1670’s, Jonathan Israel expressed surprise that their ranks should 
have included someone like the engraver Romeyn de Hooghe. De Hooghe had been 
accused of holding the scriptures in contempt, not unusual perhaps as he had been 
educated by the Spinozist Franciscus van den Emden. Another supporter of the House 
of Orange was Ericus Walten who favoured a comprehensive policy of religious 
toleration.4 As with Jan Zoet and the Catholic Jean Nicolas Parival these may have seen 
in the institution of the stadholderate and the person of the Prince of Orange an 
authority which transcended faction and division whether religious or political and was 
fully compatible with their concept of a republic.
The demands for the restoration of William III to the offices of his forefathers 
rested on their perceived contribution to the welfare and security of the Republic. The 
attack by anti-Orangist writers on the persons and policies of William I and Maurice
3 Bruin.  ‘Het begrip  ‘vaderlancT, p.  155.
4 Israel. Monarchy,  Orangism and Republicanism, pp.  10-13,15.361
probably did their cause little good. While attempting to debunk the reputations of the 
stadholders Princes of Orange, they were significantly unable to establish an alternative 
narrative which could bring together all sections of the nation. As the event of 1672 
made clear, the citizens of the Republic still held to the notion of the Princes of Orange 
as their saviours who alone could be trusted to save the country in its darkest hours.
We may smile at the naivety of  Orangist historiography, yet it could be argued that the 
power of the Orangist narrative provided hope and consolation to a battered people in 
the disaster year of 1672. As Geyl has observed, ‘in its hour of trial the state found in 
the position of stadholder-captain general a source of strength’.5
Sir Denis Thatcher in the Preface, might have found it difficult to formulate the 
principles for which his party stood, but I would hazard that he would have had no 
difficulty in defining what he was against. The analysis of rhetoric of political groups 
has inevitably and rightly concentrated on the positive but it is unwise to neglect the 
polemic of hate. Historians have not failed to take seriously the arguments of States 
Party writers when they accused the stadholders of seeking sovereign authority in the 
Republic. Equally, we should recognise the force of Orangist denunciations of a self 
selecting and self seeking oligarchy in many of the Holland towns. This theme was a 
leitmotif of Orangist rhetoric throughout the stadholderless period, becoming particular 
shrill in years of crisis such as  1653 and 1672. The declaration of an hereditary 
stadholderate in the province of Holland in 1674 owed much to the perception that only 
in this way could the pretensions of a regent oligarchy be curbed.
The crisis of 1672 was interpreted by many within the framework of the Orangist 
message. Its key themes, the maintenance of the Union, the defence of the nation and 
for many the protestant faith, the task of the stadholder in protecting the citizens against 
the encroachment of their rights and privileges by an overwheening oligarchy, the role
5 Geyl. The Netherlands in the Seventeenth  C en tu ryp.  138.362
of generations of Princes of Orange in saving their people from the forces of the enemy 
without, enabled many citizens to read these events in terms of an Orangist narrative. 
They appropriated it and made it their own. In this sense it served their purposes as 
much as those of the Prince of Orange and his supporters. The strength of the language 
of Orangism lay not in any intellectual coherence and absence of ambiguity but rather in 
its abililty to provide at key moments in the history of the Republic a mode of 
interpreting the experience of the nation and speaking to its aspirations.363
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6805 Onverwachte Blockeeringe der  Amsterdammen.
6815 Bikkers Val, Kruyst hem, kruyst hem.
6817 Borgemeester Bikkers Laurekans of Victory-Waghen.
6819 Palm-kroon voor de Heeren Andries en Kornelis Bikker.
6832 Het Tweede Deel van  7 Hollands Praetjen Tusschen Vier Personnen.. .Aengaende 
het Bedrijf van Syn Hoogheyt Mitsgaders der Ed.  Groot Mog. Heeren Staten van 
Hollandt.
6833 Hollands Praetjen Tusschen vier Personnen...Aengaende het recht en het werck 
van sijn Hoogheyd.
6837 Protest van den Brabander Aen de Lesers van’t Hollands Praatje.370
6838 Brill van den Brabantschen Protest Maecker tegen het Muyders-Spoockje.
6839 Het Rechte Tweede Deel van’t Hollands Praatje verdedigende het Recht van de 
Groot-mogende heeren Staten van Hollandt en West-Vrieslandt.
6842 Het Rechte Derde Deel van’t Hollands Praatje aangaande de wettige 
Souverainiteyt van de Groot-Mogende Heeren Staten van Hollandt.
6843 Bickerse Beroerten ofte Hollantschen Eclipsis, tegen den Helderen Dageraed der 
Provintie van Hollandt.
6848 d ’Onstelde Amsterdammer met Sijn trouwe waerschouwinge Raed en Antwoort 
Op Bickers Beroerten.
6851 Lauweren-krans Gevlochten voor Sijn Hoocheyt Wilhelm de Heer Prince van 
Oranjen.
6852 Oogen-Salve voor de Blinde Hollander Begrepen, in seeckere Missive van een 
recht Patriot ende getrou liefhebber des Vaderlands.
6857 Vrymoedige Aenspraeck Aen Syn Hoogheyt De Heere Prince van Oraengjen
6861  Onderrichtinge van Mr. Maximiliaen Teelinck, Predikant tot Middelburgh
6868 Amsterdams Buer-Praetje, Dat is Discours tusschen twee Amsterdammers...over 
de doot van Syn Hoogheydt.
6869 Wee-klaghe over de subijte, droevighe onverwachte en schadelijcke Doodt van syn 
Hoogheydt.
6871 Harts-Droefheyt Ghetoont in  ‘t storte van overvloedige Tranen vande Haegsche 
Maeght over de droevige en schadelijcke Doodt van sijn Hoogheyt Wilhelmus van 
Nassau.
6873 De klagende Princesse over d ’onrijpe Dood van haeren Man den Prince van 
Orangien.
6874 T’klagent Neederlant op de Doot van den Edelen Hoog-ghebooren Vorst Wilhelm 
de Nassau.
6874A Nederlandsche Doodt-klock Gevende een droevigh geluyt over ‘t ontijdigh Af- 
sterven van Sijne Hoogheyt.
6875 Doot ende Hemelsche Verheerlijking van Wilhelm Prince van Oranjen.
6876 Naan-Dicht op het droef-en-ontijdigh afsterven van Sijne Doorluchtige Hoogheyd 
Guilhelmus Fredericus van Nassau.
6881 Rouw-klacht en bly-gesangh over ‘t droevigh Af-sterven, Ende Blyde Geboorte 
van Wilhelm van Nassau.371
6884 Op de Nieuw-geboren Fenix van Oraengie in stede des overleden Vorsts den 
Prince Wilhelmus.
6886 Herstelling van E.E. Heeren Bickers.
68891. Conferentie van eenige Nederlandtsche Heeren op den tegenwoordigen Staet 
deser Landen.
6892 Aen het Gemeen van Amsterdam op Haren Gedenk— Penning Ende sijne 
uytlegging.
6900 Trouwhartige Aenspraeck aen alle goede Patriotten van desen gelegenheit.
6906B Aloude Bataafsche Vryheit Toegewyt den Edelen Grootmogenden Heeren den 
Heeren Staaten van Hollandt en Westfriesland.
6920 Prodromus Inquisitonis Hispanicae of Voor-bede vande Spaensche Inquistie.
6923 Keure ende Ordonnantie tegens de stouticheyt der Paus-ghesinden ende der selver 
Excessen.
1651
6952 Danck-Predikantien gedaen over de laste slach bij Worchester op den 28 Sept 
1651.
7006 Defensie ofte Antwoort op alle de Lasterlijcke, Godloose Schriften en Pasquillen 
die dagelycx uyt komen.
7007 Placaet vande Hooge Mogende Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde 
Nederlands, tegen het maecken, in-bringen Drucken verkoopen ofte stroyen van 
alderhande argerlicke ende sediteuse Boecxkens.
7009 Grondigh Bericht nopende den Interest van desen Staet, vermidts de doodt van 
Syn Hoogheyt met het noodtsaeckelijck Redres van dien.
7010 Copye van seeckere Missive aen de eenen Vrient aen den anderen geschreven.
7011 Redenen ende Motiven die sijn Hoogheyt de Prince van Orangjen, Hebben 
bewogen by de Hant te nemen soo ten Regarde vande gearresteerde Heeren.
7020 Waeraghtigh ende Noodigh Bericht van  ‘t gunt by de Heeren Staten van Hollandt 
ende West-Vrieslandt in den jare 1650 van tijdt tot tijdt is geadviseert.
7023 Waerachtigh ende Noodich Bericht.
7029 Aanvanck vande Groote Vergaderinge der Vereenichde Nederlanden.
7036 Danck Predicatie uyt den CXll Psalm Gedaen in  ‘s Graven-hage den 21st August 
1651.372
7039 Haagsch Winkel-Praatje oft Gesprek Voor-gevallen in den Hage tusschen  vier 
Personen ...nopende de Amnestie, Dank, en Vier-dag.
7040 Openhartig Discours tusschen een Hollander en Zeeuxv, een Vries ende een Over- 
Isselaer rakende de subite dood van Sijn Hoogheyd Prins Wilhelm.
7044 Lyck-Muse van vijfNatien over ‘t salig afscheyt van sijn Princelicke Hoogheyt van 
Oraengen.
7045 Victori.
7052 Geluck-Wenschinge op den laerdagh van Syne Hoogheyt Wilhelm, Prince van 
Orangien.
7075 Remonstrance der E. Kerkenraedt. Aende Ed.Mog.Heeren Staten (s Landts van 
Vtrecht.
7082 Wettelik, Heylig, Geestelik Placcaat en yverig versoeck om hastelicke executy 
Tegen den onwettelijken Paus.
1652
7204 Christelijck en Politique Redenen Waer om dat Nederlandt en Engelandt tegens 
malcanderen niet mooghen Oorloghen.
7205 Hollands Oogh-Water,  verklarende de Oogen der Hollanders ende de loosheyt der 
Engelsche.
7206 Consideratien, over de teghenwoordighe Vrede-handelinghe tusschen Engelandt 
en Nederlandt.
7207 Redenen waer om de Vereenighde Nederlanden Haer niet en behoren in Contract 
van Vrede te begeven, met het ghepretendeerde Parlemendt van Englandt.
7207A The Case Stated between England and the United Provinces in this present 
Juncture.
7208 Engelsch Praetjen Tusschen een Parlementarische, Koningsche, Nederlandsch 
Koopman en een Bootsgesel.
7209 Het Tweede Deel van  7 Engelsche Praetjen of Oorlogs-Teyken, Te Bespeuren in 
haren ontrouwen en goddeloosen handel tegen de Regenten en Onderdaenen der 
Vereenigde Nederlanden.
7212 Engelschen Alarm: of Oorlogs-Teyken te bespeuren in haren Ontrouwen en 
Goddeloosen handel tegen de Regenten en Onderdanen van de seven vrye 
Vereenigde Provincien.
7214 Engelse Secreten.  Waer in eenighe haerer dingen ende Discoursen worden 
verhaelt.373
7218  (t Beseten Engelant.
7219 Extract uyt seckere brief van een liefhebber des vrye Vaderlants.
7220 Syons Clagte ofte Tranen van Boetvaerdicheyt Wtgestort op den Vast  ende Beden- 
dagh gehouden op den 10 Juli 1652.
7221 Leydts Praetjen van desen tegenwoordige Tyt en Gelegentheydt.
7222 A seasonable Exposition with the Netherlands declaring their ingratitude to and 
the Necessity of their Agreement with the Commonwealth of England.
7226 Protestatie vande Nederlanders teghens de Engelsche ofteghen haer
onrechtmatige handelinghe met de goede Inghezetene vande Ge-Unieerde 
Provintien.
7233 Het Hollants wijve-praetjen tusschen drie gebueren,  Trijntje, Grietje, en Neeltje 
noopende den tegenwoordighen staet der Vrye Vereenichde Nederlanden.
7234 Visschers-Praetjen over de tegenwoordigen Staet der Nederlanden met het 
Parlement van Engelandt.
7335 Veen-boers Praetjen tusschen drie Gebuyren Kees, Iaep en Syme, Gehouden te 
Stomp-wijck, in  ‘t baggeren van haren Turf.
7237 Den Hekel.
7246 Engelschen Oorlog ontsteken door haar Brandende Gierigheyd en Rooverye ter 
Zee.
7251 Nederlandtsche Nyp-Tang.
7252 Raedt aen de Nederlanden, om den Staet, eer ‘t is te laet, uyt ‘t quaet...te doen 
Baet.
7253 Amsterdams Schutters-Praatje tusschen vier Burgers ...raeckende den 
teghenwoordighen tijdt en de saecken van Engelandt.
7254 Heylsame Raed in dese tegenwoordige Tijdt.
7256 Emstig gesprek voor-gevallen tusschen drie Personen nopende onse en der 
Engelsche gelegentheyd.
7257 Eenvoudich Advys om met de meeste Spoet ende de minste Schade te gheraken uyt 
den Schadelicken Oorloch met Engelandt.
7258 Zeeuws Bootsgesels Praetjen tusschen twee Gebuyren, raeckende 
d ’ontrechtveerdige Proceduyren van d ’Engelse.
7263 Notitie om aen te wijsen wat hulpe dese Landen van de Engelsche Natie hebben 
genooten in tijden van de Spaensche Oorloghen.374
7265 Het Amsterdamse Zeemans-Praatje.
121A Betert u noch, o Mensch! Ghy siet onse sonden.
7276 Uytbeeldinge van de Hoogmoedige Republik van Engelandt.
7279 Het loos Bedrog van Engelandt.
7281 Dogg en Leeuwen.
7283 Den Engelschen Koort-Dansser.
7297 Artyckelen Teghen de Loevesteynsche Heeren de With, Keyser en Stelling-Wert
ende hunne adherenten.
7300 De Staten van Hollant ende West-Vrieslant...valsch ende calumnieuspasquil
7301 Den Englischen Duyvel ontdeckt door een Bote Schelm, in twaalf  Artikelen van 
Cromwels geloof uyt-ghestrooydt teghens de Louvesteynsche Heeren en hare 
Adherenten.
7302 De recht Ondeckinge vande Hollantsche Regerende Loevensteynsche Heeren.
7307 Veclaringe vande Ed.Mog. Heeren Staten van Zeelandt op  't voorstellen van een 
aensienlijck en gequalificeert HOOFT tot directie vande krygssaken soo te water 
als te lande.
7309 Hollants ende Zeeuws Praetjen op’t voorstellen van een aensienlijck ende
gequalificeert HOOFT tot directie van de Krychs-saecken so te water als te lande.
7311  Eutrapelus ofte Middelburgs Praetje.
7313 Advys vande Heeren Staten van Hollant ende West-Vrieslant, over ‘t maecken van 
een Capiteyn Generael ofte Illuster Hooft.
7314 Een klare onderrechtinge aen Onnosele Hollanders.
7315 Een oprechte Verklaringhe, van een bedroefden Hollantschen Patriot.
7318 Aan-wysinge van de heyloose treken en gebreken van Mr Hendrik Thybout.
7323 Resolutien van tijdt tot tijdt genomen by de Ed. Gr. Mog. Heeren Staten van 
Hollant en Westvrieslant Tegens eenige Predicanten vanden Hage.
7324 Memorie van seeckere Predicatie Gedaen door D. Jac. Stermont in  ‘s Graven- 
Hage den 10 Martii 1652.
7325 Consideratie op eenige Resolutien genomen by de Ed.Gr.Mog. Heeren Staten van 
Holland ende West-Vries  land,  Tegens eenige Predikanten in den Hage ende 
specialijk tegen Jacob Stermond als mede Op sijne Memorie en Remonstrantie 
aan hare ED.GR. MOG overgelevert.375
7329 Engelburgh in den Rouw over den E.E. Heer Andries Bicker.
7330 Engels-kuiper.
1653
7377 Zeekrygh tusschen de Staten der vrye Nederlanden en het Parlement van 
Engelandt.
7401  Vrymoedighen Brief, Gheschreven door een Liefhebber des Vaderlandts.
7412 Cort Verhael van de grouwelyke Zee-Slag tusschen de Hollandsche en Engelsche 
Schepen.
7413 Extract uyt het Register van de Willekeurien der Stadt Amsteldamme.
7414 Lykzang over de dood van den Doorluchtigen Zeeheld, Marten Harpertzoon 
Tromp.
7423 Schryvens van Consideratie uyt Londen door een lief-hebber van desen Staat 
aldaar woonende.
7424 L 'Interest des Provinces Unies du Pays Bas dans le restablissement de sa Majeste 
de la Grande Bretagne.
7425 Hoe veel den Vereenigde Provintien behoort gelegen te zijn, de her-stellinge van 
den Coninck van Groot-Brittangie.
7427 Consideratiens de Religion et D ’Estat sur la Guerre Angloise et autres affaires du 
temps.
7429 Goede Apparantie tot Spoedige opkomst, der Vrye Nederlanders Magtige Zee- 
vaart; en vorige Negotie.
7432 Rotterdams Zee-Praatjen, tusschen een koopman, een Borger en een Stierman, 
Aangaande de handelinge ter Zee.
7433 Vervolg van het Rotterdams Zee-Praatje tusschen drie Personnen, een Koopman, 
een Borger en een Stierman.
7434 Een goude Balsam op een Quade Wonde.
7438 Pinxter-Bloem gezongen door Licht hart en Swaar hoofd.  Op de wijze na dat den 
tyd nu loopt.
7439 Hollandschen Ruyker geplukt door licht-hart en Swaar-Hoofd.
7440 Dialogus tusschen een bedroefden Hollander en een redelijcken Engelsman, in 
Hollant woonende.376
7441  Ondeckinghe van den Nederlantschen cancker Waer mede  ‘t gheheele lichaem van 
onsen Staet deerlijck is besmet met aen-wysinghe.
7442 De Droeck tegen de Broeck ofte Samen-Spraeck tusschen Griete Vroome en Claes 
Blohart.
7443 Een Praatje van den Ouden en Nieuwen Admiraal zijnde een noodige 
verantwoordinge van den Overtrejfelyken Zeeheld MARTEN HARPERTZOON 
TROMP.
7444 Rommel-Zootje Geploozen door een Waaterlander, Schots, en een Schipper.
7451 Dienstige Aenmerkingen op den Spaensen Raedt Eertyds door Justus Lipsius, 
Erich Puteanus, en Fr. Campanella gegeven aende Koninck van Spaengen.
7454 West-Indisch Discours,  verhandelende de West-lndische Saecken.
7456 Eene solide nerveuse ende bondige Deductie van Motiven ende Redenen ...van die 
Staten van Hollandt ende Vrieslandt, Aengaende het onnodigh aenstellen van een 
Capiteyn Generael.
7457 Sedich Ondersouck of het in dese jegenwoordige gelgentheyt de Vereenichde 
Nederlanden dienstich souden wesen een Capiteyn Generael te maecken.
7458 Den Hollandschen Catechismus voor’t Jaer 1653.
7461  Klaerlichtende Bril voor den Autheur van den Hollandtschen Catechismus tot 
Onderwijsinge van de oprechte Hollanders in desen tijdt.
7462 Ontdeckinghe van den tegenwoordigen stande Onses Vader-landts in hoe de In- 
gheseten uyt haer groot verstel souden connen verlost worden en uyt de Engelsche 
Oorloghe ghereddet.
7463 Onpartijdige Exeminatie ofte Ondersoeck vande Tweedracht die der is tusschen 
de Vereenichde Provintien aengaende het verkiesen van een Capiteyn Genereal.
7465 Resolutie by de Heeren Staten van Zeelandt den 21 September 1652 op ‘t Subject 
van CAPITEYN ende ADMIRAELSCHAP GENERAEL der Vereenigde 
Nederlanden.
7466 Zeeusche Ratel-waght Gestelt tot waerschouwinge van eenige 
STOOKEBRANDERS.
7467 De eerste en andere Raden over Hollandt Zeelant ende Vrieslant.
7469 Christelyke Borger-Plicht, In een Biddags Predicatie over de laatse bede van het 
Vader Onse.
1654377
7509 Kort verhael der beroerten en ellendigh welcke in weynige Iaren voorgevallen
zijn, beginnende vande Oorloge met Engelandt tegen de Republijcke van Hollandt.
7533 Den smeeckende Holland  se Student aen den Engelse Professor versoockende... 
om in de groote Schoole tot Londen aengenommen te werden.
7534 Den...Heer Protecteurs BROUVATENmet CROMWELS MEYNEEDICHEYT.
7535 Den President ende Raden over Hollandt Zeelandt ende Vrieslandt.
7537 Motiven die d'E. Officeren der Milite in Consideratie hebben ghenomen om met 
den Vyandt ...en Accord te treden.
7542 Copie Translaet van den Brief van syne Keur-Vorstelycke Doorluchtigheyd van 
Brandenburg.
7543 Deductie ofte Declaratie van de Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt.
7550A Bedenckinge op de Deductie van de Ed.Gr.Mog. Staten van Holland nopende 
den Artickel van Seclusie.
7552 Korte Vragen en Antwoorden, over de Deductie often Declaratie van De Staten 
van Hollandt ende West- Vriesland.
7553 Copye van de onkosten gedaen by Willem den eersten Prince van Orangien.
7554 Copia van de Resolutie ende Motiven der Ed. Moog. Heeren Staten van Zeelandt 
Teghens dActe van Seclusie.
7562 Extract Uyt de Notulen van de Edele Mogende Heeren Staten van Zeeland 
Tenderende tot Designatie van het Capiteyn ende Admiraelschap Generael der 
Vereenighde Nederlanden.
7563 Copye van een Missive van Utrecht, geschreven den 4 van September,  1654 aen 
seeckere Heer van de Camer van N. in den Hage.
7564 Zeeuwse Ratel Geroert Tusschen dry Personnen ...over Het Uitsluiten en 
deporteren van een Stadhouder en Generael.
7565 De oog-geopende Zeeuw Gestelt in maniere van een  ‘t samensprekinge tusschen 
een Hollander ende een Zeeuw, Aangaande de seclusie van sijn hoogheydt den 
Prince van Oranjen.
7566 Pylaar-Praatjen,  Uyt-gesproken over de Toestant van  7 tegenwoordige 
Vaderlandt ten beste van de goede Patriotten.
7567 Noodig Bericht aan alle oprechte Patriotten en Beminders van de deur-gekochte 
vryheyt.
7568 Waerschouwingh der Ed. Mog. Heeren Staten van Overyssel, Aen den Steden 
Campen ende Swolle.378
7570 Missive geschreven aen de Vrouwen Princesse Royal, Churf. Doorluchtigheyt van 
Brandenbrugh, de Princesse Douariere.
7571 Redenen ende Motiven Wegens de Separate aaneminge ...van een Capiteyn 
Generaal over de Provintie van Over-Yssel.
7575 Extract uyt een Brief, geschreven uyt Deventer 7/11/54.
7576 Declaratie van de Staten van Overijssel Verwattende Een fundamenteel Bericht 
van ’t gepasseerde in ende omtrent de Verschillen tusschen haer Ed.Mog. ende 
eenige van de Staetsche-wijse Vergaderinge afgeweeckene leden.
7589 Avondt-praetjen tusschen eenen Gereformeerden Predikant met synen Buyr-man 
Ian den Timmerman tot Utrecht.
7596 Den vrolijken Democryt, Lacchende met (s We  re  Ids Ijdelheden, met de Tegen- 
sprake van den weenenden Heraclytus Rotterdam.
1655
7659 Contra Deductie Dat is: Een korte ende klare weder-legginge van sekere 
Deductie, gepubliceert op de naem der Heeren Staten van Holland in den Jare 
1654.
7660 Korte Aenteeckeninge dienende tot Antwoort op seker Libel genoemt 
Bedenckingen op de Deductie van de Ed. Groot Mog: Heeren Staten.
7661  Wederlegginge op de Bedenkinge der Deductie van de Edele Groot Mogende 
Staten van Holland:
7692 Sedig Antwoord van N. N. Gereformeerd Hollander op de lasteringen tegen zijn 
Brief uyt-gestort van A. P. S. R. een vreemd Dienaar des Goddelijken Woords 
binnen Rotterdam.
7705  Vruchte-losen Biddach ofVrymoedich ende Ootmoedich Versoek aan de 
Christelikke Overheden der Vereeinichde Nederlanden.
7706 Noodige Aenmerckingen op het seditieus en Lanstverderfelijck libel, geintituleert 
Vruchteloosen Biddagh
1656
7782 Geboorte-Feest van zijne Doorlugtige Hoogheid Wilhelm Henrik.
7786 Doeg de Edomiter. Dat: Der Priesteren Aenklager vertoont in de wederlegginghe 
van V Landt-en Ziel-verdervende Libel geintituleert Nodige Aenmerckinge.379
1657
7814 Prognosticatien op het laer 1657 door den Heer Matthieuw Quester
7880 DEDUCTIE noopende  ‘t Recht, de dispositie ende  7 gesagh over de MILJTIE 
ingestellt ter occasie vande deliberatien gevallen op  ‘t aenstellen van een VELT 
MAERSCHALCK.
7884 Kort en Bondigh Historisch Verhael,  Van twee belegeringen, voorgenomen in  ‘t 
werck gestelt ende weder opgeheven in diens tyt als de Vrede int Landt Waere.
1659
8188 Drie authentijke Extracten welke door een Vriend, met bygaande Missive zijn 
toegezonden aan N. N.
8194 Al de Vier Element  en Vuur, Lucht,  Water en Aerde ... Gerijmdt en toegeeigent aen 
Sijn Vorstelijcke Genade Prins Wilhelm Frederyck.
1660
8917 Een Brief  van Verantwoording, en Opweckinge van een Engels aen de
Nederduyts Godtgeleerde, raeckende de Godsdienst van Carolus de Tweede.
8212 Eenige Verzen uit het Negentiende Capittel van  7 Tweede Boek Samuels Slaande 
op de herstelling van zijne Majesteit Karel de  Tweede.
8217 Blijdschap en Vreede aan de Doorluchtigste Majesteit van Groot-Britanje, 
Vrankrijck, en Yrland,
8224  7 Samen-Spraeck tusschen Carel de II Koninck van Engelant ende den Hertogh 
van Jorck, syn Broeder.
8353 Nassous Bedryf of Heerlycke Daden Bedreven sedert het Jaar 1567 tot den Jare 
1646.
8365A Propositie van de Ed. Mo.Heeren Staten van Zeelant, Gedaen ter Vergaderinge 
vande Ed.Groot.Mo: de Heeren Staten van Hollant ende West-Vrieslant.
8372 Praatjen tusschen een Soldaat ende een Snyder ontrent den tegenwoordigen 
veranderden tijd.380
8378 Weerstuit vande Snyder en Soldaat. Anders den omgekeerden Hollandsen Rok.
8380 Den Noyt Omgekeerden Rock, ofte  (t Samen-Spraeck Tusschen een goedt 
Hollands Patriot, Snyder en Soldaet.
8382 Tweede Samen-Spraeck tusschen een goedt Hollands Patriot, Snyder en Soldaet.
8383 Praetjen tusschen Griet Leunis ende Aeltjen Kraecx.
8384 Speculatien over den innerlijcken toestant van Regeeringe in der Vereenigde 
Provintien.
8385 Dit heeft een RAVE Roepende CRAS, CRAS,  CRAS.
8389 De Mot in  ‘t Vossevel.
8432 Amsterdamsche Buuren-Kout over den handel der Predikanten van Utrecht en 
andere Zaken.
8437 Burgerkout ofte Waerachtig en zedich discours nopende het gepasseerde tot 
Uytrecht.
1661
8535 Articulen, Begrepen in den Accorde, verbontenissen ... ghemaeckt  tusschen
den Staten der Provincien dan de Nederlanden, ende...den Prince can Orangien 
Beslooten tot Gent op de 8 Novembris 1576.
8536 Klaegh-Brief vande Provintie van Zeelandt, Aende Princes Royael hooghl. 
Gedachtenis.
8537A Klaeghe Wilhelm III ...over het droevigh af-sterven van  sijn Moeder Hare 
Conincklijcke Hoogheydt de Princesse van Orangien.
8539 Numero XLIX Fol. 385-392.  Triumphante Inkomste Van den Prins van Orangien 
... Binnen ...U  t  recht.
1662
8652 Interest van Holland ofte Gronden van Hollands-Welvaren.
8653  Wederleggingh Tegens eenige poincten, dewelcke soo lasterlijck verhaelt worden 
in het Boeck genaemt de Hollandtsche Intrest.
8653B  Ware Interest van Holland; Gebouwt op de ruinen van den Interest van Holland.
8654 Haeghs Hof-Praetje ofte  ‘t Samen-spraeck tusschen een Hagenaer, 
Amsterdammer ende Leyenaer op ende tegens de valsche Calumnien ende 
versierde leugenen van Pieter de la Court.381
8655A De Stadthouderlijcke Regeeringe in Hollandt ende West-Vrieslant.
8655C Toetze Op het Laster-schrift t’Onrecht genaamt Stadhouderlyke Regeeringe van 
Holland en West-Vriesland.
8655D Den Rechten Hollander tegen twee Pasquillen op de Heer Pieter de la Court of 
syn Boeck genaemt Hollantsche Interest.
8656 Helle-Vrucht over den Herbooren, Ende Nieu-regnerende Hollandtschen 
CROMWEL.
8657 Tafel-Praetje Gehouden tusschen de Princes de DOUWAGIERE ende de 
HEEREN STATEN.
8658 Den Klagenden Veen-Boer over de Faem-roovende Paquillen tegens zijn 
Hoogheydt de Heere Prince van Oranje en des selfs loffelijcke Voor-vaderen.
8658B Aesopus Defensor sig erbarmende over de diepe sugen van den klagenden 
Veenboer.
1663
8786 Bedunckelicken Brief Van d ’een vrient aen d ’ander in Hollant, over het nieuw 
Formulier.
8788 Vervolgh op den Bedunckelijcken Brief  Van d ’een Vrient aen d ’ander in Hollant, 
Over het nieuwe Gebede Formulier.
8789 Public Gebedt, ofte Consideratien tegens het  nominatim bidden in de publique 
Kerken voor particuliere persoonen, en specialijken voor den jegenwoordigen 
Heere van Orangien.
8790 Public Gebedt, ofte Consideratien Vervolght omtrent het zelde, zoo veel als 
aangaat het bidden voor de Hooge ende mindere Overheden in de publique 
Kerken,  Tweede Deel.
8792 Consideratien op het Publijck Gebedt ofte Gebede Formulier tegen D.H.
8793 Nadere ofte Tweede Consideratien tegen het Publijck Gebedt.
8794  7 Afgeruckte Masker vanden Haegsen Hof  prater of Wederlegginge van seecker t’ 
Samenspraeck tuschen een Hagenaer, Leyenaer en Amsterdammer.
8794A Apologie ofte Verantwoordiginge van den Ondienst der Stadthouderlyke 
Regeeringe.
8795 Gulden legende van den Nieuw  en St Jan.
8798 Den Ver-resenen Bamevelt, Betabbert met alle sijne Politycke Maximen.382
8799 Herstellen Bamevelt Ofte  7 Samenspraeck Tusschen een Hollander, Seeu ende 
Vries tot Refutatie vanden Verresenen Bamevelt.
8801 Den Schotschen Duyvel, Betabbert in den Verresenen Bamevelt.
8803 Hollandse Vrijheid Verdadigt tegen de Usurpatie der Stadhouders.
8804  7 Samen-spraeck Tusschen een Rotterdammer En een Geldersman over d ’ 
Hollantsche gepretendeerde Vryheyt.
8805 Vervolgh t’Samen-spraeck tusschen een Rotterdammer en een Geldersman, Over 
d ’Hollantsche gepretendeerde Vryheyt.
8806 Onwederleggelycke Bewys-Redenen daer door betoont wort, dat de Vereenighde 
Nederlanden, alleen door Godts voorsieninge ende den Princen van Oraigien 
beleyt, van ’t Spaensche Jock ende Slaveryne vry gemaeckt zijn.
8806A Den Herstelden Prins Tot Stadt-houder ende Capiteyn Generaal vande 
Vereenighde Nederlanden.
8806B Den Oprechten Stadthouder in Hollant,  Waer in oock aengewesen wort de 
ydelheydt van de Interest van Hollandt.
8806C De Guide Legenden van de Stadthouders in Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt
8806D De Gansche distructie van den nieuw-geboren Hollantschen Cromwel, Alias 
Leydtschen Quaker; Genaemt 7 Intrest van Hollandt.
8807 Krancken-Troost voor Israel in Holland.
8808 A.  vanden Bergs Verdediging of  Antwoort op Het schandaleuze en Monstreuze 
Boek Genaamt Hollandts Intrest.
1664
8916 Hollands Nieuw laer, Gezonden aan den Heere Officier van Utrecht over het 
ophalen en onderdrukken der Hollandse Vrijheid.
8917 Derde Deel Vervolgh  7 Samen-spraeck tusschen een Rotterdammer ende een 
Geldersman Over d ’Hollantsche gepretendeerde Vryheit.
8919 Het Tweede Deel der Hollandse Vryheid Verdadigt tegen de Usurpatie der 
Stadhouders.
8920 Kaats-Bal weer-om Gekaatst aan de Kranke Kranke-trooster voor Israel of 
Okkenburgse Baan-Boet.
8921  Oogh-Zalf voor het verblinde Israel, Mitsgaeders haeren Stercken Troost Tegen 
den Krancken Troost die het tegenwoordigh heeft in Hollandt.383
8925 Der Remonstranten Vocale Letters sijnde Het vervolgh van den Verresenen 
Bamevelt.
8927 Grondige Wederlegginge van de Fameux Weder-Roepinge. Anders gesecht: 
Diffamerende Pasquil, Sonder Naem uytgegeven bij J. J.  W.
8928 Paraenesis ofte Emstighe aenspraeck aen den Autheur, van het laster en logen- 
rijm met den tytel van Weder-roepinge tegen  ‘tAdvijs van John Boot, J.C.
1665
9062 Joumael gehouden op  ‘t Schip de Vryheydt.
9071  Olipodrigo in den Staet.
9106 Propositie vande Edelemogende Heeren Staten, vande geajfligeerde, ende 
verdruckte Provincie van Overijssel.
9121A Wonderlikke Voorzegging gedaen binnen Londen, door de Hof-nar van Karel 
Stuart.
9122 Hollandse Oprechtigheeid tegen de Engelse Redenloose Onrechtveerdigheid.
9124 Het Tweede Deel der Hollander Oprechtigheid tegen der Engelse Redenloose 
Onrechtveerdigheid.
9125 Openhertig Discours over de jegenwoordige gelegenheyt der Saecken tusschen 
een Reghent,  Capiteyn en Coopman.
9125 A Buere-Praetje tusschen een Borger en een Matroos, aengaende de 
ghelegentheydt deses Tijdts.
9\25BMatroos Discours waer in getoont wert waerom desen Oorlogh met Engelandt is 
aengewesen, ende remedie om de selfde tot een gewenschte eynde te brengen.
9126 Holland aen den Koningh van Groot Britannien.
9127 Opwekker aen de Inwoonders der Vereenigde Provintien tot afsweeringe van het 
bloedige Oorloghs-Swaard.
9128 Politique aenmerkinge over den Oorlogh tusschen Engelandt en de Vereenighde 
Nederland.
9129 Hollander en Zeeuw over de Fransche Mediatie tot beslissinge van den Oorlogh 
tusschen ENGELANDT ende de Vereenigde PROVINTIEN met eenige Zeelandts 
Discours.
9139 Discours over den teghenwoordigen Oorlogh tusschen de Vereenigde 
Nederlandsche Provincien en Engelant.384
9141 Dispuyt en Twist spruytende door ‘t Samen-spraeck tusschen een Engelsman, 
Hollander, Zeeuw ende Schipper aengaende onsen en den Engelschen Staet.
9191  Vrye Polityke Stellingen, En Consideratien van Staat.
1666
9315 Geheugenisse van den Grooten Zee-zeegen bevochten op de Engelsche Vloten.
9330 Den Oprechten Hollandsen Bootsgesel.
9334 Op de valsche Leugen van den Delfzen Boots-Gezel.
9335 Onpartijdige Samenspraeck, Tusschen drie Persooonen, voorgevallen op de 
Wacht tot Amsterdam.
9339 Schuyt-Praatje Gehouden Tusschen Een Student, Een Geldersman, En een 
Vlaming.
9341 Het Tweede Deel ofte Vervolgh vanden Oprechten Hollantschen Bootsgesel.
9364 Op de Brandt van Londen.
9367 Londen in assche.
9376 Zeetocht van den Ed. Heer Joan de Wit.
9420 De Propositie vande Loffelijcke Regenten van Zeelandt tot vol advancement des 
ALDER-DOORLUCHTIGHSTEN PRINS  van Oraignen.
9421 Slechten toestant van Nederlant, Brieven van Zeelant aen Hollant 1666 In  ‘t 
Vaderlant.
1667
9453 Het Rechte Tweede Deel van den Oprechten Hollandsen Boostgesel.
9578 Perpetuel Edict ende eeuwigh-duyrende Wett.
9582 Besluyt van de Heeren Staten van Gelderlandt ende Zeelandt, over het aenstellen 
van een Stadthouder,  Capiteyn Generael en Admirael.
9583 Kort ende Waerachtich Vertoog van al (t geen t’ sedert den 5 Aug. tot den eersten 
December deses, over ende weder tusschen de respective Provincien gespasseert 
en voorgevallen is in  ‘t benoemen ende aenstellen van een chef ofte chefs.
9586A Vrede en Vrijheid.
9587 Dubbele Victorye verkregen door de wapenen, over wijzen Raad en beleid der 
Hoog.Mogende Heeren Staten der Vrye Vereenigde Provincien.385
9589 Bamevelt op den laght, Aenwijsende de gepretendeerde lustitia Politica.
1668
9621 Ballet de la Paix, Danse par le Prince d ’Orange. A la Haye, au mois de Fevrier 
1668.
9652 Vervolch ofnader Vertooch,  Van’t geen sedert den 1 December 1667, tot den 10 
Februarii 168 successivelijck tusschen de respective Provintien voorgevallen is.
9654 Propositie van d ’Heeren Gecommitteerde wegens de H. Staten Generael.
9655 De Deputatie van haer Hooghmogende de Heren Staten Generael.
9658 Consideratien van de Heeren Gecommitteerde Raden van Zee-landt.
9661 Naecte Wederleggingh ofte Korte Aenmerckinghe Dienende tot Antwoordt op de 
Consideratie van de Gecommitterde Raeden van Zeelant.
9662 Den Zeeuwsen Buatist, of Binnenlandsen Verrader, Ontdekt in een Oproering en 
Landverdervend Pasquil.
9663 Deductie ende Debat tegens de Consideratien van de Heeren Gecommitteerde 
Raad van Zeeland.
9667 Op de Intrede van Sijn Hoogheyt,  Wilhelmus de III...Verwellekomt van de 
Zeeuwen binnen Middelburg.
9668 La chasse de Prince ou Relation de Is Reception faite a S.A. Monsieur le Prince 
d ’Orange ...en la province de Zelande...l8 a 19 Septembre 1668.
9672 Consideratien op de Harangue bij den Heere Prince van Oranjen den 19 
Septembre 1668.
9675 Zeeuwse Vreugde, Betoond in het Ontfangen en lnholen van zijn Hoogheid, den 
Prince van Oranjen.
9676 Schat der Princen,  Vertoont in een Predicatie Gedaen tot Middelburgh den 23 
Septemb. Deses Jaers 1668.
9677 Zegen-ende Geluck-wenschinge Gedaen Aen Sijne Hoogheyt... Wilhelm Henrik.
9679 Verheuging over’t verkiesen van sijn Hoogheyt Wilhelmus de Derde,  ...tot de 
eerste Edele in de Staten van Zeelandt.
9683 Den haestigen Zeeuw of Brief aen N.N. Raeckende  (t Subjet van  ‘t avancement van 
den Heer Prins van Orangien.
9687 Vive Oranje: o fT ’zamenspraak tussghen(sic) Een Uitersman, een Delvenaar, en 
een Brielenaar.386
9688 De Vrijheid op den Troon Gevestigt.
1669
9762 Apologie tegens de Algemeene en Onbepaalde Vryheid voor de Oude Hollandsche 
Regeeringe.
1670
9824 J. Orizant’s Oude Wijn in Nieuwe Leder-zacken.
9825 Op de Introductie van Sijn Hoogheydt Den Heere Prince van Orangie, in den 
Raadt van State der Vereenighde Nederlanden.
9826 Vreugde-galmen uit geademt, op Prins Wilhelm de Derde over het begunstigen in 
den Raadt van Staat.
9837A Geluk en Zegen aan den Roemruchtigen, Hoog-achtbaren HEERE Mr. PIETER 
DE GROOT op zijn Ed. Pensionarisschap der Stad Rotterdam
1671
9893 Den Hollandschen Verre-Kyker Verhalende den tegenwoordigen toestant van ons 
lieve Vaderland.
9905 Mey-Sangh op de Keurdagh van de Ed. Groot Achtbare Heeren Burger-Vadren 
der Stadt Rotterdam.
1672
9923  Fransche Prognosticatie ofte Prophetische Vorseggingen voorseyt door Michiel 
Ruholts Huysman in Westphalia, buy  ten de Stadt Boeckholt.
9928  De Verborgenheit, en den Ondergang des Konings van Vrankrijck gevonden in de 
letteren van zijn NAAM.
9932  Eenige Prophetien en Revelatien Godts Aengaende de Christen Werekt in dese 
Eeuw.
9935  Wonderlijcke Voorsegginge tot Roomen.
9937. A Prophecie lately transcribed from an Old Manuscript of Doctor Bamaby
Googe that lived in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth Predicting the Rising, Meridian, 
and Falling Condition of the States of the United Provinces.
9940  Verhael van d ’Erbarmelijcke Staet der Protestantsche Kercken in Vrankrijk.387
9950  Der Heeren-General — Staaden der Vereinigten Niederlande P  rote  stations- 
Schrieben an Des Heil. Rom. Reichs zu Regensburg.
9951  The Dutch Usurpation or a Brief View of the Behaviour of the States General of 
the United Provinces towards the Kings of Great Britain.
9954  Korte ende waerachtigh Vertoogh van a l’t geen  ‘t sedert den 5 Aug. tot den 
eersten December deser... over ende weder tusschen de respective Provintien 
gepasseert en voorgevallen is.
9955 Orange in de Wapenen.
9959 Oprecht Verhael van alle het gepasseerde zedert den 24 Februar tot den 2 Maert 
1672 nopende het eligeren van den Heere Prince van Orangie Tot Capiteyn en 
Admirael Generael.
9962  Zegenwensch aan sijn Hoogheit den Heere Prince van Orange als Capitain 
Generael van  ‘t Vereenigd Nederland
9963 Sermon intitule la Recognaissance que Dieu exige apres les avoir esleves dans les 
dignites dedie a....le Prince d ’Orange.
9965 Huldekroon van sijn Hoogheyt Willem-Hendrick by der gratien Gods Prins van 
Oranjen...tot Capiteyn Generaal vande zeven vereenighde Provincien.
9966 Veersche Vreugde-Galm en Zege-wensch, over het Kapiteinschap Generaal vande 
Zeven Provintien.
9967 Den Helden Morgenstont van den aenstaenden Dagh ven Heerlijckheyt van ...den 
Prince van Orange.
9968 D ’Oranjeboom herlevende in den Doorluchtigen Vorst en Heere Wilhelm Henrik.
9968A Inwijdingh van sijn Hoogheydt Willem de Derde, Prince van Oranje.
9969 Eeuwigh Gedenckteeken, Hoedanigh ...den Heere Prince van Orangen...tot 
Capiteyn Generael gemaeckt.
9970 Lauwer-krans ofte Apologie voor de Stadhouderlijcken Regeeringe met een 
bysondere reflexie op de die?isten en daden van den Heere Princen van Oraignen.
9970A Verdediging van de Oude Hollantsche Regeringh onder een Stadthouder en 
Kapitein Generael.
9971  Uitstekentheden Voorrechten en Waerdigheden der doorluchtigste Princen van 
Oraenje.
9976  ‘f Samen-Spraeck tusschen Jaep en Teun over het Verraderlijck bedryf der 
Engelschen aen de Smimaes en Spaensche Vloot.
9984 His Majestie ’s Declaration against the States General of the United Provinces.388
9998A. Symbolium Regium oder Konigliches Sinnbild jetzt regierendem Koning in 
Frankreich Ludovic XIV.
9999  Warrigh Brandewyns Kroegs Praetje .. .Raeckende het Rechte onderscheyt van 
France en Koren Brandewijnen.
10002 Positie ven de Gerechtigheyt en het Recht van Oorloge in Vrankrijck 
tegenwoordigh gebruickelijk.
10004 Engelands Interest ofte Tegenwoordigh waerachtigh Belong.
10005 Over de Declaratie van Oorlogh der Koningen van Vranckrijck en Engelant 
tegen de Geunieerde Staet.
10008 Consideratien over den Tegenwoordigen Toestant van het Vereenigde 
Nederland.
10013 Verbrydinge en Aenteyckeninge op de Consideratien over den tegenwoordigen 
Toestant van het Vereenigde Nederland.
10014 Eenvoudig Burgerpraatje over een Boekje genaaamt Consideratien over den 
tegenwoordige Toestant van het Vereenigde Nederland
10017 Justification of the Present War against the United Provinces wherein the 
Declaration of His Majesty is vindicated.
10017 A A Further Justification of the Present War against the United Netherlands.
10019 Trouloosheyt der Engelsche van eenige Jaren herwaerts aengewesen.
10022  7 Samen-spraeck voor-gestellt van vier Personen.
10026 Aenspraeck tot het Gedreygde Nederlant.
10028 De Gout-Mijn van Vrankryck voor de Staten en Standen van  ‘t Roomsche 
Keiserryck Geopent en gestopt.
10038 Brief van d ’ Heer Capiteyne Bertholomeus Toutlemonde, geschreven aen sijn 
Huys-vrouw, rakende  ‘t overgaen van Rhynberck.
10039 Missive geaddressert aen een Vrundt in  ‘s Gravenhage, dienende tot 
beantwoordinge en wederlegginghe van de Brief van Capiteyn Toutlemonde.
10040 Deductie ofte Waerachtigh Verhael Hoe de saecke sich tot Rhynberck heeft toe- 
gedragen.
10045 Bondigh en Waerachtigh Verhael van het voornaemst voorgevallen aen den Rhyn 
bysonderlijck in, voor en omtrent.
10052 Een Voorslag, spoedig te vergelijcken de tegenwoordige verschillen tusschen den 
Koninck van Groot-Brittanjen ende de Staten Generael.389
10070 Les conditions sous lesquelles le Roy Tres-Chrestien, et sa Majeste de la Grande 
Bretagne consentiroient defaire la Paix avec les Etats Generaux.
10080 Waerachtigh Verhael van twee wonderlycke Voorteeckenen die Godt Almachtigh 
gelieft heeft te openbaren omtrent de Stadt Aemhem.
10081  Warhaftige Erzehlung zweyer Vor der Stadt Amheim zur Nacht-Zeit.  Also 
includes Der Geist desz Jan de Witt Aus der im Grafenhaag gefruckten Copey 
iibersetzt.
10085 Tumult tot Londen en de belofte van den Koninck tot Vrede.
10116 Brevis Discursus de Revolutionibus hujus Anni. Kiirtzer Discurs von der 
Revolution oder Umlauft dieses Jahr.
10117 Maegh van Groningen,  vervattende de Oorloog in Nederland in  (t jaer 1672.
10133 Copie Ed. Gr. Mo. Heeren bysondre goede Vrienden, Nabuyren en 
Bontgenooten.
10138 Copie Rakende het verkiesen van den Wel-Edelen Hoogh Geboren Vorst Wilhelm 
Hendrick... tot Stadthouder.
10142A Erwhalung seiner Hoheit dess Herm Printzens von Oranien zum Statthalter 
General /  Capitain und Admiral.
10142B Bedenken iiber dasjenige was durch die Burgeren in Holland zuwege gebracht 
worden in Beforderung Seiner Hoheit des Printzen von Uranien.
10143 Missive van Congratulate ofte Geluck-wenschinge, geschreven by de Heeren 
Regenten der Stadt Vere, aen den Heere Prince van Orange over sijn Hoogheyts 
Stadt-houder.
10145 Versoeck Gedaen aen de ...Burgemeesteren ende Vroedtschappen Rotterdam 
door de gemeene Burgery, der selver Stede.
10150 Insinuate
10153 Een brief uyt Rotterdam
10158 Extract Getrokken uyt seker Bericht van een Liefhebber deser Stad.
10162 Breeden-Raedt den xi Juli 1672 gehouden binned Stadt Zierc-Zee.
10163 Nader Brief vande Extraordinaris en Ordinaris Gedeputeerde vande Ed. Mo. 
Heeren staten van Zeelant.
10164 Antwoort  van sijn Hoogheyt de Heer Prince van Oranje ...22/7/72 Op de 
Missive van de Heer Johan de Wit.
10169 Copie uyt den Haegh.390
10170 Resolutien ende Missiven betreffende d ’Heer Arent Sonmans, Raedt ende 
Vroedtschap der Stadt Rotterdam.
10172 Missive van Sijn Majesteyt den Koningh van Groot Brittanje aen Sijn Hoogheyt 
den Heere Prince van Oranje.
10180 Apologie we  gen den Advocaet Aegidius Maillaert aen Sijn Hoogheyt, den Heere 
Prince van Oranjen.
10181 Ed. de Groot Mogende Heeren.
10183 Extract Uyt een Brief uyt’s Gravenhage.
10194 Missive of  pertinent verhael van  ‘t ghene sich in  ‘s Graven-hage geeft 
toegedragen.
10199 Spiegel van Staet, en Recht der Burgers.
10206 Waerachtigh Verhael van  ‘t gepasseerde in, ende ontrent der saecken tusschen 
Willem Tichelaer, Mr Chirurgyn tot Piershil en Mr Comelis de Witt.
10210 Request aen Sijn Hoogheydt, den Heere Prince van Orangie.
10213 Request vande Amsterdamse Borgerye aen Zijn Hoogheyt.
10214 Correct aengeplackt Biljet.
10215 Eysch van de Burgeren te Amsterdam.
10218 Oploop der Boeren in Nederlandt,  voorgevallen in  7 Verraat-Jaar 1672.
10220 Discours noopende den tegenwoordigen Tijdt soo in’t Engelsch, als in  ‘t 
Duytsch.
10221  ‘t Oprecht Patriots Praetjen: over het versterken van Utrecht.
10222 Ronde Waerheydt in  ‘t midden der Leugen.
10224 Verscheyde Consideratien over den Tegenwoordigen Toestant van ons lieve 
Vaderlant.
10229B Fernerer und Auszufiihrlicher Bericht von dem Gegenwertigen Zustand in 
Niederland in Julio und Augusto 1672/
10230 Het Onbevleckte Wit, of het Doel van Hollandts Ware Intrest.  Tegens zeecker 
libel Genaemt Consideratien.
10234 Zee-mans Praetje voorgevallen tusschen een Hoogh bootsman en Schieman
gepast op de tegenwoordige gelegentheyt van Hollandts Oorlogh en Schielijcken 
Nederganck391
10237 Beklagh over den Bedroef den Toestant in de Nederlandtse Provintien.
10238A Hollands Grabschrift.
10239 Trouwhertige Aensprake aen de Burgers van Amsterdam.
10240 Oorsaecke der ellenden en verderf van Land en Luyden neffens aenwijsingh hoe 
men daer voor bewaert en van verlost kan worden.
10244 Klaegh-huys des Heeren of het Christelijck Zee-Schip xvaer van Christus de Zee 
is, waer door alle moeten passeren. Also includes Het Gedicht van de Spaensche 
Tyrannye wreetheydt ende ondeergangh in Nederlanden ofte het Booedige Treur- 
Toneel-Spel van onse ~ Vooroouders in  ‘t jaeronses heeren 1573.
10245 Hartgrondige Aanspraeck van de Batavieren, tot Godt de Heer, voor ons lieve 
Vaderlandt en de Prins van Oranjen.
10251  Op  ‘t verkiesen van sijn Hoogheydt tot Stadhouder over Hollandt en Rotterdam 
en breken van’t Eeuwigh Edict door de wille der Gemeene verrigt.
10252. Zege-praal over het geluckigh-stellen van zyne Doorluchtige Hoogheit...tot 
Stadthouder over Hollandt, Zeelandt, ende West-Vrieslandt.
10253  7 Lof van Orangien.
10255 Zegen-Wensch aen sijne Doorluchtige Hoogheyt Wilhelm de Derde, Prince van 
Orangien.
10256 Aensprake uyt naem der kercken van Zeelant, als oock onder die des Classis van 
Walcheren in  ‘t bysonder aen Sijn Hoogheyt...bestaende in een geluckwenschinge 
over sijn Hoogh-gedachte Hoogheydts bevorderinghe tot die aensienelijcke 
Chargie van Stadthouder over de Province van Zeelant.
10257 Dubbelsinnigh Rym.
10260 Rommelzoo.
10261  Opdracht aen sijn Doorluchtige Hoogheyt Willem de 111...Stadthouder van 
Hollandt en West Vrieslandt.
10262 Apologie of verdediginge  van’t gene by de Gemeente in Zeeland is gedaen tot 
herstellinge van Sijn Hoogheyt... in alle  ‘t gesagh ende digniteyten van syne 
Voor-Ouders.
10264 Kort Verhaal, van den Oorspronck en onderganck der Loeveesteynsche Factie.
10265 Bedenkingen over het geene door de Borgeryen van Hollanst is te weegh 
gebracht in het Avancement van ziin Hoogheyd den PRINCE van ORANGE.
10267 Vrymoedige Aenspraek aen sijn Hoogheyt de Heere Prince van Orangien 
...Stadthouderen Capiteyn Generael.392
10268 Oranje in  (t Hart.
10275 Due d ’ Albaas, en Alby Dordregtenses Heerschappyen vemietigt ende uitgeroeidt 
door Willem de Eerste Prince van Orangien.
10276 d'Opgannde Oranje Son en  ‘t dalende Wit.
10278 Theatrum ofTragedie gespeelt in  ‘t Jaer 1672, op het Hollands Treur-Tonneel.
10279 Slapen de Boeren, soo waken de Gansen.
10280 Hollandt hollende na  ‘t Verderf, Beklaegt, Bestraft, Getroost.
10281 Brief uyt ‘s Gravenhage, daer in dat de oorsaken van desen tegenwoordigen 
droevigh Oorlogh word aengewesen
10282 Huysmans-Praetje,  voorgestelt tot onderrechtingh, hoe men sich in dese 
verwenden en murmurerige toestendt des tijdts behoorden te dragen..
10284 Aanspraak aan de Bataviers.
10285 Klachte over den voorspoet der Land-Verradery.
10286 Hollandt Ont-Kermis door de Franse Kermis-Gast mit een Goede Raedt in dese 
Quade Tijdt.
10289 Copye de Gravinne van Hollandt sieck te Bedde Leggende in een schoon Salet.
10290 Algemeene Hollandze Kerk-Mis tegen het gevoelen van die geen, die zeggen 
derven, dat Holland is Ontkermist.
10291  Vrymoedige Aenspraek aen alle Oprechte liefhebbers van zijn Hoogheyt den 
Heere Prince van Oranje haer Wettelijcke Overigheyt ende Vaderlandt.
10292 Den Politiquen mantel opgelicht in  * t Princen Leger door een Hollander, Zeeuw, 
Utrechtsman en Vries.
10294 De gestoorde Vryheyt.
10294A Antwoordt van sijn Hoogheidt aan de Gestoorde Vrijheydt
10295 Oranje in  ‘t Hart of de Gestoorde Vryheydt.
10299 Lettre aux Hollandois Virelay.
10300 Eenvoudig verhael des gemeene Boots-gesellen van het Schip Hollandia gedaen 
aen sijn Hoogheyt den Heere Prince van Orangie.
10303 Vervolgh op het Bootsmans Praetje van het schip Hollandia van de Princen en 
P  redicant  en.
10304 Het Radt van Avontuere ofte den onvervalschten Spiegel.393
10305 Gemeene Mompeling en Misnoegen van Jan Rap en sijn Maet.
10308 Hollants Mars-Banquet,  Opgedischt door L. Annaeus Florus.
10309 Het Rechte Fondament van het nieuwe Herstelde Oudt Hollands Regt, ofte de 
Wettige Vryheydt der Borgeren.
10310 Voor de liefhebbers van ’t Vaderlandt ende den Heere Prince van Orangien.
10311 De Heldere Dageraed,  Verschenen over de Provintien van Hollandt, Zeeland 
enz.
10316 Krachtige beweegh-redenen, dienende tot opweckinge van alle Vaderlandt- 
lievende lngesetenen van Hollandt.
10317 Den Grooten en Witten Duyvels.
10321  The Dutch Remonstrance.
10324 Appendix, Ofte Staert van den Grooten en Witten Duyvel.
10327 Brillen voor Alderhande Gesichten.
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10630 Rechtvaerdige Wapenen des Vereenige Nederlands tegen de vyandlijke indruk en 
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10967  (s Princen-Lied.
1674
11096 De Stercke Stadt Grave, verovert door ...de Hr.Prince van Oranje den 28 Oct.
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